

A.

RECORD OF THE EXPEDITIONS

UNDERTAKEN AGAINST

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER TRIBES.

COMPILED FROM

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL DESPATCHES,

LIEUT.-COLONEL MCGREGOR'S GAZETTEER,

AND

OTHER OFFICIAL SOURCES,

BY

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. H. PAGET,

COMMANDANT, 5TH PANJAB CAVALRY.

Published by Authority.

CALCUTTA:

OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF GOVERNMENT PRINTING.

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PREFACE

FOR some years past the Panjab Government have considered it desirable that "a record should be composed of the expeditions made from time to time against the frontier tribes, with such ~~farther~~ information as might render the work a valuable guide to those who might have future dealings with these turbulent neighbours."

In 1866, Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, 5th Panjab Infantry, was selected for this work, but was obliged to decline the duty from ill-health; no further steps were taken in the matter until the beginning of 1873, when Lieutenant-Colonel Paget was nominated to the duty.

During the interval (between 1866 and 1873) other expeditions have been undertaken.

Lieutenant-Colonel Paget, on commencing his labours, found that Lieutenant-Colonel Macgregor was already occupied on the Gazetteer. He therefore took early occasion to represent to the Government of the Panjab that this latter work would contain under various heads or subjects nearly all the information he himself was expected to supply, inasmuch as Colonel Macgregor and himself would of necessity be travelling almost over the same ground, and using or referring to the same records.

The Panjab Government replied that, however this might be, the Gazetteer would not supersede the work which the Government of India had assigned to Lieutenant-Colonel Paget,—*viz.*, "to bring into one report the records of the various expeditions undertaken against the border tribes."

At the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Paget was instructed specially "to record full information on the kind of baggage animals used, the numbers employed, and the weights of loads

carried." On these important points, however, very meagre information has been obtainable.

It has remained, therefore, simply to select from the mass of records accumulated since British occupation of the Panjab in 1849, from despatches, from regimental histories, and from reports by the different civil officers, and especially from Colonel Macgregor's Gazetteer, such information as bears upon the frontier tribes, to string the events together in "tribal" order, and, while adhering as far possible to the text of the records quoted, to present the whole in a connected, and, it is hoped, a readable narrative form to Government, in which all minutiae likely to be of use in planning future expeditions have been carefully incorporated.

W. H. P.

CALCUTTA;
January 1874.

RECORD OF EXPEDITIONS

AGAINST THE

TRIBES OF THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONTIER.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

The North-West Frontier line commences from the top of the Kagan glen, (a dependency of Hazara,) near Chilas, on the north-west corner of the Maharajah of Kashmir's territory, and passes round the north-west boundary of Hazara and the east side of the

is to Torbeila; then, crossing that river, it winds round the north and west boundary of the Peshawar Valley to the Khaibar Pass; then round the Khyber Hills to Kohat; then round the western boundary of the Kohat District through the Miranzai Valley, and touching the confines of the Kabul dominions; then round the Vaziri Hills to the Banu line and to the head of the Sulimani Range; and then, lastly, right down the base of the Sulimani Range to its terminus on the upper confines of Sindh, and of the Khilat kingdom.

The extent of this frontier is very vast, and its length is full 800 miles. It is also as arduous in its nature as it is extensive.

Along the outer side of this frontier line, and therefore, beyond British jurisdiction, there dwell the following independent tribes, giving a total of about 170,000 fighting men:—

from McGre- s Gazetteer.	Cis-Indus Swatis	...	not known—British subjects and independent.		
	Akazais	...	1,165	fighting men—Independent.	
	Chagarzais	...	7,800	"	"
	Hasanzais	...	1,200	"	"
	Mada Khel	...	2,025	"	"
	Amazais	...	1,500	"	"
	Jaduns	...	2,000	"	"
	Khudu Khels	...	1,800	"	"
	Bunerwals	...	2,000	"	"
	Swatis	...	10,000	"	"
	Ranizais	...	3,000	"	"
	Utman Khels	...	5,000	"	"
	Momands	...	16,000	"	"
	Afridis	...	22,500	"	"
	Orakzais	...	28,870	"	"
	Zaemukts	...	5,000	"	"
	Turis	...	5,000	"	"
	Dawris	...	not known.		
	Vaziris	...	22,500	"	"

Batanis	...	3,760	Independent and British.
Sheoranis	...	3,800	" " "
Ushtaranis	...	not known.	
Kasranis	...	444	Independent.
Bozdars	...	2,720	" "
Khetrans	...	4,500	" "
Kosahs	...	4,450	Independent and British, (chiefly British).
Lagharis	...	3,370	Chiefly British.
Gurchanis	...	1,200	
Maris	...	3,000	Independent.
Bughtis	...	1,600	" "

The following tribes within the frontier, and consequently British subjects inhabit partly hills and partly plains :—

Hazara District	{ Turnoulis. Gukkurs. Dunds and Suttis. Kagan Syads and other tribes of Hazara.
Peshawar District	{ Yusufzais. Khulils. Momands of the plains.
Peshawar and Kohat Districts	{ Khattaks.
Kohat District	{ Bangushes.
				{ Banuchis. Marwatis. Butanis.
Dera-Ismail Khan District	{ Chiefs of Tank. " of Kolachi. " of D. I. Khan. Nutkanis. Lunds.
Dera-Ghazee Khan District	{ Dreshuks. Mazaris.

In the report on the relations of the British Government with these tribes in 1855, Mr. Temple, the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Panj, thus wrote of their character: "Now *these tribes are savages*—noble savages perhaps—and not without some tincture of virtue and generosity, but absolutely barbarians nevertheless. They have nothing approaching to government or civil institutions. They have, for the most part, no education. They have nominally a religion, but Mahomedanism, as understood by them, is better, or perhaps is actually worse than the creeds of the wildest race on earth. In their eyes the one great commandment is blood for blood, fire and sword for all infidels, that is, for all people not Mahomedans. They are superstitious and priest-ridden. But the priests (Mulas) are as ignorant as they are bigoted, and use their influence simply for preaching crusade against unbelievers, and inculcate the doctrine of rapine and blood against the defenceless people of the plain. The hill men are sensitive regard to their women, but their customs in regard to marriage and betrothal are very prejudicial to social advancement; at the same time they are a sensual race. They are very avaricious; for gold, they will do almost anything except betray a guest. They are thievish and predatory to the last degree. The Pathan mother often prays that her son may be a successful robber. They are utterly faithless to public engagements; it would never even occur to their minds that an oath on the Koran was binding if against their interests. It must be added that they are fierce and blood thirsty. They are never without weapons. When grazing their cattle, when driving beasts of burden, when tilling the soil, they are still armed. They are perpetually at war with each other."

her. Every tribe and section of a tribe has its internecine wars, every family its hereditary blood feuds, and every individual his personal foes. There is hardly a man whose hands are unstained. Every person counts up murders. Each tribe has a debtor and creditor account with its neighbours, life for life. Reckless of the lives of others, they are not sparing of their own. They consider retaliation and revenge to be the strongest of all obligations. They possess gallantry and courage themselves, and admire such qualities in others. Men of the same party will stand by one another in danger. To their minds, hospitality is the first of virtues. Any person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe, but will be kindly received. But as soon as he has left the roof of his entertainer, he may be robbed or killed. They are charitable to the indigent of their own tribe. They possess the pride of birth, and regard ancestral associations. They are not averse to civilization whenever they have felt its benefits. They are fond of trading, and, also of cultivating; but they are too fickle and excitable to be industrious in agriculture or anything else. They will take military service, and, though impatient of discipline, will prove faithful, unless excited by fanaticism. Such, briefly, is their character, replete with the unaccountable inconsistencies, with that mixture of opposite vices and virtues belonging to savages*.

"Such being their character, what has been their conduct towards us? They have kept up old quarrels, or picked new ones with our subjects in the hills and valleys near the frontier; they have descended from the hills and fought these battles out in our territory; they have plundered and burnt our villages and slain our subjects; they have committed minor robberies and perpetrated murders without number; they have often levied black mail from our villages; they have intrigued with the disaffected everywhere, and tempted our loyal subjects to rebel; and they have for ages regarded the plain as their preserve, and its inhabitants their game. When inclined for cruel sport, they fly forth to rob and murder, and occasionally to take prisoners into captivity for ransom. They have fired upon our own troops, and even killed our officers in our own territories. They have given an asylum to every malcontent or proclaimed criminal, who can escape from British justice. They are averse to will our territories, enter our villages, trade in our markets; but no British subjects, and no servant of the British Government, would dare enter their country on any account whatever.

"In return for this, what has been the conduct of the British Government towards them? It has recognized their independence; it has asserted *no* jurisdiction with regard to them; it has claimed *no* revenue from them, and *no* tribute, except in one case, and that as a punishment. But it has confirmed whatever fiefs they held within its territory; it has uniformly declared that it seeks *no* fiscal or territorial aggrandizement; and that it *only* wants, and is resolved to have, tranquillity on the frontier. It has never extended its jurisdiction one yard beyond the old limits of the Sikh dominions. Nothing has been annexed that was not a portion of the Panjab as we found it. Whatever revenue has been paid to the British Government, was equally paid to its predecessors, only at a higher rate. In one solitary case has it accepted tribute in satisfaction for offences; in all other cases of misconduct, it has avoided making any pecuniary demand on its own behalf. It has claimed no feudal or political

* The above outline of the character of the hill tribes applies much more to the Pathan than the Beloch tribes. The latter are not imbued with the religious fanaticism so strong in Pathans, and they pay the most implicit obedience, as a rule, to the authority of their chiefs.—W. P.

ascendancy over the independent hill tribes; it has abstained from any interference in, or connexion with, their affairs; it has taken no part in their contest and has never assisted either party; it has striven to prevent its own subjects from entering into disputes with them. Though permitting and encouraging its subjects to defend themselves at the time of attack, it has prevented them from retaliating *afterwards* and from making reprisals. Though granting refuge to men flying for their lives, it has never allowed armed bodies to seek protection in its territory, nor to organize resistance or attack. It has freely permitted hill people to settle, to cultivate, to graze their herds, and to trade in its territories. It has accorded to such the same protection, rights, privilege and conditions as to its own subjects. Its courts have been available, and its officers accessible to them. Its markets have been thrown open to them without all restrictions on trade and transit, all duties (except one *) which would be imposed by any native government, have been removed and remitted for them. It has freely admitted them to its hospitals and dispensaries; its medical officers have attended scores of them in sickness, and sent them back to their mountain homes cured. The ranks of its service are open to them, and they may eat our salt and draw our pay, if so inclined. What more can a civilized Government legitimately do for its rude neighbours than the above.

“There is, perhaps, one method to which the Government *might* resort more extensively than it does at present, and that is the payment of black mail. It does, indeed, purchase the good offices of the tribes round the Kohat Pass. It does permit a section of the Momands to hold a fief, and more unworthy feudatories could not be found. It does also make payments to certain Derajat chiefs, such as the Bozdarst. But the other chiefs who receive money are British subjects, and really perform responsible police duties in return. In the case of the Afridis, Momands, and Bozdars, however, the Government has only continued a concession originally granted by its predecessors. It has originated no new grants of black mail, though it enhanced one grant. There is reason to believe that such grants would embolden rather than ward off depredation; once bought off, the hill people would molest us with greater zest than ever, in order to be bought off again. They would actually resort to plundering as a means of extorting black mail. The appetite once gratified would become sharpened. Such concession would be regarded by the tribes as a confession of weakness, and would absolutely operate as an incitement to mischief. Certain chiefs are known to commit depredation in the hope of being bought off by fiefs, and one mode of avoiding annoyance is to let it be known that under no circumstance will the Government be induced to compromise by grants of black mail.”

But when kindness, conciliation, and confidence, all fail; when outrages from their serious character or from their constant repetition, exceed the bounds of toleration; when the blood of our subjects cries from the ground when our territory has been invaded and our sovereign rights flagrantly violated, and all this in the utter absence of provocation: then we either make reprisals from, or lay an embargo upon, or use military force against the offending tribe or section of a tribe.

When reprisals are made, cattle and men are seized, and a message is sent to the head-quarters of the tribe. Pending a settlement of the Government claim for the reimbursement of its subjects who have suffered, the property is detained as security, and the men as hostages. Usually the tribe do come to terms; if they do not, the property is sold in liquidation, and as soon as

* The salt tax.—W. P.

† This payment was discontinued after the expedition against this tribe in 1857.—W. P.

the account is cleared, reprisals cease. In such cases, the Government seeks to realize no fines, but merely to reimburse its own subjects.

When an embargo is declared, the mouths of the passes belonging to the tribe are closed, and watched as far as practicable. All Government officials are required to seize all persons and property of the tribe wheresoever found in British territory, and all places of mercantile resort, such as salt mines, markets, &c., are closed against the offenders. This process is continued till the tribe comes to terms. The persons and property seized, are released as soon as satisfaction has been obtained.

The following passages give the views of Major General Sir Neville Chamberlain (late commanding Panjab Frontier Force), Sir Richard Temple (late Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab), and Mr. Davis (late Secretary to the Panjab Government) as to the necessity there has been for destroying the houses and property of the hill tribes when punitive expeditions have been undertaken.

Foreign Office Memo.,
14th March 1874.

"The quotations, however, are *not* to be regarded as expressing the general policy of Government on the question."

In his despatch reporting the operations against the Kabal Khel Vaziris, Sir Neville Chamberlain wrote as follows:—

"To have to carry destruction, if not destitution, into the homes of some hundreds of families, is the great drawback to border warfare; but with savage tribes to whom there is no right but might, and no law to govern them in their intercourse with the rest of mankind, save that which appeals to their own interests, the only course as regards humanity, as well as policy, is to make all suffer, and thereby, for their own interests, enlist the great majority on the side of peace and safety.

"If objections be taken to the nature of the punishment inflicted as repugnant to civilization, the answer is that savages cannot be met and checked by the rules of civilized warfare; and that to spare their houses and crops would be to leave them unpunished, and therefore unrestrained, for in their external relations they are uncontrolled by any law save that of self-interest. In short, civilized warfare is inapplicable for the reasons put forth by Mr. Temple," who, in the report above alluded to, goes on to say.—

"It can be readily seen that the policy of these expeditions is reasonable and just. If murder and robbery still go on, in spite of patience, of abstinence from provocation, and of conciliation, then what but force remains? Is the loss of life and property and the consequent demoralization to continue or to be stopped? If it can only be stopped by force, then is not force to be applied? If reprisals and embargo prove insufficient, or cannot be adopted in a particular case, as may sometimes happen, then what but an expedition remains? When an expedition is undertaken, then *if* the enemy were to assemble in force and take up a position and offer battle, they could be attacked and defeated, and their discomfiture might suffice as a punishment, without any further measure. In *that* event the affair would be conducted after the manner of regular warfare. In *civilized warfare*, force is directed against the armed enemy and his defensible position, but not against his country and subjects, who may be morally unconcerned in the hostilities and innocent of offence. *But this is not civilized warfare*; the enemy does *not* possess troops that stand to be attacked, *nor* defensible post to be taken, *nor* innocent subjects to be spared: he has only rough hills to be penetrated, robber fastnesses to be scaled, and dwellings containing people,—*all of them to a man concerned in hostilities. There is not a single man of them who is innocent, who is not, or*

has not been, engaged in offences, or who does not fully support the misconduct of his tribe, who is not a member of the armed banditti. The enemy harasses the troops as they approach threading the defiles, and leave the village carrying off everything which can be carried, abandoning only immovable property, walls, roofs, and crops; what are the troops then to do? Are they to spare these crops and houses, losing the only opportunity they are ever likely to have of inflicting damage on the enemy? Marching back to their quarters, without effecting anything, amidst the contempt of the hill men, who would attribute the sparing of the property to nothing but their incapacity? These villages and grain are the resources and sinews of guerilla warfare and the basis of operations. They are as much the property of the enemy, as the stores, convoys, arms, and munitions belonging to an army in the field. The latter would *never* be spared, why should the former? To spare these villages, would be about as reasonable as to spare the commissariat supplies or arsenals of a civilized enemy.

"The effects of these expeditions are just as happy as the policy is reasonable. It might be supposed that the hill people would be exasperated, but not overawed; such is not the actual result. The tribe after chastisement usually professes repentance. They exhibit less instead of greater hostility than before; their hard hearts can only be won by display of prowess and valour; they recognize no virtues except those connected with bravery; they do not comprehend forbearance; they regard might as the greatest of merits. If we beat them in style, they begin to regard us with something like esteem. They enter into engagements, and *for the first time* keep their faith. They do not repeat the offences which brought on the punishment; such has proved to be the rule almost invariably. There have (up to 1855) been fifteen expeditions against different tribes. In almost every one of these cases the tribes behaved *badly before* and *well after* the expedition. In one case only has a tribe ever misbehaved *after* undergoing a regular expedition, and the solitary instance was that of the Kohat Pass Afridis. In short, the moral effect of *every* expedition has been vast and beneficial.

"From what has been urged regarding the policy and effects of these expeditions, the conclusion is that they are essentially and absolutely necessary for the peace of the border, and that without them our own subjects cannot be adequately protected. A reformation in the habits of our hill neighbours in their external relations is not to be effected by lesser means. When the territories of the Sikhs passed into the hands of the British, these tribes had been accustomed for ages to plunder in the valleys, and to defy successive Governments. They then proceeded to treat us as they had treated our predecessors. It is not to be expected that our mere presence will induce them to desist, nor that a defensive system will alone suffice to keep them off. The British Government has, indeed, organized an excellent defensive system. It has built or fitted up no less than fifteen forts, and fifty posts of various kinds on this frontier; it has caused many hundreds of miles to be patrolled. But the unvarying experience of six years* has proved that *success cannot thus be attained*, though doubtless the mode of defence is good and useful in its way. The independent hills are in the closest proximity to the line of defence; however well the posts may be placed, there will be villages and cultivation in front of them, that is, between them and the hills. Everywhere there is inhabited territory within easy reach of the enemy; in many places our subjects live within a mile or two of their tormentors. Under such circumstances, what human vigilance and arrangement can avail

* The above was written by Mr. Temple in 1856.

to entirely prevent the hill men plundering in the valleys and the plains, and then escaping to their fastnesses with impunity? The assailants may often be foiled, but they will as often succeed. To thoroughly prevent the hill people by this method alone, it would require nothing less than a Chinese wall securely manned for 800 miles! But, in fact, the fears of these people must be worked upon, the root of the deeply-seated evil must be reached, and the head-quarters of the offending tribe must be attacked in the hills. They have already desisted partially from the fear of these expeditions; if they were to become relieved of that apprehension, they would begin to harass and plunder again worse than ever.

"If, then, it be shown that the policy of expeditions is consistent with reason and humanity, and if their consequence is proved by repeated instances to be that of deterring the tribes from rapine and murder, ought they not to be resorted to? Is it not clear that the lives of our innocent subjects are hereby saved and their property secured? The amount of subsequent saving in these respects vastly overbalances the destruction to life and property caused by an expedition. For the number of lives and the amount of property lost in fight, tenfold that number and that amount is saved thereafter, to say nothing of the moral advantages. Is it not then due to our subjects that these expeditions should be undertaken? Are they to suffer while our enemies are spared? An expedition, and the like, should not, of course, be resolved upon without *ample* cause, without a conviction that nothing short of this remedy will suffice. If too frequently undertaken, expeditions might perhaps exasperate and barbarize, just as Draconic laws, punishing minor offences with death, would fail of their effect. But if undertaken with good and sufficient cause, they are just as efficient as capital punishment and imprisonment are for the repression of social crime, and they rest upon moral grounds equally valid.

"In fine, the whole argument terminates in this, that if expeditions were not resorted to, then all the territory within a night's run from the hills would virtually be given over to devastation. If the latter event were to happen, and if the Government were not to be willing to chastise the hill tribes, then our own Trans-Indus subjects would lose confidence, and would cease to be loyal, while the enemy gained heart. There would be some general combination against us, and sooner or later we should have to evacuate the Trans-Indus territory and the right bank of the Indus. If the right bank were lost, then the river itself would pass from our control; and then, with the loss of the Indus, there would be a sacrifice of advantages, political, physical, commercial, and moral, which it is not within the scope of this report to describe. But, in fact, the British Government has every encouragement to maintain its position beyond the Indus; for, situated as it is, the representative of civilized strength, in the midst of tribes which are rude and savage at present, but possess the elements of good, and are susceptible of moral impression, it has, under Providence, a noble mission to fulfil, and a purpose of regeneration to accomplish."

Mr. Davies, the ~~Secretary~~ Secretary to Government, Panjab, in 1864, thus alludes to the necessity there is for expeditions from time to time:—"Whilst any hasty exertion of physical pressure, to the exclusion of other methods of adjustment, is confessedly impolitic, there is a point beyond which the practice of forbearance may not be carried. As without physical force in reserve there can be no governing power, so under extreme and repeated provocation its non-employment is not distinguishable from weakness. In each case separately, therefore, it must be judged whether or not offensive measures have been

justified. It must be noted that the despatch of an expedition into the hills is always in the nature of a judicial act. It is the delivery of a sentence, and the infliction of a punishment for international offences. It is, as a rule, not in assertion of any disputed right, or in ultimate arbitration of any contested claim of its own, that the British Government resolves on such measures; but simply as the only means by which retribution can be attained for acknowledged crimes committed by its neighbours, and by which justice can be satisfied for future outrages prevented. In the extreme cases in which expeditions are unavoidable, they are analogous to legal penalties for civil crime,—evils in themselves inevitable from deficiencies of preventive police, but redeemed by their deterrent effects. Considerations of expense, of military risk, of possible losses, of increasing antagonism and combination against us on the part of the tribes, all weigh heavy against expeditions; and to set them aside, there must be an irresistible obligation to protest, and to vindicate the outraged rights of subjects whom we debar from the revenge and retaliation they formerly practised.

“To permit a moulvi, openly preaching war against us as infidels, to occupy our villages with his armed retainers, or murderously to attack the encampment of our officials; to suffer a British officer to be murdered in our territory whilst travelling on the public road; to allow a populous town to be plundered by an invading force; to sanction passively the returns of fanatical conspirators, robbers, and murderers to a post from which we had expelled them by military action;—this is the degree of inaction—this is the ignominious attitude—to which the British Government would be reduced, were it admitted that the expeditions recorded have not been fully justified, have not been absolutely necessary. The question is, indeed, much less one of moral right than of political expediency and of military practicability.

“Morally, we have the fullest right. As a Government, it is our bounden duty, in proportion to our ability, and after exhausting all milder measures, to chastise in their corporate capacity tribes or sections of tribes who openly and habitually rob and murder our subjects or violate our territory. This is also a condition of our political existence,—the extension of protection in return for submission. And if by refusing the surrender of the actors in the crimes committed the tribes leave no alternative but hostilities available, the responsibility is theirs.

“But, politically, the advantages to be obtained will always much depend on the concomitant circumstances. The military success which, in varying degrees, has always attended expeditions, and the demonstration that their roughest hills can be penetrated by our troops, have done much to subjugate the minds and compel the respect of the hill populations, and to reconcile them to peaceful pursuits. Success less distinguished might, on the contrary, excite them to continued rapine and resistance.”

The above describes the general policy by which the Panjab Government has been guided in its treatment of the neighbouring hill tribes of the north-west frontier.

The particular circumstances which have from time to time compelled the Government to undertake the different expeditions recounted in the following pages, will be found duly detailed in each instance.

CHAPTER II.

The Expedition to Kagan.

November 1852.

KAGAN is a mountain valley, which forms the northernmost part of the Hazara District. It commences a short distance from the Swati Town of Balakot, at a point about 50 miles due north from Murree, and runs in a north-easterly direction for more than 60 miles. Its breadth is generally about 20 miles. Its area is estimated to be 900 square miles, or about one-third of the whole Hazara District. It is bounded south by Thana Balakot, District Hazara; east by Kashmir territory; north by Kashmir Chilas; and on the west by independent territory (Kohistanis and independent Swatis). In its physical features, it consists of the inner slopes of two parallel mountain ranges, clad with perpetual snow, and ranging in height from 12,000 feet at the south entrance of the valley to 15,000 at its northernmost head. The drainage of these ranges forms the River Kunhar, or Nainsuk, a wild foaming snow torrent, which joins the Kishen Ganga 30 miles south of the Kagan glen, and the Jhelum River further down. In the northern half of the glen no cultivation is possible. In the southern half, the lower part of the mountain sides, near the banks of the Kunhar, are cultivated. The chief crop is Indian corn, sown in March, and reaped in October. But the cultivation is sparse, only aggregating $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the total area of the glen, and is of little value.

The upper slopes of the mountains on each side of the Kunhar in the southern half of the glen, as well as the mountain slopes of the northern half, are very valuable for pasture; and large quantities of sheep and buffaloes, as well as some small horses, are annually driven there to graze in the summer months. The greater part of the valley is beyond the influence of the autumnal rains, which fall so heavily on the outer Himalayas; but snow falls deeply throughout the valley in the winter months; and it is owing to the late period in summer at which this melts on the northern part of the valley that that part is not cultivated.

The population is said to be 22,000, or about 22 to the square mile; but in the winter months (November to April) the upper part of the valley is entirely uninhabited. The population consists of Syads and Gujars. The Gujars are a quiet, inoffensive race, and are the cultivators and headmen of the valley. The Syads are the proprietors; they are not warlike, and their character is indifferent. They are much involved in debt, lazy, inclined to intrigue, and on bad terms with each other. At the same time they have great influence in the valley, and whatever is done in so remote and wild a tract must be done through them, or not at all. There are no police stations in the valley.

The hill sides in parts are clothed with small deodar forests, and inferior junces and other trees grow in large numbers. Large quantities of ghi are annually exported from the valley, the demand for this article being so

great that the traders of Hazara and Rawal Pindi themselves seek out the Gujars in the glen.

After the first Sikh war Hazara belonged to Kashmir, but Gholab Singh induced the Durbar to give him other territory in the hills near Jamu in exchange, and Major Abbott was sent to take charge of the district.

On arrival he found four Syads (brothers) managing the valley for the Sikhs, and receiving half the revenue on condition of their paying the other half. These men's names were Syad Zamin Shah, who held a half share of the management, Syads Fateh Ali Shah, Anwar Shah, and Mir Gul Shah, brothers, who managed the other half. This arrangement had been made by the Nazim of Kashmir, Sheikh Ghulam Mohi-u-din, in 1844, and was confirmed by Major Abbott on behalf of the Lahore Durbar, 1847.

On annexation, Major Abbott recommended that the grants made to the Syads by the Sikh Government should be upheld; but in the autumn of 1852 they set his authority at defiance. The reason of this conduct was their disapproval of some measures Major Abbott introduced; it appears that under the Sikhs they did not themselves attend on the Nazim, nor furnish hostages, but Major Abbott attached a condition to their tenure of their 'jaghirs,' viz., the attendance of one of the sons of each of the three Syads at the Deputy Commissioner's station, as a pledge of the loyalty of their parents.

This arrangement appears to have been very distasteful to the Syads, and early in 1852 Zamin Shah himself, while performing this duty of 'hazirbashi,' suddenly left the camp without asking permission, but was brought back again. He was allowed to go away again on certain Maliks of Pakli becoming security for his loyalty, and on his leaving his sons in his place as a hostage. But the hostages of the Syads now became objects of suspicion, Major Abbott being of opinion that the Syads were only withheld from going into rebellion by their not being able to withdraw their sons, and by some other impediments thrown in their way.

In 1852, the sons of Zamin Shah fled from Major Abbott's camp, it is supposed, by orders from their father, who was afraid that they might be called to account for some of his intrigues to raise the Dhunds against Government. The next step of the Syads was to address a petition to the Deputy Commissioner, couched in the most improper terms, alluding to their rights, to their former position under the Sikhs, and threatening to leave the country if interfered with in the way they had been. Some further communications with the Syads ended in their declaring that it was because they found it impossible to subsist on their 'jaghirs' and furnish expenses to their sons as hostages, that they chose to withdraw themselves: they spoke in a tone of banter on the good advice offered them, and on the threat held out of the Pakli militia and the Jamu troops, and the resources of both governments being employed for their coercion. They said they had no power to oppose Government troops, but remarked that, although the Sikhs employed 10,000 men against Kagan (a mis-statement), they at last left the country to the Syads to manage. *They hoped we would do the same.* They added that they had committed no aggressions, but if molested in their valley, they would resort to the sword in self-defence. At least, they hoped we would give them leave to remain there during the ensuing winter months, and at the commencement of spring, on the receipt of our orders, they would leave the valley.

The insolent tenor of this communication made it evident that it would be impolitic any longer to adhere to measures of a conciliatory nature. It

was therefore determined to proceed against them; and Colonel Mackeson, the Commissioner, went to Mozafarabad to see that active operations were carried on by the Kashmir authorities for the co-operation they were ordered to undertake.

Record in Deputy Commissioner's Office, Hazara.

At this time there were in the Pakli Valley the following troops :—

2nd Sikh Infantry.
Guide Infantry.
3rd Native Infantry.
Kelati Gilzie Regiment.
16th Bengal Cavalry.
4 Mountain Guns.
2 Horse Artillery Guns.

The forces which were assembled for the purpose of overawing the Syads appear to have consisted of—

Two Dogra regiments and two guns of Maharaja Golab Singh, about 1,200 men, at Mozafarabad.

Six companies of Rawal Pindi Police (400) at Mansera.

One company of the Sati tribe, about 70 in Pakli, 150 Hazara Police, under Manawar Shah, at Mozafarabad.

Levies of Agror and Bogarmang under Ata Muhammad, in Pakli.

„ of Balakot and Pakli, at Balakot.

„ of Mansera under Muhammad Husen of Gartu Hatitula, at Gartu.

„ of Sultan Husen, of Mozafarabad.

„ of Fateh Muhammad of Ghor, at Ghor.

„ of Sher Ahmad of Kurna, at Kurna. In all about 5,320 men.

Three columns of the Pakli Levies were to move up the Bogarmang Valley and over three several passes in the mountains; whilst three other columns, (two being composed of Levies,) moved by the eastern ridge.

Record in Deputy Commissioner's Office, Hazara.

Major Abbott was placed in Pakli to superintend the advance of the western columns, and Lieutenant Pearse, Assistant Commissioner, was at Mozafarabad with Colonel Mackeson.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

The Pakli and Bogarmang Levies being reported very disaffected, Colonel Mackeson considered it essential, in the first instance, to advance with those from the west, in order to show those of the east a good example; and with this view the Levies of Sultan Husen of Mozafarabad were first put in motion, while Major Abbott was directed to move between Pakli and Balakot to urge on the departure of the western auxiliaries.

Sultan Husen advanced from Mozafarabad on the 12th November 1852, and reached the Sanghar Pass on the 14th. On the 12th, Lieutenant G. G. Pearse marched also from Mozafarabad with a regiment of Dogras and 150 Levies to the village of Ghor, ten miles. The road was bad, and the loads

Lieutenant Pearse's Despatch.

had here and there to be taken off the mules, and a halt had to be made at Ghor to allow of the baggage coming up. The next march was to Rajkot, twelve miles, the road being fair, where Lieutenant Pearse was joined by Sultan Husen, and where he learnt that the Sanghar Gali had been occupied by Muhammad Amin Khan, who had advanced from Garhi Habibula on the left bank of the Kunar River, another body of Levies being then at Whaindair Gali ready to enter Kagan by Bhunja.

On the 13th, Lieutenant Pearce marched for Ganul. The march was very long and difficult. To the Sanghar Gali was about ten miles, with two very steep ascents, practicable for mules with light loads. The report was that Zamin Shah intended to oppose Lieutenant Pearce's advance near Ganul; so, leaving 50 men to hold the pass, Lieutenant Pearce formed three columns, the right and left columns consisting of Levies were to move, so as to get above Shah Zamin's position, whilst the third column, consisting of the Dogra regiment and a few Levies moved straight on it. By nightfall, Lieutenant Pearce was still two miles from Ganul, which was ten miles from the Sanghar Gali, and in the morning he found that Zamin Shah had fled. Lieutenant Pearce then ordered the Levies from Whaindair to seize the bridge at Jaraid, whilst another body of Levies from Dharawar was ordered in pursuit of Zamin Shah. The weather was very bad, with heavy falls of snow and rain, and as both the Dogras and the Levies were without tents, Colonel Mackeson ordered that they should be sheltered in the villages.

The Balakot and Pakli column also advanced on the 13th, and the other Dogra regiment having arrived at Mozafarabad, Colonel Mackeson lost no time in pushing them on to Balakot to co-operate with Lieutenant Pearce. The Bogarmang column, which was to have advanced and entered the Kagan Valley at Belag, for some reason did not do so.

The Syads then retreated and hung about Sum, Paras, and Jaraid; and as all the columns of the west, which should have been up in their places at Kowai and Belag, had not arrived, Lieutenant Pearce did not attack the Syads for fear of driving them to retreat to Upper Hazara, where it would have been difficult to follow them.

On the 15th, Zamin Shah wrote to Lieutenant Pearce, offering to send in his sons, but in the evening he destroyed the bridge at Paras,—an operation he was enabled to perform because the Balakot and Bogarmang columns had not come up.

On the 16th, Lieutenant Pearce moved with 200 men of Muhammad Amin's Levies to Paras to repair the bridge, Sultan Husen taking up his position at Kowai with his Levies, 1,200 strong. Lieutenant Pearce now heard from Fateh Muhammad, whom he had ordered to seize the bridge at Jaraid, that Fateh Ali Shah had taken up a strong position there, and that he did not feel strong enough to attack him. On this, Lieutenant Pearce at once directed Manawar Shah, with 100 Hazara police and the rest of Muhammad Amin's Levies, to march on Jaraid. On the 17th, Lieutenant Pearce heard that the Syads had determined on holding Sum, and believing rightly that the Balakot column would that day reach Belag and Paras, he made the following dispositions for their attack. Sultan Husen, with 500 men was to advance on the front of the village, Fateh Muhammad with 500 of his own men and 100 of Hazara police was to move by Jaraid and Duna, and come down on it from the north-east, while the Pakli, Balakot, and Bogarmang Levies, were to advance from Belag to the west of the village.

In support, he had the Dogra regiment at Kowai, and Muhammad Amin at Paras, while two columns were to try and cut off Zamin Shah's retreat to Kagan, *viz.*, 700 men of Sultan Husen's Levies at Jaraid, and 300 of Muhammad Amin's at Kagan.

These movements were to have taken place on the 20th; but on the 19th Zamin Shah surrendered to Lieutenant Pearce on receiving that officer's assurance that his life would be spared.

Fateh Ali Shah and Anawar Shah managed to escape to Kagan, owing to Fateh Muhammad Khan, Bhambas, not having obeyed the orders sent him to hold the Jaraid Bridge.

On the 20th, Major Abbott arrived and took command, and the disposition of the forces then were—on the right bank of the river, opposite Paras, the Levies of Pakli, Balakot, and Agror—at Bela about 800 men—at Jaraid, Syad Manawar Shah with 60 matchlock men—on the left bank of the Nainsuk, at Saugor, one company of Jamu troops—at Kola a guard of 20 men—at Gul seven companies of Jamu troops—at Kowai the Levies of Sultan Husen, estimated at from 1,000 to 2,000 men; two companies of Jamu troops, the Sati company, and a company of Rawal Pindi police, with two zamburaks—at Paras about 300 of Amin Khan's Levies, and about 300 of the Kundi Levies—at Bhunja, Fateh Muhammad's force rated at 500 men, and at Balakot, the base of the operation, seven companies of the Jamu regiment, with two mountain guns and two mountain pieces;—Lieutenant Hodson, of the Guide Corps, was meanwhile left at Pakli to superintend the forwarding of supplies to the front.

On hearing of the flight of Fateh Ali and Anawar Shah, Major Abbott ordered the Pakli Levies to advance on Kagan; but on going himself afterwards to Garai, he found that Ata Muhammad of Agror and Muhammad Amin of Garhi had not obeyed his orders. This, however, did not so much matter, as Fateh Ali Shah came in and surrendered on the 25th, though Anawar Shah fled to Kohistan.

The two chief Syads having surrendered, and there being no likelihood of further opposition, the forces were withdrawn.

Record in Deputy Commissioner's Office, Hazara.

Snow had fallen heavily, the men could only move in sandals, and in a few days the passes would have been closed.

The Governor General in Council considered that the Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson, was entitled to very high credit for the boldness, judgment, and promptitude

Government letter.

with which he resolved upon an immediate movement upon Kagan and executed his resolution, and desired to express his approbation of the manner in which the subordinate duties were conducted by the other officers, and especially of the spirit and activity evinced by Lieutenant Pearse.

CHAPTER III.

SECTION I.

The "Black Mountain"

Is a mountain situated at the north-western extremity of the Hazara District, whence it runs northward into independent territory. Its total length is about 25 to 30 miles, and its average height about 8,000 feet above the sea. The mountain ascends from the Indus basin at its southern end, near the village of Kiara, and so up to its water-shed by Bradar; thence it runs north-east by north to the point on the crest known as Chita Batr. From Chita Batr the range runs due north, finally descending by two large spurs on to the Indus. Takot lies at the foot of the most eastern of these two. The River Indus passes close to this town, and runs westward along the northern foot of the mountain till it washes the westward of the above two spurs, when it takes a sharp bend south, and runs below and parallel to the western foot of the range.

The following are the most important passes and peaks along the crest of the mountain from south to north, *viz.* :—

<i>Names.</i>				<i>Height.</i>
Pabal Gali	6,930 feet.
Pinja Gali	7,772 "
Akhun-baba-ka-chura	9,157 "
Kahi Gali	} not ascertained.
Jabai	
Chapra	
Chita Batr	
Doda	
Machai	9,803 feet.
Khand-ka-dana	9,429 "
Ganthar	9,572 "
Kanesan	9,775 "

This latter peak is not mentioned in the map, but many natives call it thus. It is one of the most northern peaks of the range, and from it the descent to Takot and the Indus commences; none of the points from Kahi Gali to Doda can be much less than 9,000 feet elevation. Throughout its length the crest of the range dominates the following districts and tribes on both faces, *viz.*, from its rise at Kiara to the Akhun-baba peak. On its south-east face it has Tanawal, and on its north-west face the Hasanzais from Akhun-baba to Chita Batr. On its eastern face it has Agror, on its western the Akazais, from the north of Chita Batr to the end of the range. On its eastern face it has Pariari, Deshi, and Nandihar; on its western face the Akazais and Chagarzais; and on its northern extremity the Indus and Takot Swatis.

The Black Mountain may be described as a long, narrow ridge, with higher peaks at intervals and occasional deep passes; the general outline of the crest is more rounded than sharp. Numerous large spurs project from the sides, which are often precipitous and rocky, with deep narrow

glens or gorges lying between them, in which lie the villages of the tribes. The soil of the hill sides is for the most part rocky and stony. When uncultivated, the lower slopes are covered with thorny bushes and grass; further up, forest replaces this, and the whole of the upper portion of the spurs and crest is thickly wooded. The trees found, are varieties of pine, oak, sycamore, horse chestnut, wild cherry, &c. Along the crest frequent open glades occur in the forest, which, with the exposed slopes of higher peaks, are covered with short grass.

The routes by which troops can ascend the mountain necessarily lie along one or more of its spurs. From British territory all routes ascend either from Tanawal or Agror, and are as follow: 1st, from Tanawal at the southern end of the mountain, by the Bradar spur, by the village of that name, there is a path which was used for retirement by the force of 1851-52, which leads on to the water-shed overlooking the lower Hasanzais. Near to this, on another spur, is the Chamberi outpost, a fort of the Nawab of Amb. The Bradar plateau affords room for encamping a force, and water is obtainable. 2nd, from Shanglai (Tanawali Fort), which lies in a gorge between two spurs, a road ascends the southern of these to Pabal Kandu, a point on the crest of the mountain, which is steep and difficult, but which troops can get along. The left column of the force in 1852 went up this way. 3rd, a road goes from Chata, a village lying on the north of the above two spurs. Above Chata it is joined by the Sambalbut spur from Agror, and then runs up to Jabai; this is one of the best routes for an ascending force. The right column of the force in 1852 moved by this route. On gaining the top of Kahi Gali, a pass leading down to Hasanzai villages is commanded. The water-shed of this spur forms the boundary between Agror and Tanawal. 4th, there is a small spur lying opposite Shanglai between the two above-mentioned, by which the centre column of the force in 1852 ascended. It is steep and difficult. 5th, from Agror by the Sambalbut spur there is a road open and easy of ascent, (although rather steep in parts,) which joins the Chata spur higher up. 6th, from Chajri there is a steep and exposed road unfitted for troops. 7th, from Barchar a road rises steeply from the valley for about 1,500 feet. The village is situated at the top of this first rise, and might be held by an enemy who could, however, be dislodged by artillery fire from below. From the village upwards, the slope is more gradual and open for some distance where fine forest commences and on the right flank the ground gets a little steeper with one or two knolls. The last four or five hundred feet are very steep, with heavy forest on the right flank. The left is open and exposed to view from the crest. The point of junction with the top is called Barchar-ka-Chapra. The Levies went up by this route in 1868. 8th, from Khun Gali a road goes to a spur running down eastward from Chita Batr to the village of Khun Gali, thence it again ascends, still going east, and joins the Kabal Mountain, which lies east of Agror. The water-shed of this ridge forms the boundary between Agror and Pariari and Tikri. The main column of the force ascended from Khun Gali in 1868; half way up, a large hog-backed mound, named Mana-ka-Dana, rises on the crest of the spur. *The ascent to this point is easy.*

From Mana-ka-Dana the range dips for about 800 yards, and the forest commences chiefly on the right flank; then the ascent re-commences, and passing upwards over some steep and wooded knolls, affords good cover for an enemy. Beyond this point, the hill becomes steeper and more wooded right up to the knoll of Chita Batr. On the crest a determined enemy could give much trouble. A path leads round the Agror face of Chita Batr among rocks and pine trees. Mules can pass along, but it is dangerous in places.

The Khun Gali ridge is the most northern spur ascending from British territory.

From Chita Batr the path is practicable for troops and mountain artillery over Dodha to the Machai peak, the highest point of the mountain, distance $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles. From Akhun-baba to Machai on the west are the Akazai; a similar practicable spur runs from Machai to the Indus, dividing the Akazai from the Chagarzais on the north.

About $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles beyond Machai is the Dunda peak. From it runs a rather difficult spur to the Indus, near the village of Jodbai.

The spur from Mana-ka-Dana to Charmang through Bilankot is very easy; distance 5 miles.

The following information concerning the forests and geological formation of the Black Mountain is extracted from a report by Mr. Ribbentrop, of the Forest Department, who accompanied the force in 1864:—

“The jungle on the lower south-east slopes of the Black Mountain is mostly composed of berberis and *Acacia Modesta*; in the Agror Valley some camel-thorn is found. *Pinus Longifolia* grows on both sides of the valley; and at Mana-ka-Dana (about 6,000 feet) begins the region of *Pinea Webbiana*. In the ravine to the north of Chita Batr, a few oaks shew their lighter green between the pine trees; and near the top of Machai some sickly-looking horse chestnuts are met with, also a few *Abies Smithiana*; and one stunted specimen of *Cedrus Deodora* (above Doda) was found. These forests can never be of any use, except to the villagers themselves, as firewood and timber. The north side of the mountain is of the same nature, but the forests actually seen are not of quite the same extent. The small amount of country traversed, gave hardly sufficient insight to fix numbers; but there is no doubt that about 15,000 maunds of fuel could be drawn from the Indus side of the Black Mountain yearly, without exhausting its resources. As the people have only to bring down the wood in small pieces, it would probably not be impossible to find an enterprising native who would make arrangements and land the wood at Atok from Rs. 15 to 20 per 100 maunds.

“The formation of the Black Mountain is throughout granite, with the exception of the gneiss spurs down to Tikri, where the cultivation, rising higher on the hills, at once shews the more fertile soil.

“The Tikri Valley, as well as Nandihar, Konsh, and Bogarmang, have a much richer soil than the Agror Valley, the higher part being composed of the easier soluble and richer gneiss, while Agror is quite surrounded by granite.

“The Deshi slopes of the Black Mountain down to Tikri, and further on to Takot, are again mostly on their higher parts covered with *Pinea Webbiana*, but a greater amount of deciduous trees is intermixed.

“The few trees in Tikri Valley are poplars, plane, and punga in grave-yards, and umlak trees close to the villages.”

The Indus runs under the western foot of the mountain, and is deep and rapid, with rocky bed. Its width is from 70 to 150 yards, and it is said to be 300 in some places; but this is probably an exaggeration. There is a track from Darband which runs along its banks, viz., Darband to Tambai; horsemen can get along, but the road is bad in places, especially opposite the Mohabarā Ferry, and a little beyond where the hill runs straight down into the river. Beyond Tambai the hill recedes, leaving a level space 300 or 400 yards wide along the river bank. The road runs through this to Kandar (Hzai village), and so on by Tawara to the Ghariak Ferry; thence to Kotkai (Hzai village)—the road in this part is more difficult, but mules can get along.

Between Kotkai and Kanhar (Hzai village) the hill side comes right down to the river, and mules cannot pass. From Kanhar to the Ghazikot Ferry the road is easy; but from Ghazikot to the Shah's mills (Da-Shah Jarande) it is difficult in places.

The mills are situated where a stream from the mountain, rising under Chita Batr and called the Shal Khwar or Shal-ke-Keta, joins the Indus.

A ferry crosses the river from this point. From the mills a road enters the Akazai territory (Shal Khwar forms throughout its length the boundary between Hasan and Akazais) and runs to Bimbol (Akazai village) along the bank of the river, but is difficult. From Bimbol to Bilianai and Derbanai Akazai, three villages all lying together in open fields, the communication is easy.

The road or track continues from here along the river bank, but accurate information regarding it is difficult to obtain. During its course under the Black Mountain, the Indus is crossed at the following points by ferries, *viz.*, counting from south to north and from Cis to Trans-Indus:—

1. The Lakwal Ferry, from Tanawal to Kuz Mahabara (Mada Khel village).
2. From Jambai (Hzai) to Bar Mahabara (M. Khel).
3. The Gharyah Ferry, from Tawara (Hzai) to Marer (Hzai).
4. The Jaman Ferry, from Kanhar to Ghaari (Hzai).
5. Ghazikot, from Ghazikot to Nawakilai.
6. From Shah's Mills to Palosi (Hzai).
7. A ferry crosses to Maidan, the present locality of the Hindoostani colony.
8. From Bimbol to Manjike-Banda (Akazai).
9. From Billianai to Kamak ($\frac{1}{2}$ Hzai, $\frac{1}{2}$ Akazai village).
10. From Shigai (Chzai) to Kabalgram (Chzai).
11. From the hamlet Dumel (Chzai) to Kamach (Chzai).

The boats worked on these ferries will hold from 20 to 30 passengers, but do not accommodate animals, which have to be swam over alongside. They are strongly built, and are worked by oars placed fore and aft, and are also assisted by ropes, where necessary.

The natives of the country also cross the river at nearly every point on inflated skins (pushtu shinas). In Abbott's Report of the Expedition of 1852, the rapidity with which the enemy who had collected Trans-Indus swam across the river on skins when our troops commenced their retirement, is noticed.

Counting from south to north, the tribes of the mountain consist of—on the west face, 1 Hasanazai, 2 Akazai, 3 Chagarzai; north of Agror on east face, 4 Syads of Pariari, 5 Swatis of Deshi. Of the above, the first three belong to the Yusafzai clan, the Hasanazais and Akazais to the Isazai branch, and the Chagarzais to the Malizai branch.

The Syads of Pariari are simply the original owners of the lands of that name, which lie in two deep narrow glens immediately north of Mana-ka-Dana. The villages are chiefly held by the Basikhel Chagarzais, who have got most of the land into their hands either by mortgage or purchase. The Deshis, who are by descent Swatis, of the branch Moniali, hold the glens of the mountain and the sub-adjacent lands lying along the Nandihar stream, and north of Pariari and Trund as far as Takot; none of these tribes have a reputation for warlike qualities. The Chagarzais are the most numerous, and the Akazais the weakest in numbers, though they have the best name as fighting men, and are the most troublesome race of all, to our Government. The Deshis are very united among themselves, as far as outsiders are concerned and are respected by their neighbours accordingly.

The Hasanzai.

The Hasanzais are a section of the Isazai Yusafzais, who reside on both sides of the Indus; those Cis-Indus living on the Black Mountain, and those Trans-Indus immediately opposite to it. To the south and south-west Cis-Indus, they are bounded by the crest of the Black Mountain, commencing from Kahi Gali, which is immediately above the Sambalbut spur, on the eastern face of the range.

From Kahi Gali the range takes a slight bend to the south-west, and running on by Pabal Kandao, Panji Kandao, finally descends to the Indus by a spur close to the Hasanzai village of Tambai, and the Tanawal village of Gangoti, which is a branch of the southern spur. The southern and eastern face of this spur of the range belongs to the Nawab of Tanawal, the northern and western to the Hasanzais. To the north the Hasanzai boundary runs with that of the Akazais, from whom they are divided by a large ravine called the Shal Khwar, which springs from below the peaks of Machai and Chita Batr, and runs down to the Indus a little above the Hasanzai village of Ghazikot, at some mills known as the Shah's Mills" (Da Shah Jarande), from which a ferry crosses to Palosasai. Eastward, the Hasanzai are bounded by the Akazais, whose territory, running along the crest of the mountain, meets the Hasanzai, Agror, and Tanawal borders at Kahi Gali. Westward, the Cis-Indus Hasanzais are bounded by the Indus.

The Trans-Indus portion of the tribe is bounded on the south and west by the territory of the Mada Khels, and on the north by the Chagarzais, from whom they are divided by the Nadirai Khwar.

The sections of the Hasanzais are ten in number, as follow :—

Name.					Number of fighting men.
1. Kaka Khel	180
2. Mir Ahmad Khel	130
3. Loghman Khel	135
4. Kotwal Khel	120
5. Dada Khel	90
6. Zakaria Khel	110
7. Kala Khel	80
8. Nasrat Khel	70
9. Mamu Khel	60
10. Khan Khel	140
Total					1,115

In addition to the above, the following residents in Hasanzai territory must be included in the strength of the tribe, as a portion at least would certainly be found in their ranks in war time :—

1. The villagers of Tilli, which is on a spur on the western side of the mountain, with a number of hamlets scattered over it. The land is said to be divided into eight shares, seven of which belong to Syads, descendants of the Pir Jimam Baba, and one to the "Kotwal" section	250 fighting men.
2. Gujars, boatmen and craftsmen of all sorts. These live distributed throughout the various villages of the tribe	350 " "
Total				600 " "
Grand Total, Hasanzais and squatters among them				1,715 " "

It may be taken for granted, that nearly every man possesses sword and shield, and there are said to be 1,100 matchlocks in the tribe. The outside total of fighting men would thus be about 1,200. In former estimates of strength, the numbers of the Hasanzais, as well as of the other tribes of the Black Mountain, appear to have been considerably over-rated.

The Akazai.

The Akazai are a division of the Isazai clan of Yusafzais, who inhabit the western slopes of the Black Mountain on the Hazara border. Their boundaries are as follow :—

On the east, the mountain as far as Chita Batr forms their boundary with Agror, and thence to Machai with Pariari. On the north, they are separated from the Chagarzais by the large spur which runs down from Machai by Khand-ka-Dana, Traplai, Palwari, Najoria Marmandai, and Darbanai, to the Indus. On the south they are separated, as a rule, from the Hasanzais by the Shal Khwar water-course. One or two Akazai villages, however, lie south of Shal Khwar, and, as it were, within the limits of Hasanzai territory. Their western boundary is the Indus, across which they hold no land, except half of the village of Karna, which they share with the Hasanzais.

The tribe is sub-divided as follows :—

I. Barat Khel	{	1. Khan Khel	...	70	fighting men.
		2. Biba Khel	...	60	" "
		3. Shahi Khel	...	80	" "
		4. Chamba Khel	...	80	" "
II. Aziz Khel	{	1. Darza Khel	...	50	" "
		2. Rasul Khel	...	80	" "
		3. Sain Khel	...	70	" "
		4. Kala Khel	...	50	" "
III. Tansan Khel...	{	1. Ghazi Khan	...	50	" "
		2. Mamuzai	...	80	" "
		3. Akozai	...	70	" "
IV. Paında Khel ...	{	1. Awal Khel	...	70	" "
		2. Lal Khel	...	60	" "
		3. Joge Khel	...	40	" "
Total			...	910	

There are also the following stragglers of other races settled among the tribes, viz.:—

Dalazaks	30	} Pathans by descent.
Mapalan	35	
Pathans	40	
Syads	} 50	
Fakirs		
Gujars, &c.		
Grand Total		...	1,165	

Of which, about 700 could probably take the field properly armed.

The Chagarzai.

The Chagarzai are a tribe of Yusafzai Afghans, who inhabit both banks of the Indus above Buner. Those on the west bank of the Indus are located on the west and east slopes of the Duma Mountain. Their chief town is Tiraj. They are thorough.

mountaineers, hardy and brave above all the neighbouring tribes. Their chief wealth is in cows, buffaloes, and goats.

The Chagarzais are divided into—

1, Nasrat Khel; 2, Firozai; 3, Basi Khel.

The first and last live on the east slopes of the Duma Mountain and on the banks of the Indus.

The Firozai inhabit the western slopes of the Duma towards Buner, and are sub-divided into—

1, Maki Khel; 2, Juna Khel; 3, Bai Khel { Smel Khel.
Skhali Khel.
Madi Khel.

The southern boundary of the Chagarzais, Cis-Indus, on the south, is contiguous with the Akazais, and runs down the Palwari spur from the west face of the Machai peak of the Black Mountain. The south face of this spur belongs to the Akazais, and the north to the Chagarzais. A road passes over it, named the Ramus road, connecting the Akazai village of Biran with the Chagarzai's hamlet of Jangrai; and at the foot of the spur, near the Indus, the boundary lies between the hamlets of Arabai (Akazai) and Dot (Chagarzai); on the west and north, the Cis-Indus Chagarzais are bounded by the river itself, which bends a good deal to the east, at the north extremity of the Black Mountain, below Takot; on the east, the boundary runs parallel with that of Pariari Syads and Deshis, along the water-shed of the above mountain.

The tribe inhabits several villages along the bank of the river, and also on both the slopes of the Duma range. Those on the western face of Duma are contiguous with Buner; the glen which belongs to them is formed by two spurs which run down westward into the Buner Valley from the two high peaks of Duma and Dosara, and is about eight *kos* long and six or seven wide. It is watered by a stream which runs down its centre, and joins the Barando River near the Buner village of Budal.

The Cis-Indus Chagarzais are sub-divided as follow :—

				Fighting men.	
Basi Khel {	Daud Khel {	Chur Khel	...	620	
		Kalandar Khel	...	400	
	Aziz Khel {	Babujan	„	...	450
		Hasham	„	...	120
		Ormar	„	...	100
		Tausan	„	...	1,500
		Khwaja	„	...	120
		Nasar	„	...	140
		Shahu	„	...	700
Total			...	4,150	
Nasat_Khel	...	Loghman Khel	...	220	
		Musa	„	...	180
		Buda	„	...	230
		Ariju	„	...	170
Total			...	800	
Grand Total, Cis-Indus Chagarzais				4,950	

In addition to this, a holy race or sect, named Akhun Khels, hold lands in Chagarzai country. Their total strength is differently stated by various informants; but Unwin considers that their effective Cis-Indus strength might be estimated at 4,000 fighting men at the outside. They have no reputation as a warlike race. The Basi Khel and Nasarat Khel have lands also Trans-Indus, but their chief strength is Cis-Indus.

Trans-Indus, the tribe is said to muster 4,000 matchlock men, but this statement is certainly exaggerated.

It is difficult to obtain such correct data of the Trans-Indus Chagarzais, but the following estimate may be relied on as tolerably correct:—

					Fighting men.
Juna Khel	700
Makhi Khel	800
Bai Khel	450
Trans-Indus Total					1,950
Add Cis-Indus, including Akhun Khels	5,350
Grand Total					7,300

The Chagarzais have been estimated by different authorities at a much larger figure than the above, but, making due allowance for the exaggerated statements Pathans always make of their numbers, the above total may be considered as a fair estimate of the strength of the tribe.

In this total the various craftsmen, Hindus and fakirs, and other mendicants who reside among the tribesmen, and whose members would not add to the fighting strength that they could bring into the field, are not included.

The crops of Chagarzais are—

Rabi—wheat, barley, mausur, tobacco;

Kharif—maize, rice, and moth.

We have had few dealings with the Chagarzais; but they have occasionally quarrelled with our subjects, and there have been some instances of forays and petty raids perpetrated by them, but we never came into hostile contact with them until 1863, when, accompanied by the Hasanzai, they joined the ranks of the Akhund at Ambela. They made one attack there on the "Crag" picket, but being defeated, they went straight off home again.

The Cis-Indus Swatis.

The name Pakli generally is now restricted to the tract between and immediately around Mansera, Shinkiari, and Bairkund, whereas it originally applied to the whole of the countries conquered and occupied by the Swati Cis-Indus. This large tract was divided into upper and lower, and the clans of the Swati, as they occupied the upper or lower division, are respectively termed upper and lower Swati—"Utli and Tarli."

Upper Pakli then embraces the following districts:—

I.—Shinkiari or upper half of Pakli Valley	} British.
II.—Balakot	
III.—Garhi Habibula	
IV.—Kagan	
V.—Bogarmang	
VI.—Konsh	
VII.—Part of Alahi	} Independent.
VIII.—Nandihar	
Lower Pakli includes—				
I.—Bairkund or lower half of Pakli Valley	} British.
II.—Agror	
III.—Tikri	} Independent.
IV.—Deshi	
V.—Part of Alahi	

The upper Pakli Swatis belong to the Ghalhi clan, which has nine of the eighteen shares. It is divided into three divisions, having three shares, each of which is again sub-divided into sections having their respective shares, and in

accordance therewith located in different parts of the country allowed to their clan, *e.g.*—

Clan.	Division.	Section.	Location.
Ghurbri (9)	Tarkheli (3)	Tarkheli (2) Khan Khel	Balakot (British). Bafa (British). Nandihar (Independent). Takot (Independent). Garhi Habibula (British). Shinkiari (British). Kagan (British). Bogarmang (British).
	Desharai (3)	Jahangir Argushi Mulkah Mindrawi Ainali	1 1 1 1 1
	Mir (3)	Dodal Panjghol Peshwari Panj Mirai	1 1 1 1
			Mansera (British). Takhot (Independent). Nandihar (Independent). Bogarmang (British). Shinkiari (British).

The lower Pakli Swatis are divided and distributed as follows, their nine shares being made into twelve:—

Clan.	Division.	Section.	Location.
Momiali (6)	Robasi Shuror Ghulimani Panj Koni Ashlir Mulhal Deshi	1 1 1 1 1 1 1
			British territory in lower Pakli.
			Independent.
			Tikri (Independent).
			Deshi (Independent).
Mobrawi (6)	Alisherzrai (3)	Jelangial Banjori Rumsiai Khan Khel Balasori	1 1 1 1 1
			British, lower Pakli.
	Begal (3)	Chuchai Shanaori	1½ 1½
			British. Agror.

N.B.—Figures denote shares.

Alahi is occupied by a separate clan of Swatis, called Tosh, who do not possess shares in the rest of the Swati country; and the upper and lower Swatis, though theoretically entitled to half of the Alahi tract each, have no possession in it, with the exception of a few individuals; but here, as in the rest of the Swati possessions, the Syads and the other religious fraternities have one-fourth of the district.

From the British boundary line, the drainage falls on the other side through the independent Swati districts, which trench north-westerly to the Indus, flowing from north-east to south-west in a curve westward, forming their western limit, so that our border line above these tracts is defined by a marked water-shed. The British territory being considerably higher, the Alahi drainage falls into the Indus at Shakargah, one day's journey from Takot up stream. The drainage of Nandihar, Tikri, and Deshi, joining at the commencement of Deshi country, flows into the Indus, also at Takot, some 20 miles distant from Agror, by an easy road for laden mules which is used by traders.

The Swatis are a miserable race, both as regards their courage and their physique. They appear to have all the vices of the Pathan as with them cold-blooded murder and grinding avarice are the salt of life. They certainly have not any of the courage of the Pathan, whose bold, frank manner is replaced in them by a hang-dog look.

They are all Suni Muhammadans and very bigoted. Their customs are the same as those of the Pathans.

SECTION II.

Expedition against the Hasanzais on the Black Mountain, by a Force under Colonel Mackeson, C.B., 1853-54.

SHORTLY after annexation, a preventive line was established along the left bank of the Indus, as far as British jurisdiction extended, to preclude Trans-Indus salt from crossing into the Panjab. In 1851, this line extended five miles beyond Torbeila to a point on the Indus, where Jehandad's Cis-Indus lands commence.

Report on Tribes by Mr. R. Temple. During the autumn of that year, Mr. Carne, uncovenanted head of the Customs Department, desired to visit this border, with a view to any eventual extension of the line. The Board of Administration objected to the measure, and warned him not to go there.

During November, however, Mr. Carne, accompanied by one of his patrols, Mr. Tapp, proceeded against the advice of the district officer, Major Abbott, to reconnoitre the border. Having marched up the border, and returning towards Torbeila, Mr. Carne dismissed all attendants, except a few horsemen belonging to his own department. Shortly afterwards, the two gentlemen near the Hasanzai limits, but still within Jehandad's bounds, were murdered by a band of armed Hasanzais. These Hasanzais had no concern whatever in Mr. Carne's views. Even if the line had been extended, it would not have affected them. Afterwards, when called to account for the deed, they never pretended that they ever entertained any apprehension in regard to the salt line. The Hasanzais may have entertained some unjust suspicions regarding Mr. Carne's intention, but neither their bounds nor their rights were infringed, and they crossed into British territory for the purpose of murdering British officers in cold blood, because they were Englishmen, infidels, defenceless travellers, with a little property about them.

As the murder happened in his fief, Jehandad was called to account; he delivered up such Hasanzai people as he could find in his territory as hostages to the British authorities. The Hasanzais immediately made war upon him and laid waste his border villages, seized his forts of Chamberi and Shungli, stirred up his subjects to rebel, and at last reduced him to considerable straits. It was evident that the whole tribe approved of the murder, and sheltered the murderers. British interference became at last necessary, both to vindicate ourselves and support Jehandad; and the following force was assembled in Hazara:—

Report by Colonel Mackeson. *From Rawul Pindee.*—The 3rd Native Infantry, Colonel Butler commanding: 4 Guns, 5 Troop, 1st Brigade Horse Artillery, Captain Fitzgerald commanding: 16th Irregular Cavalry, Captain Davidson commanding: Kelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment, 7th Company Sappers and Miners, and 176 Police, Lieutenant Cookson commanding. *From the Peshawar District.*—The Corps of Guides (Infantry), Lieutenant Hodson commanding.

From Kashmir.—Two regiments of Dograhs.

In Hazara.—1st Sikh Infantry, Major Gordon commanding: Hazara Mountain Battery and 1,760 Levies, Major Abbott commanding.

This force assembled in December at Sherghur, and under the command of Colonel Mackeson, Commissioner of Peshawar.

On the 19th a reconnoissance was made, and on the 20th the left column of Irregulars under Captain Davidson occupied the heights above Shungli, holding them whilst the centre column under Major Abbott was employed in repairing that fort,—the right column under Lieutenant-Colonel Napier taking up a position at Chatha, and the column under Colonel Butler being in reserve at Shergurh.

During the rebuilding of the fort an advance might at any time have been forced upon the troops, for the posts of the Hasanzai and Akazai occupied the crest of the Black Mountain, and their picquets approached to within a few hundred yards of our posts at Chatha; whilst they waved their flags and flourished their sabres in defiance, sometimes at Panji Gali, sometimes in front of Chatha, and sometimes at Pabal; and on the 21st, a reconnoitring party under Lieutenant Hodson was fired upon by the enemy's picquets near Chatha.

On the occupation of Shungli, Hasan Ali Khan, a malik of the Hasanzais, who had harboured the murderers of Messrs. Carne and Tapp, and had been the instigator of the attacks on Jehandad Khan's territory, sent in to say he had no objection to our rebuilding Shungli, but that the troops must at once be withdrawn. In reply he was informed that the force, after repairing Shungli, would march along the crest of the Black Mountain over ground that was common both to the Hasanzai and Jehandad Khan to the fort of Chamberi, and that on this march the troops would molest no one, unless they were molested and met with opposition; and at the same time he was invited to send in a jirgah, to amicably arrange his hostilities with Jehandad Khan, which kept the British border in a state of disquiet, and which we were consequently very anxious to arrange, particularly as the cause of quarrel appeared to be Jehandad Khan having seized certain Hasanzais on our requisition. Hasan Ali Khan's answer was a refusal to send any jirgah, and a warning that he could not restrain the thousands of allies, Chagarzais and Akazais, who had joined him, if the force moved as stated.

It was a question how the regular troops could be used as a support to most advantage. The orders of the Board of Administration were, that these troops were not to be employed on the mountain top at that late season, and at Shergurh they were in a confined narrow valley, encumbered with impedimenta, double-poled tents, double sets of tents, doolies, palkies, and hundreds of camels; in short, the column was equipped as if for an ordinary march and not for mountain warfare, and yet it had passed through mountain defiles to its present position, and must pass through such defiles whatever direction it took; Colonel Mackeson, who was commanding, determined therefore to throw off this support from his rear, and endeavour to pass it as quickly as possible on to the plain of the Indus, more especially as it could there be used to turn the enemy's position on the crest of the mountain.

The heights the attacking columns would have to climb were so difficult, that a hundred resolute men, not appalled by the undefined terror of the irresistible prowess of regular troops, could have effectually stopped the bravest assailants. To have attacked such heights *en face* without an effort to turn them would have savoured of rashness; and Colonel Mackeson preferred therefore to move the support round to the banks of the Indus, behind the Black Mountain, and thus to turn the position on the heights; and that each column of attack should trust to a small reserve of its own, and to the fort of Shergurh in the rear, if all were beaten back. Such was the plan proposed by Colonel Mackeson at this period of the operations.

On the 27th December, the position of the forces was as follows:—

At Chatha.—The Guides, 1st Sikh Infantry, and Rawul Pindee Police, under Colonel Napier, Bengal Engineers.—At Shungli Fort, the Militia, 4 Companies Police, and the Dograhs, under Major Abbott.

At Shoshni.—Mountain Guns, Head Quarters, two Dogra Regiments, under Major Davidson.

Colonel Butler's Brigade had marched from Shergurh on the 24th and 25th, and was now at Nika Pani. Owing to the narrowness of the road through the defile to Darbund, and the immense amount of baggage and impedimenta with the column, three instead of two marches had to be made from Shergurh to Darbund, and it was fortunate that the points occupied by the irregular portion of the force at Chatha, Shungli, Shoshni, and Chamberi, formed with the assistance of intermediate chowkies (posts) a complete screen, behind which the encumbered regular column laboriously, but securely, threaded its way through the mountain defile.

As already stated, Colonel Mackeson had determined not to ascend the Black Mountain till the regular Brigade had been placed between the Black Mountain and the Indus, in sight of the Hasanzai villages in the plain, thereby threatening the rear of the parties who might oppose the columns on the mountain top.

The weather had been very favorable; snow had not fallen, and the nights were bright moonlight.

But on the arrival of the regular column at Nika Pani, there was danger of some days' further delay; the rear guards were not up, and the road in front was reported impracticable, while every hour's detention was a calamity with snow threatening: Colonel Mackeson on the 27th had been enabled from a height, 2 miles in front, and east of Chamberi (on a spur that forms the boundary down to the river side between the Hasanzai and Jehandad Khan's country), to see the whole Hasanzai country, and he altered his plan of operations to the following extent.

The main force of the regular troops were to be placed at Bradar, with 4 Companies in Chamberi, to make demonstrations on the height in front of Chamberi alluded to above. It was considered that the enemy's hold of his positions on the mountain would be sufficiently shaken by this disposition of the regular troops; and all idea of their movement, lightly equipped up the banks of the Indus to a point in rear of the enemy's position, was abandoned, as such a move would have entangled those troops in difficult ground; for the reconnoissance had shown that there was, with the exception of below Kothai, little plain between the Hasanzai Mountain and the Indus.

On the 28th December these dispositions of Colonel Butler's force were effected, and orders given for the advance of the three other columns on the 29th, the Hasanzai stronghold of Panji-ki-Gali being the point where they were ultimately to unite.

The columns were told they had nothing to fall back upon, and that the

Report by Captain Davidson. word must be "forward;" but that in the event of a repulse, the right column should make good its retreat by Shungli towards the left column, and that all would then endeavour to reach Chamberi by keeping

the road on the crest; or failing that, to reach Bradar *via* the Nika Pani road. The view Colonel Mackeson had had of the northern face of the Hasanzai Mountain had convinced him that danger from a snow-storm was not insurmountable. The elevated plateau of Tila suspended in air, midway between the crests of the Black Mountain and the River Indus, would afford a resting

place even for a month free from snow, and nothing could have prevented supplies and reinforcements reaching that place from the plains *vid Chamberi* so long as the force chose to remain there; and the force in possession of that elevated plain could have beaten off all the tribes and "Ghazis" that could have been collected against it. The difficulty that presented itself was the crossing over the heights for seven or eight miles in snow, but as it turned out the columns found little snow to contend with.

Operations of the right column.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel R. Napier, Engineers.

First day's operations.

The right column under Lieutenant-Colonel R. Napier was composed as follows:—

2 Guns, Hazara Mountain Train.			
1st Sikh Infantry, Captain Gordon commanding...			300
Guide Infantry, Lieutenant Hodson commanding			350
Rawal Pindi Police, Lieutenant Cookson commanding	176
			<hr/> 826 <hr/>

It advanced from Chatha at 7 A. M. on the 29th, in the following order:—

Three Companies Guides, under Lieutenant Hodson, as skirmishers.

Remainder under Lieutenant Turner in support.

The Mountain Guns.

1st Sikh Infantry.

Rear Guard and Rawul Pindie Police.

The ground in front consisted of a rocky ridge, rising for about a mile in length, and terminating in a small wooded hill, which lay at the foot of the first great ascent, in which the enemy, apparently about 300 in number, were posted. Shortly before daybreak, Lieutenant Hodson sent a company of Guides to reconnoitre and to occupy, if undefended, the small wooded hill, which was successfully done, without giving any alarm, and proved a very great advantage, as it enabled the column to advance from its position through some difficult ground without opposition.

The first ground held by the enemy was a very steep and thickly wooded shoulder of the mountain, rising abruptly for nearly a thousand feet, broken by precipitous rocks for some distance up the ascent, with more open ground near the summit.

The enemy had an abattis formed of a fallen pine tree at the bottom of the ascent, from which they opened a close matchlock fire on the troops whilst placing the guns in position. About 8 o'clock the guns opened with good effect, and considerable impression having been made on the enemy, the order was given to advance. The Guides in skirmishing order, supported by the 1st Sikh Infantry, rapidly ascended and cleared nearly the whole of the ascent, when the enemy, finding themselves unable to answer the fire of the rifle men, charged boldly sword in hand, and making a desperate onset on the advanced skirmishers, whose eagerness had carried them too far beyond their supports, drove them back in some confusion. But order was quickly restored, and a firm advance of the Guides up the hill, with the Sikhs following steadily in support, drove the enemy from their ground, which they defended step by step. A very bold attempt to make a second charge was checked by the excellent practice of the guns, and the steadiness of the leading companies of the Guides.

On the summit of the ascent was a fine piece of open table-land, upwards of a mile long and several hundred yards broad, beyond which the enemy retreated to the second steep ascent. After a short rest, the guns having closed up, the column advanced to the second hill, between which and the table-land was a hollow studded with rocks and pine trees; the lower part of the ascent was similar to the previous one, but of a more rugged character, broken by inaccessible cliffs on one side and a dense wall of pine trees on the other, which confined the operations to a very narrow front. The enemy had felled a number of trees at the foot of the ascent, to retard our advance as long as possible under their fire, keeping to the upper and more open ground to make their defence. Lieutenant Hodson posted his skirmishers in the broken rocky ground at the foot of the ascent, whilst the guns were being put in position; when they were ready to open, the advance was again made, covered by their fire, and the skirmishers of the Guides closely supported by Lieutenant Brownlow and a company of Sikhs on the left, and Lieutenant Turner and a party of Guides on the right, steadily crowned the hill. The enemy made several very bold attempts to charge, coming within twenty paces of the skirmishers, but were unable to face the close fire of the rifles and the excellent practice of the artillery, and at length abandoned their position, carrying with them their wounded.

The column had thus arrived near to the summit of the Black Mountain, which was open and beautifully wooded, a broad spur forming the top of the range occupied by the Akazais, branched off from this point at an elevation probably of 9,000 feet. By this ridge the enemy retreated, and it was thought necessary to hold the ground there for some time until the rear guard had come up, lest any of the enemy should return. No further defence of the hill was made; a small party followed up the rear guard, but were easily dispersed by Lieutenant Cookson. Shortly before sunset, the advanced party of Guides under Lieutenant Hodson arrived at the shoulder of the mountain above Panji-ki-Gali, where the main body of the enemy still held their position; but at the first appearance of the Guides they commenced a rapid retreat, pursued by the Maharaj Golab Singh's troops.

The main body of the right column did not come up till dark, when it was too late to descend the shoulder of the mountain to Panji-ki-Gali, and it bivouacked for the night, having traversed the crest of the mountain for a distance that Lieutenant-Colonel Napier estimated at not less than 8 miles. There was snow on the ground, but the troops behaved with the utmost cheerfulness, and not a complaint was heard. Lieutenant Hodson, with the advance of the Guides, bivouacked at Panji-ki-Gali, where the main body of the right column joined him in the morning.

The operations of the centre column.

Report from Major J. Abbott, Deputy Commissioner of Hazara.

The centre column was under Major James Abbott; it consisted of—

2 Companies Dogras	}	about 260 men.
2 Companies Police			
Levies 1,400 ..

with 5 zambooruks (native wall pieces) and 6 wall pieces. At 3 A.M., on the 29th December, 500 matchlock men of the Gandgar Mountain, who were to form the left wing of this column, were sent up Mount Takot to effect a lodgment there, where it was known the enemy's picquet was weak. ~~Until~~ this had been effected, the path which climbed up the deep ravine to the Panji Pass could not be deemed practicable,—the long single file in which the column

advanced being liable to attack from the front and both flanks. The remainder of the column began its march at sunrise, and having ascended about half way to the Panji Pass, came suddenly upon the main force of the Hasanzais very strongly posted upon a steep isolated eminence in the centre of the main ravine. They formed what seemed to be a solid square of 600 matchlock men, their skirmishers lining the ravine, which could not be attacked from the front, as the forest and brushwood were so dense that the men had to break their way at every step; Major Abbott therefore formed his line on a spur running from Mount Takot to the main ravine, when after some skirmishing Major Abbott getting possession of a spur, turning the enemy's flank, the Hasanzais fell back to a very strong position at the head of the pass, followed by Major Abbott, who had been joined by the Gandgar matchlock men.

At about 2 p.m., the left column under Captain Davidson effected a junction with this column, but the position of the enemy was so strong that Colonel Mackeson determined to await its being taken in reverse by Colonel Napier's column; on the appearance of the head of which column the Hasanzais retreated, followed by the Dograhs as far as Abu-ka-Gari, as already related.

Captain Davidson's Despatch.
Operations of the 3rd Column.

The third column, which was under the command of Captain W. W. Davidson (16th Irregular Cavalry), consisted of—

4 Guns, Hazara Mountain Train;

2 Regiments of Dogras of the Kashmir Rajah's army;

and was accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson. At 3 A.M. it commenced its march towards Panji; on reaching the village of Agror, as the second regiment of Dogras had been detained by the guns, Captain Davidson pushed on with the first regiment, and turning Pabal found himself close upon a hill overlooking Tila. Here a small picquet of the enemy fired upon the head of the column; they were immediately dislodged, and a strong party posted on the summit of the hill. At this place the column halted, until the guns and 2nd Regiment came up. About 2 p.m., the column, now intact, made good its junction with the centre under Major Abbott, close to Panji-ki-Gali, when, as stated above, the arrival of Colonel Napier's column was awaited to turn the enemy's position.

Second day's operations.

On the 30th, the whole of the Levies with 2 Companies of Dogras were employed destroying the Hasanzai villages (and were afoot from 9 A.M. to 9 P.M.), covered by 2 Companies of the 1st Sikh Infantry, from the right column at Panji-ki-Gali, and by Dogras from the left column at Abu-ka-Gari, and in the afternoon the different columns were ordered to move on Tila, which was not reached till the following morning, the left column bivouacking on the heights, the right column bivouacking on the mountain above Pabi, and marching on Tila the next morning in a light fall of snow; the Rawal Pindi Police under Lieutenant Cookson being left to hold the top of the pass leading down to the Tila Valley.

Third day's operations.

On the 31st December, the head-quarters of the attacking force were established at Tila, which is a piece of plateau land, 9,000 feet high, between the crest of the mountain and the River Indus. The work of destruction was continued; but owing to a misapprehension of orders, Major Abbott had gone on to the foot of Chamberi with most of the Levies

Captain Davidson's Report.

Colonel Mackeson's Report.

and the 400 Infantry, whilst the rest of the force remained at Tila, and the villages and hamlets in the deep glens between Abu-ka-Gari and Tila had to be destroyed by such stragglers from the Levies as had come into Tila; Shingari and other villages between Kote-kai and Bradar, along the banks of the Indus, were set fire to by Jehandad Khan and his Tanawalis who had crossed over from Amb.

Fourth day's operations.

On the 1st January 1853, the right and left columns marched from Tila *via* Panji-ki-Gali to Chamberi. Before Tila was completely evacuated, about 1,000 of the enemy showed on the neighbouring hills. The rear guard as far as Gali consisted of the Guides and Dogras, and was under Captain Davidson with Colonel Mackeson. After Gali was passed, it consisted of the Dogra Regiments and the Rawal Pindi Police under Lieutenant-Colonel Napier. At daybreak Major Abbott had marched his column from Chamberi, and being joined by Jehandad Khan and his people from Shingari, destroyed Kote-kai, the enemy making sallies on the column as it retired. This operation was supported by a detachment from the four Companies, 3rd Native Infantry, which had been placed at Chamberi. But the ~~of~~ of the village, and a mistake in sending the guns by a wrong road from which they had to return, had delayed the march from Tila till 11 A. M., and it was dark as the rear guard reached the lowest part of the ridge under the hill of Kopra, from which there was an irregular ascent to Chamberi. Some stragglers from the enemy creeping up and firing into the rear guard, Lieutenant-Colonel Napier ordered the Kopra Hill to be occupied by a strong picquet as a pathway led up to that point from the village of Kote-kai. The rear guard bivouacked there for the night, being reinforced by some of Levies under Major Abbott.

Fifth day's operations

On the 2nd January, after the rear guard had joined the force at Chamberi and cooked its food, the whole of the force marched on Bradar, where the column under Colonel Butler was encamped.

The losses of the attacking columns are given, as far as can be ascertained, in the Appendix. That of the Hasanzais, who were said to have been assisted by the Akazais, in spite of our friendly assurances, and their own solemn promise not to engage in the quarrel, was computed at from 15 to 20 killed, the number of wounded unknown.

Colonel Mackeson said the hardships from exposure to cold and fatigue and from long fasting were shared cheerfully and pretty equally by all the troops. The fighting fell to the share of the Guide Infantry, who under their gallant leader, Lieutenant Hodson, shewed themselves well deserving of the post of honor and of their well-earned fame. He remarked, that the fact of the highest summits of such a mountain as the Black Mountain having, when clad in snow, been climbed by British and Jamu troops on the 29th December 1852, in the face of all the opposition that its mountain defenders, prepared and resolute to oppose them, could bring against them, needed no amplification, but would carry the conviction that those troops were resolute, and that their leaders were not easily appalled by difficulties. Colonel Mackeson spoke of his deep obligations to Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, for the skilful way in which he had conducted his column, and of the valuable assistance he had received from Captain Davidson. It was true, he

said, the enemy were but peasantry, but peasantry that were inured to war, and masters in hill warfare, in which the troops he then commanded were but as yet novices. He also alluded to the willing assistance of Colonel Butler to forward the operations, and the good intelligence he received from Captain Caulfield, 3rd Native Infantry, at Chamberi.

Colonel Mackeson bore testimony to the energetic exertions of Major James Abbott in the operations, and his arrangements to keep the troops supplied with provisions, which were, with trifling exceptions, generally successful, and reflected credit on his management.

Captain Davidson had borne high testimony to the Commanders of the two Dogra Regiments, and to the soldier-like qualities of those troops, and their patient endurance of hardships; and Colonel Mackeson particularly alluded to their equipment for mountain warfare; their mode of carrying mountain guns, he said, was worthy of adoption. The men were ready to move at a moment's notice, and their blanket tents, which afforded sufficient protection for native troops during a few days' exposure, moved with them on the heads of coolies without causing any delay or obstruction. In his report to Colonel Mackeson, Colonel Napier mentioned the names of Major Gordon commanding, and Lieutenant Brownlow Adjutant, 1st Sikh Infantry—of Lieutenant Hodson commanding, Lieutenant Turner Adjutant, Dr. Lyall, Corps of Guides, and Subadar Mir Sunder Ali, Hazara Mountain Train; Captain Davidson—that of Assistant Surgeon Gee; and Major Abbott—those of Mahommed Ghous Akhondzadah, and others.

The Governor General in Council directed that Colonel Mackeson should be informed that the moral courage with which he resolved to prosecute the measures he had suggested, and not less the gallantry, skill, and judgment with which he had carried them into effect, were highly and justly estimated by the Government; and the hearty appreciation by the Governor General in Council of the energetic, resolute, and cheerful manner they had encountered the fatigues and difficulties so peculiarly associated with mountain warfare were to be conveyed to

Major J. Abbott,
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Napier,
Captain W. W. Davidson,

Lieutenant Hodson,
Major Gordon,
Lieutenant-Colonel Butler,

who were in command of columns and corps, and to the officers and men under their charge.

It being considered that the destruction of the Hasanzai villages, with all their grain, &c., had been sufficient punishment for the murder of the two British officers, the hostages in our hands who had been seized by the Chief of Amb were then sent back, and the tribe was informed "that the British Government did not covet their possessions, nor those of other neighbouring tribes, with whom it desired to be at peace; but that it expected tribes would restrain individual members from committing unprovoked outrages on British subjects, and afford redress when they are committed; that when a whole tribe, instead of affording redress, seeks to screen the individual offenders, the British Government has no other alternative than to hold the whole tribe responsible."

The conduct of the Hasanzais then became satisfactory, and no overt act of offence against the British was committed. In April 1855, they had a dispute with the people of Agror, relative to a marriage, and threatened to ravage that tract, but a message was sent reminding them of the lesson of 1852, and they desisted.

Report on tribes.

But on the disturbances breaking out in 1863, which led to the expedition to Ambeyla, complications with the Hasanzais again arose. In August of that year the Hasanzais tribe instigated it is supposed by emissaries of the Moulvi of Sittana, but some do not hesitate to say, incited to the movement by the Agror Chief, who was hostile to the Ruler of Amb, made an unprovoked attack on a nest of hamlets, rather than villages, in the little Shungli Valley of the Black Mountain, in which the most advanced out-post of the Amb territory is situated. The fort was not molested, but some six or seven hamlets were destroyed, and one man, who resisted, killed.

The Hasanzais then appeared at one time to threaten an attack on Chamberi, and a portion of the Mada Khel crossed the Indus with the intention of assisting, but the frontier line having been greatly strengthened by the Amb authorities, the gathering broke up, and the Mada Khel re-crossed the river. Soon after an attack was made by the Hasanzais on the Amb troops on the Black Mountain border, in which the Militia Levy of Madad Khan, the second Tanawali Chief, appears to have been particularly assailed, and to have suffered severely; one jemadar and seven men were reported killed, and six wounded, as well as other casualties among the Levies.

After the operations at Ambeyla it was too late in the season for any active measures against the Hasanzai on the Black Mountain, but their jirgah afterwards came in to Report by Major James. Major Coxe, the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, and arrangements were made with them for satisfaction being given to the Amb Chief for the injury they had committed on his villages.

APPENDIX.

Approximate Return of Casualties in the Force under LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MACKESON, C. B., operating on the Black Mountain.—December 1852.

CORPS.				Native Officers.	N. C. Officers.	Men.	
Guides	...	Killed	...	2	1	...	<i>Vide</i> Regimental History.
		Wounded	
Dogras	...	Killed	1	...	<i>Vide</i> Despatches.
		Wounded	...	1	
1st Sikh Infantry and Police	...	Casualties	6	<i>Vide</i> Despatches. No details given.
Levies	...	Killed	1	
		Wounded	3	

Total number of casualties ... 20

SECTION III.

Expedition against the Black Mountain Tribes, 1868, by a Force under
Major General A. Wilde, C.B., C.S.I.

In November 1867, it was determined to establish a body of police in the Agror Valley, and they were temporarily located in the village of Oghi, until a fortified police post could be built. At daylight, on the morning of the 30th July 1868, this body of police, numbering 22 men, was attacked by some 500 men belonging to the Chagarzai, Akazai, and Hasanzai tribes. The Syads of Pariari, situated beyond the border adjoining Dilbori, in Agror, with their Chagarzai and Gujar tenants, being also engaged in the affair. The enemy were, after a hand-to-hand fight, driven off, leaving six dead bodies in the hands of the police; our casualties having been 3 policemen wounded, 2 horses killed, 4 carried off, besides other property plundered.

Troops were immediately called for from Abbottabad, and a force consisting of the Peshawar Mountain Battery and 350 5th Gurkhas, under Colonel Rothney of that regiment, marching from Abbottabad four hours after the receipt of the intelligence, reached Oghi, before midnight, on the 31st, having marched 42 miles in 25 hours. Captain Ommaney, the Deputy Commissioner, was with Colonel Rothney's camp at Oghi, and on the 2nd of August he was joined by Akram Khan, the Amb Chief, and a body of his Levies. The Khan of Agror had in the meantime been made a prisoner and sent off under military escort to Abbottabad by the Commissioner, who was also in camp.

On the 4th August, orders were sent for the march of a squadron of the Guide Cavalry from Yusafzai to Abbottabad, and on the 5th the Commissioner and Brigadier-General Wilde recommended a native regiment being sent up from Rawal Pindi, and the working parties of the British regiments on the Murree and Abbottabad road being warned for service.

The following day a requisition was made for 200 of the men of the working parties being at once sent to Abbottabad, and three troops of the native cavalry regiment were asked for from Rawal Pindi. A wing of the 2nd Punjab Infantry was sent from Abbottabad to Agror to reinforce Colonel Rothney; the services of the Kashmir regiments at Mozafarabad being also applied for.

In the meanwhile, the following events had been passing in the Agror Valley.

On the 2nd of August, the enemy threatening the village of Dilbori, a small fort in the village was occupied by the Khan of Amb's men. The Akazais, Hasanzai, and Tikiri Syads, had

Report by Captain Ommaney, Deputy Commissioner.

been ordered to send in deputations to the Deputy Commissioner, but the Akazais refused to come in, saying they had never done so to the Sikhs, and the others replied they would only do so if all came in, and demanded the release of the Khan. The following day Dilbori was again threatened and the Agrori and Swati Levies being sent out to support the Tanawalis, were led into a trap, and suffered pretty severely by being beaten twice down the hill.

On the 5th August, another attack was made on the village, when one or two houses were set on fire, but the enemy were driven off by the Tanawalis with some loss. On the 6th, Dilbori was again attacked, when, according to orders, the Tanawalis retired, setting fire to the fort,—their retirement being covered by Colonel Rothney's detachment which had moved out from Oghi for the purpose. The enemy meantime fired six villages in the valley.

During these days, the relations of the Khan of Agror had all left the valley, with the exception of his eldest son, who, on the night of the 6th, went over to the enemy, setting fire to his village. Before doing so, his flight being assisted by the Akazais of Shahtut and others.

On the 7th a general advance of the enemy took place, the Pariari Syads and Chagarzais acting in the centre of the valley, the Swati clans and those of Nandihar, who had now freely joined, acting along the Kabal Mountain, the Akazais and Khan Khel sections of the Hasanzais acting on the Black Mountain. The Agror and Swati Levies were, with very few exceptions, disorganized and untrustworthy, and Colonel Rothney again moved out and withdrew the Tanawalis from a ridge in front of his camp, (to which they had been withdrawn on the 6th,) to the Manchora ridge still nearer Oghi.

The whole of the Swati tribe beyond the border, except Allai, were now up and rapidly joining the ranks of the enemy, our own Swati Levies were deserting in numbers to their homes; some of the head men of the villages had gone off, whilst those that remained were not to be trusted. Six more villages close to Manchora had been burnt, and the rear of Colonel Rothney's position was threatened.

On the 8th, Colonel Rothney again moved out to cover the withdrawal of some advanced Tanawali pickets to Manchora and to the ridge to the north of Oghi, which had been shamefully abandoned by the Manserah Levies the night before. The Amb men were the only Levies to be relied on, and Colonel Rothney said he could not speak too well in praise of the conduct of the Khan of that place. During the day there was a skirmish at Manchora, when the Tanawali horse made a most gallant charge up the hill, but were ultimately driven out of Manchora, which was fired as well as two other villages.

Demi-official letter from
Colonel Rothney.

Report by Captain
Ommaney.

On the 9th, Colonel Rothney was reinforced by the head-quarter wing of the 2nd Panjab Infantry; 200 men of the working parties (1-19-Regiment) having come down to Abbottabad.

On the 10th the villages at the foot of the Susal Pass were burnt by the enemy. Colonel Rothney had no cavalry in his camp, and he could do little more than act on the defensive; but his great anxiety was in regard to his communications with Pakli, as the Susal Pass was only held by Levies, on whom no reliance could be placed. However, on the 11th the pass was occupied by the 2nd Gurkhas from Rawal Pindi, when reinforcements, consisting of detachments, 2nd Panjab infantry and 5th Gurkhas, and a wing of the 16th Bengal Cavalry, arrived at Oghi, where the enemy were making demonstrations from time to time against the camp.

On the 12th, Colonel Rothney hearing that the enemy had determined to make a combined attack upon his camp, resolved to take the initiative. Accordingly, early in the morning of the 12th, he moved out with the Mountain Battery, 50 16th Bengal Cavalry and 350 Infantry, in the direction of Banda, where the enemy were strong,—two Mountain guns and detachments of cavalry and infantry were

Demi-official letter from
Colonel Rothney.

left as a guard for camp, a detachment of 50 Sabres of the 16th Bengal Cavalry under Captain Ross sweeping round the valley.

The enemy were in large clusters at Banda, Phag, all along the base of the Kabal Hill, and along the spur running down to Manchora, when Colonel Rothney driving them from Kot and Russada, they took up a position beyond the former place. After some skirmishing, the enemy were driven up a spur of the Kabal Mountain, where they made a stand in force on a small mound covered thickly with brushwood; Colonel Rothney then ordered a rush to be made on it by two companies of the 5th Gurkhas, and one company 2nd Panjab Infantry, supported by some Tanawali sowars, and covered by the fire of the Mountain guns under Major Hughes. From this position the enemy were driven with scarcely any resistance, and fled in all directions over the Kabal spur, when Akram Khan, the Amb Chief, acting without orders, with a body of his sowars followed by a few footmen made a gallant dash up and along the spur of the Kabal down to the hill overlooking Manchora.

Colonel Rothney then withdrew his troops to camp without any molestation on the part of the enemy. He stated he had received able assistance on this as on all occasions from Major Hughes, commanding the Hazara Mountain Train; and that he was indebted to Captain Ross, commanding the detachment 16th Bengal Cavalry, Captain Tyndal, commanding detachment 2nd Panjab Infantry, and Captain Codrington, commanding detachment 5th Gurkhas; as also to Captain Ommaney, Deputy Commissioner, who had tendered his services when the troops moved out.

The casualties had been—

Peshawar Mountain Battery—Major Hughes wounded.*

2nd Panjab Infantry—two sepoy severely wounded.

5th Gurkhas—Colonel Rothney slightly wounded.

” two sepoy severely wounded.

Levies—six men, two horses wounded.

The enemy having some thirty killed and wounded.

Whilst the detachment, 16th Bengal Cavalry, was moving round the valley, the villagers and a body of Levies seeing a support so near, attacked and recovered a lot of cattle which the enemy were driving off from the village of Shamtanah, when 7 of the enemy were killed and 2 Chagarzais made prisoners.

A few days before these events, the Deputy Commissioner had given permission

Report by Captain Ommaney, Deputy Commissioner.

to the Chief of Amb to hold communications with his partizans amongst the Hasanzais, which not only had the effect of causing suspicion of them in the minds of the rest of the enemy, but brought about their taking no active part in the proceedings of the 12th. By 3. p. m. of that day not a flag or an enemy was to be seen in the valley, although the enemy's numbers had previously been estimated at some 3,000, and from this time no further attempts were made in the Agror Valley.

The effects of this engagement, the arrival of British troops at Abbottabad, further reinforcements at Ogghi, and the arrival of the Kashmir regiments in the Pakli Valley, enabled

General Wilde on the 16th August to report that the safety of the Hazara Province was secured, and that he only awaited the arrival of reinforcements to carry out any punitive measures ordered.

Twenty-one British villages in the valley had been burnt; the losses are given in the Appendix, amounting in the Levies (who numbered on an average 900) to 10 killed and 50 wounded, with 12 horses killed or carried off, and 12 wounded; whilst in the police, whose strength averaged 79, 3 had been wounded, with 6 horses killed or carried off, and 5 wounded.

A feeling of uneasiness was at this time perceptible amongst the tribes *Trans-Indus*, and news-writers from Kabul, Peshawar, and Swat, agreed in prophesying coming disturbances instigated from Swat along the Peshawar border, where for many months the tribes of Buner and Swat had been blockaded, owing to the Salarzai portion of the Bunerwals having, in February 1867, had the audacity to attack and burn the British village of Spirzai

Despatch from Quarter-Master General.

in Yusafzai; the Commander-in-Chief therefore determined, instead of weakening the garrison of Peshawar or drawing troops from the posts along the border, to supply the force for operations, which the Supreme Government considered would have to be ultimately undertaken from Hazara, from the rear stations in the Panjab, and from the North-Western Provinces; whilst the whole front of the border stations which was held by the regular troops in Peshawar, and by the Panjab force along the border, was preserved intact.

D-F. Royal Horse Artillery.
E-19 Royal Artillery.
2-24 " "
1-6 Regiment.
1-19 " "
2 Companies 77th Regiment.
16th Bengal Cavalry.
2nd Gurkha regiment.
24th Native Infantry.

It was further the Commander-in-Chief's object to show such an overwhelming body of troops in the disturbed districts, as not only to render opposition unavailing, but to convince the tribes by the first demonstration, that to offer further opposition in arms would be madness. Accordingly, the troops in Rawal Pindi (as per margin) were at once transferred

to Hazara; (the arrival of some of these troops in Hazara has already been alluded to).

On its march to Abbottabad, the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, had 38 men struck down by heat apoplexy, 8 of whom died.

Letter from Officer commanding 1-6th.

The 20th Native Infantry marched a distance of 232 miles from Lahore to Abbottabad, in ten days, in the month of August. The 38th foot moved in like manner from Sealkote, and finally reached Darband. The 1st and 4th Gurkhas coming from the distant hill stations of Bukloh and Darra Sala, emulated the exertions of the above corps and joined General Wilde in a wonderfully short space of time, considering the distance traversed. The 31st Native Infantry marched a distance of 422 miles, and two companies Sappers and Miners actually covered nearly 600 miles by forced marches in twenty-nine days!

Other regiments, as per margin, left their several stations of Cawnpore, Allygbur, Umritsur, Lahore, and Campbellpore, and took post at Rawal Pindi as the immediate reserve, with the exception of the 9th Bengal Cavalry, which was moved on to Darband. The Commander-in-Chief recorded, that when it was recollected that all

30th Native Infantry.
19th " "
23rd " "
9th Bengal Cavalry.
20th Hussars.

these necessary movements were carried through in the deadly heats of August and September, it was impossible to exaggerate the alacrity of the officers and soldiers, or the efficiency of the Commissariat ~~Department~~, aided by the Civil Officers.

A branch line of Electric Telegraph had been laid down between Rawal Pindi and Abbottabad, and on the 24th September the force was disposed as follows :—

Disposition.	Troops.	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Guns.
	Staff, &c.	18
	D. F. Royal Horse Artillery	7	127	172	6
	E. 19th Royal Artillery	3	75	70	4
	2-24th Royal Artillery	5	74	...	5½ { inch mortars.
	Hazara Mountain T. Battery	4	151	102	4
	Peshawur do. do.	4	151	77	4
	1st Battalion, 6th Foot	31	594
	1st do. 19th do.	29	710
Agror— Officers, 166 Men, 7,952 Horses, 811 Guns, 24	1st Gurkha Regiment	8	650
	2nd do. do.	8	650
	4th do. do.	8	649
	5th do. do.	7	482
	3rd Sikh Infantry	7	638
	2nd Panjab do.	6	634
	20th do. do.	8	705
	24th do. do.	7	634
	Nos. 2nd and 7th Companies } Sappers and Miners	2	150
	Detachment Telegraph Sappers	1	44
	16th Bengal Cavalry	2	186	186	...
	Guide Cavalry	1	130	130	...
	Levies and Police	...	518	74	...
Manserah— Men, 44 Horses, 12	16th Bengal Cavalry	...	12	12	...
	Police Contingent	...	32
Abbottabad— Officers, 5 Men, 694 Horses, 147	16th Bengal Cavalry	...	37	33	...
	19th do. do.	1	114	114	...
	77th Foot	4	165
	Police Contingent	...	378
Pakli and Kunar Valleys— Men, 1,200 Guns, 2	Troops of the Maharajah of Kash- mir	...	1,200	...	2
	
Holding outposts and communi- cations— Men, 1,100 Horses, 66	Levies and Police	...	1,100	66	...
	
Darband— Officers, 30 Men, 1,353 Horses, 228	38th Foot	19	490
	9th Bengal Cavalry	5	228	228	...
	31st Bengal Infantry	6	635
In reserve at and moving on Rawul Pin- dee— Officers, 34 Men, 2,184 Horses, 264	Depôts of 1-6th Foot	1	172
	Ditto of 1-6th Foot	1	27
	20th Hussars	15	251	264	...
	16th Bengal	...	29
	19th Panjab Infantry	7	580
	24th do. do.	...	88
	30th do. do.	5	621
	23rd Pioneers	5	389
	2nd Gurkhas	...	27
Total		235	14,527	1,528	26

General patch. Des.

The force was divided into two brigades, the details of which are given in the Appendices A, B.

With regard to the plan of operations, on the 25th August, Major-General Wilde had submitted the following recommendations. The enemy were, he said, were thus divided—

I.—Hasanzais, Akazais, and Mada Khels (all Pathans).

II.—Pariari Syads, Chagarzais.

III.—Swatis (not Pathans.)

The first three are of one family, and are three clans of the tribe Isazais; all have lands on both banks of the River Indus; the two first chiefly on the Cis-Indus, and the latter almost entirely on the Trans-Indus bank. The Pariari Syads possess some valuable villages on the north-western slopes of the Black Mountain, and are an influential sect, and employ the poorer classes of the Chagarzais as their cultivators.

The Chagarzais are a powerful tribe, inhabiting the lands on both banks of the Indus to the north of the Akazais, are many of them traders, and had never hitherto come into contact with the British Government.

The Swatis inhabit the independent valleys of Pakli, Nandihar, Deshi, Alahi, and Takot; they are all the same race, and connected with our own subjects of the valleys of Agror, Pakli, Konsh, and Bogarmang; in fact the whole of Upper Hazara is Swati: a line drawn on the map from Manserah to Garhi Habib Ula, and again from Manserah through the Susal Pass along the crest of the Black Mountain to Kungali on the north-west corner of Agror includes the lands of the Swatis.

With regard to the Hasanzais, they had not been as hostile (with the exception of the Khan Khel section) as the rest of the enemy. They had been defeated in 1852, and the good influence of the Khan of Amb having been brought to bear on them, they were already sending in to the Commissioner, saying they desired to treat. The Swatis, too, were also petitioning to be allowed to treat, and with the punishment of the independent tribes beyond the border, Major General Wilde considered quiet would again be brought about. He proposed that, making the valley of Agror the base of his operations, a force should ascend to the tops of the Black Mountain which dominate all the spurs running north and west towards the River Indus on which the land of the Akazais and Chagarzais are situated; the Hasanzais lands being situated on the more southern slopes. At the same time a corps of observation was to be placed at Darband, as a moral support to the Khan of Amb, to distract the attention of the enemy, and to cut off, if possible, the retreat of the Trans-Indus tribes if they crossed the river to aid their brethren on this side.

The application of the Commissioner for the employment of a punitive force was warmly supported by the Panjab Government, the Lieutenant-Governor saying it was absolutely necessary, for the security of the frontier and the vindication of the British character, that the clans engaged in this outrage should be suitably punished for their invasion of British territory and their attempt to destroy the police force in Oghi, and that even if the Swatis should give in before the force moved on the Black Mountain, it was most essential after the Pathan tribes had been dealt with, that the unsubdued Swatis tribes generally, including those of Agror itself, should be made fully to understand, by an exhibition of military force, that their habitations can be visited and laid waste by us, if they should force such a course on us.

The Government of India fully acquiesced in the necessity of giving such a lesson to the offending tribes as would teach them to respect British territory for the future.

But whilst the Governor General in Council fully approved of the proposal to undertake an expedition against these tribes, and any others who might join

in helping them against the British Government, he remarked, "it is obviously very advisable that the efforts of the avenging force should be limited to what is essentially necessary to accomplish the object in view, as well as to what may be feasible with reference to the character of the mountainous country in which operations will have to be carried on, and its general accessibility to the troops. Care should be taken to respect the possessions of all adjacent tribes who may not have joined, or who may subsequently not join the enemy; and should it be necessary to march through any portion of their lands, arrangements should be made, as far as may be practicable, to give them assurance beforehand that no hostile measures against them are intended." The proclamations issued by the Commissioner, both to the Cis- and Trans-Indus tribes, are given in the Appendix G.

In his dispatch Major Pollock said it would be difficult to explain how slowly the tribes accepted the fact that our long suffering Government was really bent on coercing the border and calling them to account; and there seems no room to doubt but that the Khan of Agror had continuously led the tribes to believe that nothing would induce the Government to sanction a punitive expedition. When, however, our preparations and the formal declaration of our intentions altered their views, the people of Tikri and Nandihar spontaneously proffered payment of fines to expiate their offence, and even commenced to apportion amongst the members of their tribes, according to the means of each, the sums which they were led to suppose would be required of them; and by the time the Hazara force was prepared to advance, the representatives of these two tribes had come in, and engaged to hold aloof, sending hostages to accompany our troops during their ascent up the Black Mountain.

The Hasanzais, who had, as already stated, entered into friendly communication with the Tanawali Chief as far back as the 10th or 11th of August, and had consequently held aloof from the affair of the 12th idem, similarly sent in representatives with apologies for those of their tribe who had offended, and with the assurance of their willingness to abide by the terms of their engagement entered into with Colonel Coxe at Darband at the close of the Ambeyla campaign.

It was true that they had not acted against us as a tribe, and there was force in what they urged, that in August they actually prevented their Trans-Indus brethren, Mada Khels and others, from crossing to the Hazara bank and joining in the attack on the Agror detachment; that this was the case Major Pollock had ascertained reliably from other independent sources.

Although the tribe was not, as it endeavoured to make out, free from blame, Major Pollock felt justified, looking to the importance of detaching them from the other tribes, in dealing leniently with them. They were directed, if sincere in their professions of friendship and submission, to tell off representatives to accompany the force through their country, and warned that, in the event of resistance being offered to our troops, they would be liable to the destruction of their villages and crops, and their representatives would be detained in custody.

Another significant proof of the overawing effect of the force assembling in Agror was afforded by the gradual return into British territory of the families and relations of the deported Khans, Atta Muhammad and Alladad Khan. The adjacent hills no longer afforded them safe asylum, and they preferred surrendering themselves to seeking shelter Trans-Indus.

But the movement of the troops towards the frontier, and their gradual concentration in Hazara, had, even before any offensive movement had taken

The Akhund of Swat, conscious of past deeds deserving of retribution, evidently conceived objects on our part beyond the punishment of the immediate offenders on the Black Mountain. As our preparations appeared rather to threaten the Valley of Swat, the Akhund immediately took action against the Wahabi Hindustanis so long located on the slopes of the Mahaban, and headed by a chief generally stated to be Feroz Shah, son of the last king of Delhi.

On the 26th of August, a large force of Swatis were reported to have attacked and defeated the Wahabi Hindustanis, whose leader forsook them, and fled, it was said, towards Kabul, and have further driven these malcontents from place to place until they sought for refuge in the country of the Chagarzais, Trans-Indus, east of the Buner Valley. At the same time, at the dictum of the same high sacerdotal authority, the Salarzai Bunerwals, already referred to as under blockade for the burning of Spirsai, came in and sought terms of forgiveness from the British civil authorities in Yusafzai.

The troops in Hazara had, however, still to deal with the large Chagarzai tribe (Pathans), Akazai (Pathans), with the Deshi and Takot Swatis, the Pariari Syads and their followers, and not improbably with the Hindustani fanatics, and large bodies of Trans-Indus Pathans.

By the end of September the preparations for an advance were completed; the sick and weakly men were to be left at Oghi, where the camp remained standing, under the command of Colonel Rothney, c.s.i. The two Dogra regiments moved into the valley of Agror, to hold the following posts during the expedition, viz.:—

The Jalgali Pass, the Susal Pass, and the camp at Oghi.

The orders regarding the equipment of the force, &c., are given in Appendix E.

First day's operations.

At daybreak on the 3rd October the force marched out from the camp at Oghi. One day's cooked rations were carried in havresacks by the troops, and seven days' supplies for the whole force were carried on mules.

The object of the first day's operations was to occupy the Jalgali Pass, leading from the valley of Agror into those of Tikri and Nandihar belonging to the independent Swatis, so as to secure through the Kungali village a line of communication with Oghi. The village of Kungali is situated a short distance up a spur of that name, by which it was intended one of the columns should ascend the Black Mountain. To effect these objects, it was essential to carry the hills on both sides of the Pass. Moreover, the movement would at once test the sincerity of the professions of neutrality which had lately been made by the Swatis of Tikri and Nandihar, as, since the commencement of the hostilities, the enemy had always defiantly shown themselves on these hills.

Brigadier-General Vaughan, c. B., with the troops marginally noted, advancing by the direct road from Oghi as far as the village of Bagrian, situated at the foot of one of the spurs of the mountain, the 1-6th Royal Regiment and Peshawar Mountain Battery were halted, whilst the 2nd Gurkhas, in skirmishing order, supported by the 3rd Sikh Infantry, advanced up the Kiarkot Mountain, the crest of which was reached at 11-30, a few long shots only being fired by the enemy.

Major-General Wilde's Despatch.

Operations of the 2nd Brigade.

Brigadier-General Vaughan's Despatch.

Peshawar Mountain Train.

1-6th Royal Regiment.

2nd Gurkha „

3rd Sikh Infantry.

In the course of the afternoon the Kiarkot Mountain was occupied by the Levies, when these two regiments moved to the village of Kilagai and bivouacked for the night preparatory to the ascent, the following day, of the Black Mountain by the Sambalbut spur, the remainder of the 2nd Brigade joining Brigadier-General Vaughan at Kilagai.

Brigadier-General Bright with the following troops:—

Operations of the 1st
Brigade.
Brigadier-General Bright's
Despatch.

1-19th Regiment,
1st Gurkha Regiment,
20th Panjab Infantry,
Hazara Mountain Battery,

moved, covered by the 20th Panjab Infantry, on the village of Kungali, up to which point no opposition was offered by the enemy, but on arrival at Kungali the enemy began to collect on a height above it. Although Brigadier-General Bright had received no instructions to proceed further than Kungali, he determined to continue his advance to prevent the enemy collecting in large numbers, which they had not yet done, and driving them before him, Brigadier-General Bright reached the position of "Mana-ka-Dana" about mid-day, where, it being easily defensible, he determined to remain the night.

Mana-ka-Dana is a shoulder of the Kungali spur, rising to a point in the centre, from which the ground descends to a small plateau, and then dips again at a steep angle until it joins a narrow and nearly level ledge connecting it with the continuation of the ascent. The right of the ridge was very steep and broken, and thickly wooded. The high point in the centre was occupied by the 20th Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, C. B., and the small plateau beneath was held by strong picquets from that regiment. The Hazara Mountain Battery was on the ridge in rear, facing the village of Shatut. On the right rear of the peak the Billankot spur joins the Kungali spur. This approach was held by the 1st Gurkhas under Major Rawlins, with the 1-19th Regiment in support of them and of the guns.

The troops had not long halted before the enemy began to fire upon the advanced picquets from the wooded and broken ground on the right flank, when some marksmen of the 1-19th under Lieutenant Bennett, Musketry Instructor, were sent to assist in dislodging them, the superior range of the Enfields and the good practice of the men having a telling effect.

As dusk approached, the enemy again commenced firing, and a little before nightfall made a really determined attack on the advanced picquets, but it was gallantly repulsed.

As the first brigade pressed on to "Mana-ka-Dana," the reserve and

Movements of the reserve
and head-quarters.

Major-General Wilde's
Despatch.

head-quarters moved forward and occupied the village of Kungali, with the 5th Gurkha Regiment posted in advance to maintain the communication with that brigade, four hundred of the Kashmir troops with some wall pieces having moved out from Oghi to

hold the Jalgali Pass.

From the increasing boldness of the enemy, General Bright supposed that, having now ascertained our line of approach, they were collecting in numbers and really intended to dispute our advance in earnest; he accordingly applied for reinforcements, and the 5th Gurkhas under Major Close

General Bright's Despatch.

Attacks on Mana-ka-Dana during night.

were pushed on, reaching Mana-ka-Dana about midnight. In the meanwhile Colonel Brownlow, who was with the advanced picquets, had been reinforced by two guns from the Hazara Mountain Battery, and supported by four Companies, 1-19th. The guns did good service, as by shelling the ridge

although some demonstrations of a renewed attack were made, none of a really determined character took place; our loss having been two killed and six wounded.

On the 5th Gurkhas being sent forward, their place was taken by the 2nd Major-General Wilde's Panjab Infantry, two hundred of the Kashmir troops being brought up at the same time to Kungali.

Second day's operations.

Major-General Wilde had originally intended to ascend to the crest of the mountain in three columns, No. 1 Brigade advancing by the Kungali, while the 2nd Brigade and Levies moved up the Sambalbut and Barchur spurs respectively as a diversion.

But the 1st Brigade having already gained the very advanced position of Mana-ka-Dana, the necessity for carrying out this operation in its entirety passed away; moreover, Mana-ka-Dana afforded an excellent temporary base for operations against the Chita Batr and Machai peaks, and the 2nd Brigade was therefore ordered to abandon the line of advance up the Sambalbut spur and support the 1st Brigade, leaving the Levies to carry out their part in the original plan of moving up the Barchur spur; and at 2 A.M. on the 4th, the 2nd Brigade moved on to Mana-ka-Dana. As the day dawned, the enemy were observed to draw off from Brigadier-General Bright's position to their own, which was on a high grassy knoll, some eight hundred yards in front of Mana-ka-Dana, where they had erected an abattis with small stone breastworks below.

The approach to this knoll was along a narrow ridge connecting it with the Mana plateau, and below this ridge to the right, as well as around the knoll, was a dense forest of fir, and arrangements were made at once by Major-General Wilde to carry this position.

Covered by the fire of the D Battery, F Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery,* which had come up on elephants, the 1st Brigade, under Brigadier-General Bright, moved out in the order marginally noted; after advancing some distance the Mountain Batteries came into action on the ridge, and a heavy artillery fire being thus directed on the enemy's position, as the 1st and 5th Gurkhas ascended the knoll and entered the abattis, but few of its defenders remained to contest it. Continuing his advance with the Brigade, Brigadier-General Bright reached Chita Batr about 3-30 P. M.

The last part of the road was nearly impracticable, and two mules of the Mountain Batteries were killed by falling down precipices.

The casualties in the 1st Brigade were —

20th Panjab Infantry, 2 men wounded.

1st Gurkhas, 3 „ „

5th „ 2 „ „

The ground on the summit of the Chita Batr peak was surrounded by thickly wooded ravines, and breastworks were at once thrown up to resist an attack, in which work two companies of Sappers afforded material assistance.

Whilst these operations were going on, the Levies under Shazada Ibrahim Sadozai were ascending the Barchur spur. Near its summit they met with a faint resistance on the part of the enemy, from which five casualties occurred; but

Report of Major F. Pollock, Commissioner.

* A few rockets were also fired; but being shot, rockets were not found of great use on this

the enemy retiring, the Levies joined the 1st Brigade at Chita Batr and bivouacked there for the night.

On the night of the 4th, the Head-Quarters and the 2nd Brigade (with the exception of the Peshawar Mountain Battery, temporarily attached to the 1st Brigade) bivouacked at Mana-ka-Dana, the 2nd Gurkha Regiment and 3rd Sikh Infantry being thrown forward to occupy the breastworks from which the enemy had been driven in the morning (the "knolls") and to keep open communication with the 1st Brigade.

Third day's operations.

On the morning of the 5th, the 1st Brigade, which was reinforced by the 2nd Gurkhas, and with which Brigade were both the Mountain Batteries, was ordered to advance from Chita Batr along the crest of the mountain for the capture of the "Machai Peak," five miles distant.

There had been great difficulty in procuring water at Chita Batr, and the rations for the British troops had been delayed owing to the badness of the roads; so, until the men could get their breakfast, General Bright detached the 20th Panjab Infantry and 5th Gurkhas to take possession of a hill which intervened between Chita Batr and Machai, called Doda, and from which the enemy had fired upon the troops the preceding evening. At noon the remainder of the Brigade marched off, and joining these two regiments, proceeded towards Machai, the 2nd Panjab Infantry being left as baggage and rear guard.

From Doda the road descends to the Machai Gali, flanked on each side by wooded ravines and broken ground. After descending about a mile, it opens out into a small level space, divided by a low rocky ridge from the base of the Machai Mountain. The ravines and broken ground about the descent and plateau were held in considerable force by the enemy, who opened a fire upon the advancing troops; but the fire of the Mountain guns, which came into action by alternate batteries, and the determined rush of the 20th Panjab Infantry, supported by the 5th Gurkhas, soon drove them off.

On reaching the rocky ridge at the end of the plateau, the 20th and 5th Gurkhas were halted under cover, whilst arrangements were being made for carrying the Machai Peak.

Major-General Wilde stated that he had never, in the border hills, seen such a naturally strong and defensible position as this peak. The ascent of the mountain was steep and rugged in the extreme. It could only be ascended with a narrow front, as the ground on the left is precipitous, and on the right thickly wooded. General Bright's arrangements for its attack were as follow:—

The two Mountain Batteries were brought into action in rear of the ridge where the two leading regiments were halted. The 20th Panjab Infantry were to lead the advance closely supported by the 5th Gurkhas, with the 1st Gurkhas one hundred yards in rear, and the 1-19th in reserve.

Covered by a most accurate and effective fire from the Mountain Batteries the troops advanced, but the enemy retired as the troops pushed on, and with only eight casualties the position was taken, the enemy flying down the spurs into the valley bordering the Indus.

Whilst this assault was going on, the enemy, who had been dislodged from the gully, crept round the ravines to the rear, and commenced firing into a

company of the 5th Gurkhas left in support of the guns; but these being reinforced by four companies of the 1-19th, soon drove off the enemy—

General Bright's dispositions for the night were as follow :—

The 5th Gurkhas held an advanced position of the Machai Peak somewhat lower than the peak itself. The 20th Panjab Infantry, the 5th Gurkhas, and the Hazara Mountain Battery, were in the centre of the position on the Machai, with the 1-19th on a shoulder of the hill about 100 yards in rear, the plateau below being held by the 2nd Panjab Infantry and the Peshawar Mountain Battery.

The whole of the troops were employed, whilst daylight lasted, in improving the defences.

The losses during the day had been—5th Gurkhas, one killed and two wounded; 20th Panjab Infantry, five wounded.

The remainder of the Hazara Field Force was echelloned as follows :—

At Chita Batr the 2nd Gurkhas (which had been sent up there from the 2nd Brigade) and 800 Levies.

At the Knolls, 3rd Sikh Infantry.

At Mana-ka-Dana Field Force head-quarters, remainder of 2nd Brigade,

D. F. R. H. A., 2-24 Royal Artillery and Commissariat stores.

The night passed off with but little annoyance from the enemy. Below rain fell, but on the Machai Peak, which was 10,200 feet above the sea level, the night was bitterly cold with snow as well as rain, and for the troops, who were without tents, it was one of great discomfort.

That so little opposition had been shown on the part of the enemy, Major General Wilde attributed to the following circumstances :—

1st.—That the tribes never believed that the troops would ever have attempted the ascent of the Black Mountain, where no roads existed, and where they had to find their way by paths through dense forests, and over slopes broken up by huge masses of rock, or intersected by deep ravines.

2nd.—That these tribes had never before been exposed to artillery fire.

3rd.—That knowing the Swatis of Tikri and Nandihar were the original offenders, and seeing the ease with which those valleys could be overrun, the Black Mountain tribes believed that operations would be carried on against them alone. Another cause being that no halt or check had occurred in the advance to the highest peak of the mountain.

October 6th.—On the preceding evening only a scanty supply of water had

General Bright's Despatch. been got on the Machai Peak, but a good spring was now found on the eastern slope beneath the shoulder occupied by the 1-19th. The supply was increased by opening fresh springs at the same spot, and by forming tanks, and eventually an ample supply for the whole force was obtained. Water was also found, but in small quantities near the ground occupied by the 5th Gurkhas. A supply of good spring water had been found at Chita Batr and also at the Doda Hill, and

General Wilde's Despatch. Major-General Wilde, whose head-quarters were now established on the Machai, felt that, located on the most commanding plateau of the range, with seven days' food and abundance of water, with the line of communication with Agror secure, he had every reason to expect that the objects of Government, viz., "the vindication of the British character, and the future security of the frontier from invasion," would be attained. Beyond the mere fact of our prestige among the hill men having

been considerably raised by the late achievements, he had in his hands the power of inflicting considerable damage and loss on all the villages of the Pathan tribes situated on the slopes near the top of the mountain; and while the troops held the ridge and upper spurs, it was easy to let loose the Hazara Levies—men as light-footed as the hill men themselves—for this work of destruction.

The 6th was passed in making a road to the water, and up the crest of the mountain to enable supplies and ammunition to be moved up; the 1st Gurkhas were also moved to reinforce the position held by the 5th Gurkhas.

October 7th.—The enemy having made no signs of submission, Major-General Wilde, in concurrence with the Commissioner, ordered the 24th Panjab Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cave, to move down the Bilankot spur covered by the D. F. R. H. A. from the camp at Mana-ka-Dana to protect a large body of levies who had been sent down to burn many of the Pariari Syad's villages; this was accomplished with but little opposition, the troops and levies being back at their bivouacks before night.

On the 6th, the Deshi Jirgh (Independent Swatis) had come in to the Commissioner, and submitted to the terms already given to their Tikri and Nandihar brethren, when they repeated what they had formerly asserted, that their country being so close to that of the Pathans, they had not dared to act in opposition to them until we had shown ourselves in a commanding position in the Pathan country.

This day the head-quarters, 2nd Brigade, with the Mortar Battery (2-24th Royal Artillery) and the 1-6th Royal Regiment, General Wilde's and Commissioner's Despatches. were advanced from Mana-ka-Dana to Doda, and arrangements were made to carry out more extensive punitive operations against the Pariari Syads; but on the representation of the Jirghahs in camp that the Syads had determined to submit, the orders for the movements of the troops were countermanded.

October 8th and 9th.—On the 8th and 9th, the Syads, Chagarzai and Akazai headmen, waited on the Commissioner, leaving Commissioner's Despatch. no tribe unrepresented, but the Takhot section of the Swatis and the Allaiwals, who as a tribe had held aloof from the attack on Agror.

During the 9th, the 24th Panjab Infantry were moved up to the Machai Gali to assist in the protection of the Commissariat stores, and on the same day Lieutenant-Colonel Atlay, General Wilde's Despatch. Commanding Royal Artillery, succeeded in bringing two elephants up to the top of the Machai, establishing the fact that, if required, the field guns could have been brought up there also.

October 10th.—On the 10th, assembling the Jirghahs, Major F. R. Pollock the Commissioner, accepted their submission, and explained to the Akazais, who, as in the expedition in 1852, had taken a leading part against us, that the village of Shatut, on an eastern spur of the range, and within the British border, would in future be held by them as British subjects and assessed; hitherto, they had been allowed, as in the time of the Sikhs, to hold this rent-free and as an independent village, in return for which they had been uniformly insolent in their tone towards us, and had for years past readily afforded an asylum to bad characters of the Hazara District. He also required their Jirghah with the others to accompany our force, in token of submission, and as hostages for their good behaviour, during our march through their country to the Agror Valley, *via* the Independent Swati tracts of Tikri and Nandihar.

With regard to more stringent measures not having been imposed upon the tribes, Major Pollock said.—

“To persons unacquainted with the politics of the border, and the result of former expeditions, it might well appear, but reasonable, that more stringent terms should be imposed; and although I am perfectly satisfied that, in acting as I did, I best served the interests of Government, which had entrusted to me a heavy and responsible task; and although I am aware that my proceedings met with the full approbation of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor, who has from the commencement of our Hazara disturbance so generously and cordially afforded us his support;—there are reasons why I should, even at the risk of being tedious, explain proceedings which, to those unacquainted with the circumstances, might seem to have been characterized by undue leniency.

“In dealing with the Pathan tribes of the border, on an occasion like the present, our object should be rather to effect what is called, in oriental phraseology, “lifting up their purdahs,” than to kill numbers of them, or unceremoniously to impose fines, or to unroof or burn villages, or destroy crops; such punishments, cruel even when rightly directed, fall with the greatest severity on the least guilty members of an offending community, and our best officers, civil and military, have always held similar language.

“As regards this particular expedition, I am satisfied that the aims and objects of Government had been fully attained when our troops had, at a slight sacrifice of human life, established themselves on the most commanding position in the enemy’s country, and that enemy had submitted to us.

“Assuming the question to be put, could we by pursuing a different course to that adopted have secured better results, I unhesitatingly reply in the negative. The tribes are proud, poor, and scattered over a rugged and unproductive country; to have demanded from the heads of such a people, when tendering their submission, fines or compensation, or to surrender to undergo punishment, any of their leaders, would have been to dismiss them to their homes dispirited but desperate men; and had we used our troops in acting against them along the difficult western spurs running down to the Indus, they would have given us no chance of meeting them on equal terms, and the affair would have degenerated into a gurilla warfare, in a country where our troops would in a measure have lost their superiority by reason of their ignorance of locality and inability to act in close order.

“In such operations we should have lost many valuable lives; at best we should have secured no better results than we have actually secured, and at worst it is not too much to say that we might have been in a vastly inferior position; while, in any case, the expenses of the expedition must have been enormously increased.”

During the progress of negotiation, a few flags belonging to the Swatis of Takot were visible on a distant point of the mountain, and their presence gave the troops high hopes of a future encounter. The flags, however, disappeared as soon as the Swatis found that, consequent on their powerful allies, the Pathans, having concluded terms with us, the chance of opposing our troops with success was destroyed.

From the time of the first occupation of the Machai Peak until its evacuation, the force remained undisturbed by the enemy, except by small parties of two or three creeping up under cover and firing at the picquets and sentries at night. The position of the 2nd Panjab Infantry on the plateau below the hill was from the

General Wilde’s Despatch.

General Bright’s Despatch.

nature of the ground most exposed to these attacks, and scarcely a night passed on which they had not a man killed or wounded. During this time the troops were continually employed in improving the defences and making roads to the other positions. The experience gained by the 1-19th in making hill roads during the Summer months (they had been employed with the working parties on the Murree and Abbottabad road) here came into play, and the way in which the regiment butted themselves gave a further proof of the benefit they had derived from being so employed. In a single day they threw up shelter, which would only have required little more labour to have afforded them protection from any kind of weather.

October 11th and 12th.—Terms having been made with the Black Mountain tribes, the 11th and 12th were passed in the withdrawal of the troops and Commissariat stores to Mana-ka-Dana. On the 12th the Machai was finally evacuated. Not a shot was fired, nor was any loss incurred as long as the force was moving in Pathan lands. The deputation of the tribes accompanied the troops and remained from that time to the end, faithful and true to their engagements. On approaching, however, to within a mile of the bivouac at Mana-ka-Dana, an attack was made on the rear guard, consisting of a party of the 2nd Gurkha Regiment, by some of the followers of the Pariari Syads, when that gallant young soldier, Lieutenant Arthur Battye, who was commanding the party, turned on them, inflicting a loss of two killed and several wounded, without any loss on our side. Except this incident, and the cowardly wounding, by the same miscreants, that morning early of a servant of the Commissariat in the forests below Chita Batr, nothing occurred to interrupt the evacuation of the Black Mountain.

From the Machai Peak a most extensive view had been obtained. The panorama begins with the Gandgar and Mahaban Mountains, the Indus running between, and Attock seen far off in the distance through the opening. In the cup of the Mahaban, on the north, nestles the old Hindustani settlement of Malka destroyed in 1863. Prominent is the Ambeyla Pass; from the pass the Valley of Chamla slopes towards the Indus. Next, Mount Illum, the great barrier between Buner and Swat. Away on the far horizon glistens the snow-capped Hindu Kush. Then the valley of Upper Swat and the lofty snowy peaks of the Larun Range beyond the mountains of Kohistan, Kagan, and Kashmir, ending with the well-known Pir Panjal.

On the left bank of the Indus, and about 10 miles off, north and east, lay the Chagarzai village of Judbor, and on the opposite bank, that of Behar, in which one or two tents of the Hindustani fanatics were to be seen, and where the bulk of them, numbering some 600 or 700, were known to be.

It was at one time hoped by the Major-General and the Commissioner that during the course of the operations on the Black Mountain some blow might be inflicted on them. After their expulsion from Buner, they had moved north, and at this time they were known to be in an unsettled state; for a time at Behar on the right bank of the Indus, and then again at Jodbai. But after seeing the country on the western slopes of the Black Mountain, any such enterprise was not in Major-General Wilde's opinion feasible. Had the Hindustanis combined with the Pathan tribes (as there was a fair chance at one time of their doing) to resist our troops, an opportunity of defeating them would have occurred. They could not, however, come to any

agreement with the tribes, and the result was that when the Pathans sued for peace, the Hindustanis began to re-cross the river. To have sent a column against them was impossible, owing to the inaccessible nature of the country near the Indus where they were encamped, and, when terms had been given to the other tribes, to have attempted an attack would have been a breach of our

Report by Major F. engagement. When the Chagarzai Jirgah waited Pollock. on the Commissioner, they voluntarily commenced by

General Wilde's Des. saying they would not give asylum to the fanatics, patch. and to have made their expulsion one of the terms of peace with that tribe would, in the opinion of Major-General Wilde and of the Commissioner, have resulted in prolonging the war without any advantage, since there were no means of cutting off the retreat of these men.

October 13th.—The force halted at Mana-ka-Dana during the 13th, when the Syads were called upon to make reparation for the attack on the rear guard, and the wounding of the Commissariat servant, but without avail.

October 14th.—So on the 14th, when the head-quarters and the rest of the

1st Gurkha, L. I.

2nd P. I.

24th P. N. I.

5th Gurkhas.

General Vaughan's Des- patch.

force, with the exception of four regiments, sent under Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, c. B., to occupy the village of Kungali and the Jalgali Pass, (the Kashmir regiment being sent back to Oghi,) moved down to Chermang in Tikri, a flying column from the 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Vaughan, c. B., consisting of the—

Peshawar Mountain Battery,

1-6th Royal Regiment,

3rd Sikh Infantry,

4th Gurkhas,

Hazara Mountain Train,

with a body of levies, and accompanied by Captain Ommanney as political officer, was detached for the purpose of punishing the Pariari villages on the spur of the Black Mountain of that name.

From the village of Bilankot there was a descent into a deep intervening ravine, crossing which the crest of the Pariari spur was gained by Brigadier Vaughan's detachment, without opposition, after a very laborious ascent. The crest was held by the troops (with the exception of a portion of the 1-16th and the Hazara Mountain Battery which had been left below Bilankot to cover the retirement), whilst the police and levies were employed burning the Pariari village of Garhi; this was effected with very slight opposition, after which the troops were withdrawn to the camp at Chermang without any attempt at molestation by the enemy.

October 15th to 22nd.—On the 15th, the force under Major-General Wilde marched to the village of Tikri, where it was joined by two squadrons, 16th Bengal Cavalry, from Jalgali. The following day was spent in making a road over the Shahbara spur, which divides Tikri from Nandihar. The troops at the Jalgali Pass being employed in improving the road through it. The 1st Gurkhas from Jalgali, and a squadron, 16th Bengal Cavalry, from Tikri, being posted at Chermang to keep open the line of communication on the intended advance on the Nandihar Valley.

On the 17th the force marched to Maidan, in the Nandihar Valley, which was found to be highly cultivated, even high up on the ranges dividing Nandihar from Alahi. In Tikri some little difficulty was at first experienced in re-assuring the people, but as the

Major Pollock's report.

march through it had been attended with no act of oppression or spoliation, the Nandiharis remained quietly in their villages, and firewood, forage, &c., were freely brought into camp. In his despatch, Major-General Wilde adverted to the excellent conduct of the troops, both British and Native: he said that, on entering the valleys of the Independent Swatis, he had announced that as they had submitted as suppliants, and as a fine of Rs. 12,000 had been imposed upon them, all supplies of food and forage were to be paid for, and no plundering could be allowed; and although the transition from war to peace in the feelings of the native soldier is no easy process, yet not a complaint was made, nor a single man punished in the force from the time it left the camp at Oghi till its return.

The 17th and 18th were passed in making reconnoissances towards the Takot country, which were conducted by Major C. C. Johnson, the Assistant Quarter-Master General, as far as the top of the Dubrai Pass 7 miles from camp: the troops being employed in improving the road up the mountain in case an advance on Takot was decided on.

The Takoti Swatis still remained recusant, and it was a question whether they should be coerced or not. At Paimal, a village immediately below the Dubrai Gali, resided Habib Gul, a holy man of great local influence, to whom a summons was sent by Captain Ommanney, the Deputy Commissioner, on the arrival of the reconnoissance at the Dubrai Gali, which he obeyed, accompanied by the headmen of the village and of the Takoti Village of Pomang; and as, later in the day, reliable information was received that Shal Khan, the leading spirit in Takot, had fled across the Indus, it was determined not to undertake any operations against Takot.

The country beyond the Dubrai Pass was the most difficult that could be imagined; the lands of the Takotis were poor; their crops scanty, and unlike the districts of Tikri and Nandihar. No valleys were visible; their principal lands were said to be on the right bank of the Indus. It would have been possible for a force to have moved down and destroyed Takot, a village of two hundred houses on the left bank of the Indus, but the country was so difficult that such a project could not have been safely carried out as a military raid, and to have moved to Takot in force would have occupied many days, and have cost much money for an inadequate object.

On the 19th, the force moved to Pugora at the head of the Nandihar Valley, and a shot having been fired from the hill side after dark, as the rear regiment approached camp, the Malik of the neighbouring villages were arrested and taken on and subsequently released at Oghi, on payment of a fine of Rs. 500 as a punishment for the outrage.

The following day the force re-entered British territory, crossing a low range into the Konsh Valley, a beautiful open plateau about 6,000 feet above the sea. The following day a march was made to Chatra in Konsh, and on the 22nd October the camp at Oghi was reached, the troops having been absent from their tents and baggage since the 3rd.

The Mada Khels and Amazais had taken advantage of the absence of the Khan of Amb and his levies at Agror to attack two of his Trans-Indus villages, Sittana and Gener; and it was felt that there was good reason for apprehending further

assisting those opposed to us. So, before the advance of the force up the Black Mountain, the following troops had been placed at Darband:—

Lieutenant-Colonel Willes, commanding.

7 Companies 38th Regiment.

31st Panjab Native Infantry.

1 Squadron and Head-Quarters, 9th Bengal Cavalry.

Lieutenant Wace, Political Officer.

The measure was in every way successful. The Mada Khels altered their tone on the arrival of the troops; and the civil officer was in a few days able to report that these tribes were apparently willing to settle their disputes with the Amb Chief. They subsequently sent in their jirgahs, and the troops were halted at Darband till the negotiations were closed.

Major-General Wilde commented in the following terms on the conduct of the troops that had been employed on the Black Mountain. He said the force had traversed eighty miles of hill country, through which it had had to make its own roads and carry its own supplies; and he noted the mobility displayed on this occasion by the British regiments, and their capability to partake most efficiently in hill campaigning. Nothing, he said, could exceed the high spirit and energy displayed by both the Royal Artillery and British Infantry: with the exception of one blanket carried for each man, they fared as the Native troops did; and their food did not actually require more carriage than that of the Native troops. The men, too, of the Royal Artillery evinced their aptitude to adapt themselves to duties quite novel to them. The Horse Artillery men of D Battery, F Brigade, packed and unpacked their guns on elephants, and the gunners of 2nd Battery, 24th Brigade, led and tended the mules carrying the mortars; from the first day not a soldier, either British or Native, made a complaint, but cheerfully underwent all the hardships, labour, and exposure incidental to a bivouac.

The officers mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief as deserving favourable notice were Brigadier-General R. O. Bright, and Brigadier-General Vaughan, C. B., and the several Commanding Officers of regiments, *viz.*:—

Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Brownlow, 20th Native Infantry.

„ E. Chippindall, 1-19th Foot.

„ C. O. C. Osborne, 6th Foot.

„ H. T. Macpherson, V. C., 2nd Goorkhas.

„ G. N. Cave, 24th Native Infantry.

Major D. Mocatta, 3rd Sikh Infantry.

„ J. T. Rawlins, 1st Gurkhas.

„ J. A. Tytler, V. C., 4th Gurkhas.

Captain R. Topham, 16th Bengal Cavalry.

„ H. Tyndall, 2nd Panjab Infantry.

„ R. P. B. Campbell, Guides.

“And although not engaged in active operations, Colonel F. A. Willes, C. B., “38th Foot, commanding at Darband, and the Commanding Officers under his “orders (Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Wilson, commanding 31st Native Infantry, “Major H. L. Campbell, commanding 9th Bengal Cavalry)”. The names of the officers of the staff favourably mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief were—

Major C. C. Johnson, Assistant Quarter-Master General.

„ J. Morland, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Johnstone, in charge of the Survey.

Captain W. K. Elles, 38th Foot, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.

Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals, G. E. Morton.

Lieutenant W. B. Holmes, Royal Engineer.

Major W. H. Paget, 5th Panjab Cavalry, Aidé-de-Camp to General Wilde.

Of the Artillery—

Colonel E. Atlay, commanding Royal Artillery.

Major T. Hughes (late in command, Peshawar Mountain Battery).

Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Renny, v. c., D. F., R. A.

Major F. R. DeBude, Hazara Mountain Train Battery.

Captain Minto Elliot, Peshawar Mountain Battery.

„ C. S. Jackson, 2-24th Royal Artillery.

Of the Commissariat Department—

Colonel A. D. Dickens, to whom was due the admirable success of the Commissariat arrangements.

His Excellency most specially recommended to the notice of Government Lieutenant-Colonel O. E. Rothney, commanding 5th Gurkha Regiment of the Panjab Frontier Force.

The Officers commanding the Artillery and the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades had also brought to notice the services of the different Staff Officers under them.

And the following general order was published by the Government of India in regard to these operations:—

“The Governor General in Council cordially concurs with the Commander-in-Chief in highly appreciating the services that have been performed, and desires to thank His Excellency for his able and energetic directions of the military resources of the Government on this occasion. His Excellency in Council wishes also to acknowledge the great exertions of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab, who promptly caused reinforcements to be moved into Hazara, on the serious nature of the outbreak becoming apparent, and who throughout has most actively aided the force by all the means at his command.

“To Major-General Wilde the Government of India is much indebted for his great care in superintending the proper equipment of his force, owing to which it was enabled to operate successfully in most difficult and rugged mountains. His great experience of hill warfare and excellent judgment have caused the duty entrusted to him to be carried out without accident, and in a manner which, beyond its present and immediate effect, will doubtless convince the border tribes that they cannot inflict annoyance on our frontier without rendering themselves liable to punishment, despite the almost inaccessible situation of their villages. It is gratifying to the Governor General in Council to be able to offer his hearty thanks to Major-General Wilde for his conduct in his recent command.

“The valuable and untiring exertions of Major Pollock, the Commissioner, and the services of those under his orders, will be acknowledged in the proper department of the Government; but His Excellency in Council desires here to express his satisfaction at the cordiality and good-will with which Major-General Wilde and Major Pollock acted together prior to, and throughout the operations.

“Brigadier-General Bright and Brigadier-General Vaughan, c. b., have earned the approval of the Government by the manner in which they commanded their respective Brigades, and all the Commanding Officers named in Major-General Wilde's reports deserve the thanks of Government.

“Lieutenant-Colonel Rothney, commanding the 5th Gurkha Regiment, has already received the commendation of the Governor General in Council for his prompt movement to Oghi in July last and for his resolute conduct

in maintaining his position until reinforcements enabled him to drive the enemy from his immediate vicinity.

"The staff of the force and Officers of departments are reported to be deserving of approval for a correct and intelligent performance of their duty, and are therefore entitled to the thanks of the Governor General in Council; but the very important services from the first movement of troops of the principal Commissariat Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Dickens, upon whose exertions the success of the expedition so much depended, demand special recognition which the Governor General in Council is happy to accord.

"The troops employed, British and Native, have exhibited some of the best qualities of soldiers, by their discipline, their cheerfulness, and their active and willing exertions under all circumstances. The opportunity of serious encounter with the enemy was denied them, but there can be no doubt from their whole conduct and from their anxious desire for such opportunity that, had the enemy ventured to make a serious stand, the force would have distinguished itself and inflicted signal punishment on its adversaries.

"As it is, the troops have rendered admirable services in a most difficult country when deprived of tents and many of their usual comforts, and His Excellency in Council offers the best thanks of the Government of India to each of the corps engaged.

"Nor does the Governor General in Council forget that various troops, European and Native, moved with great rapidity from distant stations; some of whom were necessarily kept in reserve and not actively engaged. These troops underwent great fatigue at a most unfavourable season, but pressed forward with ardour in the hope that they might be of use. To all of these, and to the Departmental and Civil Officers by whose exertions they were enabled to quit their stations with promptitude, the Governor General in Council tenders the thanks of the Government.

"His Excellency in Council desires to express his appreciation of the prompt and gallant aid rendered by the Nawab of Amb and his retainers, and of the useful service of the Hazara Levies and Police, some of whom distinguished themselves; and His Excellency would finally acknowledge the assistance rendered by troops of His Highness the Maharajah of Kashmir placed temporarily at the disposal of the British Government and usefully employed by Major-General Wilde."

In his despatch Major-General Wilde had stated that from the first he had been in perfect accord with Major Pollock, the chief Political Officer, and his Deputy, Captain Ommaney, and the Government of India considered that its cordial thanks and acknowledgments were due to Major Pollock for the discretion and judgment manifested by him, and its approval of the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone, Revenue Surveyor, of Captain Ommaney and Lieutenant Wace, were ordered to be conveyed to them.

On the 24th October a durbar was held at Agror by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab, when the title of Nawab was conferred on the young Tanawali Khan, and on the following day the Jirgahs were dismissed to their homes and the prisoners released.

The Khan of Agror had been sent into Rawal Pindi that his conduct might be investigated, when his jaghir was declared forfeited on account of his treasonable conduct, and he was banished to Lahore.

But the raids in the valley did not cease. In July 1869, two hamlets in Agror—Barchar and Gulderi—were burnt by a party of raiders consisting of

Letter from Supreme Government.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

Hasanzais, Pariari Syads and Akazais, partisans of Ata Mahammad, when four of the villagers were killed and seventeen wounded, the raiders being gallantly repulsed by the men of Jaskot, a neighbouring village. In August, Jaskot was attacked, and several of the villagers and a police constable killed.

In consequence of these outrages, a force of the following strength was sent out from Abottabad under the command of Colonel Rothney, C.S.I. :—

$\frac{1}{2}$ Hazara Mountain Battery	...	72 men
4th Panjab Cavalry	...	27 "
3rd Panjab Infantry	...	282 "
5th Gurkhas	...	296 "
Total		... 577 men

and a detachment of the 23rd Panjab Infantry were ordered to march to the Susal Pass to improve the road.

A blockade was established against the offending tribes.

On the 7th October, Colonel Rothney, moving out with the greatest secrecy at 2½ A.M., destroyed the village of Shatut belonging to the Akazais. The troops were delayed between Jaskot and the base of the hills by water-courses and rice cultivation, and Shatut was only reached at 6 A.M. Most of the cattle had been driven off, but a few, with a large amount of property, fell into the hands of the troops. No resistance was attempted, and the troops retired without molestation.

It was now determined that a force should be permanently stationed in the valley of Agror, under a selected officer, sufficient to meet all attacks, and, if possible, to follow up raiders beyond the British border; and an ordinance was passed by the Supreme Government removing the Agror Valley from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, and the operation of the general laws.

During the winter of 1869-70, the valley was unmolested, but as soon as the snow melted on the Black Mountain, raids re-commenced. The first was on the 9th April, when Barchur was attacked by a party of Akazai, and the head man killed. On the 15th, the village of Sambalbut was burnt by Akazais and Khan Khel Hasanzais, and on the 23rd the village of Bolu shared the same fate. As the villages were all situated on the slopes of the Black Mountain, our troops, who were encamped in the valley, were powerless to prevent these outrages, nor could they avenge them without crossing the border and committing the Government to the probability of a frontier expedition; but the presence of the troops undoubtedly prevented more extensive outrages, and secured the safety of the villages in the valley. The force in Agror consisted now of detachments of the 3rd Panjab Infantry and 5th Gurkhas, and 2 Mountain Guns, under Colonel Rothney; and on the 25th April the crops around Shahtut were destroyed by him.

Meanwhile, Captain Wace, the Settlement Officer of Hazara, had been engaged in the preparation of the "record of rights" for the Agror Valley, and had instituted a close enquiry into the nature and history of the landed rights of Ata Muhammad Khan, the ex-Khan of Agror, the result of these enquiries being that Ata Muhammad Khan was pardoned and allowed to return to Agror.

No special responsibility for the peace of the border had devolved upon the Khan by his restoration; his responsibility was merely that of a proprietor of seven-tenths of the valley, bound to act with the utmost loyalty, and support, as far as lay in his power, the civil and military authorities. The

general feeling in Agror, and even beyond the border, was of satisfaction at the restoration of the Khan, and the state of the valley justified the withdrawal of the troops late in the autumn.

Notwithstanding the act of grace by which he was restored to his chiefship, raids did not cease. They were carried out by the Akazais, instigated by the party opposed to the restoration of Ata Muhammad Khan, and the tribe wished to take their revenge for the burning of the village of Shahtut. During the whole year they caused annoyance.

On the 4th of June 1871, about 2 A.M., a raid was made on the villages of Kongu, Gulderi, and Bolu, in Agror, by a party of Akazais, numbering in all about 180 men. The raiders came down in two parties, one of which, numbering about 80 men, under Zarif Khan, partially burnt the village of Kongu, which is situated under the Chita Batr ridge, between Ghorpihar and Attar.

After setting fire to this village, these raiders moved off to join the other body. This second body, numbering probably about 100 men, came down the Barchar spur and attacked Guldheri.

From this village they met with little or no opposition. The men who were garrisoning the towers in the village, after having fired two or three shots, beat a hasty retreat on Jaskot. One of them was, however, wounded by the raiders.

These latter then burnt the whole of Gulderi except the masjid, and then they went to Bolu, which they also set fire to.

In retaliation for this outrage, Ata Muhammad Khan burnt the village of Ali Khan, in Tikri.

This violent and mischievous act on the part of the Khan, who had been prohibited from carrying his quarrels across the border line, brought down upon him the grave displeasure of Government. He was well aware that there was no intention on the part of Government to move troops across the border, yet he deliberately circulated a story to the effect that such an expedition was in preparation; while, by his attack on Ali Khan, he hoped to force the Government to adopt active measures against his enemies.

The military force in Agror was for a time strengthened, and a selected Extra Assistant Commissioner was stationed in Agror to prevent any repetitions of such conduct without the knowledge of the Government. But matters in Agror are as yet far from settled.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

Hazara Field Force.

Major-General A. Wilde, c.B., (commanding Panjab Frontier Force) commanding.

Staff.

Major C. C. Johnson, Assistant Quarter-Master General.

„ J. Morland, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Johnstone, in charge of the Survey.

Captain W. R. Ellis, 38th Foot, D. A. A. General of the Army.

„ F. N. Mackenzie, S. O., P. F. F.

Major W. H. Paget, Aid-de-Camp.

„ A. Fane, Orderly Officer.

Lieutenant Campbell, Orderly Officer.

Captain Holmes, Field Engineer.

Lieutenant J. Armstrong, Assistant Field Engineer, in charge of Telegraph.

G. Morton, Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. D. Dickens, Commissariat Department.

Artillery.

Colonel E. Atlay, commanding.

Major T. Hughes, Orderly Officer.

Lieutenant Stewart, Adjutant.

Mr. McDermote, D. A. C. O. D., in charge of Park.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Brigadier-General O. Bright, commanding.

Captain Evans, Brigade-Major.

Lieutenant Buller, D. A. Q. M. G.

„ Brind, Orderly Officer.

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Major-General J. L. Vaughan, c. B., commanding.

Captain Cockburn, Brigade-Major.

Lieutenant Lockart, D. A. Q. M. G.

„ Macpherson, Orderly Officer.

Captain Graham, D. A. Commissary General.

APPENDIX B.

Summary of Hazara Field Force, exclusive of reserve.

Detail.	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Guns.
Staff, &c., ...	18
Royal Artillery ...	15	276	242	16
Native Mountain Train Artillery ...	8	302	179	8
British Infantry ...	83	1,959
Bengal Sappers and Miners ...	3	194
Native Cavalry ...	9	707	703	...
Native Infantry ...	65	5,677
Troops of Maharaja of Kashmir...	1,200	...	2
Levies and Police	2,028	140	...
Total ...	201	12,343	1,264	26

APPENDIX C.

Numerical list of Casualties, from 30th July to 2nd October 1868, of the Troops composing the Hazara Field Force under the command of MAJOR-GENL. A. WILDE, C. B., C. S. I.

CORPS.	EUROPEANS.						NATIVES.						MULES.	REMARKS.			
	WOUNDED.						KILLED.			WOUNDED.							
	Field Officers.	Captain.	Subalterns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Privates.	TOTAL.	Native Officers.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Drummers.	Sepoys.	TOTAL.		Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Peshawar Mountain Battery	...	1					1										Major Hughes wounded.
2nd Panjab Infantry	...												3	3			
5th Gurkha Regiment	...	1					1						2	2			Lieutenant-Colonel Rothney wounded.
Police	...										1	1					
Levies	...										12	12		42	42		

EUROPEANS ... Wounded 2. NATIVES ... { Killed 13.
Wounded 49.
Total casualties 64.

APPENDIX D.

Numerical list of Casualties, from 3rd to 22nd October 1868, of the Troops composing the Force under the command of MAJOR-GENL. A. WILDE, C. B., C. S. I.

CORPS.	EUROPEANS.						NATIVES.						MULES.	REMARKS.									
	WOUNDED.						KILLED.			WOUNDED.													
	Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Privates.	TOTAL.	Native Officers.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Drummers.	Sepoys.	TOTAL.		Native Officers.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Drummers.	Sepoys.	TOTAL.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing
Peshawar Mountain Battery	1	Lieutenant Unwin wounded.
Hazara " "	1	
1st Gurkha Regiment Native Infantry	6	6	
3rd Sikh Infantry	1	1	
2nd Panjab " "	2	2	2	2	
20th Native Infantry (Panjab)	2	2	...	2	15	17	
5th Gurkha Regiment	1	1	3	3	
Levies	

EUROPEANS ... Wounded 1. NATIVES ... { Killed 7.
Wounded 35.
Since dead 2.

SECTION IV.

APPENDIX E.

Extract from Report on the carriage equipment of Hazara Field Force, under command of Major-General Wilde, C.B., C.S.I., by LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. C. JOHNSON, Officiating Deputy Quarter-Master General, late Assistant Quarter-Master General, Hazara Field Force.

The greatest difficulty experienced was in supplying dooly bearers; and those who were obtained to enable the troops to leave Rawal Pindi deserted on the first opportunity, causing much inconvenience, particularly to the 1-6th foot.

Eventually bearers were obtained from adjoining stations, otherwise the troops would have had great difficulty in advancing from Abbottabad.

As soon as it was determined to assemble a force in Hazara, the civil authorities throughout the Panjab were called upon to collect carriage; and the accompanying statement, marked A, gives the number of each description collected in the several districts. The whole of this carriage was brought on the rolls of the transport kept up for the force. Some was employed to transport considerable quantities of supplies to Hazara, and was paid up and discharged on arrival. Large numbers of camels and mules were rejected, as unfit for service, on arrival at Abbottabad and Oghi, of which no report was made, and the Field Telegraph Department employed a number of camels which were supplied by district officers in bringing up material. The return, however, shows that carriage can be collected on short notice in particular districts of the Panjab.

The annexed table (B) gives the number of dooly bearers, public and private, camels, mules, and elephants, kept up for the Hazara Field Force during the months of August, September, and October. On the 1st November the field force was broken up.

The foregoing remarks and returns refer to the carriage what was kept up for the force generally, but the following observations have reference to the special equipment of the force when it left British territory and commenced scaling the heights of the Black Mountain.

The force was divided into two brigades, which were so equipped as to be capable, if necessary, of acting on different and detached lines of advance. The equipment of each regiment and battery was decided upon after a very careful consideration; the force (except the Darband column) moved into the Agror Valley with its regular equipment of tents and carriage, after which no time was lost in allotting to each regiment its special equipment for seven days' service in the mountains, and on the third day after the last regiment arrived, the force marched from Oghi.

The annexed tabular statement (C) exhibits the equipment of each brigade as it moved from Oghi; and Table D gives the details on which the equipment was calculated. At the last moment it was found convenient to revise the strength of one or two regiments, but the number of ammunition and supply mules remained unaltered.

It was found that this equipment was generally all that could be desired, and that in very few particulars was it capable of improvement.

Ammunition.

The snider ammunition is packed in English boxes, each holding 500 rounds, and four boxes, or 2,000 rounds, were originally detailed for each mule; but it was found necessary to take 100 rounds out of each box to lighten it, and to fill up the space with paper, &c. The boxes are of convenient shape, and four make a

very compact, close sitting load in a salita. They should be fitted with two rope-handles instead of one, to enable two classies, or soldiers, to run with them up hill to the front easily and quickly.

For the enfield and other ammunition, there should always be a very large number of mule boxes ready in magazine at Rawal Pindi; each should hold 800 rounds with caps, and be fitted with three leathern cartouches, with shoulder slings to hold each 270 rounds with caps. Much difficulty was experienced in getting a sufficiency made up in time; they are essentially necessary in hill warfare, in order that supplies of ammunition may be taken to the front over ground impracticable for laden mules.

If these cartouches are provided, 40 rounds per man in pouch will be generally found sufficient, and as much as the men can conveniently carry up a hill in front of an enemy. The cartouches have been in use with the Panjab Frontier Force for some time.

The ammunition boxes should be made narrower than the present pattern; they should be lighter and easier to carry, and there would be less chance of their knocking against projecting rocks and trunks of trees on narrow paths.

So long as our troops are armed with different descriptions of weapons, the boxes should have distinguishing colors, whereby they may be easily recognized on the hill side.

It was found necessary to detail some of the Government mules belonging to the regiments of the Panjab Frontier Force for service with the mortar battery, as the hired mules were not equal to the work. This battery was equipped in a very short time. The mortars and beds coming from the Ferozpor Arsenal, the latter were so much beyond the capabilities of a mule that they had to be cut down as much as 80 lbs.

It is very desirable that a properly organized mortar battery should be kept in the magazine at Rawal Pindi, or better still, that the Mountain gun batteries should have mortars attached to them; this would enable their taking with them into the field either the one or the other, according to the requirements of the service for which detailed.

Great coats, boots, and socks.

It was at first intended that only great coats and chogahs should be taken, but as the cold weather was coming on rapidly and there were indications of rain, it was determined to take in addition one blanket for each English soldier; thirty great coats were packed in three bedding salitas, and made a very compact load for one mule, one hanging on either side and one across the top; but when blankets were added, seventeen great coats and seventeen blankets with socks and cobbler's requisites formed one mule load. The men should be practised in packing the salitas. Before the regiments left Abbottabad, different ways of packing and slinging them were tried practically. They should not be made too long, otherwise they trail on the ground and drag the pad off; neither should they be tied up too round, for then they stick out too far from the mule's sides. The hired mules were only supplied with the common Panjab pad, which answered very well; but in future new pattern saddles will probably be used, when the packing will be different.

A change of socks is advisable; also boots, or a few tools and material for repairing those in wear*.

Pakals.

The regulation number was doubled, our information leading to the conclusion that there might be difficulty about water. The number, four per company, which included the hospital requirements, proved to be no more than sufficient, assisted by the regulation number of hand bhistees; for Gurkha Regiments sheep skin pakals are required; 4 can be slung on one mule.

Cooking utensils.

A great improvement can be effected in these, by having the cooking pots on the Bombay principle, i. e., fitting into each other, or by introducing Warren's

* A supply of grass and leathern sandals for Native troops is necessary.
Drab blouses and helmet covers had to be made up for the British troops.—W. P.

stoves, which answered admirably with officers' messes; four per company, of a good size, and with cradles or Kajawahs made to fit them and to hold tin plates and pots, would suffice.

The Kajawahs supplied by the Commissariat were very objectionable; they hung out much too far from the mule's sides, and consequently the greatest difficulty was frequently experienced in getting the mules past narrow bits of road. If the regulation pots are used, they should be slung in strong nets.

Tools and Forge.

One mule load of bill-hooks and axes for firewood per regiment was found sufficient.

2 picks
30 bill-hooks
6 felling axes
5 hatches
1 spade

} Form one mule load, weighing 150lbs.; they should be packed in *tât salitas*.

Cooks.

The scale was quite sufficient.

Classies.

The scale was quite sufficient, but the fighting was not hard enough to test it properly, particularly with regard to the snider ammunition.

Muleteers.

Panjabee muleteers have sickles; those in Hazara do not use them.

It is very desirable, as the mules are led and not driven, that the ammunition as well as the artillery mules should have a man to each; they should all be provided with tulwars.

Private servants and ponies.

The scale of private servants was sufficient; they kept with the baggage and led mules. All native followers should be provided with tulwars*.

Elephant Equipment.

Thirty elephants were employed in the transport of the guns of D. Battery, F. Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, and six leathern frontlets were taken as part of their equipment, to save their heads from injury when employed in knocking down houses.

Commissariat supplies.

After the Machai Peak was secured, our line of communication with Oghi being open, the Commissariat Department brought up camp ovens and supplied the troops with fresh bread. The ovens, however, suitable for the plains, are not by any means so for the hills, and should never be taken up, as they form most unwieldy and inconvenient loads for mules; but, doubtless, they might be made more portable. The kneading tables are also very cumbersome.

Hospital equipments.

The dandies were of the two descriptions used by the Panjab Frontier Force. The fracture dandy, with a stiff bottom, is inconvenient for hill work. The ordinary dandy, a cotton rug slung on a pole, answers its purpose; but the Bareilly pattern would be better. The dandies used were made up hurriedly by the Commissariat, as there were none of the pattern ready, bamboos could not be procured for the poles even from Lahore, so pine poles were substituted, and they were found very heavy and clumsy. Each dandy was provided with a white blanket with eyelets along the sides; they were so cut that they formed excellent tents, capable of being closed at the ends, if necessary; thus each patient carried his tent with him. The doolies could be raised from the ground by supporting the pole on forked sticks which the pioneers could quickly cut and prepare. Each dandy should be provided, as they were on this occasion, with a chagal or leather-water bottle.

General remarks.

The hired mules were generally fair, but most of them were very small and not up to carrying more than 150 to 170lbs.; the saddles were the common Panjab

* There was great difficulty in obtaining tulwars.—Distinguishing badges with numbers are also required for these men.—W. P.

pad, and though they were not all that could be wished, the number of sore-backs reported was very small. No provision was made for carrying food for any but the Government mules, but no inconvenience was experienced, the "Makai" (Indian corn,) then in ear, not having been removed by the enemy owing to our sudden final move; consequently the officers' ponies, elephants and mules, had, as was anticipated, an abundance of excellent grain and fodder.

Owing to the excellent arrangements of the Panjab Government and the Commissariat Department, there was never any difficulty about transport throughout the campaign. When the outbreak in the Agror Valley occurred, there was certainly some difficulty in moving the troops from Rawal Pindi and the British working parties from the Mari and Abbottabad road, but that was owing to the moveable column at Rawal Pindi being so inefficient; this has been rectified, and there is now a good supply of carriage, including 500 Government mules ready for any emergency.

A.

Statement of Carriage, &c., supplied by District Officers in the Panjab for the Hazara Expedition—vide No. 957, dated 20th January 1869, from Government of India, Military Department.

LAHORE, 23rd April 1869.

Number.	DISTRICT.	Number of Mules.	Number of Ponies.	Number of Camels.	Number of Bullocks.	Number of Carts.	Number of Donkeys.	REMARKS.
1	Shahpor	177	92	1,422	1,778	Mules, ponies, and camels, at 6 annas each per day, and 4 annas per day for each bullock.
2	Jhelum	784	...	716	504	Mules 12 rupees per month; camels 14 rupees per month.
3	Rawal Pindi	905	...	2,340	Mules 14 rupees per month; camels 12 rupees per month.
4	Lahor	335	112	828	Mules and ponies 15 rupees per month; camels from 10 to 15 rupees per month.
5	Peshawar	691	...	1,825	130	Mules 15 rupees 8 annas per month; camels 12 rupees per month; bullocks 10 rupees each per month.
6	Sealkot	550	...	69	...	107	...	Mules 6 rupees per day; camels 6 rupees per day; carts 8 annas per bullock.
7	Amritsar	552	155	193	Mules and ponies 15 rupees 4 annas to 16 rupees per month; camels 10 rupees 4 annas to 11 rupees per month.
8	Gujrat	140	509	333	Advances made, but no pay fixed.
9	Gujranwalla	21	50	479	507	51	282	Rates not given.
10	Jalandar	258	...	59	Advances made, but no rates given.
	Total	4,413	918	8,262	2,919	158	282	
	<i>Deduct not accepted by the Commissariat Department.</i>							
1	Shahpor	37	1,778	
2	Jhelum	11	130	
3	Rawal Pindi	125	...	239	
4	Lahore	...	62	204	
5	Amritsar	27	53	25	
6	Gujrat	30	406	167	
	Total	230	521	635	1,908	158	282	
		4,183	397	7,627	1,011	158	282	

RECORD OF EXPEDITIONS

	AUGUST.										SEPTEMBER.										OCTOBER.												
	PUBLIC.					PRIVATE.					PUBLIC.					PRIVATE.					PUBLIC.					PRIVATE.							
	Bearers.	Elephants.	Ponies.	Camels.	Mules.	Bearers.	Elephants.	Ponies.	Camels.	Mules.	Bearers.	Elephants.	Ponies.	Camels.	Mules.	Bearers.	Elephants.	Ponies.	Camels.	Mules.	Bearers.	Elephants.	Ponies.	Camels.	Mules.	Bearers.	Elephants.	Ponies.	Camels.	Mules.			
	No.	No.	No.	No.	Days.	No.	Days.	No.	Days.	No.	No.	No.	No.	Days.	No.	Days.	No.	No.	No.	No.	Days.	No.	Days.	No.	Days.	No.	Days.	No.	Days.	No.	Days.		
D-F Royal Horse Artillery	47	29	..	21	31	51	25	2	1	12	2	45	29	..	36	30	73	30	3	16	17	30	25	30	..	10	19	45	18	1	4	3	26
E-19th Royal Artillery	41	15	5	5	5	41	10	29	1	18	
2-24th Royal Artillery	50	15	13	59	5	6	50	46	10	65	23	..	5	15	
1-6th Regiment	241	155	8	88	25	55	24	351	1	..	187	13	173	12	98	30	281	50	24	204	7	24	9	6	14
1-19th Regiment	149	6	..	122	11	78	10	31	20	34	16	264	6	..	230	18	153	30	47	30	45	30	211	55	34	169	18	13	11	14	29
38th Regiment	307	307	41	21	31	5	281	322	23
77th Regiment, Detachment
9th Bengal Cavalry	9	3	11	31	7	1	22	9	6	31
16th Bengal Cavalry	14	7	14	1	15	13	12	16	27	14	9	20	1	9	17	1	29	5	14	9	7	9	21	19	13	30	5
Hazara Mountain Battery	30	28	46	6	39	14
Peshawar Mountain Battery	25	10	60	30	60	30
Sappers and Miners.																																	
1st Gurkhas	38	50	17	23	50	24	38	6	160	19	98	1	22	75	15	1	9	95	7
2nd Gurkhas	45	14	1	22	8	5	2	70	13	45	21	4	48	13	7	18	97	18	45	12	9	104	20	37	8
4th Gurkhas	44	51	3	4	100	22	5	6	129	16	91	1	17	94	30	8	23	74	7
20th Native Infantry	46	38	7	9	5	5	14	46	32	30	141	6	13	11	17	30	128	12	27	113	29	7	14	4	3
24th Native Infantry	6	21	39	3	3	22	23	21	48	24	2	85	9	11	6	25	9	50	1	32	113	6	1	10	3	7
31st Native Infantry	16	12	26	7	98	31
2nd Panjab Infantry	85	6	109	9	43	30
3rd Seikhs	4	24	49	16	28	4	1	6	3	19	68	7	9	22	3	26
5th Gurkhas	72	9	101	2	33	15
Commissariat and	380	..	266	1,705	299	2,093	..	109
Ordnance De-	130	..	78	347	340	165	..	40
partment.	62	..	330	343	220	6	..	1,504	..	2,080

Orders regarding Equipment, Hazara Field Force.

1. Ammunition.—440 rounds snider in box, 40 in pouch ; 200 rounds enfield in box, 40 in pouch ; 200 rounds Native troops in box, 40 in pouch.

Snider ammunition to be kept in its own boxes, of 500 rounds each ; the boxes to be fitted with a second handle or sling ; four boxes to form one mule load. Enfield rifle ammunition in mule boxes, 800 rounds with caps per box. Two-grooved rifle ammunition in mule boxes, 800 rounds with caps per box. Smooth-bare musket in mule boxes, 900 rounds with caps per box.

2. Cartouches for S. ammunition.—1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, 120 ; 1st Gurkhas, 114 ; 2nd Gurkhas, 114 ; 4th Gurkhas, 114 ; 20th Native Infantry, 120 ; 24th Native Infantry, 120.

The regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force will take their usual equipment.

3. Guns, rockets, mortars, &c.—Field guns and ammunition will be carried on elephants. Mortars and ammunition will be carried on mules ; Mountain guns and ammunition will be carried on mules ; rockets will be carried on mules, and be attached to the mortar batteries.

4. Great coats or chogahs.—Each mule will carry thirty great coats, packed in bedding salitas when available, with extra boots or cobbler's requisites for British troops. For Native regiments, one mule will be allowed for spare shoes and sandals.

The necessary ropes will be supplied by the Commissariat Department.

5. Pukals.—Four per company for European regiments, and one for the hospital, and same proportion for artillery.

Two per company for native regiments.

Hand bhistis according to regulations.

It is to be understood that the establishment of pukals allowed to each regiment and battery includes the requisition of the medical officers for the hospitals in the field.

6. Cooking utensils.—One mule per company or less, and two per battery, European troops ; six mules per Gurkha regiment ; four mules for other Native regiments. Kajawahs, or rope nets, will be supplied by the Commissariat Department for European troops.

7. Tools and forge.—One mule for bill-hooks, axes, &c., per regiment and division of artillery, for cutting firewood, clearing ground, &c. ; four per half Battery D—F, Royal Horse Artillery, for forge ; four per Mountain Battery for forge.

8. Private baggage.—One mule for General officer.

One mule per two staff officers for baggage and office.

One mule per three regimental officers.

One mule per staff, artillery, and Native regimental messes.

Two mules per European regimental messes.

9. Commissariat supplies and rum.—The supplies for officers of European troops will be carried and issued by the Commissariat Department ; those for staff and officers of Native troops will be issued beforehand and carried with the mess, carriage being provided by the Commissariat Department. Supplies for European and Native troops will be carried and issued by the Commissariat Department.

10. Cooks.—Two per company and four per battery, European troops ; two langries per company and battery of Native troops requiring them.

11. Classies.—Two per company, European and Native regiments ; 1st Battalion 6th Foot, four per company, to carry ammunition to the front.

12. Muleteers.—Minimum, one muleteer per three mules ; mules employed with the artillery, one per mule.

13. Private servants and ponies.—One per officer, one per mess ; one syce per each officer's pony, per officer ; no forage to be issued by the Commissariat for it.

Scale of provisions to be taken by the Commissariat Department for officers and European soldiers—

Biscuits for four days, flour for three days, tea for seven days, potatoes 8 ozs., and a proportion of dall.

Native Troops.— $1\frac{1}{4}$ seer per man for seven days.

Camp-followers.—1 ditto ditto ditto.

Rum.—Two drams per diem for officers and European soldiers; 18 gallons to a mule; one mule load to each Native regiment and battery; muleteers will arrange for the mules' food. Bandsmen without their instruments, and fifers and drummers with theirs, will accompany European regiments. Bands and drummers and fifers, complete, will accompany Native regiments.

No tents to be carried for either troops or hospitals.

No firewood to be carried.

Each European soldier to carry in his havresack either a full or half ration.

Each Native soldier to carry in his havresack one day's food.

Leather frontlets to be provided for six elephants, to be employed with working parties.

Equipment of Head-Quarters Staff and Departments, Hazara Field Force, for a seven days' expedition.

STRENGTH.		STAFF AND DEPARTMENTS.	Private baggage officers.	Commissariat supplies and rum.	Great-coats.	Pukals.	Total.	Bheesties and Pukalies.	Muleteers.	Private servants.	Total camp followers.	Commissariat supplies mules.	Grand Total Mules.	Ponies.	Elephants.	Dandies.	REMARKS.
Officers.	Men.																
14	...	General Staff	9	2	11	...	5	29	34	3	14	1 Major-General, 1 A.D.C., 1 A.A.G., 1 A. Q. M. G., 1 A. C. G., 1 D. I. G. H., 2 O. Officers, 1 Staff Officer P. F. F., 1 Chaplain, 1 Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, 1 Adjutant Royal Artillery, 2 Orderly Officers, Artillery, and Major Fane.
...	...	Political Officers	Will be arranged for at Oghi.
5	58	Survey Department	3	5	8	...	3	10	13	...	8	5	Will carry and arrange for own supplies; will be divided into three parties.
...	28	Guides Infantry	...	3	1	1	5	1	2	...	3	...	5	
		Total	24	50	...	27	19	
72	3,191	1st Brigade	1,116	1,626	...	1,233	88	15	132	
71	3,102	2nd Brigade	1,133	1,585	...	1,252	87	5	111	
		Grand Total	2,273	3,261	...	2,512	194	30	243	

N. B.—Hospital tents were not to be taken with the columns at first, but if it was found practicable or advisable to bring them up to the front during the course of operations, it would be done. No difficulty was anticipated in transferring during the first two or three days and

Equipment of 1st Brigade, Hazara Field Force, for a seven days' expedition.

STRENGTH.			CORPS.	Ammunition and guns.	Great coats and boots.	Pukals.	Cooking pots.	Tools and forge.	Private baggage.	Hospital stores and pukals.	Rum.	Commissariat supplies.	Total mules.	Cooks.	Classies.	Bheesties and pukals.	Muleteers.	Private servants.	Elephants' attendants, &c.; grass-cutters.	Commissariat establishment.	Artificers.	Hospital establishment.	Total camp followers.	Mules for Commt. supplies.	Grand total mules.	Elephants.	Ponies.	Dandies.
Officers.	Medical subordinates.	Men.																										
4	2	63	½ D-F Royal Horse Artillery	2	3	1	5	3	2	2	6	25	2	...	4	11	9	30	5	5	33	99	8	33	15	4	7
2	...	30	½-2-24th Royal Artillery	63	1	1	1	...	1	...	1	3	71	1	...	2	68	4	...	3	...	16	84	7	78	...	2	4
27	4	640	1-19th Regiment ...	75	22	40	10	1	11	8	13	57	237	20	20	61	93	55	...	14	...	300	563	39	276	...	27	70
4	...	146	Hazara Mountain Battery	78	5	2	1	4	2	1	1	13	107	2	...	2	92	9	16	...	9	16	146	12	119	...	20	3
8	...	600	1st Gurkhas ...	67	21	16	6	1	5	2	1	52	171	...	16	24	61	17	55	173	12	183	...	8	12
8	...	400	5th Gurkhas ...	50	15	16	6	1	5	2	1	35	131	...	16	24	48	17	55	160	11	142	...	8	12
7	...	680	20th Panjab Native Infantry ...	76	24	16	4	1	5	2	1	59	188	16	16	24	69	15	55	195	14	202	...	7	12
6	...	600	2nd Panjab Infantry ...	75	21	16	4	1	4	2	1	52	176	16	16	24	65	13	55	189	13	189	...	6	18
6	Brigade Staff	5	...	1	1	7	3	13	16	1	8	...	6	...
...	...	26	Police	3	3	1	1	...	9
72	6	3,185	Total ...	484	111	110	33	14	41	20	22	281	1,116	67	84	165	511	152	46	22	14	585	1,626	117	1,233	15	88	132

Equipment of 2nd Brigade, Hazara Field Force, for a seven days' expedition.

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RECORD OF EXPEDITIONS

STRENGTH.			CORPS.	Ammunition and guns.	Great coats and boots.	Pukals. •	Cooking pots.	Tools and forge.	Private baggage.	Hospital stores and pukals.	Rum.	Commissariat supplies.	Total mules.	Cooks.	Classics.	Bleesties and pukals.	Muleteers.	Private servants.	Elephants' attendants and grass-cutters.	Commissariat establishment.	Artificers.	Hospital establishment.	Total camp-followers.	Mules for Commissariat supplies.	Grand total mules.	Elephants.	Ponies.	Dandies.
Officers.	Medical Subordinates.	Men.																										
2	...	63	½ D-F Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery	2	3	1	5	1	...	2	6	20	1	...	4	9	4	30	4	5	25	82	6	26	15	2	6
3	2	30	½ 2-24th Brigade, Royal Artillery ...	63	1	1	1	...	2	3	1	3	75	1	...	3	69	7	...	3	...	21	104	7	82	...	3	4
24	4	440	1-6th Regiment ...	88	15	40	10	1	10	8	9	40	221	20	40	61	86	49	...	14	..	218	488	34	261	...	24	50
4	...	137	Peshawar Mountain Battery ...	78	5	2	1	4	2	1	1	12	106	2	...	2	92	9	16	...	9	16	146	12	118	...	20	3
9	...	700	2nd Gurkhas ...	87	25	16	6	1	5	2	1	62	205	...	16	24	91	19	55	205	14	219	...	9	12
8	...	550	4th „ ...	62	20	16	6	1	5	2	1	48	161	...	16	24	58	17	55	170	12	173	...	8	12
8	...	600	24th Panjab Native Infantry ...	67	21	16	4	1	5	2	1	52	169	16	16	24	66	17	55	194	14	183	...	8	12
7	...	500	3rd Sikhs ...	69	20	16	4	1	5	2	1	48	166	16	16	24	61	15	55	187	13	179	...	7	12
6	Brigade Staff	5	...	1	1	7	3	15	18	1	8	..	6	...
...	...	26	Police	3	3	1	1	...	3
71	6	3,096	Total ...	514	109	110	33	14	40	20	18	275	1,133	56	104	166	536	152	46	21	14	500	1,585	113	1,252	15	87	111

*Return of Hospital Equipment for each Regiment, British and Native,
included in the Tabular Statement.*

REGIMENTS.	DANDIES.		BEARERS.			Mules.	Mule trunks.	Mule palanquins.	Mule kujawabs.	Mule tarpaulins.	Medical subordinate.	Native doctors.	Hospital servants.	Pukal mules.	REMARKS.
	Fracture.	Ordinary.	Sirdars.	Mates.	Kahars.										
D-F Royal Horse Artillery.	Each dandy to have a blanket and some rope as part of its equipment.
½ Battery, 1st Brigade...	1	6	...	1	28	2	2	2	...	2	2	...	4	1	
½ Battery, 2nd Brigade...	1	6	...	1	24	
2-24th Royal Artillery...	
½ Battery, 1st Brigade...	...	4	16	
½ Battery, 2nd Brigade...	1	3	...	1	16	2	2	2	...	2	2	...	4	1	
1st Battalion, 8th Foot...	9	41	2	4	200	7	4	2	2	7	4	...	12	1	
1st Battalion, 19th Foot	13	57	3	5	280	7	4	2	2	7	4	...	12	1	
Peshawar Mountain Battery.	1	2	...	1	12	1	...	2	...	1	3	...	
Hazara Mountain Battery.	1	2	...	1	12	1	...	2	...	1	3	...	
8th Native Infantry Regiment's, each.	2	10	...	1	48	2	2	2	...	2	...	2	4	...	

APPENDIX F.

Some remarks on the scale of equipments for a military force entering the hills, with description of carriage, &c., required for transport of the sick, by Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals, G. E. MORTON, M. D., dated Camp Oghi, 28th October 1868.

It is clear that no absolute scale can be laid down applicable to every hill campaign, even on this frontier. The three principal conditions which must modify all calculation for the Medical Department, I take to be—

1st.—The distance from some permanent base of operations.

2nd.—The season of the year at which the operations are undertaken.

3rd.—The probability of maintaining communication more or less interrupted with the rear.

It is manifest that in the rains, or exceedingly hot weather, it would not be prudent to take out troops—British troops—especially without tents or protection of some kind, as was done in the recent campaign in the Black Mountain; or, if the necessity were so great as to oblige this being attempted, provision would have to be made for a larger amount of sick, both amongst British and Native regiments, than need be contemplated under more favorable circumstances. Even if this force had moved out into open bivouac early in September, as I believe was once intended, we must have laid our account for a much heavier sick list than we happily experienced. The operations, however, in these hills are generally undertaken in the healthiest season of the year—namely, from 1st October to 30th April. Usually, too, I believe, the communications with the rear are never entirely interrupted, and convoys of sick could be sent under escort to some permanent hospital every four or five days. In the following remarks, I assume, therefore, these conditions, and also that the actual absence of the troops in the hills, without communicating with their base of operations, would not exceed seven days at a time. It is probable that Commissariat arrangements alone would prevent a spurt of longer duration than this. I further assume that all sick—weakly and doubtful men—would be left behind in

the final march out of the troops, so that the General would start with picked material.

I think the scale*, as settled for the past campaign, will form a very good base on which to found our calculation. Experience, however, suggests some modifications. In the first place, I adhere to the opinion I have from the first expressed to Major-General Wilde, that nothing is really gained by doing away with a flying field hospital. This need not be on a large scale, and I should always regard it merely as a temporary convenience for accommodation of the sick, till convoys could transport these to a permanent field hospital in the rear. Speaking of a force, of the strength of the one which took part in the recent operations on the Black Mountain (say, in round numbers, 1,500 British and 4,000 Native troops), and reckoning only those who actually enter the hills, and not the reserves, I think a flying field hospital with the fighting columns to accommodate 20 British and 30 Native sick would suffice for all purposes. With this help I would confine the number of dandies for European troops to the authorized 10 per cent. of strength, but I would give the Native Infantry regiments 12 instead of only 8 dandies, to which they are by legislation entitled on field service. The objections to doing without a flying hospital to accompany the fighting columns are patent on the surface. A regiment, say, with its sick and wounded attached, is suddenly ordered to the front to resume active operations. It is, of course, a piece of unnecessary cruelty to carry on the sick and wounded in the rear of the regiment, and the only arrangement possible is to leave them with some other regiment not likely itself to be moved also to the front. But it is not always easy to ascertain what regimental hospital can fulfil this condition. The sick and wounded are thus constantly liable to be shifted from one regimental hospital to another. Although the distance may not exceed a few hundred yards, yet it is well known to medical men at least, how painful, both mentally and physically, even such small changes are to sick and wounded men. Besides, it is not in human nature that a surgeon can take the same interest in a lot of men, who, very possibly, may not remain under his care for more than a few hours. It is true even the flying field hospital does not afford absolute rest, or that feeling on the sick man's part of being settled, which contributes so materially to his rapid recovery; still it possesses great advantages over the other arrangement, or rather absence of arrangement, and it is at all events the best possible means at our disposal under the circumstances.

With regard to the description of carriage to be employed for the sick and wounded on a hill campaign, the dandie appears to me incomparably the best, and I need therefore describe no other.

The general plan of the dandies we made up for the campaign I think very satisfactory. The dandie is much the same as that known under the appellation of "dandie at hill stations." I mean, of course, that form of the hill dandies for the occupant lying down at full length. The pole should be of bamboo. The works supporting the hanging stretcher or hammock should be screwed into the pole or passed right through, and screwed by a rivet at top, and they should be 6 feet 3 inches apart, this being the proper length of the hammock itself. If made shorter than this, a tall man lies on it uncomfortably.



An iron bar or rod bent into a triangular shape supports at each end the durree or canvas forming the hammock. This bar (B—C) at its broadest part should be 18 inches wide for "ordinary" and 20 inches for "fracture" dandies, but the

* *Vide* Hospital Equipment Statement, Appendix E.—W. P.

canvas or durree forming the hammock should have a breadth double that size ; in other words, should be 36 and 40 inches wide for the respective dandies. To the apex of the triangular bar A should be attached a connecting chain 12 inches long, with links so arranged that either the ring at A, or any one of the links of the chain, can be slipped over the hooks attached to the pole. This admits of either or both ends of the hammock being swung nearer or further from the pole at pleasure. Two straps, with corresponding straps and buckles on the other side, are attached at equal distances from the ends and from each other to the sides of the hammock cloth, and when the patient is inside, these buckled over the pole prevent the possibility of his falling out, and moderate the lateral swing of which some persons complain as making them sick.

The fracture dandie differs from the ordinary in this, that the soft yielding bed of the latter is rendered rigid in the fracture dandie by the introduction of a board 20 inches wide and 6 feet 3 inches long, over which the durree or canvas is tightly stretched, being firmly sewn to the board, through holes drilled in the latter. This gives 10 inches of loose cloth on each side of the board. The chains, buckles, and straps, are the same as in the ordinary dandie.

The full equipment of the dandie, and on which much of its comfort and usefulness depend, consist of—

Firstly.—A chagul, or small round water skin, holding three-quarters of a gallon when full.

Secondly.—A good looe, or blanket, gray or white, for preference, 12 feet by 8, with 9 eyelet holes, protected as in a tent by leather rings along each of its long sides; and one eyelet hole in the centre of each of its short. To these holes three strong cords are attached, to admit of the blanket being pegged to the ground, when required, like the fly of a tent.

Thirdly.—Some small pegs for these holes. They need only be very small and light. Even in wooded country it is preferable to carry twelve of these, rather than trust to the bearers cutting them as required.

Fourthly.—Two pairs of pukka bamboos, $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet long. These are notched at A,



and when set up for support of the dandies are then bound together tightly with cord. A cord along the dotted line prevents the lower ends from separating too far when the weight of the dandie rests on the cross supports. Extra cord for pegging them down outside should also be carried. Two hooks of the pole, which rests against the cross bars at A, prevent the supports from slipping onwards. When the blankets and supports are not in use, the bamboos and small pegs are tied to the pole, and the whole presents a neat and tidy appearance. In the absence of tents, a dandie thus equipped forms a bed which can be lifted off the ground when required, like a swinging hammock, whilst the blanket affords protection from sun, rain, and dew, and owing to the great slope is perfectly waterproof. By letting down the dandie as far as the chain will admit, a fair distance is kept between the occupant and the pole.

APPENDIX G.

Translation of Proclamations addressed to Cis and Trans-Indus tribes generally.

Whereas the tribes bordering on British territory, and accustomed to move freely to and fro between it and their own country, are well acquainted with our

customs and ways, that Government oppresses no one, unless he is guilty of committing an outrage, either of his own folly or incited by some designing person. But those who live further off from the British border, and hold less communication with us, hear nothing but what is told them by designing persons. Therefore, this notice is issued for the information of those who are in ignorance or have been misinformed. That certain independent tribes residing on this (Hazara) bank of the Indus, incited by Atta Muhammad Khan and Alladad Khan, Jagirdars of Agror, which is situated within the British border, attacked the Thana of Oghi in Agror; these tribes had in no respect been interfered with or oppressed, but after attacking the Thana they further offended by entering our territory with arms and flags and burning sundry villages, rendering imperative their punishment. Those who were not concerned in the above acts, and continue to hold aloof, should rest quite assured and free from apprehension. Government has no concern with them, nor will it cross the Indus to coerce them. Government calls to account and punishes only those who offend it.

TO CIS-INDUS TRIBES.

Chagarzais, Akazais, Deshis, and Takotis, residing on this (Hazara) bank of Indus.

Be it known to you—

Prior to this, on sundry occasions you have interfered with Agror affairs, and now you have gratuitously attacked the Oghi Thana; Government, which is a long-suffering one, can bear with you no further, and calls you to account for the above acts.

It will be better for you to put in an appearance and answer to the above charge, or to do so when the Government forces enter your territory. If you oppose the Government troops, whatever loss follows is on your own head. Government has no desire to take your lives and destroy your property; in such affairs many innocent persons suffer in life and property. You are hereby required to wait on us here, or when the force advances, to receive the orders of Government.

N. B.—The above were written in Persian on one side of the paper, and on reverse side in Pushtu, written in the Arabic character, which is best understood by the village Mulas across the border.

CHAPTER IV.

SECTION I.

The Hindustani Fanatics.

Report by the Secretary to Government, Panjab.

SYAD AHMED SHAH, the founder of this colony, was a native of Bareilly. At one period of his life, he was the companion in arms of the celebrated Amir Khan Pindari, who was himself a Pathan, born in the valley of Buner. The Syad's daughters were married in Tank, and a son was residing there in 1863. Syad Ahmed afterwards studied Arabic at Delhi, and then proceeded to Mecca by way of Calcutta. It was during this journey that his doctrines obtained the ascendancy over the minds of the Mahomedans of Bengal, which has ever since led them to supply this colony with fresh recruits. Although the Syad in after life attempted to disguise the fact, his doctrines were essentially those of the Wahabi sect inculcating the original tenets of Islam, and repudiating commentaries on the Koran, the adoration of relics, &c. It was in 1824 that the adventurer arrived by way of Kandahar and Kabul amongst the Yusufzai tribes of the Peshawar border. He proclaimed a religious war against the Sikhs, and uniting with the Barakzai Sirdars, then in possession of Peshawar, attacked the Sikh camp at Saidu, but was defeated. He fled by Lankhor to Swat, and then took up his residence with Futteh Khan of Panjtar. This connection strengthened his position amongst the Pathans. He subdued the Khans of Hand and Hoti and levied tithes from the Yusufzai clan. In 1828, by a night attack, he defeated the Barakzai force which had advanced against him as far as Zeydah. Subsequently, he took possession of Amb. In 1829, having again defeated the Barakzais at Hoti, he occupied Peshawar. But his successful career was now brought to a close. His exactions had become oppressive to the Pathans, and an attempt on his part to put a stop to their taking money on the betrothal of their daughters was still more distasteful. There was a general insurrection against him, many of his followers, including the Deputy left at Peshawar, were massacred, and he himself forced to flee to Pakli in Hazara. There his followers again rallied round him, but in 1830 they were completely defeated by a force under Shere Singh, and the Syad himself was slain. Of his disciples who escaped with their lives, a portion found their way to Sittana. This village then belonged to Syad Akbar Shah. For tribal reasons, it had some years before been made a neutral village, and conferred on his grandfather, Zamin Shah, a refugee from Takt-a-band in Buner. Syad Akbar had served as treasurer and counsellor to Syad Ahmed, and on this account he willingly allowed the Hindustanis to gather round him. After the British annexation of Peshawar, the Akhund, Abdool Ghafur of Swat, prevailed on the people of that valley to receive Syad Akbar as their king in order that in the event of invasion

The Amazais.

“The Amazais are a section of the Utmanzai clan of Yusafzais. About half of their country is settled within, and the rest beyond the British border. The section has two divisions—1, Daolatzai; 2, Ishmailzai. Within British territory the Daolatzai inhabit the Sadum Valley, and their chief villages are Chargolai and Rustam. The Ishmailzai occupy a strip of country in the sub-division of Yusafzai, Peshwar District, south of the Karamar range, and on the road from Mardan, east. Their chief village is Kapur-da-garhi. The Amazai beyond the border are divided into—1, Syad Khel; 2, Mobarak Khel.

“The boundaries of the Amazai beyond the British border meet that of the Jaduns at Birgali, a little to the north-east of Ghabasni. A small stream, which falls into the Indus at Ashra, divides the two tribes on the north and the south; while to the east the village of Sherbasti, nominally under Tanawal management, forms the boundary of the Amazai and Tanawalis in that quarter.

“The Amazai border continues parallel with the course of the river from opposite Birgali to Bhetgali, including the village of Parusa in its course. At Bhetgali it meets the Mada Khel boundary, and thence takes a north-west direction to the main north spur of Mahaban; it runs down this to the Barando River, and then follows that river to the point where the north spur of the Sarpatai Mountain, which is above Nagri, hits it; afterwards it follows the crest of the main ridge, nearly due south of Malka, and then runs back slanting south-east to Birgali. A larger proportion of the inhabitants of Chamla are Amazais.

“The Amazai country is divided into two districts by a northern spur from the Mahaban. All the villages lying to the east of this spur, and between it and the Indus, are called Pitao Amazai, and all to the west, Sorai Amazai. The first belongs to the Syad Khel, and the second to both sections.

“The Amazai country is narrow and rough, drained by many mountain torrents, all of which, except the Ashra stream, drain to the Barando, and are perennial. It contains about thirty villages, situated along the courses of the different hill streams. Charozai is the chief village. The whole of this district is well wooded with pines; cultivation is consequently scanty. Cattle are plentiful, and ghi the product of the country.

“Lumsden gives the number of Amazais at 8,000, but this is surely much exaggerated. Bellew says 2,000, and Coxe and Taylor 1,500, which is probably the outside. They are considered one of the best fighting clans of all the Yusafzais. The Amazais still intermarry and communicate with their brethren under British rule, but in matters of internal government are quite distinct from them. The most influential chief of the Amazais is Mouza Khan, who resides at Charozai, and is spoken of as a chief great in council and action. In matters affecting the politics of the tribe, in connection with their neighbours, they side with the Bunerwals, the authority of whose chiefs they acknowledge after a fashion. The relations of this tribe with Amb have generally been of a friendly nature, though there is a party in the tribe who were rendered hostile on account of the ill-advised interference of the minister of Amb in a dispute regarding the possession of the village of Bhetgali.

“The Sorai Amazai can be reached from British territory, starting from the village of Panjman, on the Jadun border, and going up the Kandal Pass by Badga (Jadun) to Serai, thence by a tributary to the Kandal River *via* Damner, Ghaizko (Khudu Khel), and Shigai, over the Jan Muhammad

Kandao to Ashraf, and then on to Nagrai. The distance from Panjman to Nagrai is about 27 miles. This road is well supplied with water, and is practicable for laden camels.

"From Amb there are two roads to Sorai Amazai, one *via* Kanir, Bhetgali, Sheoriga, Parbih, Kapri, and Thandari. It is about 13 miles to Thandari, and wood and water are plentiful. From Thandari there are two roads to Charozai, one over the Mahaban by the Jandargali Pass, by Khadar Khan, and Pakbon, distance 12 miles; it is difficult, but unladen cattle can go. The other 12 miles, with no villages between, and a difficult road, only used by footmen; wood and water plentiful."

The Jaduns.

The Jaduns are a tribe of Afghans, who reside partly on the south slopes of the Mahaban Mountain, and partly in the Hazara District. The descent of this tribe does not seem certain. They are not Yusafzais, like those round them. By some they are supposed to be a branch of the Kakara tribe, which was, in the first instance, driven to take refuge in the Sufid Koh, and afterwards in Hazara Chach.

The divisions of the Jaduns are—

- 1—Salar, sub-divided into (a) Mast Khazai, (b) Uluzai, and (c) Sulimanzais.
- 2—Mansar, sub-divided into (a) Khidrzi, (b) Daolatzai, and (c) Musuzai.

The whole of these divisions, but especially the Salar Division, are settled along the banks of the Dorh, in the Hazara District, as far as the Urash Hasad, and own a fertile, prosperous tract, which they gradually possessed themselves of from the Dalazaks, when the latter threw off their allegiance to the Emperor Jahangir. Another portion of the tribe is settled Trans-Indus, to the south of the Mahaban Mountain, and own from the crest down the east slope; they have about twenty insignificant hamlets and three villages.

The Mast Khazai section lives in Mount Babeni, in Yusafzai, in British territory.

The Utazai section principally inhabit Gandap and Dalwari.

The Sulimanzai have four villages, Bada, Kolagarh, Bala, and Atcheli; these are small, and are scattered about Mahaban.

The principal village of the Mansur is Bisak, chiefly occupied by the Daolatzais.

The Khidrzi section own Malka Kadi, Kadra, and Tah Khel.

The Musuzai section own Morabanda.

The villages near the foot of the hills, such as Gandap, Bisak, and Mulka Kadai, are chiefly dependent on rain for their cultivation, and their land is different in quality. The land, however, belonging to the villages in the hills is more fertile; and wheat, mukhai, and rice, are grown in large quantities on the slopes of Mahaban. The tribe are all cultivators or cattle-owners, and their buffaloes are celebrated. Considerable quantities of ghi and timber are exported by them to Yusafzai, and cotton cloth, indigo, and salt taken in return.

The Jaduns say they have 12,000 fighting men, but careful enquiries prove that they have not more than 5,000 men, of whom half are armed with matchlocks and swords, and the other half with swords only. They are not considered a fighting tribe, as they contain amongst them a large number of Indian settlers.

The only level ground in the Jadun country is in front of Gandap, Bisak, and Malka Kadai. This country is drained by the Pola ravine, which goes to the Indus.

The Utmanzai.

The Utmanzai are a division of the Madan Yusafzais. They consist of four divisions, *viz.*, Alazai, Kamazai, Akazai, and Sadzai. The three first are beyond the British border, and occupy the southern spurs from Mahaban, on the right bank of the Indus.

A considerable portion of their original lands, about two-thirds, are now occupied by the Jaduns, who were in former times invited to come over from across the Indus as military mercenaries, and in reward for their services were granted the lands they now hold on the west and south slopes of the Mahaban Mountain.

The three Utmanzai tribes sharing the hills with them are supposed to be much better soldiers; but they are numerically weak and cannot muster more than about 1,200 matchlock men. The Sadazai division of the Utmanzai consists of five sub-divisions, *viz.*—(1), Abakhel; (2), Umarkhel; (3), Mirahmad Khel; (4), Bihzad Khel, and (5) Khudu Khel. The four first of these are all within the British border, and occupy the south-eastern corner of the plain. Their chief towns are Hand Swabi, Marghoz, and Kalabat, respectively. The Khudu Khels are beyond the British border, and occupy the western slopes of Mahaban between Jadun on one side and the Chamla Valley on the other.

The Utmanama division of Yusafzai takes its name from this tribe.

The Mada Khel.

A section of the Isazai-Yusafzais, who inhabit the north slopes of the Mahaban. They touch the Amazai near Bhet Kali to the south, and their boundary proceeds north, parallel with the Indus as far as Munjakat, north of the Barando River, where it meets the Hasanzai border. As regards Amb, the east border of the Mada Khel is formed by the range of hills, which runs parallel with the Indus in front of Amb, and they meet the Amb boundary between the villages of Kya and Sitana, the former belonging to the Mada Khel, the latter to Amb.

Their country may be described as lying between the Indus on the east, and the water-shed of the northern portion of the Mahaban Mountain on the west, the eastern slopes of the range being Mada Khel, and the western Amazai.

Several high peaks are found along this range, which are named in succession, from south to north, as follow, *viz.*—Chahlai, Da Barat Sir, Lughar Sir, and Nasar. Beyond this point the range is cleft by the Barando, a stream of considerable size, which flows from Buner and joins the Indus a little below the Mada Khel village of Mahabara. Crossing the Barando, and re-ascending the range which still runs northward, the point called Baio Sir, close to the Hasanzai village of Baio, is reached. This forms the northern limit of the Mada Khels. To the south they are bounded by the Trans-Indus possessions of the Nawab of Amb. The boundary line in this direction is stated by some informants to be formed by a ravine named the Kel Khwar, which runs from the Mahaban to the Indus.

The Mada Khel clan is divided into three principal sections, which are again sub-divided; but the Mada Khel number in all about 1,520 fighting

The majority of the Mada Khel villages are situated on the Mahaban-Range, and only two are on the banks of the Indus.

Buner.

Bunerwals is the name given to the Pathan inhabitants of the valley of Buner.† (They number 11,000 souls, and can turn out 2,000 matchlock-men.) The Bunerwals are on good terms with their neighbours of Swat. In 1849, they aided some British subjects in Lundkhor, who refused to pay revenue; and they also aided the Swatis in attacking Pali, and threatening the villages in British territory to which the Paliwals had fled for safety. They did not, however, attack them.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

From Buner there is some trade in timber, which is floated down the Indus to Atok. Mr. Beckett states regarding the hold we have on Buner and Chamla, that their exports consist chiefly of ghi in quantities, honey, forest produce, beams for roofs of houses, &c., and the imports of cotton fabrics and salt. A number of goats, sheep, and cattle, are annually purchased in Buner for the Peshawar market. The people are independent of us for the necessities of life, and fear a blockade less than any of the other tribes. For villages adjoining our border, a blockade has been found to be successful, but for the others it is impossible.

The trade is mostly carried on by Hindus and Paranchas. (A seizure of these, with their merchandise, could always be made at Rustam, or even in Chach, in the Rawal Pindi District.)

The Buner Pass leads from the Chamla Valley in Yaghistan, over the east shoulder of the Guru Mountain into Buner. It is due north of the village of Ambela, from which its crest is about 1,800 yards distant. The crest can be shelled from below with 24-pounder howitzers. The pass on the Chamla side seems very easy. The actual ascent by the windings of the path may be half a mile, and the hills on either side command the pass, inasmuch as whoever is in possession of the hills has the pass at his mercy. A small and almost imperceptible ridge runs down from the mountain on the east of the pass and stretches across the face, from which riflemen can command the crest. According to native report, the road is easy for camels, the entire length of the pass being but three miles. The descent into Buner is easy, and is commanded from the crest. There is no water near the crest, but it is found at the further end of the pass. At the foot of the descent the country is like the Chamla Valley.

The Khuddu Khel.

The Khuddu Khel are a section of the Sadozai Division of the Utmanzai Mandan Yusafzais, who inhabit the south slopes of the Sarpatai Mountain. (They are said to be able to turn out from 1,500 to 1,800 fighting men.)†

Their country is drained by the Badrai Nala, which is dry, except after rain in the hills, when it rushes down with great violence. It rises in the Sarpatai Hill, and at Dandars it receives a branch from the east; a little lower, another branch from the Chingla and Sunawai joins it from the west; it then passes the site of Panjtar, the villages of Ghurghushti, Khalai Kili, Jangidara, and issues into the plains north-east of Salim Khan, and thence goes through British territory to the Indus. (The passes leading to the Khuddu Khel country, commencing from the north, are Narinji or Baghoch, Amankot, Darhan, Tigarai, Moghdara, Jahangir Dara.)

The men of this tribe belong to the same stock as our subjects in the Utmanama Division of Yusafzai. They are now divided amongst themselves, and therefore easy to manage; but if united, they could give a good deal of

trouble. They have plenty of grain, but a blockade would annoy them, as they have much intimate relations with the people in our territories. Their villages are mostly in the open, and exposed to attack. This gives us a greater hold on them than the fear of a blockade. A good seizure could always be made. The chief villages, Totalai and Chinglai, have been at feud for a year. At present there seems no chance of a reconciliation.

Bajawar.

Bajawar is an independent district of Yaghistan, bounded north by Panjkora, east by the Utman Khels and Momands, south by the Momands, and west by the Kunar Range.

Bajawar is chiefly a pastoral country, the inhabitants possessing large herds of cattle, sheep, and goats, for the grazing of which the country affords extensive and excellent pasturage.

The shepherds generally pass the summer season in structures of wood and mats (made from the misser grass), called "kudies." A collection of these forms a hamlet belonging to some large village, and around each is to be found a few acres of cultivated land. Most of the cultivated land in the country is dependent for water on rain, but there are also considerable tracts of land irrigated by "Karez." Wheat is the chief product, of which in average seasons two maunds are sold for one rupee, considerable quantities also being exported.

Faiztalab, the chief of the best part of Bajawar, is said to be the most powerful of all the chiefs around. He is styled Haji Sahibzada, as he has made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and his influence extends beyond his own province. He is also known as the Badshah and Baz. His rule, too, seems to be popular, though severe, and is consequently well suited to the wild tribes he has to deal with.

Eighty-six Bajawaris are returned as serving in the ranks of the Panjab force, and 98 in the line regiments.

The Bajawaris have always been hostile to the British. During the Afghanistan campaign, the Chief of Bajawar was present with a contingent at the siege of Jalalabad, and both Mir Alam Khan and Faiztalab Khan, Chief of Jhandul, joined the attack on the British position at Ambela in 1863 with a large body of Bajawaris, these being the only occasions on which it was possible for this clan to show their disposition.

The chief villages in Bajawar are Bajawarkhas or Shahr and Nawagai. Bajawar is not subject to the Kabul Government, but it pays tribute whenever forced to do so. Ali Mula, whose information, if indistinct, is worthy of some credit, says that the area of Bajawar is 125,000 jarebs, and its revenue Rs. 200,000. The Chief has 13 guns, 40 shahins, 700 large jezails, 8,000 foot, 2,000 horse, 6 pairs of state drums, 12 state horns and standards. He has absolute authority over his people, even extending to their wives and daughters.

Bajawar is inhabited by the Afghan tribes of Turkolanis, but it also contains other races, viz., Hindkis and a mongrel race called Rudbaris, who number 30,000 souls. The Turkolanis number 10,000 to 12,000 families, and can turn out, according to Lumsden, 15,000 fighting men. Mir Alam Khan of Bajawar Khas can turn out 6,000 men and 16 guns. They have a feud with their southern neighbours, the Momands. This arose from the Momands having on one occasion invited them to fight the Sikhs at Shabkadr, and when they were beaten, having turned on their allies, plundered them of all their property, and sent them home with scarcely a rag on their backs.

The Swatis.

The Swatis are a race who inhabit portions of the Swat Valley, and of the valleys of Tikri, Alahi, Deshi, Nandihar, Pakli, Konsh, Bogarmang, and Agror, Balakot and Garhi Habibula, north of Hazara.

The Swati tribe have no connection with the Yusafzai Pathans, who now occupy the Swat country. When the Pathans came eastward from Kabal and took possession of the Peshawar Valley, they also seized the adjacent hill tracts on the north, and either drove before them the ancestors of these Swatis, or reduced them to a state of servitude from which they released themselves by leaving their country, under the leadership of Syad Jalal Baba, the son or descendant of Pir Syad Ali, (Syad of Kunduz), more generally known as Pir Baba, who settled in Buner, and died there, and the common ancestor of the Kagan Syads, the Syad late of Sittana, and several other Syad communities who live amongst the tribes along our border. In fact, the ancestor of this family of Syads came originally with the Pathans, and the family are consequently unusually venerated by the Yusaf and Mandan branches of the Pathan tribe, and their neighbours on the Peshawar and Hazara borders. This accounts for the wide establishment of the family. These Swatis, under their religious leader, were comprised of the original inhabitants of Swat, artizans, and a few Pathans probably, who possessed no landed property, and did not belong to the conquering Pathan clan. This force went eastward and across the mountains to the Indus, and crossing that river took possession of the countries now occupied by their descendants. Here the force succeeded; its numbers were doubtless increased by men of various tribes and callings on the route, eager to gain a footing in the land which the Syad prophesied would be conquered by those who followed him. When the country had been taken full possession of, one-fourth of the whole was set aside as the share of the Syad leader and his family and the Mada Khel and Akhun Khel religious fraternity; the remainder was divided into eighteen shares.

An account of the Cis-Indus Swatis will be found in the record of the expedition to the Black Mountain in 1868.

The Trans-Indus Swatis.

The district of Swat comprises the valley of the Swat River from Charorai, in about latitude $35^{\circ} 26'$ to the junction of the Swat River with that of Panjkora. Above Charorai is the Kohistan of Swat, inhabited by a different race. On the north and south the crest of the bounding ridges are the boundaries.

The length of this district is about 70 miles, and the breadth varies very much according as the mountains run down close to the river; but it is probably, on an average, not under 4 miles. In some places it is 10 miles broad, and in others only a few hundred yards.

Swat is divided into (1st) Ranizai, from the junction of the river to Alahdam; (2nd) Kuz, or Lower Swat, which extends from Alahdam to the village of Charbagh; and (3rd) Bar, or Upper Swat, extending from Charbagh to Charorai.

Lumsden describes another division of the lands in Swat. The portion which was allotted to the Afghans at the time of the conquest was termed "Daftar," and that given to Mulas, Syads, and the foreign confederate clans who joined in the conquest was called "Tsirai," by which names these lands are still known. And it was also divided at the same time into two other nominal parts, *viz.*, that portion lying between the right banks and the mountains towards the north and west was given the name of "Landa," in Pashtu signifying moist, from enjoying a greater portion of water than the

other; for where the river separates into several branches is part of this moist tract; hence the name: and to the land lying between the left bank and mountains on the south and east was called "Wuchah" or "dry." The bounds of the "Landa" half of the valley was fixed to be from Barangolai, the boundary village of Lower Swat, nearly facing Tukatan on the opposite bank of the river to Landa, the last village to the north just opposite Pia, and extending in length about 60 miles. The "Wuchah" portion extended from the village of Tukatan, in Lower Swat, to Pia, the boundary village of Upper Swat, a distance of 63 miles. The width of both these divisions was from the respective bank of the river to the mountains on either side.

Swat is again divided among the two branches of the Akozai Yusafzais, who are again sub-divided into two smaller ones. The "Wuchah" was given to the Baizai division, and the "Landa," to the Khwazozai division. These two divisions branch out into several clans or khels, who again occupy separate portions of the valley. Thus, from Tukatan to Thana are the Ranizais, who also hold some country to the south of the Malakand Range. Then come the Khan Khels, Musa Khels, Aba Khels, Babuzais Maturizais, Azikhels, and Zinkikhels. On the right bank of the river the Khwazozai sections come in the following order, coming from the north:—Shamizais Sibujnai, Ashazai, Naikbi Khel, Shamuzaais, and Adinzais. (A standard bearer of the Akhuns gave the following estimate of fighting men of the Swat clans to Captain Lockwood, of the Guides, Musa Khel 240, Aba Khel 800, Maturizais 130, Azi Khel 400, Zinki Khel 600, Shamizai 160, Naikbi Khel 600,—total 2,930.

The district of Swat consists of one long main valley, which is intersected by ravines and glens bringing down the drainage of the bounding ranges. This valley is intersected by the river, which, however, does not run through the centre, but changes from one side to the other—the side opposite to where it hugs the mountains consisting of a space of level. These level plains on the banks of the river are cultivated, as are the hill sides, as far as is practicable, and above is a pine-clad range.

The principal tributary glens of Swat are, on the south, Katilae, or Syadugan, and Manglor; and on the north, Uchana, Sair Sana, and Galoch, or Tal Dardial.

The only river of any size is that from which the district takes its name, but numerous torrents join it on either bank. These are, however, of no importance whatever.

The only canals are those for irrigation purposes.

There are no lakes in Swat.

The climate of Swat, though differing from that of the Yusafzai plain, is described as resembling that of Buner in most points. The hot weather sets in later than on the open plain, but it is more oppressive and continuous, owing to the mountains around preventing the free circulation of the winds. The frequent storms that burst over these hills do not cool the air, but; on the contrary, produce a hot, steamy atmosphere in the valleys below.

Swat is unhealthy in summer, for, owing to the extensive surface there under cultivation of rice, malaria is exhaled in great abundance. This circumstance has given the country an unenviable notoriety for its peculiar and obstinate endemic, intermittent and remittent fevers, which affect all ages alike. The malaria, it appears, is of universal distribution throughout the valley, and very poisonous in its effects. It has impressed its mark on the people, who, in their general physical condition, are more or less fever-stricken and unhealthy.

In Swat, shut in as it is by lofty snow-clad mountains, the winter is a milder season than on the open plain: for the air is less disturbed by

lower levels. At intervals of three or four years, the valleys everywhere receive a coating of snow; but it seldom remains longer than a week or ten days. On the whole, the winter in these valleys is a less severe season than in the plain country; but it is more prolonged, and the atmosphere is much more humid, and persistently so than on the open plain.

There are no camels to be found in Swat; but there are horses, mules, asses, bullocks, oxen, cows, and buffaloes: oxen, mules, and asses, are the beasts of burden.

The population of Swat Valley consists almost entirely of Baezai and Khwazazai Akozais. (Bellew says these could turn out 10,000 fighting men between them.)

The total population of the Swat Valley, taking the three districts together, is estimated at about 96,000 souls. The bulk of the population are husbandmen, who live on the produce of their cattle and fields, and whose domestic wants are supplied by a minority of merchants, petty traders, mechanics, and artizans.

It is interesting to note the following from Raverty:—

The Afghan tribes generally have a great respect for the last resting-places of their own dead at least; but the Swatis seem to feel little compunction or respect on this head. The strip of land lying between the villages and the rise of the mountains is set apart for the cultivation of wheat and barley, and in that land also their burying-grounds are situated. After a few years they allow these fields to lie fallow for some time, and plough up all the burying-grounds, and in future bury the dead in the fallow land. This may be consequent on the small quantity of land available for purposes of agriculture; but still it appears a very horrible custom.

When fighting amongst each other, the Afghans of these parts never interfere with or injure the helots of each other, nor do they injure their women or children, or their guests, or strangers within their gates, and such might serve as an example to nations laying claim to a higher state of civilization.

The people of Swat are said sometimes to observe the same custom as practised by the Afridi tribe of Afghans, *viz.*, that of selling, or rather bartering, their wives, sometimes for money and sometimes for cattle or other property they may require or desire. But, having witnessed the complete system of petticoat government, under which the Afghans of Swat are content to dwell, I cannot place much faith in their having the courage to do so. The women in this valley enjoy more liberty, and rule the men to a far greater degree than is known amongst other Afghans, who are so very particular in this respect.

The Afghans of Swat, like others of their countrymen, are very hospitable. When strangers enter a village, and it be the residence of a chief, he entertains the whole party; but if there be no great man resident in the place, each stranger of the party is taken by some villager to his house, and is entertained as his guest. As respects the physical constitution of the people of Swat, the men, for Afghans, are weakly, thin, and apparently feeble, whilst the women, on the other hand, are strong, stout, and buxom.

The Afghans of this part are dark in color, short in stature, or rather of middle size, generally thin, and, if stout, they have usually large puffy stomachs, and buttocks like fat Hindus.

The females of Swat are not veiled. When they meet a man advancing along a road, they look down modestly and pass on; but the younger women turn their backs generally, and come to a stand-still until the man has passed by. They are, however, very plain, although they still look like Afghans. But the men bear little resemblance to that race in form and feature, for they are dark in complexion and emaciated in appearance; indeed, they appeared more like the Gajars of the plain below the mountains.

The houses of Swat generally consist of walls built of mud; on the top of this a few rafters are laid, and dry grass spread over them, and over this a layer of plaster is laid of the same materials as the walls. They rarely last more than a few years; but this is of little consequence when they have to vacate them about once every three or four years.

The houses of the Hindus are built of stone in a substantial manner; but those of the Pathans are all alike. From Aladand to Charbagh, on the "Wuchah" side of the valley, and from Chak-Dara to Bandi, on the "Landwah," which places face each other, the villages are small and very close together; while lower down the valley, towards the south-west and higher up towards the north-east, the villages are larger, and at a greater distance apart, often from two to three miles.

The Swat Valley is highly cultivated and densely populated throughout its extent along the course of its river, whilst each glen and gorge has its hamlets or collections of shepherds' huts. The general surface of the ground is rough and stony, and there is a considerable slope from the foot of the hills to the bed of the river. Owing to this slope of the surface, the fields are laid out in strips of terraces one above the other, the boundary walls being formed of the stones collected from the surface. By this arrangement the soil is cleared of stones and made level to retain the water led on to it for irrigation.

Cultivation is general throughout the valley; the chief crops are rice and wheat, lucern, peas, and beans; but sugarcane, barley, Indian corn, cotton, and tobacco, are also cultivated. Generally, all the cultivation is irrigated, water being plentiful, and easily led off in canals and cuttings both from the river and the numerous hill streams flowing to it, and in order to facilitate its retention in the soil, the land is laid out, as above-mentioned, in terraced fields that extend from near the river's bed to the foot of the hills.

Along the course of the river the valley is crowded with villages, hidden amongst groves of stately trees, and surrounded on all sides by an unbroken stretch of cultivation.

In Lower Swat rice is extensively cultivated, whilst in Upper Swat wheat, barley, and bajra, are the chief grains. As regards temperature and excellence of climate, picturesque beauty, fruits and game, Upper Swat, from Manglor to Charorai, is by far the best. The Kohistan beyond is much the same. The whole of the upper portion of the valley is intersected at right angles by the most picturesque little vales of about half a mile or less in extent. Each has its own clear stream running through towards the main river, and their banks on either side are shaded with fine trees, many of which bear the finest fruit, and beneath which, here and there, there are fragments of rock where one may sit down. The hills on both sides, up to the very summits, are clothed with forests of pine, whose tops yield a most fragrant smell. Dust is never seen.

The Swatis of Lower Swat sow all the available land near the river with rice, and that near the hills with jowar, cotton, tobacco, melons, and the like. The higher ground still nearer the hills they have appropriated to their villages and burying-grounds, and numbers of villages for this reason have been built close to the hills. However, where the river, in its windings, encroaches more on one side than the other, that is to say, when the river approaches the hills on the right or "Landwah" side of the valley, the left or "Wuchah" side is more open and expansive; and here the villages will be found lower down towards the centre of the valley. These villages lying lower down have, from the windings of the river and the different branches into which it separates, as already stated, streams of water running

The patches of land about the lower ranges, if fit, they also bring under cultivation, and when they cannot bring their bullocks to work the plough, this is done by hand. In fact, there is scarcely a square yard of tillable land neglected in the whole of Swat, for all the valley is capable of cultivation if there are no stony places or sandy tracts, or the like, to prevent it.

There are few or no trees in the lower parts of the Swat Valley, save in the smaller valleys running at right angles to it. Here and there one or two may be seen in fields near the banks, under which the peasants rest themselves and take their food in the hottest part of the day. It is in the mountains, on the sides of the valley, that trees are numerous. The mountains on either side, as seen from the broadest part of the valley constituting Lower Swat, are of different degrees of elevation. The first or lower ranges are of no great height and gentle ascent, and the second are rather more abrupt, and on these there are comparatively few trees, but much grass. The third or higher ranges appear like a wall, and that to the north is densely covered with pine forests, which are seen over-topping all.

Firewood is scarce in the lower parts of the valley, and the dry dung of animals is used instead ; but in those smaller valleys at right angles to, and opening out into that of, Swat, there are woods and thickets enough.

There are no shrubs or wild trees, such as is called jungle in India, in any part of Lower Swat, save in these smaller valleys and in the higher ranges.

The hills on either side are well stocked with forest trees. On the southern range they are principally pines, but on the northern are magnificent forests of the deodar cedar.

In the valley itself, the trees commonly met with are the palm, poplar and willow, the mulberry, sirrus, sissoo, bukain, acacia, olive, and jujube ; and in the higher parts of the valley are also found the walnut, diospyrus, or amluk, &c. Swat is famous for its timber, rice, and honey, all of which are exported to Peshawar in exchange for salt and cotton fabrics, &c.

Mr. Beckett in his memorandum says, that the exports from Swat to British territory are rice in large quantities, fruits, honey, glue, and timber ; and the imports are salt, cotton goods, indigo, spices, sugar. The people of Swat are quite independent of the British districts for the necessaries of life, but they dread a blockade on account of the loss their trade would incur. A sudden seizure of their property might be made any day in the city of Peshawar or in Lundkhor to a large amount.

The best road from Yusafzai to Swat is over the Malakand Pass ; and the next best is by the Mora Pass, which is a shorter cut than the Malakand, but the ascent is much steeper. There is also another by Sherkot, which is still more difficult.

In the valley there are roads tolerably well-defined, which lead from village to village on both sides of the river, which during the cold season is fordable almost everywhere, but during the hot weather it is not so ; it is then crossed by the natives in rafts of inflated skins. During the latter season they can flood the whole valley, which is thereby splendidly irrigated, and is a luxuriant sheet of rice cultivation ; but the noxious exhalations caused thereby make the whole country extremely unhealthy, and consequently for operations in this valley the cold weather is the season in which they should be carried on.

The Swatis are all Suni Mahomedans, and they have earned the reputation of being most bigoted of all the Afghan tribes. This is, no doubt, owing chiefly to the presence of the Akhund, who is revered by the tribes from the Indus to the Kuram.

The Government of Swat is like that of all Pathan tribes, a most complete democracy. The country is split up into as many factions almost as there are villages; and even in these there are often several sections.

Each sub-division of each section of each tribe of villages has its separate quarrels and supports its own chief, who is generally at mortal feud with either his own relations or his neighbours, and who is seldom obeyed one instant longer than is convenient; so that nothing short of pressing danger to the whole community from without could ever bring together all the Khowzais and Baezais; but that which could not be affected by ordinary means has, in a measure, been brought about by the influence of one individual working on the religious feelings of the mass of grossly ignorant and proportionally bigoted Swatis, viz., by the Akhund of Swat.

This man, now called the Akhun Sahib, is the son of a poor Syad of Buner; and was born in the village of Syadossum, in that country. His name was Jholah Gafur when he studied for the priesthood in the village of Beka, in Yusafzai, and he subsequently became a disciple of the Thodair Saibzada in Khatak.

For twelve years he prosecuted his studies in the Peshawar District, living on "shamack" (the seed of a sort of grass) and milk, and strictly performing all the observances imposed by the Koran. Having thus obtained a character for sanctity, he returned to his native Buner, and shortly afterwards emigrated to Swat.

A further account of the Akhund will be found in the account of the Ambeyla Campaign.

The Akhund is consulted in all difficulties, though frequently, after his opinion has been given, a chance of procuring plunder proves too powerful for religious reverence, and leads the chiefs to follow the bent of their inclinations, though opposed to his expressed command.

The following are strong instances of this sort:—When the inhabitants of Babuzai and Pali first drove Colonel G. Lawrence, in charge of the Peshawar District, to destroy those villages, the Akhund strongly advised the Swatis not to support the rebels; nevertheless they flocked to Pali in great numbers.

Again, in 1849, the Akhund exerted his utmost influence to persuade the Khans of Pali to discontinue their depredations, and to discharge the gangs

of professional highway men then in their pay; this Mr. Temple's report. counsel being disregarded, those chiefs brought on themselves the punishment inflicted by Colonel Bradshaw's detachment, which will be narrated.

Towards the lower extremity of Swat, a formidable range of hills bounding the valley runs for many miles from east to west, nearly parallel to the British frontier, and at the eastern extremity of this range stands the Mora Mountain. Between this range and the frontier, however, intervene two tracts, named Ranizai and Lower Utman Khel, both *quasi* dependencies of Swat. The best of the passes leading into Swat is, as already stated, the one named Mullakund, which opens from Ranizai. A little further to the eastward of Ranizai also there are some passes, leading into the Lundkhor Valley, which belongs to British Yusafzai. These latter passes are not available for passage from Swat to our territory, because, leading into Lundkhor, they can be stopped by any party holding that valley. The passes *via* Ranizai and Utman Khel, if the people of those tracts accord a passage, lead straight on to the British plains of Hashtnagar.

SECTION II.

Affair with the Hindustani fanatics by a force under Colonel Mackeson in January 1854.

THE first occasion of our coming into any collision with this fanatical Hindustani colony occurred in 1854, under the following circumstances:—

They had co-operated with the Hasanzais against Jehandad Khan of Amb, and had actually seized a small fort of his, named Kotla, in the Amb territory, on the right bank of the Indus, and it was necessary that it should be recovered and restored to the Amb Chief. Accordingly, after the conclusion of the operations under Colonel Mackeson against the Hasanzais on the Black Mountain in December 1853 and January 1854, already narrated, a force was moved down to the left bank of the Indus, opposite Kotla.

None of the tribes around, the Amazai, Mada Khel, or Jaduns, had joined the Hindustani fanatics; but the latter, in answer to the warning to them to withdraw from Kotla to their own settlements, gave no written reply, but, according to some verbal reports, sent a defiance, Moulvi Inyat Ali declaring he had come to die.

Feeling confident, after seeing the ground, that the crossing and re-crossing could well be protected, and the garrison reduced to extremity if they offered opposition, Colonel Mackeson determined to send a force across; though there were only two boats available for the passage, each capable of carrying 100 men at a time.

On the 6th January, the following force was crossed over from Kriplian, under the command of Major J. Abbott, to re-take the fort:—

- 1st Sikh Infantry, Major Gordon.
- 8rd „ „ Captain Repton.
- 2 Guns, Hazara Mountain Train, Rawal Pindi Police.
- 6 Zumburchis.
- 6 Wall Pieces.
- 2 Regiments of Dogras, Kashmir Army.

As there were doubts if the Mountain guns would suffice to reduce the fort, two of the Horse Artillery guns were held ready to be sent across, to ascend the mountain on elephants, or to be dragged up on sledges formed of hollowed trees, the other two being kept on the left bank to cover the crossing and retirement.

The village of Ashra rises in terraces on a spur of the mountain from the bank of the Indus to an elevation of 200 feet, and the fort of Kotla is higher up on the same spur, at an elevation of 1,000 feet or more from the river.

It was known that there was no spring or well in the fort, and it was intended that Jehandad Khan's men should assault the village under cover of the six-pounders on the left bank of the river, whilst Major Abbott's column should move round and gain possession of the heights above it, whilst the crossing opposite the Sittana cantonment was threatened by the regular troops from their encampment at Rargar.

The heights above Kotla had been held since the day before by Jehandad Khan's men, and the force was sent to take them.

interior of the fort, and their unopposed advance to occupy that position had already been secured.

In spite of the boasts of the Hindustanis on the two Sikh regiments and Mountain guns commencing to ascend the hill, they were all, to the number of from 200 to 300, in full flight from the fort of Kotla and village of Ashra, and being pursued by Jehandad Khan's people, some 30 or 40 were cut up. They retired very doggedly, the Tanawalis following very cautiously.

The troops exchanged some distant shots without effect.

The Hindustanis had removed everything from their cantonment at Sittana, in order to strongly occupy Ashra and Kotla; but Colonel Mackeson did not think it necessary to burn their empty houses at Sittana, which could easily have been done by sending on the troops three miles in advance, as he considered their flight, without offering resistance, would generally increase the contempt in which they were held by the surrounding tribes, and be more useful to us than any persecution of them could be.

The troops bivouacked for the night at Ashra, re-crossing the Indus the following day.

SECTION III.

Affairs at Sheikh Jana and Narinji Yusafzai, 1857, by a Column under Major J. L. Vaughan.

THE only portion of the Peshawar District in which advantage was taken of the sepoy mutiny by the people to disturb the country, was on the Yusafzai frontier, adjoining to the independent valleys of Swat, Panjtar, and Buner, so long the asylum of fanatical refugees from Hindustan.

Report by Colonel H. B. Edwardes, C. B., Commissioner.

The Yusafzai country is controlled by the fort of Mardan, which was usually garrisoned by the corps of Guides; but in the middle of May 1857, this regiment moved down to form a portion of the Panjab Moveable Column, its place being taken by the 55th Native Infantry. At the end of May the 55th Native Infantry broke into mutiny, when about 100 sepoys were put to the sword, and 150 taken prisoners by a column which had moved out from Peshawar under Major John Nicholson, some 600 sepoys of the regiment making good their escape to Swat.

Two powers had hitherto reigned in Swat—the Akhund, or priest, and the Badshah, or king—whom the Akhund had set up for carrying on the temporal government. Had these two been united in harbouring the 55th Native Infantry, and at that moment proclaimed a holy war against us, there can be no doubt that it would have set fire to the valley of Peshawar and placed us in considerable difficulties. But Syad Akbar, the king, had just died. He had long survived his popularity, and had he been then alive would not have been allowed by the Akhund and Chiefs of Swat to entertain a disciplined army of Hindustani sepoys. The crisis roused these chiefs to the preservation of their liberties, and they first expelled Syad Mobarik Shah, the son of the late king, and, lastly, the refugees of the 55th Native Infantry, who were conducted by disciples of the Akhund through mountain paths to the River Indus, which they crossed at a point far above our territory, with the desperate design of making their way to Kashmir, and seeking an asylum with Maharajah Golab Sing; but they were intercepted and destroyed in Kagan by Major Becher, the Commissioner of Hazara.

Mr. Davies's Report on Tribes,

A few of the 55th sepoys had shrunk from encountering the perils of the journey to Kashmir, and joined the young Syad Mobarik Shah, who took up his abode at the village of Panjtar. Here, at a place called Mangal Tana, there was already a settlement of Hindustani Muhammadan fanatics under some Moulvis of the Wahabi sect, the whole being a branch from the parent colony at Sittana on the Indus, opposite Hazara, and supported for years by contributions of men and money from traitorous princes and private individuals in Hindustan.

Mukarab Khan, the Chief of Panjtar, had been refused aid by us to tyrannize over his subjects, and he had consequently long been hostile.

Some of the western villages of Yusafzai now gave way to the influences by which they were tempted to disaffection, refused to pay their revenue, and appealed to the chiefs and religious leaders of Panjtar to come down and

The fort of Mardan had been garrisoned by the 5th Panjab Infantry and two guns, Peshawar Mountain Train, under Major Vaughan, 5th Panjab Infantry, after the mutiny of the 55th Native Infantry, and the Assistant Commissioner, Lieutenant Horne, calling upon that officer to act, on the afternoon of the 1st July, he moved out with the following detachment: 80 Sabres, 2nd Panjab Cavalry, the two Mountain guns, and 270 Rifles, 5th Panjab Infantry, and the next morning attacked the village of Sheikh Jana.

The village was occupied by 200 men from Chinglai, under Baz Khan, the nephew of the Chief of the Khuddu Khels, and by 50 horsemen under a partisan soldier, named Jan Muhammad, besides men from the neighbouring villages. A considerable number of matchlock men with the horse were drawn up along the eastern bank of the nullah on which the village is built. A few rounds from the guns speedily threw them into disorder, when the skirmishers of the 5th Panjab Infantry cleared the village, and the cavalry pursuing the fugitives over the open plain in its rear, drove them into the adjoining village of Spinkana.

This village was then attacked and carried, and the enemy pursued to the hills by the cavalry and some levies, under Lieutenant Graham, when several were cut up and some 25 taken prisoners. The only casualties on our side having been 2 sowars, 2nd Panjab Cavalry, and 3 Levies wounded.

Major Vaughan stated that the conduct of the troops had been admirable, and the pursuit by the cavalry very spirited. Baz Khan was amongst the slain, and Jan Muhammad having been taken prisoner was tried and executed, as were subsequently seven of the villagers.

Report on Tribes by Mr. Davies.

Report by Lieut. Horne.

SECTION IV.

At this time each day brought news of some new disaster in the military stations of Hindustan. The 8,000 Purbeah soldiers, horse and foot, in the garrison of Peshawar, half armed, half disarmed, had found their master in General Sydney Cotton, but were scanning their position with the angry eyes of prisoners burning to break loose. Their intrigues with the hill chiefs were a cause for constant anxiety and watchfulness, and it was no matter of surprise when a fortnight after the affair at Sheik Jana, Moulvi Inayat Ali, a leader of the Hindustani fanatics of Mangal Tanna, crossed the border and raised the standard of religious war at the mountain village of Narinji.

Narinji is on the extreme border, and being very difficult of access, had become an asylum for bad characters, and had several times defied the authorities in Yusafzai; at the last moment, however, the maliks had always hitherto saved the place from destruction by submission and reparation. The villagers were proud that the place had more than once been attacked by a Sikh force without success.

Col. Edwardes' Report.
Report on Tribes by Mr. Davies.
Captain James's Report.

The number of Hindustani followers with the Moulvi was about 150; he had also some 30 or 40 of the men of the late 55th Native Infantry. The fighting men of Narinji were about 400, and 40 horsemen had joined the party from Panjtar, under the brothers of Mukarab Khan. A few horsemen had also come down from Swat, and several of the fugitives from Sheik Jana were with the Moulvi. The Moulvi had made great efforts for help from Buner and Chinglai through the Chief of Chinglai, whose nephew had been killed at Sheik Jana, but without success. Mukarab Khan was secretly favoring the movement, though personally withdrawing himself from open participation in it; the people of Panjtar generally were not inclined to take an active part, and the two strong villages of Totali had long thrown off allegiance to the Khan.

On the night of the 18th July, a force, as per margin, marched from Mardan under the command of Major Vaughan, 5th Panjab Infantry, and accompanied by Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner, to Yar Hasan, thirteen miles. The 4th Panjab Infantry under Captain Wilde had marched from Naoshera on the 18th, but had been so much delayed crossing the Kabul River, it was necessary to halt the 20th to give them a rest; Captain Wilde and 30 of his men being attacked with heat apoplexy from the effects of this exposure.

This route was adopted in order to conceal the object of the movement, which was further effected by the laying in of supplies at Selim Khan, as if the troops were proceeding to Panjtar, the people in the vicinity of which commenced to remove their property.

On the night of the 20th, the troops marched to Permouli, nine miles, and, after a short halt, advanced towards Narinji, five miles, which was sighted at daylight. The surprise was complete, the enemy making such hasty preparations as were possible after the troops were seen, but Captain S. Browne with the troop 2nd Panjab Cavalry making a spirited advance beyond the village, succeeded in capturing 100 head of cattle.

Major Vaughan's Despatch.
4 Mountain Guns, Peshawar Mountain Train.
1 Troop, 2nd Panjab Cavalry.
300 Rifles, 4th Panjab Infantry.
400 Rifles, 5th Panjab Infantry.
50 Sowars, Mounted Police.
100 Sowars, Multan Levy.

The position of the village was very strong. It was built in terraces and situated at the foot of a precipitous hill, rocky spurs of which surround it on three sides, but in the front the ground was open and practicable for cavalry, as a broad sandy nullah runs along the foot of this hill, on the other side of which nullah, facing Narinji, was another range of heights. The slopes of the hill above Narinji were very steep, though practicable for infantry.

Major Vaughan's force was not strong enough to enable him to crown the heights above the village before attacking it in front; moreover, the men had had a long night's march, the season of the year was very trying, and it was unadvisable to attempt the long and laborious operation of crowning the heights, or, whilst the enemy's strength was undeveloped, to divide the force. So taking up a position favorable for artillery fire, the Mountain guns opened with shot and shell on the place.

The Maliks had been previously called upon to give up the Moulvi, but as in reply they ignored his presence, the infantry advanced in skirmishing order, and after a tenacious resistance on the part of the enemy made

Report by Major James. themselves masters of the lower part of the village, and of the rocks which flanked it. There were several strong breastworks in the upper part of the village, and the enemy, who were very numerous, then pressed down to try and drive the infantry out of the position they had won; but though they fought with great bravery, and some even descended into the plain, they were driven back with loss, and the destruction of the village was commenced.

Major Vaughan's Report. A desultory fire was maintained on the troops from above, whose efforts to destroy the village were thus materially impeded, but soon columns of smoke rose in all directions, and the lower village was destroyed.

About 8 A. M. Major Vaughan determined on retiring, as it was not probable that further injury could be inflicted that day.

The troops had been severely worked, and would soon have become exhausted from the almost intolerable heat. To show the trying nature of the weather, it is only necessary to say that the force had 40 men, soldiers and camp followers struck down by the sun during the day before, nine of whom died, including the Farrier Sergeant of the Mountain Train. The supply of water, too, would have become scarce, as it had to be brought from the villages in rear by the people and on donkies. The villagers behaved well in this respect, and there was an abundant supply during the time the troops were employed.

The retirement was effected without the slightest opposition on the part of the enemy, although the ground was most favorable for them, and the troops reached their camp at 10 A. M.

The losses of the enemy had been very severe. Independently of those who must have been killed or wounded by the guns on the higher slopes above the village which the infantry did not reach, 50 of the enemy fell in the lower village alone; many of these were Hindustanis, probably stragglers from the late 55th Native Infantry. The wounded were calculated at least 50 more.

Our loss had been 5 killed and 20 wounded (see appendix), which Captain James considered small compared with the results attained, observing that in warfare of this nature experience had shown us that our own losses usually equalled those of the enemy.

Major Vaughan stated that he was much indebted to all the European officers with the force, military and medical, and that the conduct of the troops of all arms was excellent throughout, and that the mounted police had

been most useful, cutting up some of the enemy who had ventured down. He said he was also much indebted to Captain James for the excellence of his arrangements and the assistance rendered throughout.

But the people of Narinji remained stubborn, and would not expel the Moulvi, and soon afterwards a raid was made on cattle in British territory, and nothing remained to be done but to renew the attack on Narinji. It was known, too, that Mobarik Khan of Chinglai and Alam Khan, brother of Mukarab Khan of Panjtar, had taken money from the Moulvi, and succeeded in purchasing the aid of the chief men of Buner, who promised to bring assistance three days after the festival of the Eed. Chamla had already sent seven standards (probably 200 men), and other parties were daily arriving. Promises had been made from Swat, and reinforcements of Hindustanis had arrived from Mangal Tanna and Sittana.

Major Vaughan's camp had been established at Permouli after the affair at Narinji, and on the 31st it was moved to Shewa as affording better shelter for the European troops, and partly to conceal our intentions. On the morning of the 2nd August, Major Vaughan received the following reinforcements from Peshawar; his force, however, having been previously weakened by the march of the 4th Panjab Infantry :—

2	24-pounder howitzers.
50	men, Her Majesty's 27th Regiment.
50	„ Her Majesty's 70th Regiment.
50	„ Her Majesty's 87th Royal Irish Fusiliers.
50	„ 21st Native Infantry.
200	„ 6th Panjab Infantry.
150	„ Captain Cave's Regiment.
100	„ Horse Levies.
140	„ Foot „

It had been intended that this reinforcement should have reached on the 31st, as it was known that, with the exception of the Moulvi and his followers, all others had left Narinji to keep the Eed festival at their homes, but a heavy fall of rain had delayed the troops. Their movements became known, and on the 2nd there were 1,000 men in Narinji, the Buner men being expected in two days.

At 1 A. M., on the morning of the 3rd, a column of the strength marginally noted marched from Shewa under Major Vaughan, with Captain James as the Political Officer, on Narinji. Captain James had information that there was a bye-road branching off about one and half mile before reaching Narinji by which a column could ascend to the rear of the village, and on arrival there, a force of 300 Rifles, 5th Panjab Infantry, and 50 of the 87th Royal Irish Fusiliers, were detached under

the command of Lieutenant Hoste, 5th Panjab Infantry, to take the enemy in flank and rear. The existence of this road was known when the first attack was made, but the force was then too weak to detach any portion of it.

The main body came in sight of Narinji soon after sunrise. Rumours which had exaggerated our weakness now turned our hundreds into thousands, and as the force approached, many of the auxiliaries fled. Inayat Khan and the Moulvi were among the first to leave the village.

As soon as the main body had come into position opposite the village, fire was opened upon it, and upon the clusters of men observed upon different parts of the mountain, from the 24-pounder howitzers and Mountain train guns. This was feebly replied to by a matchlock fire from the "Sangars," &c., above the village and along the heights.

After this had continued for about half an hour, the column which had been detached to ascend the hill made its appearance far away on the right. Its progress was vigorously opposed by the enemy, but the latter were dislodged from every point where they attempted a stand, and the column passed on in the most brilliant manner and without a check until the rear of the village was gained. The upper portion of the village, which is very strong and commanding, and other points overlooking the village, were then rapidly taken possession of at the point of the bayonet by a portion of Lieutenant Hoste's men, whilst the remainder continued their advance in pursuit of the enemy, until the heights westward of the village were also cleared.

As soon as the success of Lieutenant Hoste's column was no longer doubtful, a detachment of the 6th Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant Saunders was sent to ascend the heights which enclose the village to the westward and intercept the retreat of the fugitives. This service was well performed, and 25 or 30 of the enemy were killed. Amongst the slain were several Purbeas, believed from their arms and accoutrements to be men of the late 55th Native Infantry. Simultaneously with the movement last described, Captain Cave's men and 50 men of Her Majesty's 70th Regiment entered the village from the front and found it deserted.

The work of destruction then commenced. Not a house was spared; even the walls of many were destroyed by elephants. The towers were blown up under the direction of Lieutenant Taylor of the Engineers and the village was soon a mass of ruins. Three prisoners were taken—one was a Bareilly Moulvi; the second, a Chamla standard bearer; and the third, a vagrant of Charouda—they were all subsequently executed.

When everything was completed, the troops were withdrawn. Not a shot had been fired at them during the six hours they held possession of the village; nor was a shot fired at them as they withdrew.

Though not actively engaged, the large force of cavalry gave great security to the movements of the guns and infantry in the bed of the nullah.

Some of the Foot Levies were very useful in occupying the heights in the rear opposite the village, from which possible annoyance was anticipated.

Major Vaughan stated that he was deeply indebted to Captain James for his cordial assistance and co-operation, to which, in a great measure, might be attributed the success of the operations.

The Governor General in Council requested that his satisfaction might be conveyed to Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner, Government letter. to Major Vaughan, commanding the 5th Panjab Infantry, and to Lieutenants Horne and Hoste, for the excellent service they had rendered in the course of these operations.

These acknowledgments were, it was stated, specially due to Captain James, for his able, zealous, and judicious co-operation with the military officers; and to Major Vaughan, for the discretion with which all his arrangements were made, and the vigour with which they were carried into execution.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

*Return of Casualties in the operations against Narinji on the 21st July 1857,
under MAJOR VAUGHAN.*

Detachments, Peshawar Mountain Train.—Wounded, 1 mule.
 „ 2nd Panjab Cavalry.—Killed, 1 horse.
 4th Panjab Infantry.—Killed, 1 naik, 2 privates.
 „ Wounded, 1 havildar, 2 naiks, and 5 privates.
 5th „ Killed, 2 privates.
 „ Wounded, 1 jemadar, 1 bugler, and 11 privates.
 TOTAL.—1 naik, 4 privates, 1 horse, killed; 1 jemadar, 1 havildar, 2 naiks,
 1 bugler, 16 privates, 1 mule, wounded.

APPENDIX B.

*Return of Casualties in the Yusafzai Field Force, under MAJOR VAUGHAN, on
the 3rd August 1857.*

KILLED.

Detachment, 6th Panjab Infantry—1 private.

WOUNDED.

5th Panjab Infantry—5* privates.
 6th „ „ 1 private.
 Captain Cave's Regiment—2† privates.

* 1 by accident.

| † 2 by accident.

SECTION V.

The Expedition to Sittana under Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton, K.C.B.,
April 1858.

IN the month of October following, Lieutenant Horne, Assistant Commissioner, being in camp at Sheikh Jana, a night attack was made upon his camp by about 100 of the Hindustani fanatics under the guidance of one Wali Muhammad, known as the Jemadar of the Moulvies, and some 50 horsemen under the leadership of Mir Alam Khan of Panjtar, when his camp was fired, several people killed, and many horses carried off. In sending in a report of this occurrence, Colonel H. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner, strongly urged that, as soon as troops were available, due punishment should be inflicted for these wanton and unprovoked hostilities.

Total of all Ranks.			
	European.	Native.	Total.
Artillery ...	131	88	219
Cavalry ...	16	535	551
Infantry ...	632	3,475	4,877
Grand Total ...	779	4,098	4,877

Accordingly, on the 22nd April 1858, a force as per margin, the details of which are given in the appendix, assembled on the left bank of the Kabul River, opposite Naoshera, under the immediate command of Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton, K.C.B., where it was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, C.B., the

Commissioner.

The troops had marched to this place from Peshawar, and their several stations independently. The amount of carriage allowed was, 1 camel for every 10 men: officers were only to take what was strictly necessary. One tent was to suffice for 2 or 3 officers; and no dogs were to accompany the force.

On the 25th of April, the frontier village of Selim Khan was reached by the troops, when reconnoitring parties, one under Captain Wright, Chief Staff Officer of the Force, and the other under Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, C.B., were at once sent forward.

First day's operations.

The approaches to Panjtar were held by the people at Totali, who had for several years been resisting the payment of tithes demanded by Mukarab Khan, and thus Mukarab Khan's enmity to us originated in our refusing to lend him troops to enforce this demand on the clan. When, therefore, the Totali people saw the reconnoitring parties approaching, they not only turned out to welcome them, but rushed ahead with all their men to try and seize Mukarab Khan, and that Chief, supposing probably that the reconnoitring parties were followed by a column of attack, abandoned his position, and fled with about 60 horsemen to Chingli; seeing which, the Totali people dashed in and set fire to Panjtar before troops could come up. Thus our first object was unexpectedly and easily attained.

Second day's operations.

It was now determined to enter the Panjtar District on the following morning, the force being told off for that purpose into three columns, as follows:—

No. 1 Column.

Artillery ...	{	2 9-pr. guns	...	} of Captain Stallard's Light Field Battery.	
		2 24-pr. howitzers	...		
		{	1 3-pr. gun	...	} of the Peshawar Mountain Train Battery.
			1 12-pr. howitzer	...	
Cavalry ..	{	100 sabres,	7th Irregular Cavalry.		
		200 "	Guide Cavalry.		
		30 "	Peshawar Light Horse.		
		100 sappers under Captain Hyde.			
		260 R. and F., H. M.'s 98th, under Major Peyton.			
		300 "	"	21st N. I., under Major Milne.	
		400 "	"	9th P. I., under Captain Thelwall.	
400 "	"	18th P. I., under Lieut. Williamson.			
300 "	"	Guide Infantry, under Lieut. Kennedy.			

No. 2 Column.

Cavalry, 100 sabres, 18th Irregular Cavalry, under Major Ryves.
 47 sappers, under Lieut. Tovey.
 200 rank and file, H. M.'s 81st, under Captain Brown.
 200 " " Kelat-i-Gilzi Regiment, under Lieut. Rowcroft.
 450 " " 8th Panjab Infantry, under Lieutenant Brownlow.

No. 3 Column.

Cavalry ...	{	25 sabres,	7th Irregular Cavalry.
		25 "	18th " "
		60 "	Guide Cavalry.
		105 R. F.,	H. M.'s 81st Regiment.
		10 "	" 98th "
		155 R. F.,	21st Regiment Native Infantry.
		254 "	Kelat-i-Gilzi Regiment.
		54 "	8th Panjab Infantry.
		137 "	9th " "
185 "	18th " "		
76 "	Guide Infantry.		

Selim Khan was made the "base" of operations where the camp remained standing. The Major-General was to proceed in company with Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes with No. 1 Column furnished with two days' provisions, so as to enter the Panjtar District by the Daran Pass, whilst Colonel Renny, Her Majesty's 81st Regiment, proceeded in command of No. 2 Column direct to Panjtar, with orders to destroy that place, No. 3 Column under Major Allan, Her Majesty's 81st Regiment, remaining in

Lieutenant-Colonel Ed. wardes' Report. charge of the standing camp at Selim Khan. Not a single tent was allowed to be taken by officers or men, and the baggage consisted simply of two days' provisions and abundance of ammunition.

Third day's operations.

At one o'clock on the morning of the 26th April, the 1st Column under the command of the Major-General left camp for Chingli, and at daylight entered the Daran Pass, which is a remarkably narrow defile, of about 2 miles, between two hills. It is not formidable to disciplined troops, because the heights on either side have only to be crowned to cover the safe passage of the force; and the length of the pass is so limited, that if stoutly contested, it could not resist for more than a couple of hours. The enemy did well, therefore, to abandon it and allow the troops to ascend unmolested into the elevated valley of Chingli or Upper Panjtar.

There is a well of spring water in the pass at the foot of the last steep.

Near the entrance of the valley, in a wooded nook of the hills, stands the village of Bag, inhabited by Syads. A stream of water runs through its shady groves of mulberry trees, and it is a favorite halting place for marauders when making raids on our territories. General Cotton and the Commissioner visited the Syads to call them to account, but on their pleading their real inability to refuse a shelter to the robbers, their village was not destroyed; a fine of one rupee a house[§] taken from them, with an injunction in future to give information of any raids that were contemplated.

The column after reaching the top of the Daran Pass proceeded at once to the village of Chingli, which is the chief place in the Panjtar country. Chingli contained about 1,000 houses, very substantially built, and is an emporium for the wood trade with the plains of Yusafzai. Here resided Mobarik Khan, uncle of Mukarab Khan of Panjtar, who had a substantial little fort of wood and stone. But no resistance was attempted.

During the day it was observed that some of the village people with their property had endeavoured to secrete themselves in ravines in the mountain side, overlooking the town of Chingli; and the 9th Panjab Infantry under Captain Thelwall was ordered by a circuitous route to ascend the mountain, with a view to cutting off their retreat into the Chamla territory; whilst a party of the 98th Foot under Captain Cotton, the General's aid-de-camp, proceeded straight up the hill to dislodge them from their position. A few shots only were, however, exchanged, and the enemy hastily escaped, leaving a few killed by the Panjab Infantry.

During the day the troops were employed, under the direction of Captain Hyde, Engineers, in destroying the fort, town, and crops, and at night were bivouacked on a ridge near Chingli.

Fourth day's operations.

On the 27th April, the force, having completed its work at Chingli, returned to Selim Khan, not by the Daran Pass through which it came, but through the heart of the country by Swawai and Panjtar, which enabled Lieutenant Taylor, of the Engineers, to survey the country through which the troops passed.

The direct road by which the column returned from Chingli to Selim Khan proved to be about equal in length with the road *viâ* the Daran Pass, but there can be no question but that the Daran line is the easiest for an army. From Selim Khan to Chingli *viâ* Daran is an open plain, with one difficulty in it, *viz.*, the pass itself, which can be soon surmounted. From Selim Khan to Chingli *viâ* Panjtar is chiefly through a broken country, winding amongst ups and downs of jungle and ravines very embarrassing to a column, and at one point passing through a rocky defile called Tarali (the bed of the stream which flows under Panjtar), which would be infinitely more formidable than the Daran Pass if disputed by the enemy.

Mukarab Khan's horsemen and footmen were seen lurking about our line of march this day, but apparently only in the hopes of preying on stragglers from the force. Nothing, in fact, could more strongly mark the badness and unpopularity of the Khan's character than his total inability to work up his own clan to defend what had hitherto been considered a strong country.

When General Cotton started on the 26th for Chingli, he had detached a

7th Irregular Cavalry	...	50
18th " "	...	50
Her Majesty's 81st	...	200
8th Panjab Infantry	...	450
Kelat-i-Ghilzi	...	200
Sappers	...	56
Total	...	<u>1,006</u>

small force as per margin, also to Panjtar, for the double purpose of completing the demolition of that place, and of forming a reserve at Chingli, if necessary. When the troops returned to Panjtar, scarcely a vestige was left of the fine villages from which it took its name; so thoroughly had its demolition been completed by these troops, employed under

the direction of Lieutenant Tovey, Assistant Field Engineer.

Both Panjtar and Chingli being now destroyed, the column might have moved on to Sittana; but there was a strong hold in Mukarab Khan's country, which he had made over to the Syads and Hindustanis, and to which he only resorted himself in the last extremity.

The name of this place is Mangal Tanna. It stands on one of the chief spurs of the Mahaban Mountain, and it was the head-quarters of that Moulvi Inayat Ali who so perseveringly endeavoured at Naringi and other places to raise Yusafzai in rebellion in 1857. This Moulvi died about the beginning of April 1858, and his followers were said to have gone off from Mangal Tanna to Sittana to place themselves under another Hindustani Moulvi there. But Mukarab Khan's family and property were reported to have been removed for safety to the vacant fort of Moulvi Inayat Ali at Mangal Tanna, and to render the chastisement of the Khan more complete and memorable, it was determined to also destroy this last remaining fastness.

By all accounts, the road from Panjtar to Mangal Tanna was practicable, though difficult. The Totali people were our allies, and would show the troops the road. The troops were well suited to such an expedition, and the General and Commissioner therefore determined on the expediency of attacking Mangal Tanna.

Fifth day's operations.

On the 28th April, the force was again divided into three columns as

<i>1st Column.</i>		
Artillery,	{ 2 Guns, M. T. Battery.	
	{ 2 24-pounder howitzers of Captain Stal-	
	lard's L. T. Battery.	
	Cavalry Guides	... 50
	Sappers	... 50
Infantry...	H. M.'s 81st Regiment	... 200
	8th P. I.	... 400
	18th " "	... 400
	Kelat-i-Ghilzi Regiment	... 400
	Guides	... 400

<i>2nd Column</i>		
Infantry...	H. M.'s 98th Regiment	... 200
	9th P. I.	... 450
	Guide Cavalry	... 250

<i>3rd Column.</i>		
Cavalry ...	{ Artillery, 2 9-pounder guns.	
	{ 125 Sabres, 7th Irregular Cavalry.	
	{ 125 " 18th " "	
Infantry...	{ 21st Regiment, N. I. " "	
	{ Detachments of all corps over the regi-	
	mental baggage.	

per margin; the 1st Column to act against Mangal Tanna, the 2nd Column to proceed and halt at Panjtar as a support to the 1st Column, and the 3rd Column to remain in reserve at Selim Khan and to protect the camp which was left standing.

On the 28th April, the 1st Column under the command of the Major General left the camp at Selim Khan, and pushed on by moonlight towards Mangal Tanna. The ascent of the hills was very arduous and toilsome, and half the column was ultimately left as an intermediate support at Dhakara,

which is midway between Panjtar and Mangal Tanna. The advance reached

the heights about 11 A. M. Not a shot had been fired at the troops as they laboured up the steep and wooded road, and on entering Mangal Tanna the fort was found abandoned, and every sign of a hasty and recent flight.

Mangal Tanna consisted of two villages, upper and lower. The lower consisted of 30 or 40 houses, and was occupied by Syads, who were peaceable and inoffensive. Upper Mangal Tanna stood on a plateau in the midst of three crests, which were themselves out-works while held by the garrison, but as soon as carried by an enemy commanded the place. On this plateau stood, first, the fortified house of Inayut Ali, with enclosures for Hindustani followers; secondly, the fortified residence of Syad Abbas; and thirdly, Syad Abbas's citadel,—a white masonry tower, the whole having about 30 or 40 houses clustered round them.

These fortifications had been laboriously constructed of large stones and fine timber, and the Hindustani fanatics and thieves who flocked around Syad Abbas must have lived here in great enjoyment and security, and it was easy to understand the prestige that surrounded them.

Sixth day's operations.

The advanced troops bivouacked at Mangal Tanna for the night, the Sappers being engaged all night under Captain Hyde's instructions in mining the buildings. At daylight of 30th April the troops being drawn off, the mines were fired, and when the dust and smoke cleared away, Mangal Tanna existed no longer.

Mangal Tanna is probably between 5,000 and 6,000 feet above the level of the sea. The trees grow thickly, and the scenery about it is much like that of Murree.

It would be possible to cross the Mahaban from this point and descend upon Sittana in two marches, but all accounts agreed that the road was more difficult even than that to Mangal Tanna.

Seventh day's operations.

On the 30th April, the whole of the troops at Mangal Tanna, Dhakara, and Panjtar, returned to their camp at Selim Khan, and there halted on the 1st May.

It now only remained to deal with the fanatic colony of Sittana, for which purpose the force under the command of the Major-General proceeded towards Kabal, distant from Sittana about four miles, where it encamped on the morning of the 3rd May.

Between Amb, on the right bank of the Indus, which was the stronghold of our feudatory Jehandad Khan, and our own Commissioner's Report. frontier Yusafzai village of Topi, lies a narrow strip of land on the bank of the river under the shadow of the spurs of Mahaban, which is independent of our rule and belongs to the Utmanzai Pathans. It contains, in addition to the two or three small hamlets of Topi, the villages of Upper and Lower Kabal (exactly opposite Torbeyla), Upper and Lower Kyab and Sittana, Mandi and Upper Sittana. Sittana had originally been given away as Serai, or church lands, to a Syad of Buner, who was expatriated on account of a feud. His descendants, instead of remaining quiet on this grant, allied themselves to the notorious Hindustani adventurer, Syad Ahmed, and took part in all his ambitious struggles to establish a Wahabi empire on the Peshawar border. The ablest of the Sittana Syads was Syad Akbar, who, in 1849 or 1850, was chosen to be Badshah of Swat. He died in May 1857, just as that crisis arose, in which, aided by the Hindustani fanatics, he might have given us some annoyance.

Deprived of his authority and counsel, it is known how little the Hindustanis under Moulvi Inayut Ali effected at Narinji. Moulvi Inayut Ali had himself since died. The Syads of Sittana were left with two leaders, Syad Umar, who kept a gang of thieves, and Syad Mobarik Shah, son of the late Syad Akbar of Swat. The Hindustanis had one or two Moulvis, but none of any reputation.

Thus stood affairs at the beginning of April, when the Syads of Sittana most unwisely began to press the Utmanzais of Kya and Kabal to pay them tithes. Not content with the church lands given them at Sittana, they must needs demand tithes from the laity.

The Utmanzais resisted, but were divided amongst themselves. Major Becher, Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, encouraged them to unite against the Syads. The people of Kya and Kabal had been for two years under a blockade by us, on account of a murder they had committed on one of our subjects. To get this blockade removed, was a motive urging them to serve us and oppose the Syads. One day then, when the Syads sent out their followers to cut the crops of the refractory laymen of Kya, the Utmanzais beat to arms and turned out; a battle royal ensued on the Sittana plain, and by singular good fortune Syad Umar was killed, and Syad Mobarik Shah was badly wounded in the foot. An irreparable breach was thus created between the Monks of Sittana and the *Lords of the Manor*, and Major Becher, who had from the opposite bank been a spectator of the fight, seized the opportunity to remove our blockade and condone the past offences of the Utmanzais.

When, therefore, General Cotton's force appeared on the 3rd May at the independent village of Kabal, it was welcomed as an ally, though at no former period of our rule would it have been regarded otherwise than as an enemy.

By previous arrangements, Major Becher, the Deputy Commissioner of

2 12-pounder howitzers...	{	Hazara Mountain Train.
1 3-pounder gun		
300 of the 2nd Sikhs.		
450 of the 6th P. I.		
300 of the 12th „		

Hazara, moved down simultaneously to the left bank of the Indus with the troops as per margin, with a view to crossing the river so as to co-operate with the force under the command of Major-General Sir S. Cotton, in making a general attack on the enemy's

villages at Sittana and on their Ghari, or defensive enclosure near the village of Mandi.

The Major-General having, on the evening of the 3rd May, reconnoitered the hills and towns of the enemy, and fixed on the following morning to make the general attack, Major Becher* with his troops crossed the Indus early in the morning, whilst the force under the command of the Major-General marched out of its encampment at Kabal towards the enemy's position, thus coming upon him from the eastward and southward simultaneously. The Chief of the Amb territory, Jehandad Khan, a British ally, having occupied the hills northward of Upper Sittana, and by doing so completed the general co-operation.

As the force approached the Lower Sittana, four columns of skirmishers were detached, as follows, from Major-General Cotton's column:—

150 Her Majesty's 98th Regiment.
400 9th Panjab Infantry.
300 18th „ „ „ „
Guides.

* No details of Major Becher's operations are forthcoming.—W. P.

Whilst two columns, *viz.*, the 2nd Sikhs and 6th Panjab Infantry, were detached from Major Beecher's column to move up the mountain which forms the rear defence of Sittana; these columns, converging to the summit called Shah Noor-ki-Lari, where the Hindustanis had taken up their positions in a village and erected a stockade, would to a great extent cut off their retreat, and force them to submit or fight. They chose the latter, as will be seen.

The 18th Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant Williamson, supported by the 19th Panjab Infantry under Captain Thelwall, having without opposition reached the crest of the mountain above Lower Sittana, and having moved northward along the same, and also on a pathway on the side of the mountain, in two divisions, first came in contact with the enemy, and drove them from the main position, which they desperately defended with considerable loss. The 18th Panjab Infantry would then have carried the second position also, had not the fire of the 6th Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant Quin been already pouring into it; that regiment had ascended the northern spur of the range, thus taking the enemy's position in rear, and the 6th Panjab Infantry, following steadily up with the bayonet, drove the enemy out of this position towards the 18th Panjab Infantry, and a hand-to-hand struggle of several minutes ensued till every Hindustani in the position was either killed or taken prisoner. The fanatics had Pathan allies from the neighbouring Jadun Hills, but their heart was not in the business, and they fled precipitately.

The fighting of the Hindustanis was strongly marked with fanaticism; they came boldly and doggedly on, going through all the preliminary attitudes of the Indian prize ring, but in perfect silence without a shot or a word of any kind. All were dressed in their best for the occasion, mostly in white; but some of the leaders wore velvet cloaks.

The Detachment 98th Regiment, the 2nd Sikh Infantry, and Captain Brougham's Mountain Battery, had also been employed against various positions of the enemy; and two guns of this battery did good service on the crest of the hill.

The labor to both the mules and artillery men had been very great, the loads having often to be carried by hand for fifty yards or more in the worst places.

Whilst these operations were going on, Upper Sittana was held by a wing of Her Majesty's 81st under Colonel Renny, and the Sappers and Miners under Captain Hyde were employed in destroying the village.

The position of the enemy having been carried at all points and their villages destroyed, Major-General Cotton determined to withdraw the troops. In the afternoon, the enemy, chiefly Pathans, rallied again upon another height on the road to Chuni; they had been joined by considerable numbers during the day, but the Major-General, in concert with the Commissioner, determined to adhere only to the object in hand, and not pursue the enemy further into the hills, when the troops would come in collision with the Jadun and other independent tribes.

As the troops withdrew, the enemy followed up closely, but were kept in check by a detachment of Her Majesty's 98th, the Guide Infantry, and two 5½-inch mortars. This was the first time that the enfield had been used in the hills, and the fire of the 98th, who were thus armed, was most effective, and evidently made a great impression both on the minds of the enemy as well as on those of the native chiefs who accompanied the force.

Our losses are given in the appendix; those of the enemy were Hindustanis 50, and Pathans 10, killed. The number of the wounded was not known, but the enemy acknowledged that they were numerous. Two Hindustanis were taken prisoners, one a native of Rampore, the other a Bengali, and they were summarily hanged at Sittana.

The Syads and Hindustanis, expelled from Sittana by the Utmanzais, had taken refuge with the Upper Jaduns, and it was probable that on the force disappearing, the Jaduns would come down and compel the Utmanzais to re-admit the fanatics. Indeed, the Utmanzais besought Colonel Edwardes to take measures to prevent this, and a force was therefore sent to surround the Jadun villages of Gandap and Bisak, which is close to the Yusafzai border. The headmen came in at once, but declared their inability to coerce the Upper Jaduns, and they were therefore sent to them to say that, unless they agreed to our terms, coercive measures would be adopted, in proof of which a force of about 1,000 horse and foot was detached under Colonel Mulcaster to our frontier village of Mymi—a demonstration which took rapid effect; for on the night of the 8th of May, the Upper and Lower Jaduns sent in their representatives, when they signed an agreement in full conclave of Utmanzais and Jaduns, by which both sides bound themselves to unite in expelling and keeping out the Syads and Hindustanis, and in resisting any third tribe which should endeavour to bring them back.

Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton stated that the conduct and discipline of the whole of the troops in the field deserved his most unqualified admiration, and that he was deeply indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, C.B., the Commissioner of Peshawar, for his very able co-operation and advice. He also alluded to the excellent service performed by Major Becher, the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, who commanded the Hazara Field Force, and whose disposition of his troops in the attack on Sittana contributed in no small degree to the success gained. The names of the other officers mentioned by Sir Sydney Cotton were—

Major Allen, „ 2nd „

Captain Brougham, commanding artillery.

Captain Brown ,, ,, ,, 81st.

"	Standard	"	Two 5½ inch mortars.
"	Pulman	"	

„ Cordner „ Dett. P. M. T. Battery.

Major Ryker	„	„	21st Regiment N. I.
Major Milne	„	„	

Captain Harding	„	2nd Sikhs.	•
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Quin 6th Panjab Infantry.

N

Captain Thelwall, commanding 9th Panjab Infantry.

„ Blagrove „ 12th „
 Lieutenant Williamson „ 18th „
 „ Kennedy „ Corps of Guides.
 „ Lockwood „ Dett. Peshawar L. Horse.

Captain Wright „ D. A. A. General.

Lieutenant Greaves, Acting D. A. A. General.

Captain Cooper, D. A. Q. M. General.

Lieutenant Whegham, Adjt., Peshawar L. Horse.

Captain Jones, D. J. A. General.

„ Cotton, Aide-de-Camp.

„ Fane, Peshawar L. Horse.

„ Tonnochy } Brigade Majors.
 „ Ellerman }

Lieutenant Tierney, S. O. of Artillery.

„ Osborne, S. O. of Cavalry.

„ White, S. O. to Hazara F. Force.

Surgeon Mann, Field Surgeon.

Mr. Sub-Cond. Cooper, Comt. Department.

Captain Hyde, Commissary, Sappers and Miners.

Lieutenant Tovey, 24th Regt. ditto ditto.

„ Henderson, Engineers.

„ Taylor, ditto.

In publishing the despatches, it was notified that the Governor General

G. O. G. G. fully appreciated the ability and judgment of Sir S.

Cotton in the conduct of the expedition, and that it would afford His Lordship great satisfaction to bring to the favorable notice of the home authorities the eminent merits of the Major-General, and the excellent services of the officers and troops.

Government letter. Great satisfaction at the judgment and vigour shown by Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes and Major Becher was also expressed.

APPENDIX.

Sittana Field Force.

Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton, commanding.

Staff.

Captain T. Wright, Chief of the Staff.

Lieutenant Greaves, Acting D. A. A. General.

Captain Cooper, D. A. Q. M. General.

„ Jones, D. J. A. General.

„ Cotton, A. D. C.

„ Hyde, B. E. Field Engineer.

Lieutenant Taylor, B. E. Asst. Engineer.

„ Henderson, B. E. „

„ Tovey, 24th Foot.

Captain Brougham, commanding.

Lieutenant Tierney, Staff Officer.

Cavalry.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mulcaster, commanding.

„ Osborne, Staff Officer.

1st Infantry Brigade.

Colonel Renny, commanding. | Captain Tonnochy, Brigade Major.

2nd Infantry Brigade.

Major Allen, commanding. | Captain Ellerman, Staff Officer.

Hazara Column.

Major J. Becher, commanding.

Lieutenant White, 12th P. I. Staff Officer.

Detail of the Field Force.

Artillery.

2—24-pounder howitzers. | 2—12-pounder howitzers.
2—9-pounder guns. | 2—3-pounder guns.

Cavalry.

125 Sabres, 7th Irregular Cavalry.
125 „ 18th „ „

Sappers.

100 Sappers, of 5th and 6th Companies.

Infantry.

250 Rank and File, with Head-Quarters and Band, H. M.'s 81st Regiment.
250 „ „ „ „ „ 98th „ „
400 „ „ „ „ „ with Band, 21st „ „ N. I.
400 „ „ „ „ „ Kelat-i-Ghilzi „ „
450 „ „ „ „ „ 8th Panjab Infantry.
450 „ „ „ „ „ 9th „ „ „
450 „ „ „ „ „ 18th „ „ „

Guide Corps.

250 Cavalry. | 350 Infantry.

Hazara Column.

450 Infantry, 6th Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Quinn.
3 Companys 2nd Sikh „ Captain Harding.
3 Companys 12th Panjab „ „ Blagrove.
3 Guns, Hazara Mountain Train Lieutenant Butt.
2 „ „ Captain Brougham's Mountain Train, Lieutenant Cordner.
50 Men, Hazara Mounted Police.

Return of Casualties in the Field Force under the Command of Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton, K.C.B., in the action of Sittana, on the right bank of the Indus, on the 4th May 1858.

CORPS.	KILLED.				WOUNDED.				REMARKS.
	European officers.	Native officers.	Havildars.	Rank and File.	European officers.	Native officers.	Havildars.	Rank and File.	
21st Regiment Native Infantry	1	*Lieutenant Vander Gucht sabre cut on the leg.
6th Panjab Infantry	1	5	
9th Ditto	1	...	1	...	6	
18th Ditto	1	...	3	*1	15	
Total	1	...	5	1	1	...	27	

ABSTRACT.

Killed ... 6
Wounded ... 29
Total ... 35

SECTION V.

Expedition against the Hindustani Fanatics by the Yusafzai Field Force under Sir Neville Chamberlain, K. C. B., October 1863.

AMBEYLA.

Report by Secretary, Panjab Government. AFTER the engagements taken from the Jadun and Utmanzai tribes not to allow the Hindustani fanatics to re-occupy Sittana, they re-settled at Malka, on the north side of the Great Mahabau Mountain. But in 1861 they came down to a place named Siori, just overhanging their old haunt at Sittana, and commenced sending robbers into Hazara to carry off Hindu Banias, and it was not until an embargo was placed on the Utmanzai and Jadun tribes that they returned to Malka.

Report by Colonel R. Taylor, Commissioner, Peshawar. The nature of these outrages is thus described by Colonel R. Taylor.

A trader loads his mules at one of our chief towns, and starts across country, (though there have been extreme cases of the offence taking place on the high road,) to a village he hopes to reach by nightfall. On the road, in some lonely spot, he is seized, gagged, and taken aside into the jungle or some mountain nook, and there kept close under drawn swords till dark, when the whole party starts by well-known, but unfrequented, tracks to the mountainous river bank, where the victim is inserted in an inflated skin, and a brigand mounting on it ferries him over the Indus, where he is detained till his relations pay up the required ransom. His chief danger lies in the day dawning, or other obstruction occurring before the kidnapping party reach the Indus, in which case the encumbrance, in the shape of a gagged idolater, must be got rid of. They might perhaps let him go if they could afford it, but the locality and route would be described by him, and individuals perhaps recognized, and so he is knocked on the head, and thrown into a mountain crevice.

Of the difficulties of exercising any preventive measures against these acts, Colonel R. Taylor observed.

"From the nature of the country it has been found impossible to deal with these acts merely by protective police arrangements. The actors are bold men, and actuated by a thirst for money for the actual needs of life, sharpened by hostility to us, while it would take the whole of the Hazara force one day to search one mountain, and at the end they would be quite knocked up and useless. What then could be hoped from a limited body of police in a tract of country containing a constant succession of such mountains? These are crimes which nothing but pressure on the head and source of the offence can check. The men who send out these brigands, and those who harbour and give them passage through their lands, must be reached and made to suffer, and then, and then alone, will the activity of their emissaries be checked."

Report by Colonel Taylor. During the autumn of 1862 and ensuing cold season, there was a considerable immunity from these kidnapping practices; but in the spring of 1863 two murders were committed, which were generally attributed to Mubarik Shah's men, and on the 5th July it was reported that the Syads and Hindustanis

had suddenly re-occupied Sittana. No attempt to prevent their coming was made by the Jadun or Utmanzai tribe, and some of the members actually invited them.

These tribes, being called upon for their reasons for having thus broken the engagements they had entered into in 1858, only afforded evasive replies, the Jaduns laying the blame on the Utmanzais, the Utmanzais on the Jaduns; and as the Syads and Hindustanis were sending threatening messages to our feudatory, the Chief of Amb, a blockade of the Jadun and Utmanzai tribes was

Colonel R. Taylor's Report. ordered, and militia were entertained for the defence of the territory of the Amb Chief.

After the expedition to Sittana, in 1858 Umar Shah who had been for years the chief counsellor of Syad Akbar, the late king of Swat, waited on Colonel Edwardes, soliciting that some employment should be given to the remaining Syads and Hindustanis, when Syad Mahomed Shah, the nephew of Syad Umar, was, with a certain number of his followers, enlisted and sent down for service in Hindustan.

On the reduction of the troops this party was disbanded, Syad Umar however being retained, for political reasons, in the Lahore police, from which subsequent reductions necessitated his discharge: and at this time, July 1863, Colonel Taylor heard that he had also come down to Sittana with 100 or 200 followers; giving out that he had the authority of the British Government for taking up his residence there. This statement of his was utterly false, as in the previous April he had asked for the grant of Sittana, and had been informed in reply that as Sittana did not belong to the British Government they could not give what did not belong to them; and on his again applying for permission to take possession of the village himself, without the intervention of the British, he was told that nothing of the kind would be listened to, and that anything further on the subject would lose him all hopes of future employment.

The dispositions for the blockade were as follow:—

Shergurh	...	} On the Hasanzai border of the } Left bank of	} Amb territory held by Amb troops. }	} the Indus.
Shungli	...			
Chamberi	...			
Chamba	...			
Darband	...	{ 50 Police and Jaghirdari Horse	...	} Ditto.
		{ 100 Foot Levies	...	
Kirpalaan	...	{ 1st Panjab Infantry	...	} Ditto.
		{ Hazara Mountain Train	...	
		{ 50 Sabres, 5th Panjab Cavalry	...	
		{ 50 Police over the boats	...	
Nao Giran	...	{ 85 Foot Levies	...	} Ditto.
Towi	...	{ 37 Police and Levies	...	
Khanpore	...	{ 55 Levies	...	
Torbelah	...	{ 1 Company, 5th Gurkhas	...	
Dalmohut	...	{ 20 Police over the boats	...	
Amb	...	{ Amb Horse 100	...	} Right bank.
		{ „ Foot 300	...	
		{ Hazara Levies 135	...	
Topi	...	{ 300 Infantry Guides	...	} Ditto.
		{ 150 Cavalry	...	
Swabi Maniri	...	{ Head-Quarters Guides.		
		{ 2 9-Pounders from Kohat.		

The 101st R. B. F. being ordered to Hazara.

The Syads and Moulvi Abdula were now acting with their Hindustani followers in the bitterest spirit against the British Government; the leaders of the colony expressly declared they were embarked in determined opposition to the infidel, and called upon all good Mussulmans to quit the friendship of the unbelieving, and join the would-be martyrs of the faith. A letter to this effect was also actually sent to the Chief of Amb.

On the night of the 7th September, Moulvi Abdula with his Hindustanis, and accompanied, it was said, by Malik Esau Jadun, attempted to attack the force at Topi. The attacking force had arrived within a short distance of the camp, when they came upon a cavalry patrol of 1 Duffadar, 4 Sowars, of the Guide Corps. The N. C. O. had been previously warned of the neighbourhood of a body of men, and on coming on an advanced party he immediately attacked them. One man was cut down, and the rest, rushing back on the main body, communicated a panic, which ended in a general and disgraceful flight. The Hindustanis then erected a breastwork on the right bank of the Indus, opening fire on the levy picquet at Naofiran.

About the middle of September, the Hasanzai tribe, instigated, it was supposed, by the Moulvi of Sittana, made an unprovoked attack on the hamlets in the little Shunghli Valley of the Black Mountain, in which the most advanced outpost of the Amb territory is situated. The fort was not molested, but some six or seven hamlets were destroyed, and one man, who resisted, was killed.

The Hasanzais then threatened an attack on Chamberi, and a portion of the Mada Khel crossed the Indus with the intention of assisting, but the frontier line having been greatly strengthened by the Amb authorities, the gathering broke up, and the Mada Khel re-crossed the river. Shortly afterwards, the Hasanzai made an attack on the Amb levies on the Black Mountain border, in which 1 Jemadar and 7 men were killed, and several of the levies wounded.

Report by Secretary,
Panjab Government.

The country thus disturbed by the Hindustanis was occupied, and divided as follows:—

It is separated into two tracks by the Upper Indus, which here runs nearly due south. On the left bank is the greater part of the Tanawal Canton held by the Amb Chief. North of this is the Black Mountain, the southern half of which is occupied by the Hasanzais, and the northern by the Akazais; and further eastward from the river joining the Hasanzais is the petty chiefship of Agror, subject to the British, and forming, like Tanawal, part of the Hazara District. The portion on the right bank is bounded on the north by the Guru Range, dividing it from Buner, and by the Barando River, separating it from the Chagarzais and from the Trans-Indus Hasanzais; on the east by the Indus itself; and on the south and west by the plains of Yusafzai.

The Utmanzai occupy a narrow strip opposite the Tanawal Canton, which contains the villages of Kabal, Sittana, and Mandi. To the north is the town of Amb, which stands on the river bank, and the Trans-Indus lands of Tanawal, and north of this again the country of Mada Khel. Within this line is the great Mahaban Mountain, the southern slopes of which are peopled by the Jaduns, the northern and eastern by the Amazai; west of the Jaduns are the Khudu Khels, who are shut off from the Chamla Valley by a lofty prolongation of the Mahaban reaching the Yusafzai border. The Chamla Valley is occupied by mixed tribes, amongst whom the Amazais are most numerous. The respective limits of these tribes is given in the accompanying map, and a fuller account of the tribes under their different headings.

The number of fighting men were thus estimated:—

Hasanzais	... 2,000	Amazais	... 1,500
Akazais	... 1,000	Jaduns	... 4,000
Chagarzais	... 12,000*	Khudu Khels	... 2,000
Mada Khels...	... 4,000		

The situation of Amb across the river rendered it difficult of defence. The chief was exposed not only to the threats and interdicts of the Syads, but to the hostility of the Hasanzais, who had never forgiven the arrest of their tribesmen by the chief's father for the murder of Messrs. Carne and Tapp, and of the Chief of Agror, a personal enemy, who by his marriage with the daughter of the chief of the Hasanzais is connected with that tribe. The Mada Khels were also little friendly to Amb, but the Amazais were well disposed towards him.

It was now considered that the time had arrived when it became absolutely necessary to have recourse to military operations. Despatch from the Panjab Government. Hitherto the hostilities and provocations had been offered by detached tribes, but now, for the first time, the majority, if not the whole of the Hazara border tribes were arrayed against the British Government. In the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, it was perhaps possible, though very doubtful, to avert a campaign by making use of the feuds and factions of the different tribes to sow discord in their councils, but this could only put off the day of reckoning a little further. Delay, which with these tribes is little understood, might encourage other tribes to action, and a favorable opportunity might thus be lost for putting an end to the chronic frontier irritation which existed. That an expedition against these tribes would be forced on the British Government sooner or later appeared inevitable, and condonation without chastisement would only be an inducement to them to repeat their offences.

An expedition was accordingly sanctioned by the Supreme Government, the first object of which was to effectually rid the frontier of the chronic cause of disturbance,—the Hindustani fanatics. Their mere expulsion from the right bank of the Indus back upon their old posts at Malka, and on the south bank of the Barando, was not considered enough; nor was it thought advisable that they should find shelter in Swat and make that powerful tribe the future focus of disturbance on the frontier. If possible, the line of retreat of the fanatics towards the Barando was to be cut off; and although their *extirpation* might not be possible, yet their dispersion would be on lines of direction favourable to their capture, if the co-operation of the well disposed sections of the tribes could be elicited. The punishment of the Jaduns was to be a secondary consideration to the primary one, of crushing effectually the small, but troublesome, horde of fanatics.

With regard to the plan of operations. In a memorandum drawn up by Colonel A. Wilde, c.B., commanding the Corps of Guides, it was stated that the expedition of 1858, although successful (as far as the fact that the troops defeated the Sittana men wherever met with), had not been perfectly conclusive as to its results. The Jadun tribe had not felt the power of Government, and although the Hindustanis had been turned out of Mangal Tanna and driven from Sittana, they had retreated on Malka, more from the pressure put upon them by the Jadun tribe, than from the defeats they had sustained from our troops. For the future peace of the border, Colonel Wilde said the destruction of this colony of priests and fanatics was a necessity, and that they must be

removed by death or capture from the hills, and a treaty made with the hill tribes not to allow them to reside in their territories. He believed that the plan of the campaign would have to be totally different from that pursued in 1858, as the country to the north of the Mahaban would have to be temporarily occupied. The military object being to attack the Hindustanis from the north, forcing them to fight with their backs to the plains, operating in fact on their line of retreat, instead of, as before, by advancing from the plains, driving them out of Mangal Tanna and Sittana, and allowing them a safe retreat and passage into the hills. To effect this, two columns were to be employed, the base of operations of one column being in the Peshawar Valley, that of the other in Hazara.

The Peshawar column was to be assembled at Nao Killa and Swabi Maniri, with the avowed object, as in 1858, of moving on Mangal Tanna (which would be *naturally expected*); but when ready to march, was to pass through the Ambeyla defile (or more properly the Surkhawi Pass), and occupy the village of Koga, in the Chamla Valley, 13 miles by a camel road chiefly over our own land, and stated then to be "easy in the extreme." The next day the force was to march to Cherorai, 16 miles, an open plain, and near to the River Barando, when, simultaneous with the occupation of Cherorai, the Hazara column was to drop down the Indus and drive the enemy out of Sittana, occupying that place; the Peshawar column moving on the third day to Malka.

Report by Panjab Government.

The advantages of this route were thus reckoned:—

I.—That the Jaduns, finding their country commanded by the force in the Chamla Valley, would keep quiet, and perhaps assist in capturing the Hindustanis.

II.—That the operations would be in an open valley, containing several fine villages, and admitting the employment of cavalry, whence also flying columns could be sent up the Mahaban, the northern slopes of which are easier than the southern.

III.—It afforded the alternatives of either withdrawing to the plains through the Ambeyla Pass, or of sending back the cavalry by that route, and advancing the rest of the force either to Mangal Tanna or Sittana. Colonel Wilde said it might be argued, that by entering the Chamla Valley we should become involved with tribes whose hostility was not as yet declared.

If the Amazais proved enemies, it was easier to fight them there than on the Mahaban heights. In the event of the Amazais remaining friendly, or even after they had been coerced, the destruction or capture of the Hindustanis must follow, as their line of retreat would be in our hands. And if the Jaduns were willing to buy their immunity by capturing them, we should place the enemy between us and the Jaduns.

Colonel Wilde then enumerated the political points involved in the above scheme, amongst which were—

Would the Bunerwals cross the Guru Range to attack the British camp in the Chamla Valley?

Was the Ambeyla Pass easy of access?

Was the Chamla Plain large, and well adapted for military operations?

Could communication be opened from Cherorai with Hazara?

Colonel Taylor, the Commissioner, was at Murree till the 3rd October in consultation with the Lieutenant-Governor and Sir Neville Chamberlain, when the different routes and the points enumerated in Colonel Wilde's memorandum were fully considered and discussed.

On the 7th October he despatched Captain Munro, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, to the camp at Swabi, directing him to make all enquiries compatible with secrecy regarding the proposed route by the Ambeyla Pass, proceeding himself to the upper part of the Indus, being especially and hopefully desirous of investigating the point mooted in the last of Colonel Wilde's questions. Information led to the belief that a force could without difficulty reach Cherorai, and Colonel Taylor hoped that a feasible exit for it by the line of the Barando might be found, which would enable the force, after fully dealing with the Mahaban tribes, to cross into our own territories without the necessity of re-tracing our steps, holding ground in our rear, &c.

On the 7th October, Colonel Taylor took sketches (see Appendix) of the whole river-board, from Batheri below Sittana on the Indus to the exit of the Barando River, opposite the Amb outpost of Chamla on the left bank. The effect of this examination was, to dash all hopes of a force being able to move by the Barando route. But the sketches made by Colonel Taylor showed features which were recognizable by the surveyors on the other side, and furnished them with names and bearings.

On the 12th October, Colonel Taylor reached the camp at Swabi, when he found all the accounts obtained by Captain Munro, the Deputy Commissioner, and his Assistants Lieutenant Sandeman and Atta Muhammad Khan, tended to confirm the belief that the Ambeyla Pass was easy as to roadway, and presented no military obstacles; that the Chamla Valley was wide and open, and the northern slopes of the Mahaban easier than those on the southern face.

The road, as already stated, was known to be one of general traffic, was reported commonly in the country as open and easy, practicable for camels, and to be the ordinary road for the traffic from the Chamla Valley, but it was afterwards found unfitted for the carriage with which the force was furnished.

Colonel Taylor then accompanied a reconnoitring party to Panjtar, and saw that the southern face of the ridge was very stiff. Enquiry on the spot confirmed the fact of the Chamla Valley being open and easy. But the Ambeyla Pass could not be mentioned from prudential reasons, nor could it be examined from the same cause.

With regard to the action likely to be taken by the Buners, Colonel Taylor says:—

No hostilities were anticipated from the Bunerwals, as they had no sympathy as a body with the fanatics, being of different tenets and forming part of the religious constituency of the Akund of Swat, who was known to be bitterly opposed at that time to the fanatic body, the members of which he denounced as Wahabis, coupling them with his special rival, the Kotla Mula, whom, with his disciples, he had not scrupled to stigmatise as kaffirs, *i. e.*, infidels, for certain heterodox theories opposed to his (the Akund's) rulings in matters affecting the Mahomedan faith. The Buner tribe had always been peaceable, and for fifteen years had never given us any trouble; they were known as great traders, and that was nearly all that was known of them, for their leaders and headmen had come so little in contact with us that neither did we know them nor did they know us except by common report. Secrecy regarding the line of proposed operations was of the utmost importance, and it was under the circumstances impossible to examine that route by questioning those of our own territories best acquainted with it without raising suspicions as to the line it was intended to take on entering the hills, and for the same reason it was not advisable to consult the Buner Jirgah or

Report by Panjab Government.

Report by Colonel R. Taylor.

tribe council, nor to consult our own Sadum Chiefs, the men who knew most about the clan and the Chamla Valley.

With regard to the Chamla Valley, it was known to be inhabited by mixed classes, some of them settlers from our own Yusafzai plains, some from Buner, others belonging to the Khudu Khel clan, who were known to be desirous to remain friendly with us, the rest being Amazais, who were in some measure implicated as enemies, from the fact of the Hindustani colony at Malka and the Chamla outposts and Nagri water-mills being all situated in their territory. The valley was not claimed by, or considered as under, the protection of any large clan, and it was known to be divided from Buner by a lofty range of mountains called the Guru.

Of its advantages as a military position Colonel Taylor said, a force would be here able to take its stand in open ground, in rear of the whole of the enemy's tract, which it would fully command, and from whence, by rapid excursions, it would be able to do all its work, and deal with all difficulties, returning, when convenient, to its standing camp; while such a position would render the tribes on the southern slopes of the Mahaban Mountain well nigh powerless, as their whole position would be stopped, putting them at the mercy of an army which could descend upon their strong-holds, and thus carry out its ends with irresistible advantage.

Sir Neville Chamberlain, Commanding Panjab Frontier Force, who had been selected by the Commander-in-Chief for the command of the Expedition, decided on adopting this plan of operations, with the exception that the Hazara column was not to take any active part in the movements against the Hindustanis, but simply to remain stationary at Darband, opposite to Amb, with the sole object of overawing the Hasanzais and other tribes on both banks of the Indus, and protecting the Hazara Frontier from attack; the active operations against Sittana being confined entirely to the column under his personal command.

The constitution of the force is given in the Appendix A.

In addition, there were 1,000 levies under the Commissioner.

Letter Sec. P. G.

The following troops were to hold the line of the Indus, Hazara, and Yusafzai:—

Darband	...	{	350 European Infantry, 51st Regiment.
			250 Native Infantry.
			3 Guns.
Torbela	...	{	1 Squadron 13th Bengal Cavalry.
			Details „ Infantry.
Topi	...	{	150 13th Bengal Cavalry.
			250 „ Infantry.
			2 Guns.
Abbottabad...		{	1 Company European Infantry, 93rd Highlanders.
			2 Depôts, Native Infantry Regiments, 5th Gurkhas, 1st Panjab Infantry.
			50 Native Cavalry, 5th Panjab Cavalry.
			3 Guns.
Rustum Bazar		{	300 Native Cavalry.
			Details, Native Infantry.
Mardan	...		Depôt Guide Corps.

About 4,000 mules, ponies, and other beasts of burthen, were assembled through the agency of district officers; this was exclusive of camels and the carriage taken by regiments.

To form the expeditionary force, all the northern stations were drawn upon to such an extent that no reserve could be maintained nearer than Lahore.

The numbers of troops left at each station were as follow :—

Peshawar.

Besides several Batteries of Artillery—

1 Regiment Hussars.

1 „ European Infantry.

2 Regiments Bengal Cavalry.

3 „ Native Infantry, all weak, in effective men, and having to hold outposts which took up one regiment.

Rawal Pindi.

1 Regiment Native Infantry, having 120 men at Murree.

1 Battery Artillery.

1 Company 93rd Highlanders.

Depôts 51st and 101st R. B. F.

Kohat.

2 Guns, Panjab Battery.

2 Squads, Panjab Cavalry.

2 Weak Regiments, Panjab Infantry.

Bannu.

2 Guns, Panjab Battery.

1 Regiment Panjab Cavalry.

1 „ „ Infantry.

Dera Ismail Khan.

2 Guns, Panjab Battery.

1 Regiment Panjab Cavalry.

1 „ „ Infantry.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch. On the 13th October, Sir Neville Chamberlain arrived at Swabi, the place at which it had been arranged that the troops proceeding from Hazara were to assemble; but owing to the insufficient number of boats available for the passage of the Indus opposite Topi, the troops were delayed in crossing, and it was advisable therefore to delay proportionately the arrival at the rendezvous at Naokilla (ten miles north-west of Swabi) of the troops proceeding *via* Naoshera. If the force had been allowed to assemble at Naokilla, it would have been necessary to supply the troops from the Commissariat stores collected there for the expedition; whereas, by keeping them in the rear, they were supplied from villages in the neighbourhood of their camps. However, this delay did not defer the commencement of operations, as neither the Commissariat nor the ordnance arrangements were then completed.

Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch. On the 18th October, the troops, as per margin, marched to the mouth of the Daran Pass. This is the pass by which the force under Major-General Sir S. Cotton, K. C. B., entered the hills in 1858; and by this movement the impression was, of course, conveyed that the force was about to enter the hills by the same route as before, the other troops of the expeditionary force moving up at the same time to Naokilla from their camps in the rear.

On the afternoon of the 19th, when it was too late for the Chamla or other tribes to make any preparations on a large scale for impeding the march of the troops through the Ambeyla Pass, a proclamation was forwarded by the Commissioner to the Chamla, Jadun, Amazai, Mada Khel, and Buner tribes (Appendix H), stating the object with which the force was about to enter the Chamla Valley, and assuring them that it was with no intention of injuring them or of interfering with their independence, but solely because it was the most convenient route by which to reach the Hindustani fanatics, and to effect their expulsion from the Mahaban.

First day's operations.

October 20th.—At 9 P. M. on the 19th October, the troops marginally noted, marching from Naokilla, effected a junction at Permouli with the troops which had been sent before to the mouth of the Daran Pass, and the united detachments under Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde, C. B., moved upon Surkawai or the Ambeyla Pass.

Movements of the advanced column.
 100 Sabres, Guide Cavalry.
 100 „ 11th Bengal Cavalry.
 Guide Infantry.
 5th Panjab Infantry.
 20th (Panjab) Native Infantry.

This column was accompanied by Colonel R. Taylor, C. B., the Commissioner. It entered the pass at sunrise, and the Maliks of our own village of Surkawai, situated inside the mouth of the pass, were taken on by the Commissioner; they told him that the advance was then easy, but that opposition would certainly be shown in the pass the following day.

The column halted for an hour inside, to rest the men who had been marching across country during the whole night. About 9 A. M. the column having been organized for service, and the baggage directed to remain at the entrance of the pass, under an escort of the 11th Bengal Cavalry, the troops advanced; the Infantry of the Corps of Guides and the 1st Panjab Infantry leading, supported, respectively, by the 20th Panjab Infantry and the 5th Panjab Infantry. The 5th Gurkha Battalion remained as an escort to the two Mountain Train Batteries.

About one-third of the pass had been traversed when information was received that the advance would be opposed. Reports brought down by cattle graziers, differed as to the numbers of the enemy, and the thickly wooded nature of the country rendered it difficult to ascertain what points of the hills were occupied, but it was said that the head of the pass was held by the people of Buner.

At 12 o'clock the enemy commenced firing from the rocks in the vicinity of the road, but were gradually dislodged by the advanced guard of the column; in this manner two-thirds of the pass was gained, when the end of the pass, called the Ambeyla Kandao, appeared in sight. The hills on both sides were high, covered with low brushwood and jutting rocks, but perfectly practicable to good light troops. On many of the most prominent rocks small parties of the enemy showed themselves, and occasionally fired.

The Infantry of the Corps of Guides under Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins were directed to take the crest of the hills to the right, and the 1st Panjab Infantry under Major C. P. Keyes to move up the valley slowly, and it was left to Major Keyes to act as his judgment dictated. Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan with his regiment protected the flank of the column, which some parties of the enemy threatened. By 2 P. M. the top of the pass, the water-shed of the valleys of Sadum and Chamla, and the entrance of the Chamla Valley, was secured. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde stated that both Major Keyes and Lieutenant Jenkins had displayed both skill and knowledge of hill warfare in the management of their corps.

The numbers of the enemy in the field were estimated at from 200 to 250 men, and their loss amounted to two killed and three wounded, besides one captured. On the side of the troops there was no casualty. Sir Neville Chamberlain considered that the duty was satisfactorily performed, and that credit was due

to Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde and to the officers and troops employed under his orders.

Movement of the Main Column.

The main column, composed of the troops as per margin, marched from Naokilla at 1 A.M. on the 20th October, and reached Rustam at 7 A.M. The road was a mere village track, and as any attempt to improve it earlier would have revealed our intended route, it had only received such repairs as a company of sappers could hastily give it. Late in the afternoon of the 19th, when concealment was no longer necessary or practicable, the civil authorities aided in removing obstructions by employing large parties of villagers, who worked at the road by torch light, and a line of fires marked the route by which the troops were advancing.

The main column rested for a short time at Rustam for the troops to refresh and breakfast, and the opportunity was taken of selecting the best available position for the depôt of sick and weakly men, &c., to be left at that place*. At about 9 A.M. the troops were again in motion. As far as the village of Surkawai the track was tolerably good, and lay through small open valleys; but at a little distance from Surkawai the real pass commences. In regard to the pass, Sir N. Chamberlain said: "As a road for troops, it certainly presents great difficulties. The track lies up the bed of a stream encumbered with boulders and large masses of rock, and is overgrown with low trees and jungle. The hills on either side rise to some height, but for the most part with a gradual slope, so that infantry can ascend them without difficulty except for the obstacle presented by thick thorny jungle." The guns were drawn by horses as far as possible, and then transferred to elephants. The progress of the force was of course extremely slow, as in most parts it was only practicable to move in single file. The British troops were much fatigued; but the plentiful stream of water which flows through the pass prevented their suffering from thirst, and late in the afternoon the rear of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's column was reached.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's column had not been strong enough to post flanking parties at more than a few of the most important points in the pass. Detachments were, therefore, posted from the main column wherever it seemed necessary, and the entire 5th Gurkha Regiment was left about three-quarters of a mile from the crest of the pass, in a commanding situation, where it served as a support to the small flanking parties, and also protected the baggage. The 32nd Native Infantry formed the rear guard, but did not get beyond Surkawai on the night of the 20th.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde had encamped the advanced column on and beyond the crest of the pass on tolerably open and level ground, which afforded sufficient room for the main column also to bivouac as it came up; but it was 10 P.M. before the guns reached camp. The whole of the cavalry had been sent on with the advanced column, under the representation that the pass was much easier and shorter than it proved to be, in view to pushing

* During this campaign, for political reasons, no field hospital could be formed at the base of the operations in the first instance, but one was afterwards organized out of the regimental stores of different regiments left at the foot of the hills on entering the Ambeyla Pass; this had to be further supplemented by stores from Peshawar. Quinine was also sent for the use of the troops from the depôt at Calcutta, as the Native troops suffered at first much from fever, apparently from change of temperature.

Brigadier-General Chamberlain's Despatch.

½ C Battery, 19th Brigade, R. A.

Company of Sappers.

71st Highland Light Infantry (550).

101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers (500).

32nd Bengal Native Infantry.

3rd Panjab Infantry.

6th Ditto.

them forward, supported by some infantry and Mountain train guns, to reconnoitre the road down the pass and the head of the Chamla Valley. But when it was found what difficulties the pass presented even to the march of the troops, and how long it would necessarily be before the whole of the baggage could come up, it was thought prudent to make no further movement in advance. The ammunition mules of the infantry had been able with difficulty to keep up with the rear of their respective regiments, but with this exception not a single baggage animal reached the camp during the night of the 20th.

The position which the troops occupied on that night was thus described by Sir N. Chamberlain: On the left they were enclosed by the Guru Mountain, which divides the Ambeyla Pass from Buner. This mountain, which is estimated roughly to be 6,000 feet high, rises in a succession of ridges, steep but not precipitous, running generally parallel to the pass; occasional plateaux and knolls are found on its sides, which afforded convenient and safe situations for our picquets; and about 1,000 feet above the camp was a very remarkable heap of enormous *granite* rocks, which forms a conspicuous object from the entrance and throughout the pass, and marks the point at which the crest or water-shed is reached, which separates Yusafzai from Chamla. The sides of the Guru Mountain are clothed with fir trees of large growth, interspersed on the lower slopes with the wild fig and the date tree; a remarkable mixture of the vegetation of a cold and of a tropical climate. To the front of camp the pass widened as it descended, and opened out into little plateau, which at last met the plain of Chamla. The latter was distant about three miles from the camp, and had the appearance of being well cultivated, with a stream flowing through the middle of it, the head of which gave water to the camp. A range of hills much lower than the Guru was on the right of camp, and was crowned by our picquets. To the rear, but far below, was seen the plain of Yusafzai.

One of the Maliks of Ambeyla had been made prisoner while opposing the advance of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's column. From him it was ascertained that the slight opposition made in the pass was made by the people of his own village, (situated at the mouth of the pass in the Chamla Valley, and therefore belonging geographically to Chamla, but paying tribute to one of the Buner tribes), and by a few of the Chamla villagers. He was sent to his people by the Commissioner, together with a wounded man, and they were allowed to take away the body of their man who had been killed. The Malik was charged with a verbal message corresponding with the terms of the proclamation, and informing the Chamla people that if they would bring supplies they would be liberally paid for.

21st October.—Up to the evening of the 21st, but a small portion of the baggage had reached the camp, partly in consequence of the difficulties of the road, and partly from the inferior nature of much of the carriage and the incompetence of the drivers. The road in many places was overgrown with brushwood, and overhung with trees, which proved a serious cause of detention to the baggage. Time had not sufficed, after the assembly of the troops, for the arrangement of all details, such as the careful apportionment of loads according to the strength and efficiency of the cattle. The large amount of mule and pony carriage necessary had naturally resulted in the presence of a good many animals very little fitted for their work. Loads were knocked off, or thrown by cattle unfit to take them up again, and this, of course, choked the line. It was further necessary as

Sir N. Chamberlain's
Despatch.

Commissioner's Despatch.

night fell, to push on certain stores for the use of the Europeans; this effort increased the already existing difficulties in narrow passages, and the result was a stoppage of the whole line, which was not easily set in motion again.

The Buner Malik, who had been allowed to go back to his village the day before, returned in the morning to the camp with the Maliks of Ambeyla and Koga with fowls, &c., and professions of a full intention to assist the force; and in this manner the Maliks of all the principal villages of the Chamla Valley came in bringing offerings; but all these friendly symptoms subsequently received a check when Buner threw itself into opposition.

It has already been stated that on the 19th a proclamation had been sent to the Buner tribes with others; to this a reply was this day received by the Commissioner from the two chief Maliks, saying that the force was at liberty to follow its own enemies, and that the Buner people would only be prepared to defend their own country should it be attacked; in return an agent was sent to them by Colonel Taylor to fully explain our intentions.

22nd October.—On the morning of the 22nd, the rear guard being then at no great distance from the camp, it was considered that the preliminary steps might be taken for moving the force forward.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Accordingly, in the forenoon, a detachment of sappers (details of the 4th and 5th companies) was set to work to improve the descent of the pass. The road was fair, and the pass, about two miles in length, was unoccupied by the enemy. The sappers were supported by the 20th Panjab Native Infantry under Major Brownlow, and as soon as the road was reported tolerably good, were followed by the cavalry* under Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn, c. b., v. c. The sappers were then sent back to camp, and the cavalry proceeded to reconnoitre, supported by the 20th Panjab Infantry†, which occupied the gorge of the pass, the reconnoissance being conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, c. b., Royal Engineers, accompanied by Lieutenant R. Sandeman, Assistant Commissioner, with whom were the Sadum Khans.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Taylor, Royal Engineers.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

The information which had been received in camp was to the effect, that a considerable body of the Buner tribe were occupying the pass which leads from Chamla into Buner from near Ambeyla, but that their intentions towards us were peaceable; and, as already narrated, Colonel Taylor, the Commissioner, had been in communication with them, when they had avowed their intention of merely acting on the defensive, and of opposing us only in the event of our attempting to enter the Buner country.

Sir Neville Chamberlain being most desirous that no cause of offence, or even of suspicion, should be given to the Buner people, had instructed Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, R. E. to act with the greatest circumspection.

From the foot of the pass there were two roads through the Chamla Valley: one passed by the village of Ambeyla and lay under the hills which divided Chamla from Buner on the north side of the valley, the other road was by Koga and along the south side of the valley; and as Ambeyla, though actually in Chamla, was regarded by the Buner people as one of their own villages, the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor were to proceed by the Koga route, to guard in every possible way against giving offence to the Buner people, and to prove to them our desire to hold entirely aloof from them and their country.

* 100 Sabres, Guide Cavalry.

100 Sabres, 11th Bengal Cavalry.

† 250 Rank and File.

As the cavalry passed the Kotal leading into Buner, which was on their left, distant about two and half miles, it was seen that it was occupied in force by the Bunerwals; but from all that could be learned none had descended into the valley.

On arrival at Koga (four miles from camp), the reports that the valley was quite unoccupied were confirmed, and it was considered by Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, R. E., desirable to take advantage of such a favorable state of affairs to push down the valley as far as was compatible with the General's order to be in camp by sunset.

Leaving the main body of the cavalry at Koga, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor proceeded with a small escort to Kuria (seven miles beyond Koga) and reached Koga again about 4-30 P. M.

From Ambeyla to Korla the surface of the valley was level, free from obstructions, and quite practicable for field artillery. The nullah banks were all low, water was abundant, and the land highly cultivated; fuel, however, had to be supplied from the hills, as there was no jungle in the valley. Beyond Korla the country was rugged and difficult.

On arrival at the foot of the Ambeyla Pass, it was found that the Bunerwals had been and were still descending in considerable numbers, with the view of preventing the return of the reconnoitring party. They attempted to gain possession of a patch of very broken ground at the extreme end of the valley through which the road lay. It was necessary to prevent this, and to check them until Major Brownlow could come up in support; with this view the cavalry charged in the most spirited way, and sabred six of the enemy. Major Brownlow then occupied the broken ground with two companies, and the cavalry, under a small escort of infantry, returned to camp.

The rear guard duties now devolved on Major Brownlow. Emboldened by the continued retreat of the party, the enemy recovered from the effects of Colonel Probyn's charge, and by the time the pass was fairly entered, had assembled in great numbers and had surrounded a picquet under Lieutenant Richmond on the north side of the pass, which it took some time to withdraw. By this time daylight had quite gone, and the remainder of the retirement was effected in dim moonlight. The enemy pressed Major Brownlow very closely, and several times came in amongst his men, sword in hand. Eventually, as the troops drew into camp, the camp picquets became engaged, and there was a general attack upon them in the front and on the flanks of camp, which continued at intervals until midnight, but the enemy were repulsed with but trifling loss to the troops (see Appendix C), Lieutenant Gillies, R. A., of the Hazara Mountain Train, being however amongst the killed.

The nature of the ground, which was very broken and covered with brushwood, enabled the enemy to carry off most of their dead during the hours of darkness, but eight of their bodies were taken up in the morning, and from the reports of spies it appeared that about fifty of them had been killed, amongst them being some people of influence. The losses of the reconnoitring party had been—

				Killed.	Wounded.
20th Panjab Infantry	2	11
Cavalry casualties	0	5

(See Appendix C.)

Sir N. Chamberlain considered that in covering the retirement of the cavalry, the 20th Panjab Infantry had behaved with great steadiness, and Major Brownlow's conduct most praiseworthy; that Lieutenant Richmond had

exhibited great gallantry, and that Lieutenant Brown, Royal Engineers, slightly wounded, who had joined the 20th Panjab Infantry, had also distinguished himself.

At this time a very remarkable paper fell into the hands of the Commissioner, viz., a letter from Moulvi Abdula*, the military leader of the Hindustani fanatics, and Syad Umran, an uncle of Mobarik Shab, to the Buner Chiefs, warning them that, with reference to the assembly of troops in Yusafzai, we might probably assert it was to punish the Hindustanis, whereas it was in reality to lay waste and annex Chamla, Buner, and Swat. The letter was not dated, but had evidently been written before the proclamations, and must have roused the worst suspicions of the Buner people, as the predictions contained in it anticipated almost word for word portions of the proclamations.

23rd October.—That the Buner people should thus have taken a decidedly hostile part against us, was extremely serious, and not only altered our position in the hills, but required possibly a change in the plan of operations. The security of the communication of the force with the rear had to be arranged for, and the wing of the 14th Native Infantry was ordered up from Naokilla to Rustam, and application made for another Native Infantry regiment to be sent from Peshawar. Sir N. Chamberlain requested the Commissioner to arrange for the occupation of the lower portion of the pass with his Foot Levies, and thought it probable that he should have to ask for more Native Infantry before the communication with the rear could be considered secure, even so long as the force occupied its position on the crest of the Ambeyla Pass.

The plan of operations, as already shown, was to use the Chamla Valley as a route to reach the Hindustani settlement on the Mahaban, but it now became doubtful if it could be adhered to.

With a powerful and warlike tribe like the people of Buner in declared hostility on the left flank of the proposed line of march, and in a position to which they could always return, even though once dislodged and beaten, it would perhaps be impossible to persevere in this plan of operations. Moreover, as information had been received that the Buner people had summoned the Hindustanis to their aid, and that at least a portion of them had obeyed the summons, it was probable the fanatics would be either encountered in our present position, fighting with the people of Buner, or have to be sought elsewhere than on the spurs of the Mahaban; indeed an advance on the Mahaban would not find them, but would leave them in the rear to harass the march of the troops.

A deputation, consisting of almost all the influential men of the Jadun tribe, came into camp to the Commissioner this day, and many of the Chamla Maliks were also in camp.

Both the British and Native troops had to undergo considerable discomfort from the baggage having been delayed, but the plentiful supply of firewood had fortunately enabled them to keep up large watch-fires, and the troops generally were healthy, except those who had brought Peshawar fever with them.

October 24th.—On this morning the sick, both British and Native, all baggage except that absolutely necessary for efficiency; and all carriage rendered spare by this arrangement, were sent to the rear under a strong escort, whilst an Infantry Regiment occupied a spur of the Guru Mountain, thereby preventing any attack by the Bunerwals on the convoy as it filed

* See Appendix I.

down the pass. At the same time, parties from the camp were employed in improving the road and in removing the worst of the obstacles. The enemy remained quiet, but large bodies of men, with numerous standards,

Hasanzais.
Chagarzais.
Mada Khel.

were observed approaching the mouth of the pass, consisting of the tribes from the Northern Indus as per margin, with a portion of the Hindustanis under

Syad Mobarik Shah. The night passed over quietly.

October 25th.—On the night of the 24th, the 1st Panjab Infantry under

Major C. P. Keyes's Despatch.

the command of Major C. P. Keyes occupied the advanced picquets of the right defence, and a little after daylight on the morning of the 25th, the

enemy showed on a ridge of hills opposite these picquets, which it was considered dangerous to let them hold in force because of its vicinity to the picquets. Calling upon Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B., who was in command of the right defence, for support, Major Keyes advanced to dislodge the enemy from the ridge. Major Keyes had then about 200 men, 100 of whom he sent under Captain Davidson, 2nd in command, to take the enemy in flank, and when he had advanced sufficiently far on the ridge occupied by the enemy, Major Keyes moved at the double to attack them in front, and drove them from height to height until he obtained a position which could be safely held till reinforced.

The position Major Keyes had now taken up was on a ridge overlooking a plain 200 yards broad, over which the enemy had been driven. On the other side of this plain was a conical hill, the summit of which commanded the ridge at a range of 700 yards. On this, the enemy were collecting from the plain by the villages of Lalu and Koga. As they appeared to be coming in considerable force, (eventually between 2,000 and 3,000 men,) Major Keyes sent off for a Mountain battery and another regiment, and ordered the 1st Panjab Infantry to keep under cover, and not to return the fire of the enemy.

Owing to the distance from camp, and the nature of the ground, these reinforcements did not arrive till 2 P.M. 150 men from the 71st H. L. I. and 101st R. B. F. arrived first with Captain Fosbery, Musketry Instructor, who had joined the force by order of the Commander-in-Chief to test the value of a shell invented by him. The marksmen of this party were selected and placed along the ridge, the men of the 1st Panjab Infantry being recalled and drawn up out of sight of the enemy, as also the 5th Gurkha Regiment, which joined shortly afterwards. As soon as the Peshawar Mountain Battery arrived, they were brought up as near the ridge as possible without showing themselves to the enemy. The guns were then dragged up by hand into position marked by sections standing in their front, and immediately opened fire with shrapnell at a distance of 600 yards, the marksmen opening fire at the same time.

The "conical" hill held by the enemy was rocky and very precipitous, but essentially a weak position, having a line of retreat that would expose the retreating enemy to great loss if closely pursued.

After the guns had fired two rounds, the 1st Panjab Infantry were advanced at the "double," supported by the 5th Gurkha Regiment, the whole of the British troops keeping up the fire from the ridge.

The enemy did not stop to defend their position, but after firing a few shots, retreated at their utmost speed. To the admirable practice of the guns, and the withering fire of the marksmen, may be attributed our obtaining the hill without any loss. The enemy left several bodies on the ground, and their

total loss was afterwards ascertained to have been 33 killed and upwards of 40 wounded*. Our loss was only one private, 1st Panjab Infantry, wounded on the first advance from the picquets. As soon as the enemy were seen to have re-passed the village of Lalu on their way to the plains, the troops were dismissed to their quarters.

Major Keyes stated that great credit was due to Captain Hughes, commanding the Peshawar Mountain Battery, for the admirable manner in which he brought up his guns over the very difficult ground he had to traverse, and his very effective practice when brought into action; also to Major Campbell, commanding 5th Gurkha Battalion, and the Officers commanding the European Companies, for the manner in which they carried out the object in view, of masking all movements until the moment of attack. He further stated, that Captain Davidson took up his flanking party with great spirit, and performed essential service in driving back the enemy, and that the energy, intelligence, and zeal of Lieutenant and Adjutant H. W. Pitcher, who was foremost in every movement, rendered most effective aid.

Sir N. Chamberlain in his despatch said this affair was most skilfully managed by Major Keyes, and in forwarding that officer's report for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, begged to bring to notice the officers therein named.

* Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Whilst this affair was being conducted by Major Keyes on the right, the heights above the left flank picquets were crowned by large bodies of the enemy, and it afterwards became known that a simultaneous attack on both flanks of the camp had been arranged, but the Buner people, who were to have attacked the left flank, failed to keep their agreement. This gave great offence to the tribes engaged in the right attack†, and the Mahaban tribes were so disgusted by this reverse that they trooped off the same day down the valley to their homes, and did not rejoin the war for some weeks.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch. The camp arrangements at this time were as follow:—

The front picquets were under command of Colonel Hope, c. b., 71st Highland Light Infantry, those on the right under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, c. b., Guide Corps, and those on the left under Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, 5th Panjab Infantry. The heights which commanded the camp were occupied by strong parties of infantry and stockaded picquets. The approach to the camp from the gorge was defended by a breastwork and guns in position, and the rear was also secured from attack.

The defences consisted of loop-holed stone walls, abattis, and branches of trees pointing upwards. As will be afterwards seen, the enemy generally singled out one position at a time to attack; and, owing to the nature of the ground, which was broken and wooded, they were enabled to get close up and attack in such large numbers, and with such boldness, that in some instances they pulled down the stone walls and threw the stones at the defenders.

Reports were now rife that the Buner people had solicited the aid of the Akhund of Swat. If he joined in the war, bringing, as he would doubtless do, an immense accession of material as well as moral strength, an advance by the Chamla Valley would become still more difficult, but Sir N. Chamberlain considered that in the meantime the halt of the force at the crest of the pass was not without its advantages. The situation was a menacing one, it obliged the enemy to keep a large body of men together whom they found

* Amongst the killed was the brother of a Syad of some note of Chamla, although this tribe had sent in a deputation to the Commissioner.

† Colonel R. Taylor's (Commissioner) Report.

it difficult to feed, and it made it indispensable for them to become the attacking party, when all the advantage was on our side.

26th October.—In the account of the operations of the 25th, it was mentioned that a simultaneous attack upon both the right and left flanks of the camp had been arranged by the enemy to come off on that day, but that the Buner men had failed in their agreement for an attack on our left. But as large bodies of men had then been seen collected upon the Guru Mountain, it was necessary to provide against the threatened attack on the left, and also against the possibility of the enemy making an attempt from the spurs of the Guru upon a convoy of sick, baggage, &c., which was about to be sent to the rear. Accordingly, on the morning of the 26th, the left picquets under Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan were reinforced as follow :—

30 Marksmen, 71st and 101st Regiments.
200 Men, 71st Regiment.
5th Panjab Infantry.
6th ditto.
Hazara Mountain Battery.

These troops proceeded to the neighbourhood of the “Eagle’s Nest” picquet. This picquet occupied the top of a very steep rocky knoll, which rises out of the southern face of the Guru, and is the apex of that portion of the mountain which overlooked the left flank of the camp.

It was necessary to hold this position with a picquet by day, in order to give security to the grass-cutters, &c., of the camp; but its distance from camp, and the consequent difficulty of reinforcing it quickly, had made it unadvisable to hold it by night until the ground below had been securely occupied, and the picquet had been consequently withdrawn at sunset to a lower position. The knoll had been hastily prepared for defence the preceding

afternoon by the erection of a breastwork of stones on high ground, showing a semi-circular front of about 90 feet. Below this the ground was level and commanded by the work, and beyond the plateau, the hill, which was well wooded and studded with rocks, rose again, and its crest (distant about 500 yards from our breastwork) was protected by a similar work of the enemy.

Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan’s dispositions were as follow :—
The picquet already described was under Major Brownlow, and consisted of—

30 Marksmen, 71st and 101st Regiments, under Lieutenant Fosbery,
80 Do., 20th Panjab Infantry.

As the picquet itself was only capable of holding about 110 men, some large rocks at the base of the knoll sheltered 120 more of our men, *viz.* :—

70, 20th Panjab Infantry,
50, 3rd do. do.

The rest of the force was drawn up on and about a small Mamelon, 400 yards west of the “Eagle’s Nest” picquets, in the following order from right to left :—

Detachment 71st Highland Light Infantry	...	Major Parker, commanding.
6th Panjab Infantry	...	Captain W. D. Hoste, do.
Hazara Mountain Battery	...	DeBudé, do.
5th Panjab Infantry	...	Lieutenant Stewart, do.

The latter regiment in extended order lined the crest of the Mamelon, with three companies in support of the guns. The 71st Highland Light Infantry was in connection with the "Eagle's Nest" picquet.

The breastwork on the crest of the hill was occupied by about 2,000 of the enemy, and at about noon the Bunerwals, who had hitherto fired only an occasional shot, commenced to move down from their position by the different spurs, and with loud cries attacked at once the picquet and the troops. The steady fire, however, with which they were received, rendered their very gallant efforts to enter the defences unavailing.

Major Brownlow and Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan's Despatches.

Major Brownlow's Despatch.

In attacking the picquet, the matchlock-men of the enemy posted themselves most advantageously in the wood, and opened a very galling fire, while their swordsmen and others advanced boldly to the attack, charging across the plateau in front in the most determined manner, and planting their standard behind a rock within a few feet of the "Eagle's Nest" breastwork. The nature of the ground prevented the guns from being brought to bear at first upon those who assailed the picquet, and they were thus able to swarm up the steep sides of the knoll, and to plant their standard close under the picquet. All the efforts of the garrison failed to dislodge the enemy from this position for some time, notwithstanding that the direct fire from the breastwork was aided by a flank-

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan's Despatch.

Major Brownlow's Despatch.

ing fire from the Mountain Battery and from the enfield rifles of the 71st Highland Light Infantry. The enemy were ultimately driven back up the hill, leaving the ground covered with their dead; their matchlock-men only maintaining the fight, and continuing to harass the picquet very much.

Whilst this was occurring at the "Eagle's Nest," an attack was also being made on the rest of the troops on the Guru Mountain. The Mountain guns opening fire with shrapnell, common shell, and round shot, soon checked those of the enemy who were advancing against the troops in position (though not those moving against the "Eagle's Nest" picquet). This check of the enemy by the Hazara Mountain Battery

Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan's Despatch.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

affording a favorable opportunity, the 6th Panjab Infantry, which was in reserve, made a very bold charge upon the enemy headed by their Commander Captain Hoste, who was wounded; but unfortunately carried too far in the ardour of pursuit, this regiment lost very heavily in its retirement, viz., in addition to Captain Hoste wounded, 4 native officers, 40 rank and file wounded, and 2 non-commissioned officers, and 9 privates killed.

Regimental History, 6th Panjab Infantry.

Colonel Vaughan's Despatch.

The retirement of the 6th was covered by a company of the 5th Panjab Infantry, and the fire of the Enfields and Artillery.

On the advance of the 6th Panjab Infantry the enemy had again come down the hill, and with loud yells rushed, sword in hand, to the assault of the "Eagle's Nest," but were again finally repulsed; the affair for the rest of the day at this position subsiding into an exchange of shots, when either party exposed itself.

Major Brownlow's Despatch.

During the course of the action, Colonel Vaughan, seeing how desperate were the attacks on the "Eagle's Nest," and how hardly pressed was its garrison, sent reinforcements of

Colonel Vaughan's Despatch.

a Company 71st Regiment and a Company 5th Panjab Infantry. In one of the sallies made by the troops who were holding the rocks below the "Eagle's Nest," Lieutenant Clifford, Adjutant of the 1st Panjab Cavalry, who was on leave when the force was formed and joined it as a volunteer with 3rd Panjab Infantry, was killed while gallantly leading his men.

After the charge of the 6th Panjab Infantry, no further attack was made by the enemy on Colonel Vaughan's position; during the rest of the day they kept up a heavy fire from the low hills and broken ground in front of the troops, but the ground affording excellent cover, little damage was done to our men.

While this attack was going on at the left defences of the camp, a demonstration was also made by the enemy in the front, when Lieutenant Drake, of the 32nd Native Infantry (Pioneers), was wounded; this was the only casualty, the enemy drawing off at dusk.

The determined attack on the "Eagle's Nest" had, of course, been productive of severe losses (see Appendix C), amounting to 50 killed and wounded of all ranks, being nearly half the number the work held at any one time. Amongst the killed was Lieutenant G. M. Richmond, whose reckless gallantry whilst encouraging his men by his personal example in their gallant resistance of the enemy cost him his life, and the Subadar Major Mir Ali Shah of the 20th Panjab Infantry, who died like a gallant soldier at his Commanding Officer's side, recommending his son to Major Brownlow's protection.

For a general list of the casualties see Appendix C. Amongst the wounded was Lieutenant Barron, R. A., attached to the Survey Department, who had joined Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan in the morning for the purpose of sketching the ground.

The enemy suffered very severely; some 250 killed, whilst numbers of the wounded had been carried to their homes, or crawled to the nearest Buner villages.

The attacks had been made by the Hindustanis and the Bunerwals, and as amongst the killed were large numbers of the Salarzai, Daulutzai, Gadarzai, sections of the Buner tribe, it was apparent how general was the combination of that tribe against us.

On this occasion Sir N. Chamberlain reported that Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan's management of the troops was excellent, and he considered himself indebted to his clear judgment for the very successful result of the action; that Major Brownlow had again greatly distinguished himself by his ready resource and gallant personal bearing, and that his regiment (20th Panjab Infantry) had evinced the greatest steadiness and gallantry; that Captain Hoste's charge at the head of the 6th Panjab Infantry had been very bold, also that the fire of Captain DeBude's guns had been ably directed and of the greatest service; that the Detachment 71st Highland Light Infantry had behaved with great steadiness under Major Parker, and greatly assisted the retirement of the 6th Panjab Infantry; that the 5th Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant Stewart had been chiefly employed to cover and support the guns, one company of which under Lieutenant Beckett did excellent service in supporting the advance of the 6th Panjab Infantry, and that it had withdrawn in the best order after the 6th had regained its position.

Major Brownlow said that the conduct of all under his command during the day had been admirable, but that he would desire especially to bring to notice the undermentioned officers and men, whose coolness and gallantry were conspicuous :—

Major Brownlow's Despatch.

Captain Butler, v. c.	...	101st R. B. Fusiliers.
Lieutenant G. V. Fosbery	...	late 4th Regiment (European).
" J. Bartleman	...	} 20th Panjab Infantry.
Assistant Surgeon R. T. Lyons	...	
Private Stewart	...	} 71st Highland Light Infantry.
" Clapperton	...	
" Barber	...	
Subadar Owdeo	...	101st R. B. Fusiliers.
Havildar Mir Mahomed	...	20th Panjab Infantry.
Sepoy Lena Sing	...	Ditto.
" Jowala	...	Ditto.

Colonel Vaughan, who had mentioned the officers named by Sir N. Chamberlain, also stated he was under the greatest obligations to Major Wright, A. A. G. to the Force, whom the Brigadier-General at his special request had allowed to accompany him.

Lieut. Colonel Vaughan's Despatch and Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

It had been originally intended to bring the troops back to camp by sunset, and to withdraw the "Eagle's Nest" picquets at the same time; but the enemy were in such force on the mountains, and the importance of continuing to hold the position was so apparent, that Colonel Vaughan determined to hold both positions during the night. The troops under him, therefore, bivouacked on the ground they had held during the day, the Buners, who had evidently suffered severely, making no further hostile demonstrations of any kind, although there was some firing by Hindustanis and others.

27th October.—The following day the "Eagle's Nest" picquet was strengthened, and a picquet called "Vaughan's picquet," on an adjoining eminence which supported the "Eagle's Nest," was erected, and it was determined that these positions should be held permanently,—the "Eagle's Nest" by 40 British Infantry and 300 Native Infantry; Vaughan's picquet by the Hazara Mountain Battery, 60 British and 300 Native Infantry.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

When on our invitation the Buners came down to carry off their dead who had fallen the previous day, opportunity was taken to try and reason with them as to the unnecessary loss they were causing to their tribe, but with little effect.

Commissioner's Report.

Their demeanour was courteous, and they conversed unreservedly with Sir N. Chamberlain and the Commissioner, Colonel Taylor, but the former saw from their manner that they were not in the least humbled.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Upwards of thirty bodies of the Hindustanis were counted upon the ground during the short truce.

It was observed that both the wounded and dead bodies of the Hindustanis on this and subsequent occasions were left by their allies, who seemed to look upon the Hindustanis as they might upon earthen vessels, to be thrown at our heads in the day of battle, when no doubt their utility was appreciated, but of which it was quite superfluous to think of picking up the fragments if they happened to get broken in the fray. But what their allies would not do, was performed by the Christian soldiers, whom their tongues had been so ready to curse and consign to perdition; for, under the humane direction of Sir N. Chamberlain,

Colonel R. Taylor's Report.

these mutilated rebels of our own territories, together with some wounded Buners, were taken into our hospitals and carefully and tenderly treated.

Two of the wounded Hindustanis were apparently soldiers of the late Telegram from Sir N. 55th Native Infantry, and many of them young men Chamberlain. apparently from Bengal; they used the old pattern musket and Government ammunition.

The duty of the troops was now very heavy, the regiments being no stronger than wings; the camp was this day, however, reinforced by the 14th Native Infantry (the Ferozpor Regiment) under Major Ross.

On the 26th, it had been reported that the Buners had induced the Akhund of Swat to espouse their cause, and news was this day received that the Akhund had actually joined the Buners and that he had brought with him upwards of 100 standards from Swat, each standard representing probably from thirty to forty footmen, and, it was said, 120 horsemen. Besides the tribe with which he was more immediately connected, *viz.*, the Swatis, he had summoned the people of the remote country of Bajawar (on the border of the Kabul territory), the Malazais of Dher under their Chief, Ghazan Khan, and other distant tribes whose names even were hardly known, except to officers who had served long on the frontier.

A detailed account of the Swatis is given at page 75, but the position and influence of the Akhund of Swat are so great The Akhund of Swats. as here to demand a brief account of his history, as well as some allusion to the tribes who were now arrayed against us.

Superstitious and wonder-loving like all the Yusafzais, the people of Swat had long yielded themselves to the guidance of a certain Akhund, who had become resident amongst them. Originally, a Syad of Buner, known as Abdul Ghafur, had passed his life in close study and asceticism, and at this time must have been between seventy and eighty years of age. Reverentially consulted, it is said that his advice was opposed to the disturbance of the British border, and was therefore not always followed. But when neglect of it led to the appearance of a British force at the mouth of the Malakand Pass (see Chapter V, Section VI.), he prevailed on the frightened Khans to elect a chief.

The religious sway of the Akhund over all the hill and plain tribes of the Peshawar Frontier, and extending as far as Kohat, Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch. is very great, and towards them he holds a position which can best be illustrated by comparing it with that of the Pope of Rome.

He has gained such an ascendancy over the minds of Mahomedans in general, that they believe he is supplied by supernatural means with the necessities of life, and that every morning on rising from his prayers a sum of money sufficient for the day's expenditure is found under the praying carpet. He keeps open house for the pilgrims, who throng to consult him, and has never been known to receive a present since his arrival in Swat. His goats even are said to be muzzled when driven out to the jungle, lest they should take a sly nibble at a neighbour's crop in passing. McGregor's Gazetteer.

It is remarkable that up to the present time the Akhund, with the solitary exception of forcing a king upon the Swatis, had Major James's Despatch. always held himself aloof from worldly affairs, and had even in 1857 counselled his disciples, who flocked to him for advice, to peace. He also was ostensibly opposed to the tenets of the Sittana fanatics. The previous year, it was said, he had been unusually busy in attempting to refute some religious views held in Peshawar which were opposed to his own. But for the time all sectarian differences were forgotten, the Akhund and the Sittana Moulvi were said to be on the most friendly terms, and it was known

that the whole Hindustani colony were either at, or on their way to, Ambeyla. Colonel Taylor believes, (and his belief was shared by the native chiefs in the camp at the time best able to judge), that the Akhund had moved in fear that if he did not show sympathy with Buner on the occasion, he might lose influence with the tribe who were his natural constituents; and possibly to this was added anxiety, lest Mobarik Shah, who was an aspirant to his father's position of king of Swat, might, by having joined the war with the Hindustanis, gain some of the influence which he, the Akhund, would lose. It was also known that the adjurations of the Buner Chiefs and people had been most passionate, all the Mulas of the country, with many of the women, having been deputed to beseech him to adopt their cause.

The Akhund was accompanied by the two chiefs of Swat, Sobut Khan and Shirdil Khan, usually at bitter feud with each other, but then the best friends. They had with them about 3,000 men. The Hindustani fanatics were under the leadership of Mulvi Abdula. They numbered at the commencement about 900 men, most of whom had been wrought up to a pitch of fanaticism, and were all prepared to lay down their lives. It is, indeed, only men animated by this spirit who can be found willing to leave their homes in India, and to take up their residence in these rugged mountains. Widely separated in language, manners, and interests from the people amongst whom they dwell, receiving only a bare subsistence from the Moulvi who entertains them, and paying exorbitantly for all the supplies they consume, their life is passed in a manner by no means congenial to natives of Hindustan.

They were drilled on our system, and some were clothed like the sepoys of the old Indian army. Three of their jemadars were non-commissioned officers of the late 55th Regiment Native Infantry. The Moulvi himself had been about four years in these parts. He was the nephew of that Moulvi, Inayat Ali, who gave so much trouble in 1857 at Narinji, and was a man of good ability. He it was who appropriated all the contributions received from India for the colony from which he derived a rich income. He entertained also ulterior views for the re-establishment of a kingdom in Swat, in the person of Syad Mobarik Shah, the son of the late Syad Akbar Shah. With these Hindustanis were associated the family of the Sittana Syads. The only one, however, who took a prominent part against us was Syad Mahmud, who was in our service for some time. For, after the expedition of 1858, the eldest representative of the family Mobarik Shah, took no active part in the proceedings.

A detailed account of the Bunerwals is given elsewhere. Their chiefs were Zaidula, Ahmed, and Nawab, the two first-named being closely allied by marriage to our own chiefs of Sadum, Aziz Khan and Ajab Khan. They were supposed capable of producing from 12,000 to 15,000 men.

The villages of Chamla sent their quota—the Amazai of Cherorai being well represented, and the Mada Khel also came in force. The Ranizai are of the same stock as the Swatis. They occupy the villages in the plain of Yusafzai, below the Malakand Range. It was against their villages that the force under the late Lord Clyde operated in 1852, and they also joined the ranks of the enemy in large numbers.

In addition to these, there were small parties of men from other tribes who had joined the enemy. In fact, there was a general combination of almost all the tribes from the Indus to the boundary of Kabul, and Major James

at about 15,000. Old animosities were for the time in abeyance, and under the influence of fanaticism, tribes, usually hostile to each other, had joined, or were hastening to join, the Akhund's standard, and to fight for the sake of their common faith.

Independently of these, however, was a mischievous gathering of our own subjects, who associated with bands of the enemy in infesting our lines of communication. Chief amongst these were the Utman Khel, an Afridi clan, long settled in the upper parts of the Lundkhor Valley, but who have retained all the wild habits and plundering propensities of their race. They were joined by men from Narinji, and by bigots and malcontents, who, individually or in parties of two and three, slipped away from a great number of our villages. They numbered only a few hundreds in all, but were of great use to the enemy in the manner alluded to above.

Such being the state of affairs, it is easy to understand how entirely the situation had altered since the force entered the Ambeyla Pass, so that instead of having to deal with the Mahaban tribes, with a view to the expulsion of the Hindustanis from that mountain, the force was engaged in a contest with the enormous coalition already mentioned. Brigadier-General Chamberlain felt certain that it would not be advisable to make an advance into the Chamla Valley with his present force against such numbers. He could only do so by giving up the Ambeyla Pass. If the force moved into the valley, with a view to continue its advance towards the Mahaban, to carry out the original views of Government, it would be exposed to the enemy's incessant attacks, both by day and night, in flank and rear, and it would be impossible, in the face of such numbers, to protect adequately a long line of laden animals, to which would be daily added an ever increasing number of wounded and sick. On the other hand, if the force merely moved into the valley with a view to take up a position in open ground, it would still lose its communication with the rear, and whenever it required fresh supplies of provisions or ammunition, or to clear the camp by sending sick and wounded to the rear, it would have to retake the pass, and to re-occupy, at great sacrifice of life, the very ground from which it had advanced. Further, if the force was seriously compromised by a hazardous movement in advance, there was not, within a very great distance, the troops necessary to meet any difficulty which would under such an eventuality be certain immediately to arise, either within or beyond the border. In fact, Sir Neville Chamberlain considered that with the present numbers the only way to uphold the honor of our arms and the interests of the Government was to act on the defensive, in the position the force now held, and trust to the effect of time, and of the discouragement which repeated unsuccessful attacks were likely to produce upon the enemy, to weaken their numbers, and to break up their combination.

During the 27th a demonstration was made in front of camp, but without any result, and news was received that the Moulvi had sent for more Hindustanis.

Telegrams.

28th October.—The sick and wounded were sent to Rustam this day, and the breastworks were strengthened to enable the force to

Telegrams.

move out to attack the enemy below. Many of the enemy's skirmishers who endeavoured to annoy the picquets were killed daily by the British marksmen. News was received in camp that some 280 Hindustanis, with treasure and more men from Swat, had joined the enemy, and that the Maliks of Buner and Swat had elected the Moulvi to command

the united force. There was little firing during the day, but a night attack was threatened.

29th October.—It was reported that the Akhund had called upon the Utmanzais, Ranazais, Momands, and people of Bajawar, for support. The 4th Gurkhas and two guns of No. 3

Telegrams.

Panjab Light Field Battery joined the camp this day. This was a Thursday, the Mahomedan day commences at sunset, and an

Commissioner's Report.

attack in force by the enemy was reported, as intended, either during the night or the next morning. From the nature of the ground the position held by the troops was both extensive and difficult, and required half the native troops to guard it.

30th October.—The first result of the combination between the Akhund

Attack by the enemy on right defences. and the Moulvi now occurred.

The advanced picquets of the right defence were held by the 1st Panjab Infantry and a company of the Guide Corps under Major Keyes. Above the main picquets was a high rock, subsequently always known as the "Crag." The ascent to this was most precipitous, the path leading to its top narrow and difficult, and when the summit was reached there was but little level ground to stand upon; it was, however, necessary to occupy it, as it commanded the lower picquets, and Major Keyes placed a small party of twelve men in it, which was as much as it could conveniently hold. About half an hour before daylight heavy firing commenced on the "Crag," and it soon appeared that the picquet was hard-pressed by the enemy. All the men from the lower picquets that could be spared were immediately detached in support, and accompanied by Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, Adjutant, 1st Panjab Infantry, Major Keyes himself with about twenty picked men advanced to their assistance; but before the top of the "Crag" was reached, the small party holding it had been overpowered and driven off the rocks, though they still were holding the ground lower down the hill.

Finding this important position lost, the men were ordered to take cover from the enemy's fire beneath the overhanging rocks, about twenty paces from the summit, and Major Keyes determined to wait till daylight should enable him to distinguish friends from foe, and reinforcements should reach him from Colonel Wilde, commanding right defence.

As the day broke, the 20th Panjab Native Infantry under Major Brownlow

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Major Keyes' Despatch

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

entered the main picquet, and Major Brownlow became the senior officer on the ground; but Major Keyes, feeling convinced of the danger of allowing the "Crag" to remain even for a short time in the hands of the enemy, determined to carry it by assault, and suggested to Major Brownlow that he should advance by a ridge which ran to the right of the "Crag" and threaten the enemy in rear, to which Major Brownlow at once assented; and there is no doubt that this movement most materially aided the success of Major Keyes' attack in front, though it deprived Major Brownlow of the opportunity of sharing in the actual conflict at the "Crag." Major Keyes foresaw that, should the enemy (many hundred of whom were in the rear) once understand that their advanced party had gained an advantage over our troops, they would quickly occupy the position in force and render the lower picquets untenable from their raking fire.

From the nature of the approach to the top of the "Crag" amongst the

Major Keyes' Despatch.

large rocks, one or two men only could advance at one time; ordering his men to fix swords and charge

Major Keyes ascended with his party by one path, whilst Lieutenant Fosbery was directed to push up another path at the head of a few men.

The party under Major Keyes was led to the assault with a perseverance and intrepidity never surpassed, and Major Keyes spoke in equally laudatory terms of the way in which Lieutenants Fosbery and H. W. Pitcher led their respective parties. Lieutenant Fosbery was the first man to gain the top of the "Crag" on his side of the attack. Lieutenant Pitcher had led his men up to the last rock, when he was knocked down and stunned by a large stone. As soon as our men had reached the top of the "Crag," a most exciting hand to hand fight ensued, in which Major Keyes was wounded, the enemy driven out at the point of the bayonet, the position recovered, and three standards taken. No sooner had the "Crag" been taken, than a panic seized the remainder of the enemy who were attacking on the right, and they quickly disappeared down the mountain.

This attack had been made by the Hindustani fanatics, who lost 54 killed on the spot and 7 wounded; our loss being, in addition to the officers already mentioned,—

1st Panjab Infantry	...	{ 1 Non-Commissioned Officer and 3 Privates killed.
		{ 1 Ditto ditto and 2 Privates wounded.
Guides	...	{ 1 Sepoy killed.
		{ 1 „ wounded.

Sir N. Chamberlain considered that the re-capture of the "Crag" by Major Keyes was a most brilliant exploit, and that the decision and determination he had displayed stamped him as possessing some of the highest qualifications of an officer; he also considered that the distinguished conduct of Lieutenant Pitcher and Lieutenant Fosbery rendered them fully deserving of the Victoria Cross, a distinction which Major Keyes had also well deserved.

Lieutenant Fosbery had been on duty the day before at Major Keyes' picquet, with a party of sharpshooters of the 71st and 101st Regiments, and remained there during the night, expecting to be on duty in the morning; but when the attack commenced, he joined the 1st Panjab Infantry.

Major Keyes mentioned the following Native Officers and men as having been most forward on this occasion.

Subadar Ahmed Khan;	Sepoy Samandar, who had made himself especially conspicuous;
Guide Corps.	a Havildar and four men (names unknown), who were under fire within 25 yards of the enemy.

Subadar Major Bahadoor Habib Khan,	Subadar Pyat, Jemedar Tulsi;
1st Panjab Infantry.	Havildars Taz Mahomed, Syad Mahomed, Musali,
	Mahomed Nur; Naicks Mullick Aman, Ahmed Khan;
Sepoys, Amin, Mirza, Amir Beg.	

Almost simultaneously with the attack by the Hindustanis on the right defences, an attack was made on the front of the camp by the Swatis, which was repulsed without difficulty (under the personal superintendence of the Brigadier-General), by the good practice of the artillery under Captain Tulloh, and the fire of the 71st Highland Light Infantry and the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, which lined the breastworks, under Colonel Hope, C. B., and

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.	Lieutenant-Colonel Salisbury, respectively. Some of the enemy behaved with considerable boldness, making an attempt to assault the 9-Pounder Battery in the
Colonel R. Taylor's Re-	

the Battery. This afforded the 5th Gurkha Regiment an opportunity of making a spirited charge, driving the enemy down the slope.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

The enemy left 45 dead bodies on the ground, which were recognized as men from Swat and Ranizai, and must have lost heavily in addition; though, according to custom, they carried off as many of their dead as they could. Our losses were 6 killed and 21 wounded (see Appendix C).

Demonstration on left.

Telegram from Sir N. Chamberlain.

At the same time a demonstration was made against the upper left flank picquets, where the 5th Panjab Infantry lost 3, killed.

By 10 o'clock A. M. the enemy had been driven off at all points, and the effect of their defeat was so great that they proceeded at once to the Ambeyla village, and from thence carried off their great priest, the Akhund, in perfect flight, to the other side of the Buner Pass; he was, in fact, in full retreat to Swat, when he was overtaken by the Buner Chiefs and induced to return, as they represented that if he deserted them, their country would be lost.

Colonel R. Taylor's Report.

31st October to 5th November inclusive.—On the 31st the wounded of the previous day were sent to the rear, and the enemy invited to carry off their dead, which however they did not do.

Between the above dates the enemy attempted nothing more serious than firing, as usual, at our exposed breastworks and picquets, and advancing from time to time with standards, as if to attack the camp; these demonstrations were met with alacrity by the marksmen and the field guns in position, with some loss to the enemy, and little or none to the troops. In the meanwhile the inactivity of the enemy enabled the troops to improve the breastworks and defences generally, as well as the interior communications of the camp, and a 24-Pounder Howitzer was sent up to strengthen the "Eagle's Nest" picquet.

During this time communications were entered into with the Buner tribe by means of the Sadum Chiefs, and by the agency of two Buner Maliks, residents of the Malandri Pass in our own territory.

Commissioner's Report.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

From the moment that the Buner had declared hostilities, it was evident that the line of communication by the Ambeyla defile could no longer be depended upon, and it became indispensable to seek some new line further removed from the Guru Mountain, thereby enabling communication to be kept up with British territory beyond the reach of the Buner tribe;—a line of road between the villages of Khanpor and Shirdara had, accordingly, been selected by Colonel Taylor, the Chief Engineer, for this purpose, and its construction was commenced. The base of operations was changed after its completion from Rustam to Permouli, the nearest village in the plains where water was obtainable.

Working parties had also been employed for some days in making a road in the direction of Ambeyla along the western slopes of the right ridge. This road was to supersede that by the gorge, which was extremely bad and commanded on both sides, and would enable the troops, whenever the time came, to march forward without coming under fire from the Guru Mountain.

On the 28th October the forward march of the 93rd Highlanders from Sialkot, and of the 23rd and 24th Native Infantry from Lahore, was ordered, which last two regiments were on duty with the Viceroy's camp there, and on the 5th November the 7th Fusiliers, which also formed part of the escort, marched towards the frontier.

Letter from Secretary P. G.

Foreseeing the demand that would arise for carriage suitable to the hills, the Panjab Government at this time ordered its collection, and in all November and the beginning of December 4,200 camels and 2,100 mules were assembled from all parts of the Panjab Provinces at Nao-shera.

In the absence of Native Infantry, a party of 200 police foot and 75 horse were sent to Naokilla to aid in protecting the rear communications which had been threatened.

6th November.—On the morning of the 6th, Sir N. Chamberlain had gone down with the covering party for the protection of the working parties on the road which was being made towards Ambeyla; on his return to camp he placed this covering party under command of his orderly officer, Major G. Harding, Commandant 2nd Sikh Infantry, whose conduct on previous occasions had led Brigadier-General Chamberlain to place entire confidence in his coolness and determination, although up to the commencement of these operations he had had no experience in actual warfare.

Major Brownlow, who was commanding the advanced picquets of the right defence, had detached 100 men of the 20th Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant J. Bartleman to cover the immediate front of the working parties, and had posted a similar number of the 1st Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant W. Unwin on the head of the ridge, beyond that at the foot of which the fatigued party was working. Lieutenant Unwin was instructed to send patrols down the ridge as far as he could with reference to their safety, and Lieutenant Bartleman's orders were to keep two or three hundred yards in front of the working parties.

About 11 o'clock Lieutenant Bartleman's party had been pushed forward to a spot low down the ridge, the top of which was in possession of Lieutenant Unwin's party.

About half past 12 in the day, hearing that Major Harding was anxious lest the enemy should get above him, and wished the party of the 1st Panjab Infantry strengthened, Major Brownlow sent a company of the Guides under Lieutenant Battye to join Lieutenant Unwin, and about the same time instructions were received from Colonel Wilde, commanding the right defences, for the working parties to be withdrawn, and the covering parties to retire up the hill. These instructions were forwarded at once to Major Harding, who was at the time on the top of the hill with a detachment of the 1st Panjab Infantry, he having gone up to see the positions of the detachments holding his line of retreat. The working parties

were at once withdrawn; but why the lower covering parties were not at the same time withdrawn, can never be known, Major Harding having been subsequently killed. There appears no doubt, however, that he found it difficult to bring away some of his party who had been wounded, and that consequently, remaining too long, he permitted himself to be surrounded; probably on his return from the top of the hill he found his lowest detachment involved with his assailants, and encumbered with killed and wounded.

At about 2 o'clock, Major Brownlow, observing that the enemy were moving in considerable numbers, sent all the available men he had as reinforcements for the ridge, *viz.* :—

2 companies Guide corps under Lieutenant Jenkins.

80 men 1st Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant Davidson.

The troops occupying the ridge now became constantly engaged with the enemy, who were perseveringly trying to head the ridge: Lieutenant Jenkins performed his duty most ably, driving back the enemy by charging them with his men and the 1st Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant Davidson.

Colonel R. Taylor's Report.
Colonel Wilde's Report.

At about half past 3 o'clock, Colonel Wilde, receiving information that Major Harding was being attacked in force by the enemy, proceeded to the advance picquets, sending to head-quarters for reinforcements. In about an hour the Peshawar Mountain Train and 350 Riflemen of the 4th and 5th Gurkha Regiments arrived at the main (Major Keyes') picquet.

One hour only of the day remained, and it became necessary to endeavour to cover Major Harding's retreat by the shortest route; accordingly Captain Chester, commanding the 4th Gurkha Regiment, was ordered to proceed across the lower spurs in the direction of the beleaguered picquet, whilst the guns of the Mountain Battery, protected by the 5th Gurkhas, took up a position on one of the lower spurs, checking the advance of the enemy on the picquet, and covering Captain Chester's advance to its assistance.

Whatever error Major Harding may have committed in too long delaying his retirement, when he found himself overmatched and in difficulty, he behaved like a gallant soldier, and probably saved his detachment by his coolness and determination.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Colonel R. Taylor's Despatch.

Colonel R. Taylor writes: "It was on seeing the approach of the 4th Gurkhas that Major Harding finally resolved on retiring. I saw myself the detachments fall in very steadily for retirement and move off, a portion being engaged all the time with an enemy we could not see." Major Harding was the last man to leave the picquet.

Colonel Wilde's Report.

"After the detachment had passed out of our sight, the enemy appear by a rush to have broken in between two of the detachments. Major Harding had been previously shot through the neck, and was being carried by a Gurkha sepoy, and it was at this time that he and Lieutenant Dougall of the 79th Regiment were killed." The latter officer had left the advanced breastworks without leave, and accompanied by a single sepoy had gone down to join the covering party.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Colonel Wilde's Report.

During this time Captain Chester with the 4th Gurkhas had moved on towards Major Harding, as far as the nature of the ground and light permitted, and some of his men even reached the spur upon which Major Harding's detachment were fighting; a movement which enabled the remainder of the covering party which was fighting its way up the ridge to reach the crest, and the troops to get back into camp, though not till after dark.

The losses in this affair are given in the Appendix C. In addition to Major Harding and Lieutenant Dougall, Ensign Murray of the 71st Highland Light Infantry had fallen early in the action at the head of his men, and Lieutenant Battye of the Guides and Lieutenant J. S. Oliphant of the 5th Gurkha Regiment had been wounded. In a subsequent despatch Sir Neville Chamberlain alluded to the excellent service rendered by the two companies Guide Corps under Lieutenant Jenkins, which were in support of the covering party, and with which Lieutenant Battye was wounded.

7th November.—As already narrated, night having come on before the covering party got back to camp, it had been impossible to recover the bodies of the killed the previous evening, and accordingly, early in the morning of the 7th, the troops as per margin moved out under the command of Colonel Wilde, C.B., for the purpose. Small parties of the enemy appeared on that portion of the ground where Major Harding's picquet had been situated; these were quickly dispersed and driven into the plain, and having collected the bodies of seven British and 28 Native officers and men, the force returned to camp without any casualty. It appeared that the enemy must have suffered severely the day before, as they were seen by this column removing many of their slain, and they showed no inclination to meet the troops, although they had displayed great boldness on the previous day, charging sword in hand. They consisted of Sobat Khan's party of Swatis, assisted by some of the Mahaban tribes, the Chief Malik of the Mada Khel being amongst the killed.

8th to 11th November.—The new road to the rear was now reported practicable, and easier than the Ambeyla Pass, which was no longer to be used, the supplies and supports being moved to Permouli.

A flag of truce was this day exhibited by the enemy at a spot previously fixed on, and Captain Munro and the Sadum Khans went out to communicate with the Buner Chiefs, but nothing could be arranged.

On the 9th a large body of Bajawaris under Zeman Khan, son of Faiztalab Khan, the Bajawar Chief, joined the enemy.

As it was intended shortly to concentrate the whole force on the south side of the Ambeyla Pass, which would save much picquet duty, and give a stronger position, the Commissariat stores were now being moved for this object.

The nights were getting colder, and Sir N. Chamberlain considered it necessary to sanction a moderate issue of meat, rice, and rum, at fair prices, to the native troops to keep away sickness.

On the 10th a flag of truce being again shown, Captain Munro and the Khans went down to meet the Buner Chiefs who were to return and consult with the rest, but the war party, viz., the Swatis, Bajawaris, Hindustanis, and Mahaban tribes, were still in the ascendant.

Two more roads had been opened up to the ridge on the right of camp, and the Peshawar Mountain Battery, the 5th Gurkha Regiment, and the Ferozpor Regiment, had been moved up to strengthen that flank.

On the 11th the enemy showed in large numbers about Ambeyla, whence considerable bodies ascended the hills in the direction of Lalu, on our right front, evidently with the intention of attacking the picquets on that flank of the camp. These picquets were accordingly reinforced, and their breastworks and defences strengthened. The "Crag" picquet in particular had been much enlarged and strengthened since the last occasion of its being attacked (30th October), and was now capable of containing a garrison of 160 men. It had also been supported by the guns of the

101st R. B. F.
Corps of Guides,
4th Gurkhas,
32nd Native Infantry,
Mazbis.
Peshawar Mountain
Train.

Commissioner's Report.

Telegram.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Peshawar Mountain Train, which were placed in position in the main picquet*.

Major Brownlow's Despatch. 12th and 13th November.—Major Brownlow assumed command of the "Crag" picquet at 4 P. M. on the 12th: the garrison consisted of—

15 marksmen, 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, under Lieutenant Fosbery.
115 " 20th Panjab Infantry.
30 " 14th Ferozpor Regiment.

Two of the four Peshawar Mountain guns which were in the main picquet had been placed by order of Major C. Ross, 14th Ferozpor Regiment, who was commanding the advanced picquets, in position on the left of Major Ross's camp, to command the left shoulder of the hill on which was the "Crag" picquet, as well as the front of the "Centre" picquet below. The enemy occupied a level ridge, about 250 yards, in front of the picquet, their position extending more than half a mile in a direction facing our own. Between the two positions lay a smooth hollow intersected by a ravine. The ground on the right and rear of the "Crag" was precipitous, and almost unassailable in any force. The left face of the post was its weak point, rocks and trees affording shelter to an attacking party till within a few yards of it.

Anticipating an attack, Major Brownlow had urged Lieutenant Bartleman, 20th Panjab Native Infantry, who commanded the picquet during the day, to use his utmost exertions in improving the position as much as he could, by heightening the breastwork, constructing an abattis, &c; a duty which was admirably performed by that officer.

Before dark every man was in his place for the night, with strict orders as to the nature of his duties, and the direction of his fire in case of attack.

About 10 P. M., the enemy's watch-fire showed that they were in movement, and descending in great numbers to the hollow in front of the picquet, which in half an hour was full of them. Their suppressed voices soon broke into yells of defiance, and they advanced in masses to the attack, their numbers being, as far as could be judged, at least 2,000. They were allowed to approach within a hundred yards of the picquet, when a rapid and well sustained file fire was opened upon them from the front face, which, Major Brownlow believed, did great execution, and soon silenced their shouts and drove them under cover, some to the broken and wooded ground on the left, and the remainder into the ravine below.

In half an hour they rallied, and, assembling in almost increased numbers, rushed to the attack, this time assaulting both the front and left of the picquet. They were received with the greatest steadiness, and again recoiled before our fire. These attacks continued until 4 A. M., each becoming weaker than the last, and many of them being mere feints to enable them to carry off their dead and wounded.

The post was at one time in great danger of being forced at its left front angle, which from its position was badly protected by our fire. The enemy clambered up, and assailing its occupants with stones from the breastwork, stunned and drove them back; at this critical moment the gallantry of the undermentioned men saved the post. Answering Major Brownlow's call when others wavered, they followed him into the corner, and hurling stones on the enemy who were close under the wall and sheltered from musketry, they

* At this time as uneasiness was felt, owing to sympathy evinced by the border villages of the Lundkher valley for the Akhund's cause, the 11th Bengal Cavalry, then at Permouli, was ordered to Mardau, so as to hold a more central position in Yusafzai.

drove them back, and rebuilt the parapet, holding that point for the rest of the night:

Havildar Alan Khan,	} 20th Panjab Native Infantry.
Naick Chatar Sing,	
Sepoy Gulbadin,	
„ Mahomed Khan,	
„ Ala Mir,	

Captain Hughes' Mountain Battery rendered Major Brownlow very valuable assistance during the night. From its position about 250 yards below and in the right rear of the "Crag," it made most successful practice, being guided as to direction and range by voice from the picquet. Two shells were pitched by it into the watch-fire of the enemy before the attack commenced, and must have done considerable damage.

In the morning not more than eight or ten of the enemy were in sight. In his despatch Sir N. Chamberlain stated that the repeated assaults upon the "Crag" picquet had been repelled by the steadiness of the defenders, most ably directed by Major Brownlow.

Major Brownlow stated that the casualties (see Appendix C) were not very serious, as, owing to the darkness of the night, the enemy did not fire much or effectively.

Major Brownlow's men having been 48 hours on picquet, during which time they had worked all day and watched all night, were completely worn out, while their muskets were so foul that they could scarcely load; they were, therefore, relieved at 8 A. M. by a detachment of the 1st Panjab Infantry under Captain J. P. Davidson.

A short time after Captain Davidson had taken over the Crag picquet from Major Brownlow, Major Keyes, commanding 1st Panjab Infantry, received a note from Captain Davidson to ask for reinforcements, as he did not consider the 90 men he had with him sufficient for its defence. At this time Major Keyes was on the Standard Hill, with Lieutenant Conolly of the Peshawar Mountain Train, who was preparing a platform for his guns on the side of the hill. Constant firing had been heard at the "Crag," but it did not attract any particular attention, as heavy firing had been kept up there all night, and was continued at intervals after the relief of the picquet. On Captain Davidson's requisition being received, Major Keyes immediately sent him up a reinforcement of 30 rifles under a Native officer, being all that could be spared, as a serious attack was expected on the Centre and Cliff picquets.

Shortly after this reinforcement reached the "Crag" picquet, Major Keyes observed, as he was descending the "Standard" Hill, the men of the "Crag" picquet rushing down in confusion.

Major Keyes did not see the commencement of the retreat, as the position was not visible from the platform where he was at the time. Proceeding immediately to the breastwork across the road by which the main post was approached from the "Crag," he rallied all the men that could be got together, and kept up a heavy fire, which was taken up by Captain Hughes' guns. This checked the advance of the enemy; but, as many wounded soldiers and others who had been garrisoning the "Crag" rushed past the breastwork and could not be stopped, a panic was communicated to the camp followers, who took to flight and increased the confusion. These men retreating had a visible effect upon all, and Major Keyes felt the necessity for an advance to re-assure

those that were wavering, and to further check the enemy until reinforcement should arrive; he therefore directed a few men to remain in the breastwork, and ordered the rest to charge.

Considering that his presence at the breastwork was absolutely necessary to keep the men together, the duty of leading the charge devolved upon Lieutenant Pitcher, 1st Panjab Infantry, who was accompanied by Lieutenant Young of that regiment. Lieutenant Pitcher led many yards in advance of the foremost of his party, and his gallant bearing was the admiration of all spectators. He was ably assisted by Lieutenant Young, who made himself most conspicuous by his coolness and gallantry. The assaulting party of the 1st Panjab Infantry were gallantly supported by a small detachment of the Corps of Guides under Lieutenant Furlong of that corps, which had been brought up from the rear defence of the post; but in spite of the coolness and daring with which the assault had been conducted, and in which Lieutenant Pitcher had been severely wounded, rendering it necessary that he should be carried back, the detachments were too weak to be able to re-take the "Crag," and they had to fall back upon the rocks beneath it.

Major C. Ross, commanding the advanced picquets, finding the "Crag" picquet had been carried by the enemy, who were pouring a heavy fire into the camp, which was in great confusion, collected as many men of the 14th Native Infantry and the other regiments as possible (the head-quarters of the 14th were at the centre picquet below), and passed in front of camp, where he was joined by Lieutenant Inglis of the 14th Native Infantry and Lieutenant Young, 1st Panjab Infantry, who assisted him in getting men together to try to re-take the "Crag" picquet. Owing to the confusion this was not immediately possible. However, on Major Ross reaching the steep rocks of the picquet itself with some men of the Guides, 1st Panjab Infantry and 14th Native Infantry, a heavy fire was opened on the top of the rock until reinforcements could arrive, which was taken up by the Mountain guns.

On receiving the news of the disaster which had occurred at the "Crag," Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, who was commanding the Right Defence, ordered up the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers to his assistance, and proceeded at once from his camp with three companies of the Guide Corps towards the "Crag," meeting on his way the head of the 101st, which the Brigadier-General had already ordered to move at once to the advanced picquets.

Sir N. Chamberlain was in the camp below when the "Crag" fell into the hands of the enemy, and his attention had been accidentally drawn to the dust and confusion caused by the unusual rush of camp followers and animals down the hill. Feeling convinced that some reverse had occurred, he immediately ordered the 101st, which was fortunately under arms for another purpose, to move towards the "Crag"; and shortly afterwards receiving information from Colonel Wilde of what had occurred, Sir N. Chamberlain gave orders to Lieutenant Colonel Salisbury that his regiment was to move up the hill as fast as possible and re-take the position at any sacrifice.

The "Crag" picquet from its locality was the key of the whole position, and its loss rendered the lower picquets untenable. On Colonel Wilde's arrival at the advanced picquets the state of affairs was as follows:—

Major Ross, commanding the advanced picquets, was half-way up the "Crag" picquet hill, gallantly holding the enemy in check, but unable, with the few

men he had rallied round him, to advance and re-take the lost picquet. Parties of the enemy were attacking the lower picquets, but were kept back by the steadiness of the fire of Captain Hughes' Mountain guns. The 1st Panjab Infantry, 20th Native Infantry, and two companies of the Corps of Guides, still held the breastworks, but numerically the garrison was too weak to resist the numbers of the enemy advancing to its capture.

Colonel Wilde then directed Colonel Salisbury, commanding 101st Regiment, to assault the "Crag" picquet with his regiment, leaving one company as a support in the main position with two companies of the Corps of Guides under Lieutenant Jenkins. The enemy were driven back in their advance on the right towards the guns, and this party then joined Colonel Salisbury in the assault on the "Crag" picquet with another party of the Guides and 1st Panjab Infantry. The enemy were then attacked down the valley to the left. The 101st, fatigued as they were by their rapid march to the relief of the troops in advance, never halted or broke till they had stormed the height and secured the picquet. Nothing could excel their soldier-like conduct, which was worthy of the distinguished reputation of the regiment. They started with the determination to perform the duty, and, led on by Lieutenant-Colonel Salisbury and his officers, they soon reached Major Ross' party on the hill,

Colonel Wilde's Despatch. and together repulsed the enemy, driving them over the hills beyond. Lieutenant F. Jenkins, commanding a wing (three companies) of the Guide Corps, leading his men up the "Crag" hill drove the enemy back from the right of position with great gallantry, whilst the detachments of the 14th Native Infantry and 1st Panjab Infantry, which, with some of the Guides, had so gallantly held their ground until the

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch. arrival of 101st, joined in and vied with the British Regiment in the attack.

With this success on the part of our troops, all opposition ceased, and order was as quickly restored, as it had been previously disturbed by the suddenness and force of the enemy's attack.

In their retreat the enemy, who chiefly consisted of the Buners under Saidula Khan, with Swatis and some of the Hindustanis, suffered so much that they desisted from all further attempts that day along the whole line of defences.

Sir N. Chamberlain's telegram. Their loss was 57 killed on the ground, 32 killed and carried off, and 140 wounded; amongst the former a Bajawari Malik of consequence.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch. Whilst the attack was going on on the right, the enemy made demonstrations both against the front and left defences of the camp; but these were of so minor a nature that they required no special notice by the Brigadier-General.

The defenders of the "Crag" appear to have been seized with an unaccountable panic, but the nature of the ground and the thickness of the brushwood enabled the enemy to concentrate a large force upon the weak picquet; however, Lieutenant J. P. Davidson, who commanded, behaved in a most heroic manner, and after endeavouring in every way to recall his men to a sense of their duty was killed at his post.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch. The temporary loss of the Crag picquet was, of course, a cause of great mortification to the officers and men of the regiments concerned; but it was the first success which the enemy had been able to obtain over any portion of the force. And it is worthy of record that the same regiments which furnished the picquet when it was lost, were those by which it was re-taken.

Sir Neville Chamberlain solicited the favorable notice of the Commander-in-

Lieut.-Col. Wilde, commanding Guide Corps.
 Lieut.-Col. Salisbury, commanding 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
 Major Ross, commanding 14th Native Infantry.
 Major Brownlow, commanding 20th Punjab Native Infantry.
 Major Keyes, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry.
 Captain Hughes, commanding Peshawar Mountain Train.
 Lieutenant Inglis, 14th Native Infantry.
 Lieutenant Pitcher, 1st Panjab Infantry.
 Lieutenant Young, 1st Panjab Infantry.
 Lieutenant Conolly, Royal Artillery.
 Lieutenant Pemberton, Royal Artillery.

Chief of the officers named in the margin, in particular Major Brownlow, to whose determination and personal example he attributed the preservation of the "Crag" picquet throughout the night of the 12th, and of Lieutenant Pitcher, who was severely wounded; and he also begged to draw attention to the most distinguished conduct of Lieutenant H. R. Young. The loss of the

"Crag" was met for the time being, as far as practicable, (Sir Neville Chamberlain said,) in the most resolute and praiseworthy way by Major Ross, who commanded the advance defences, and by Major Keyes, commanding 1st Panjab Infantry, and the other officers, Lieutenants Young, Pitcher, and Inglis; Sir Neville added that Captain Hughes, commanding the Peshawar Mountain Train, and his two subalterns, Lieutenants Conolly and Pemberton, had, by the correctness of their fire and their readiness of resource under most trying circumstances, materially aided these officers in arresting the torrent of the enemy, which was about to pour down, and in preventing them from improving their advantage till reinforcements could come up, and that they had well sustained the honor of the Royal Artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, commanding the Right Defences, he observed, was entitled to great credit for his promptness and decision when the picquet was driven in, and for the excellent and complete arrangements he made for its re-capture. In a subsequent despatch Sir N. Chamberlain alluded to the excellent service rendered by the three companies of the Guide Corps under Captain Jenkins, the 2nd in command of that corps, in the re-taking of the "Crag."

The following are the Native officers and men who were said to have particularly distinguished themselves:—

Major Ross' Despatch.	Subadar-Major Sikandar Khan	...	14th Native Infantry.
	Sepoy Ganda Sing	...	1st Panjab Infantry.
	" Jowahir Sing	...	14th Native Infantry.
	" Unup Sing	...	
	" Shir Sing	...	
	" Nihal Sing	...	
Major Keyes' Despatch.	" Syad Khan	...	1st Panjab Infantry.
	" Sharaf Khan	...	
	" Zarif	...	
	" Fatih	...	

From the 14th to the 17th November.—During these days no actual attempts were made by the enemy, but in anticipation of the change of position already alluded to, by which the whole force was to be concentrated on the south side of the pass, the Commissariat stores, reserve ammunition, &c., &c., were gradually removed to the eastern ridge.

On the 15th the defences were strengthened, and the 101st sent up to the right flank ridge. The enemy had sent marauders to harass the line of communication to the rear; it was therefore unsafe, except for strong armed parties. A demonstration was made by the enemy in front of camp, but they withdrew. Half

the Bajawaris were said to have returned to their homes after the action of the 13th, but the Akhund was reported to be trying to stop these desertions. The enemy were said also to be much depressed at their losses and want of success.

On the 16th the Akhund was on the top of the Buner Pass to prevent his followers going home. Owing to the levies being employed elsewhere, the communications with the rear were not very safe; the mules which had come up with a convoy the day before, were therefore sent back by the Ambeyla Pass getting down unmolested, the enemy not expecting this movement.

17th.—The Engineer Officers, Sappers and Miners, Pioneer Regiment, and fatigue parties were employed daily in strengthening the defences, but the tools were deficient in number and of bad quality. The Akhund was still on the summit of the Buner Pass, where he had built a temporary mosque for shelter. News was received that the Haji Sahib of Kunar* had been sent for.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Telegram.

He was reputed to be very holy, and gifted with the power of counteracting the effect of bullets. Intimation was received that a party of Utman Khel from the Lundkhor border had been told off to intercept convoys between camp and Shirdara.

Battery horses, being in the way and consuming the camp supply of grain and forage, were to-day sent to the rear. An attempt to impede their march resulted in loss to the marauders only.

Late in the evening of the 17th, the guns of Captain Griffin's Battery were removed from the advanced breastwork of camp to a new position to cover the withdrawal of the picquets from the Guru. Two guns of the Hazara Mountain Train being sent down from the Guru to take their place temporarily.

18th November.—At daylight on the morning of the 18th, the whole of the picquets on the Guru Mountain under Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan's command, consisting of the Hazara Mountain Battery and 3rd, 5th, and 6th Panjab Infantry, were withdrawn, and the entire camp and troops transferred to the heights on the south of the pass. Every precaution had been taken to prevent the enemy from suspecting the intended movements, and the troops, both on the Guru and in the front line of defence, continued to strengthen up to the last moment their breastworks and defences. These precautions were successful, and though the enemy's picquet on the Guru was not 400 yards above our own, the withdrawal was effected without their knowledge and in the most perfect order.

The concentration of the whole of the troops on the eastern heights made it necessary to extend the position, and particularly to secure the full command of the water, on which the whole force was now dependent. With this

Peshawar Mountain Battery. Wing 101st R. B. F., 1st and 6th Panjab Infantry.

view the troops, as per margin, moved out under the personal command of Sir N. Chamberlain, as soon as the change of position was completed, to drive the enemy from what has since been known as the "water ridge." This was very quickly effected by an advance and charge of the 1st and 6th Panjab Infantry with a loss on our side of three men wounded, whilst some of the enemy were killed. The troops were then placed in position to protect the 5th Panjab Infantry and 32nd Pioneer Regiment, employed as a working party under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, C. B.,

* Kunar is a district of Afghanistan situated on the Kunar River between Paskut and Shewa.—*McGregor's Gazetteer*.

Chief Engineer, in stockading a picquet to command the water. These troops were withdrawn to camp in the evening under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, 5th Panjab Infantry, the new work having been completed and occupied.

On discovering the camp and picquets on the Guru to have been vacated by the troops, the enemy seemed to have supposed that the force was in retreat, and with this idea came into the gorge in great numbers, both from Ambeyla and from the Guru, and thence, about 11 A. M., commenced an attack upon what had now become the left front of the position. The defences at the point principally attacked consisted of some small breastworks, thrown up on the side of the hill to cover the picquets connecting the advanced right picquets with the camp in the gorge below. It was not intended to hold these breastworks permanently after the camp had been removed from the gorge; but it was necessary to hold them this day to prevent the enemy from pressing upon the camp and firing into it before the troops were thoroughly established in their new position.

The positions of these picquets were rather advanced and exposed to be taken in flank, and they were from natural features not easily defensible.

Commissioner's Report.

Major Ross commanded at this point, and the breastworks were held by 130 men of the 14th Native Infantry, who, being greatly out-numbered by the enemy, were, in the first instance, compelled to give way, but being reinforced by the troops, as per margin, re-took the post and drove back the enemy.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

2 Companies, 71st Highland Light Infantry.
1 Company, 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
1 Company, 5th Panjab Infantry.
3 Companies, 5th Gurkhas.

The enemy, however, having gained a large accession of numbers, again attacked the picquets, when it became necessary for the two lowest down on the hill to fall back on the third, which was nearer the camp breastwork.

Our loss on this occasion was very considerable (see Appendix C), and the enemy were known to have lost 130 killed and upwards of 202 wounded.

The picquet upon which the lower picquets had retired was withdrawn after dark. On its withdrawal the enemy pressed on, and some few of them endeavoured to annoy the camp until at a late hour of the night, but without making any serious attack.

Sir N. Chamberlain stated that the conduct of Major Ross, 14th Native Infantry, merited his approval, and he again begged to recommend him to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief.

Of the officers who fell on this occasion, Sir N. Chamberlain wrote as follows:—

Sir N. Chamberlain's Telegram.

“Captain C. F. Smith, of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, was an officer of long and good service.

“Lieutenant H. H. Chapman, Adjutant of the 101st Regiment, had been sent by his Commanding Officer to convey an order, but, feeling that his own wound was mortal, he begged of his men to leave him and to assist Captain Smith to the rear instead. His regiment has lost in Lieutenant Chapman an admirable Adjutant, and the service a most promising officer.

“Lieutenant I. S. G. Jones, of the 79th Highlanders, who, on officers being called for for the force, had joined the 71st Highland Light Infantry as a volunteer; and

"Lieutenant W. P. Mosley, of the 14th Native Infantry who was shot when the lower picquets were forced to retire."

Amongst the wounded was Lieutenant Inglis, 14th Native Infantry.

19th November.—It was found that the water picquet erected the day before Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch. was more advanced than necessary, and it was therefore abandoned this day, and a new position chosen and stockaded about 300 yards to the rear.

During the day the enemy kept up a fire upon the "Crag" and water picquets, when Captain R. B. Aldridge, 71st Highland Light Infantry, was killed at the latter, and Ensign C. M. Stockley, 101st R. B. F., severely wounded at the former picquet. For other casualties see Appendix C.

The troops had now been very hard-worked, day and night, for a month; Sir N. Chamberlain's Telegram. having continually to meet fresh enemies, it was difficult to repel the attacks and provide convoys for supplies and wounded sent to the rear. There were at this time 166 wounded and 286 sick men in the camp, and every animal not urgently needed in camp was sent to Permouli.

The Akhund now proclaimed that any deserter from his camp should have his property confiscated. Some men were reported to have joined him from Kabul; their object was not known. The Akhund, it was known, was averse to the proposal of the Bunér tribe to treat, and said he would not be bound by any engagement they might make; he also abused the tribes for want of success.

Major James, Commissioner of Peshawar, having returned from furlough, Colonel R. Taylor's Report. took over political charge from Colonel R. Taylor, C. B., on this day, but Colonel R. Taylor at his own special request remained with the force to be of any use he could.

Letter from Sir R. Montgomery to Colonel Taylor. 20th November.—The garrisons of the "Crag" and water picquets were as marginally noted.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Crag Picquet.

100 men, 101st R. B. F.

100 „ 20th P. N. I.

Water Picquet.

100 men, 71st H. L. I.

100 „ 3rd P. I.

About 9 A. M. the enemy began to collect in great numbers near these picquets, the "Crag" being, as before, the point principally threatened. They were, however, checked in some degree by the fire of the Peshawar Mountain guns, Captain Hughes, from previous experience, and his acquaintance with the ground, knowing exactly on what points to bring his fire with most effect, even though the enemy were not visible from the Battery; the "Crag" and water picquets also mutually supported one another by their cross-fire at 450 yards.

Up to a late period of the afternoon the enemy had made no impression upon the "Crag" picquet, though numerous standards had been gradually advanced under cover to within a few yards of the breastwork, but about 3 P. M. the unaccountable conduct of a portion of the garrison gave the enemy possession of the post. This was not, however, accomplished without affording the officers and men who held the lower portion of the picquet the opportunity of distinguishing themselves by the resolute way in which they endeavoured to hold their portion of the post under very discouraging circumstances, abandoning it only when it was no longer tenable. These officers were Major H. G. Delafosse of the 101st Regiment, who commanded the picquet, Captain R. G. Rogers of the 20th Panjab Native Infantry, and Ensign A. R. Sanderson and Staff Assistant Surgeon W. Pile, both of the 101st

Regiment. The two last officers were killed at the breastwork whilst endeavouring to rally their men. The above officers were well supported by some of No. 3 Company of the 101st Regiment, and by some of the 20th Native Infantry.

On the fall of the "Crag" picquet coming to the notice of Sir N. Chamberlain, he immediately ordered the 71st Highland Light Infantry and the 5th Gurkha Regiment to be got under arms and proceed to the upper camp; and at the same time directed Captain Griffin's half battery, and the two 24-Pounder Howitzers of No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery under Captain T. H. Salt, to open fire upon the "Crag," which they did in so efficient a manner (joined to the fire of Captain Hughes' Mountain guns) as effectually prevented the enemy from attempting to occupy it in anything like large numbers.

On the 71st and Gurkha Regiments reaching the upper defences, Colonel Hope, C. B., commanding the former regiment, was ordered to storm the "Crag" in front, and Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, with the 5th Gurkha Regiment and 5th Panjab Infantry, to go round the hill, so as to take the lower portion of it in flank. The 71st discharged their duty in the most steady and soldier-

Colonel R. Taylor's Report.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Colonel R. Taylor's Report.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Colonel R. Taylor's Report.

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan and Major J. P. W. Campbell, commanding 5th Gurkhas, were both wounded.

Colonel Hope then pushed forward in pursuit of the enemy, having been joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan's column, and drove them for some distance over the height in the direction of Lalu. After continuing the pursuit as far as seemed prudent, Colonel Hope led the troops back towards the "Crag," and was severely wounded whilst superintending the re-occupation of the picquet, which, at his special request, was garrisoned for the night by 200 men of his own regiment.

Sir N. Chamberlain accompanied the storming column, and when near the crest of the slope received a severe wound, which, though it did not prevent him pressing on and entering the work at the time, subsequently obliged him to relinquish the command of the force, and Lieutenant Anderson, Adjutant, 3rd Panjab Cavalry, his orderly officer, was also wounded.

The circumstances attending Sir N. Chamberlain's wound are thus described by Colonel Taylor, who accompanied him: "He

Memo. from Sir R. Taylor.

"had dissuaded the General from leading the advance, "but, as the men could only stream up slowly, a sword in hand, rush on the "part of the enemy was to be expected, and the General, fearful of any failure, "pushed on with Colonel Taylor to the front. The advance though slow, because "of the ascent, was unchecked; on the crest, however, showers of stones were "being hurled, and the shells from our guns were bursting just over the heads of "the leading men, and close to the top the General was struck by a shot in the "arm."

The excellent service rendered by the artillery, both previous to and during the assault of the "Crag," elicited Brigadier-General Chamberlain's highest commendation especially as regarded the Peshawar Mountain Battery, the guns of which were served under a heavy fire; their position, viz., on the upper defences immediately adjoining the "Crag," made their assistance most valuable at a very critical moment. With reference to the part taken by the artillery in this day's proceedings, Sir N. Chamberlain in his despatch specially brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the Officers commanding Batteries, viz. :—

Captain Griffin, C. Battery, 19th Brigade, Royal Artillery.

„ T. H. Salt, No. 3 P. L. F. Battery.

„ T. Hughes, Peshawar Mountain „

Colonel Wilde's Telegram. For a list of casualties see Appendix C. The enemy's loss was reported to be 120 killed and 200 wounded. Large reinforcements were stated to have joined the Akhund this day.

21st to 24th November.—The action of the 20th seemed to have had a depressing effect upon the enemy, notwithstanding that they had gained a temporary success, and had wounded the Brigadier-General, which last injury it would have been natural for them to make and think a great deal of. However, from the 20th November to the 15th December (as will be hereafter shown), they made no further attack in force, and at one time their gathering had dwindled so much that there appeared a possibility of their giving up the game altogether.

Early on the morning of the 21st, Colonel Vaughan, commanding the advanced piquet, moved out, drove off a few of the enemy in the vicinity, and recovered without a casualty all the bodies of our men slain on the 18th. Twelve of the enemy were killed. The "Crag" picquet defences had been improved, and the troops were in the same position they occupied before the previous day's attack.

On the 22nd the enemy came at the invitation of the Commissioner, and removed their dead. The sick and wounded officers and men were safely escorted to Permouli. The defences of the "Crag" picquet being now completed, that post was occupied by 200 Rifles of a British Regiment, held on alternate days by the 71st and 101st Regiments. The health of the troops was good, and the weather mild.

On the 23rd a small party of Bunerwals were allowed to take away some of their slain.

25th.—The enemy still remained quiet, but large numbers appeared in the plain near the village of Ambeyla, and an attack was expected either on the 26th or 27th. The defences of the "Crag" and water picquets had been much strengthened by Colonel A. Taylor, the Chief Engineer. Communication with the rear had also been greatly improved by the completion of a second line of road to Khanpor, by a low ridge of hills easily occupied by our troops. The men were hutting themselves, and as the nights were getting very cold, arrangements were being made for getting up tents.

Sir Neville Chamberlain's wound proved more serious than he had expected, and it was with the greatest regret he had to request to be relieved of the command of the force, which therefore devolved temporarily on Lieutenant-

Sir N. Chamberlain's Despatch.

Colonel A. T. Wilde, c. b., who had been in charge of the camp since the General was first wounded.

In relinquishing the command, Sir N. Chamberlain thus spoke of the conduct of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.—

1st. The nature of the service had made the duty unusually heavy, and the troops had been under arms night and day. On no occasion, however, had there been the least murmur on this account, and every duty had been performed with the most cheerful alacrity.

2nd. He felt sure it would be considered most satisfactory that though the ranks of the Native regiments contained members of almost every tribe on the frontier, including those who were fighting against us, there had been no desertions and no backwardness in any instance to engage the enemy.

3rd. He said the services of every regiment with the force had already been alluded to, with the exception of the 32nd Panjab Native Infantry (Pioneers) under Major Morgan, and the 4th and 5th Companies of the Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant Tucker. The nature of the service had made it indispensable to employ the 32nd altogether on the defences and lines of communication, and he therefore took this opportunity of saying that its services and those of the Sapper companies had been of the greatest value to the force. With regard to the 32nd, such was the paucity of men that, even when they had labored during the day at the breastworks and roads, it was impossible to avoid putting a portion of them on duty at night for the defence of the camp. The discipline of this regiment and its conduct reflected great credit on Major Morgan and his officers.

4th. He added, that although there was no scope for the employment of the few cavalry (11th Bengal and Guides) retained in camp, yet they always took dismounted duty, and were most useful in aiding in the night defence of the camp.

5th. He brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the very meritorious conduct of the whole of the officers of the force, from all of whom he said he had at all times received the most cordial support, as he then publicly acknowledged.

The officers he wished particularly to bring to notice were—

Colonel Hope, c. b., commanding 71st H. L. I., who had command of the front defences from the time of arrival of the force in the Ambeyla Pass, until the time of its changing position to the eastern heights, and whose distinguished conduct at the re-taking of the "Crag" picquet on the 20th has already been mentioned.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, c. b., commanding Corps of Guides, who commanded the right defences, and who, although the position his regiment occupied in camp, did not give him the opportunity of gaining distinction in actual conflict with the enemy, rendered the most constant and valuable aid; the excellent arrangements he made for the re-capture of the "Crag" picquet when it was taken by the enemy on 13th November were particularly alluded to.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, commanding 5th Panjab Infantry, who commanded the Left Defences from the time of the arrival of the force in the Ambeyla Pass to its changing its position to the right heights. He at all times rendered the most cordial assistance and support, and was considered by the Brigadier-General a most intelligent officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Taylor, c. b., Royal Engineers, Chief Engineer with the force, who afforded throughout the most hearty co-operation, and whose services were of great assistance to the force. With Lieutenant-Colonel

Taylor's name were associated those of his subalterns, Lieutenants H. F. Blair, J. Brown, and T. T. Carter, all of the Royal Engineers, who, whether when engaged with the enemy, or when employed in their more regular duties, well upheld the reputation of their corps. Lieutenant Carter joined the force to carry out the objects of the trigonometrical survey, and volunteered his services under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor.

Captain J. S. Tulloh, Royal Artillery, Senior Artillery Officer with the force, who most carefully overcame all difficulties, and in whose opinion in all matters connected with his arm of the service, perfect confidence was held by Sir N. Chamberlain. With Captain Tulloh's name were associated those of Captains Griffin, Salt, DeBude, and Hughes, all of whom have been previously alluded to. In Captains DeBude and Hughes, Sir N. Chamberlain said that the service had two officers most admirably fitted for the command of mountain batteries, who by their zeal had, he believed, brought that arm of the service to as great a degree of efficiency as the ordnance then in use would admit of.

Lieutenant-Colonel Salisbury, commanding 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, who had been most zealous in the discharge of every duty, and who was specially noticed for his distinguished conduct in the re-taking of the "Crag" picquet on the 13th November.

Major Ross, commanding 14th Native Infantry, an officer of most soldierly determination, whose excellent conduct on the 13th and 18th November has previously been specially noticed.

Major C. H. Brownlow, commanding 20th Panjab Native Infantry, who particularly distinguished himself when covering the retreat of the reconnoitring party, 22nd October, when commanding the "Eagle's Nest" picquet, 26th October, and when commanding the "Crag" picquet on the night of the 12th November. Sir N. Chamberlain stated, that, in addition to any other mark of approval the Commander-in-Chief might consider this officer to deserve, he would most strongly recommend him as having well earned the distinction of the Victoria Cross by his personal gallantry on each occasion of his being engaged.

Major C. P. Keyes, commanding 1st Panjab Infantry, whose distinguished conduct on every occasion of his being engaged have already been specially noticed, and whose services were of the utmost value to the force.

Captain W. D. Hoste, commanding 6th Panjab Infantry, whom the Brigadier-General begged to thank for his cheerful and soldierly bearing, and for his marked gallantry at the head of his regiment on the 26th October.

Surgeon Simpson, 71st H. Light Infantry, senior medical officer with the British portion of the force, on whom it devolved to make all arrangements for the sick and wounded of the British troops, which duty he performed giving entire satisfaction.

Surgeon H. B. Buckle, 1st Panjab Infantry, senior medical officer with the Native portion of the force, whose superintendence of all arrangements for the numerous native sick and wounded, in the most zealous and efficient manner, the Brigadier-General particularly wished to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief.

Captain J. H. Jenkins, in charge of the Commissariat Department, to whom the force was highly indebted for his untiring exertions to keep it throughout as well supplied as if it had been in cantonments, and whose services Sir Neville desired to bring specially to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief.

Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn, C. B., V. C., commanding the small party of Cavalry in camp, who, although he was only afforded the opportunity of conducting the reconnoitring party in the Chamla Valley on 22nd October, and of

charging the enemy who endeavoured to cut off his return to camp, Sir N. Chamberlain wished to bring to notice, for his extreme desire to have his men employed on every duty where it was possible to employ dismounted cavalry, as also the cheerful manner in which he made his own services available on every possible occasion.

In giving prominence to the names of the above officers, Sir N. Chamberlain begged to express a hope that the services of officers whose names had been brought to notice in previous despatches, but who were not mentioned in the above list, would also obtain the favorable consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, and he would also beg to acknowledge the services of his staff, *viz.*, Lieutenant-Colonel Allgood, Assistant Quarter-Master General, who had discharged his duties satisfactorily, and afforded every assistance; Major Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenants F. N. Mackenzie (Staff Officer, Panjab Irregular Force), W. C. Anderson, and H. S. Jarrett, who had acted as orderly officers, and given perfect satisfaction.

The non-commissioned officers and men specially recommended to Brigadier-General Chamberlain for their distinguished gallantry were as under :—

71st Regiment, Private William Clapperton.
 „ George Stewart.
 „ William Malcolm.
 101st Regiment, Sergeant Jeremiah Brosnan.
 Lance Corporal G. Simister.
 Private Francis Barber.
 „ Daniel Lane.
 „ Francis Elliott.
 „ Charles Fitzpatrick.

Sir N. Chamberlain also begged to acknowledge the hearty co-operation he had received throughout from Colonel R. Taylor, C. B., who had been, up to within a few days of his (Sir N. Chamberlain's) retirement, chief civil and political officer in the camp. He stated that Colonel Taylor had used every possible endeavour to procure information of the movements and proceedings of the enemy, and when the situation of affairs afforded little scope for political negotiations, both he and his assistant, Captain A. A. Munro, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, resumed their position as military officers, and accompanied the troops when engaged with the enemy.

26th to 29th November.—On the 26th the enemy assembled in small parties on the ridge above the advanced picquets, and reinforcements were sent to the upper camp, with orders to attack, should the enemy attempt to descend. No collision however took place, and the day passed off quietly. This day was Friday, a day on which, owing to the superstitious reverence of the enemy (it being the Mahomedan Sabbath), it had hitherto been customary with them to attack in force.

But although, since the 20th, there had not occurred anything of importance in the field, the work of the political officers had been steadily going on. Major James had done all that was possible by negotiation to weaken the enemy, and had met with considerable success, due in some degree to the losses sustained by the confederacy.

He had succeeded in drawing off Ahmed Khan, with the greater portion of the Asazai and Salarzai sections of the Buner tribe; the Ranizai were also induced to return to their homes to the number of 2,000; Sobut Khan, of Swat, also sent home his immediate followers; minor personages acted in

a similar manner, and amongst those who remained a mutual mistrust prevailed. These desertions were becoming so numerous, that the Akhund issued denunciations, as already stated, against all who should leave the field, and the Moulvi re-doubled his efforts to bring back the wavering.

On the 25th a deputation had been received from the Buner jirgah; and both from conversation with those composing it, and with men who arrived at intervals by permission to take away their slain, it was evident that the main body of the Bunerwals were really inclined for peace. It was hoped that the jirgah would now come to terms, and agree to a brigade passing up the Chamla Valley to Malka. The greater portion of them was certainly inclined to do so, but the negotiation was broken off by Zaidula Khan, who was informed by the Moulvi that his rival, Ahmed, had received large sums of money from the Commissioner. However, the negotiations resulted in the retirement of Ahmed Khan, with two important sections of the tribe.

Meanwhile, the above desertions were more than counterbalanced by the arrival of large reinforcements to the enemy. Some 3,000 men arrived at intervals from Bajawar under Faiztalab Khan, the chief of that country. The Haji of Kunar, the spiritual adviser of the Hasanzai, arrived with about 500 men; and his repute for sanctity rendered his advent a matter of great rejoicing to the war party. Still it was noted that, notwithstanding these accessions, the enemy were so divided and mistrustful of each other, that they were unable to resume the attack, even on a Friday, as previously stated.

30th November.—On the 30th, Major-General Garvock arrived in camp and assumed command of the force, which was now organized into two brigades, the details of which are given in the appendix.

1st to 14th December.—At one time it was in contemplation to make a demonstration on the Swat border as well calculated to draw off some of the enemy and facilitate the advance of the Ambeyla force, as the column making the feint on Swat would still remain within a few marches of the Ambeyla Pass. But this plan was not carried out, and some delay occurred in the troops which were to have been so employed (the 7th Fusiliers and 3rd Sikhs) reaching the Ambeyla force. The other reinforcements which arrived consisting of the 93rd Highlanders and 23rd Mazbi Pioneers.

But although the enemy had been so disheartened by their defeats that, after the 20th November, they had made no further attempts on the camp, and the Bunerwals were really desirous for peace, the reinforcements which they had received made them still believe they could successfully oppose our advance; and as the 93rd Highlanders, the last of our reinforcements, marched into the camp, the bands playing them in, the plain below and around Ambeyla were covered with formidable masses of armed men evidently paraded as a counter display to ours.

The force had at this time two parties in its front.

1. The Bunerwal and Chamla tribes, originally fighting for their country, but now crediting our repeated assertions that we had no intention to invade them. Weary of the war, divided amongst themselves, and subject to innumerable vexations and inconveniences by the presence amongst them of so large a host.

2. The Moulvi and his fanatics, with the Akhund and his allies, a mixed assemblage of men from far and near, whose ranks had just been reinforced by Gazan Khan, the chief of Dhir, with 6,000 men, and who imagined they were beginning to realize their dream of years, viz., the expulsion of

However, Major James's communication with the tribes was now having its effect. On the afternoon of the 10th December, a deputation from the Buner tribe had come into camp, where they remained all that night. Every chief of influence was there, and after several lengthy discussions they had agreed—

1st. That they would accompany the Commissioner with a force and destroy Malka.

2nd. That they would expel the Hindustanis from their country.

They left on the morning of the 11th, to obtain the sanction of the Akhund and his allies to these arrangements.

At first, by the complete silence of the enemy, the withdrawal of some of their picquets and other indications, a pacific reply was anticipated; but on the 13th, the day fixed for a decision, repeated firing of musketry, welcoming fresh arrivals, and the reports of proclamations by the Akhund fulminating anathemas against any one who spoke of peace, prepared the Commissioner for the message which arrived early on the morning of the 14th, to the effect that the jirgah (deputation) had been overruled by Gazan Khan and other new-comers, and that they were therefore unable to return to the camp. It was further intimated that a general attack on the camp was to be made on the 16th, and they advised our taking the initiative, when they, the Buners, would take no prominent part in the action.

Offensive measures were, therefore, at once decided on by the Major-General, in communication with the Commissioner for the next day, to anticipate further reinforcements expected by the enemy.

At this time there was a force of some 4,000 of the enemy at Lalu, including some 300 Hindustanis; and as no attack could be well made on Ambeyla with that force on its flank, it was determined to attack the former place.

The increasing boldness of the enemy was apparent from the fact of parties taking possession during the night of all the roads to the rear, preventing any messengers leaving camp, which appeared to be their sole object, for they vanished in the morning.

On the arrival of the 7th Fusiliers, 93rd Highlanders, 3rd Sikhs, and 23rd Panjab Infantry, the force consisted of about 9,000 men, and the arrangements for the attack on Lalu were as follow:—

Rations for two days were served out on the 14th, and cooked during the night.

The attacking troops were formed into two columns, viz. :—

1st Column.

Hazara Mountain Train.
1 Company Sappers.
7th Royal Fusiliers.
3rd Panjab Infantry.
4th Gurkhas.
23rd Pioneers.
32nd Pioneers.
Colonel W. Turner, C. B., 97th Regiment,
commanding.
Lieutenant F. H. Campbell, 71st H. L. I.,
Brigade-Major.

2nd Column.

Peshawar Mountain Train, 4 guns.
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
Corps of Guides.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
5th Gurkha Battalion.
1 Company Sappers and Miners.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde, Guide Corps,
commanding.
Captain A. O. R. Chester, 4th Gurkhas,
Brigade-Major.

Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan with 2,900 men was left in camp for its protection.

Despatches from Major-General Garvock, Brigadiers

15th December.—At daybreak on the 15th, the attacking force consisting of 4,800 men, unencumbered

This column assembled at the base of the "Crag" picquet, and on receiving the order to advance, it moved in the following formation:—

Movements of 1st column.

4th Gurkhas, 3 companies skirmishing, 3 in support.

3rd Panjab Infantry, 4 companies skirmishing, and 4 in support, covering right flank.

Main Body.

7th Royal Fusiliers.

Company Sappers.

Hazara Mountain Train.

23rd Pioneers.

32nd ditto.

The advance was made from the right flank of the water picquet; on reaching the crest of the heights overlooking that position, the enemy's picquets were encountered, and driven with some loss to the "Conical Hill."

From the Conical Hill the 1st column was separated by a valley about 200 yards wide, and Brigadier Turner therefore directed the troops to line the crest of the height, overlooking it from our own side, to await the arrival of 4 Hazara Mountain guns, which, on coming up, were forthwith brought into action. Under cover of their fire, the 23rd Pioneers, supported by the 32nd Pioneers were moved up into a valley on the right, and secured a height which enabled the left of the enemy's position to be turned.

As soon as the 1st column had passed out of the main position of the upper camp, the 2nd column was formed in the following order:—

Movements of the 2nd column.

Advance Guard.

5th Gurkha Battalion.

101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.

Peshawar Mountain Train.

Sappers and Miners.

Corps of Guides.

3rd Sikh Infantry.

Mountain Train extra ammunition.

Infantry ditto.

Rear Guard.

Detachment, 3rd Sikh Infantry.

Colonel R. Taylor accompanied Brigadier Wilde throughout the operations.

The column advanced under the "Crag" picquet, the skirmishers of the 5th Gurkha Battalion quickly reaching the low ridge of rocks immediately in front of the enemy's position, which was situated on a high steep hill covering the hamlet of Banda.

This hill was occupied by the enemy, who held it in strength behind stone breastworks. The following dispositions were made for the assault: the Mountain Battery moved up and opened sufficient fire to keep down the matchlock fire from the heights; the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers and Corps of Guides were formed in line of contiguous columns out of fire beyond the ridge, the other two regiments being held in reserve, in column of sections, to preserve the left flank during the coming attack.

Both columns were now ready to assault the "Conical Hill," which was the main position of the enemy. This was a most formidable position. The hill sides were rocky, precipitous, and scarped by nature, and the summit strongly occupied was strengthened by stone breastworks offering no ordinary obstacle. The ascent would have been a matter of considerable difficulty under any circumstances. Below it, and to its proper left, was the hamlet of Banda, strongly protected by artificial defences. Beyond it stretched a narrow ridge terminating in a hill of lesser elevation, and then came a small picturesque level, backed by a lofty range, containing the village of Lalu.

On the bugle sounding for the assault, under cover of the guns of the Mountain Battery, which were admirably served, the two columns acted as follows:—The 1st column advanced down the hill across the valley, and in ten minutes were driving the enemy down the opposite side of the height. In the 2nd column the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers made straight for the highest peak, a strong work crowded with the Hindustani fanatics and their Pathan allies, the Corps of Guides taking a point a little below, with the object of taking the pressure off the 101st, to whom the most difficult part of the assault had been safely assigned. The 101st leaping into the breastwork bayoneted some 30 of its defenders, and the Corps of Guides, turning the position under a shower of stones, shot and cut down numbers as they retreated from the peak of the hill to escape from the assault of the gallant 101st Fusiliers, while the reserve under Colonel Wilde secured the line of hills on the left overlooking the Chamla Valley, and drove small parties of the enemy before it.

The enemy, some 2,000 in number, were now in full flight towards the hamlet of Banda, and were rapidly pursued by the men of the 2nd column, part of the Corps of Guides, and the 23rd Native Infantry had the honor of reaching the hamlet about the same time.

The village of Lalu now appeared about a mile and a half on the right flank of the 1st column. Brigadier Turner, therefore, pressed the pursuit in that direction, leaving five companies to guard and bring up the guns, and followed the enemy so closely that they retreated in the utmost confusion down the hills towards Ambeyla.

As soon as the main position of the enemy had been gained by the 2nd column, Brigadier Wilde moved the Mountain Battery to the end of the ridge, and placed the two regiments in position to watch the spurs of the mountain leading up from the Ambeyla plain agreeably with Major-General Garvoek's instructions. The enemy, evidently under the impression that the force had pressed on too far, leaving its left unguarded, came out in large numbers from the village of Ambeyla, and threatened both the left of camp and the communication with it along the mountain by the second column, sending a heavy column up the spurs and vigorously assaulting Brigadier Wilde's column.

On securing possession of the village of Lalu, Brigadier Turner found himself with the 1st column on a line of heights flanking the approach to the "Conical Hill." Seeing the attack which was now being made on the 2nd column, the fire of the guns of Brigadier Turner's column was brought to bear on the flank of the enemy.

As soon as the enemy's attack was developed, Brigadier Wilde sent for reinforcements. Before this requisition could reach the Major-General, he had already despatched two companies, 7th Fusiliers, to support the 2nd column,

and, on receiving Brigadier Wilde's requisition, the 101st Fusiliers, with the exception of four companies left at the "Conical Hill" and on the ridge beyond it, protecting two guns of the Mountain Battery, were sent to Brigadier Wilde's support, who was at this time rejoined by the Corps of Guides.

Passing these troops along the rear, Brigadier Wilde re-occupied all the ground close up to the "Crag" picquet, and thus received the enemy's attack. About this time the enemy made a gallant attempt to force the line of communication with the camp at the point held by the 3rd Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel Renny, but were successfully beaten back by that regiment, which lost 14 men, killed—Lieutenant Cook distinguishing himself on the occasion.

Shortly afterwards, Major-General Garvock directed a forward movement to be made, and the Guide Infantry and a part of the 5th Gurkhas, well led by Lieutenant Codrington of this regiment with a part of the 3rd Sikhs, gallantly charged down one of the spurs, the 101st down another, when the enemy were driven off with great slaughter, leaving a standard in the hands of the Gurkhas, and in their flight coming under the fire of the guns of the 1st column.

Whilst the advanced force under Major-General Garvock's command was operating in the direction of Lalu, a desultory attack was made by a considerable number of the enemy upon the front and left flank of the upper camp. Being met by the fire of the only one of Captain Griffin's guns (C-19th Royal Artillery), which could be brought to bear upon them from the standard picquet, and by the musketry fire from the breastworks, the enemy were reduced to taking cover amongst the rocks and broken ground, from which they caused, from time to time, considerable annoyance to the upper camp, also to C-19th Royal Artillery and to the adjoining breastworks.

Later in the forenoon, successive bodies of the enemy endeavoured to approach the camp by the gorge from the direction of Ambeyla, but coming under the fire of the guns of C Battery, ~~10th Brigade Royal Artillery~~, in the lower camp, they broke away to the left, and ascending the ravines and spurs to the front of the position, joined in the attack upon the upper camp.

The advanced picquet upon the ridge, below and in front of the "Crag" picquet (consisting on this day of 50 men, 1st Panjab Infantry), had been threatened, from early morning, by a constantly increasing body of the enemy.

The ground occupied by the advance picquet, from which the whole of the centre of our position could be commanded, and on which the "Crag" picquet could not, from the nature of the ground, maintain an effective fire, was the point the enemy strove to gain. This point was so important to the safety of the main position, that Lieutenant Unwin, 1st Panjab Infantry, was instructed by Major C. P. Keyes, commanding that regiment, to hold it as long as he could with any degree of safety. The enemy repeatedly crept up under cover of the rocks within a few yards of the picquet, having driven in a small party placed there for observation. Lieutenant Unwin was then reinforced, and subsequently had 200 rifles at his disposal, including 60 men of the 5th Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant Fox,—all that could be spared from the reduced force; and the enemy, who made two vigorous attempts, in considerable strength, to take the position, were only repulsed on each occasion by the picquet charging down upon them, inflicting a loss of 40 killed.

At this time (about 2 P.M.) Major C. H. Brownlow, 20th Panjab Native Infantry, who had command of the Right Defences of the upper camp, observing that the enemy seemed much dispirited by the ill-success against Lieutenant Unwin's picquet, determined to assume the offensive from the camp, and accordingly about 100 men of the 1st Panjab Infantry, led by Major C. P. Keyes, advanced from the breastworks, and by a succession of well-executed charges upon the different points occupied by the enemy, completely cleared the whole front and left flank of the defences, driving the enemy in great confusion into the plain below, leaving their dead on all sides.

All opposition having now ceased in every part of the field, and the enemy being in full retreat, arrangements were made for bivouacking for the night. Brigadier Turner occupied the ground he had gained in the vicinity of Lala; Brigadier Wilde that between the camp and the Conical Hill. Not a shot was fired during the night. Our losses are given in the Appendix C. Those of the enemy were 400 killed and wounded.

Major-General Garvock in his despatch begged to draw the special attention of the Commander-in-Chief to the distinguished gallantry of Major Keyes and Lieutenant Unwin: Colonel Vaughan stated the 1st Panjab Infantry deserved the greatest credit for their conduct: Major Keyes alluded to the way in which Lieutenant Keen and Vallings, 1st Panjab Infantry, had led the attack on the right and left, and to the assistance afforded to Lieutenant Unwin by Lieutenant Oliphant. The men marginally noted, were specially mentioned as having distinguished themselves.

16th December.—Early on the morning of this day 400 sabres of the 11th Bengal Cavalry and Guide Corps, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn, were brought from camp, and the order was given to move.

The 2nd (Brigadier Wilde's) column, which was accompanied by Major-General Garvock, passed down by the spurs in its immediate front, the Mountain guns attached to it and the cavalry descending by a steep path, which ran down a hollow on the right. The descent occupied about two hours, and Major-General Garvock said he believed that ground more difficult, for mounted men had never before been traversed, even in the hills of the Anatola.

Advance Guard.
1 company Guide Corps.
Column.
Guide Corps.
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
Peshawar Mountain Train.
Sappers and Miners.
5th Gurkhas.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
Ammunition Dandia.
Rear Guard.
1 company 3rd Sikh Infantry.

The plain was reached about mid-day, and a column, as per margin, having been formed, Brigadier Wilde advanced across the valley towards the Buner Pass, the troops in high spirits confidently hoping for an engagement on ground comparatively easy to what they had been previously accustomed to.

As the column had debouched into the open country, the enemy appeared in great force on a low ridge of hills, which completely covered the approach to Ambeyla, and numerous gay standards of all colours were visible on the prominent hillocks. The position of the enemy was one singularly well chosen and of unusual strength, but Major-General Garvock determined, after a careful examination, on attacking it and turning the enemy's right.

On approaching this position, Brigadier Wilde had formed his Brigade into two attacking columns, but he encountered but little opposition where most had been expected. The ground in his front was of singular strength

and peculiarly capable of defence; but the enemy, seeing his left would be so effectually turned by the 1st (Brigadier Turner's) column and by the cavalry, abandoned his position, and almost without firing a shot retreated slowly towards the pass leading towards Buner.

As soon as the 2nd column had begun to descend from the "Coni-al Hill," the 1st column, having the shortest line to pass over, had moved in echelon of regiments from the left; the 3rd Panjab Infantry went down the spur which ran parallel to that by which the 2nd column was descending, and protected the right flank of that column; the 4th Gurkhas marched down the next parallel ridge, and the main body, consisting of the 23rd Pioneers, in advance, left wing Royal Fusiliers, Hazara Mountain Train, Sappers and Miners, and right wing Royal Fusiliers, proceeded down the gorge leading from the village of Lalu to that of Ambeyla and the Chamla Valley; while the 32nd Pioneers crowned the heights and effected a parallel movement, covering the right flank.

The pathway was steep, and in parts precipitous and rocky, and it was with great difficulty that the Mountain guns could be brought down; but Captain de Budé, by his energy and perseverance, overcame all obstacles, a company of Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant Tucker rendering most valuable service. At 2-30 p. m. Brigadier Turner found himself able to debouch into the plain with the leading regiments and the left wing of the Royal Fusiliers.

The 3rd Panjab Infantry and the 4th Gurkhas had now effected their junction with the right of 2nd Brigade, and with it were in possession of the extreme right of the enemy's position, which was about a mile and a half from, and facing the entrance to, the Buner Pass.

Up to this time the cavalry had remained concealed behind a projecting spur; they were now ordered to advance, and passing on at a gallop under Colonel Probyn and Captain Hawes of the Guides passed round the left of the enemy's position now in our possession, swept into the valley beyond, and

halted to the eastward of Ambeyla. The town which
 Commissioner's Despatch. had been previously abandoned was immediately fired, large stores of grain falling into our hands.

The main portion of the 2nd Brigade had deployed immediately opposite the town of Ambeyla, and Brigadier Turner was now ordered to try and cut off the rear of the enemy from the pass, as they were retreating from before Brigadier Wilde, but at the same time not to compromise himself in the pass. He therefore formed a line of the 23rd Pioneers and left wing of the 32nd Pioneers, with the right wing of that regiment in column of companies at wheeling distance, left in front, and directed their advance along the south-western face of the village of Ambeyla, the left wing of the 7th Royal Fusiliers forming the reserve, in quarter distance column, in rear of the centre of the line.

After passing the town, which was in flames, the right wing of the 32nd was brought up in prolongation of the line to the right, which brought the right near the base of the hill which shut in the mouth of the pass. The advance was steadily continued in the same order to within about 800 yards of the mouth of the pass, when the enemy opened a furious fire of matchlocks and zumburuks, which was returned by the line as it continued to advance. As a large body of the enemy were observed moving to their right and beyond the left flank, Brigadier Turner moved two companies from the reserve of the Royal Fusiliers, and placed them in an oblique position covering the left, whilst at the same time Colonel Probyn also moved a body of his men into a position which still further covered the left flank.

Seeing these movements, the enemy made a furious onset, sword in hand, upon the left flank of the line, which was now in broken ground covered with jungle. The 23rd and 32nd Regiments of Pioneers composing it were staggered for the moment by the suddenness of the onslaught, but turning quickly on their assailants they destroyed the whole of them, not allowing one to escape. Upwards of 200 of their bodies lay upon the field, 40 of whom were Hindustanis. Lieutenant Alexander of the 23rd was killed, and Captain Chamberlain and Lieutenant Nott of the 23rd, and Major Wheeler and Lieutenant Marsh of the 32nd, were wounded.

Flushed with success, the Pioneer Regiments now pushed forward into the pass, driving the enemy before them. But the day was far spent, the hostile position was occupied in great force, and Major-General Garvock was besides aware that the Government did not desire to invade Buner, the withdrawal of the troops was therefore ordered. This was effected in echelon of regiments from the right under cover of the fire of the guns of the Hazara Mountain Train, and half of C. Battery, 19th Brigade, under Captain Griffin. The guns of this Battery had been brought on elephants from the camp and were now fully horsed. No molestation whatever was offered by the enemy, who in immense numbers and in sullen silence lined the heights above.

The numbers of the enemy in the field during these two days, *viz.*, the 15th and 16th, were 15,000. During these days the Major James's Report. Bunerwals gave signal proof of their sincerity by taking no prominent part in the actions, the men who fought having been chiefly Hindustanis, Bajawaris, Swatis, and Gazan Khan's men.

Thus the punishment inflicted fell, as Major James had hoped and intended, on those who had in such an unprovoked manner joined in the contest, and over-ruled the Bunerwals in their desire for peace.

17th December.—On the night of the 16th the columns bivouacked in the neighbourhood of Ambeyla. During the night Faiztalab Khan and the Bajawars, Gazan Khan and his clansmen from Dher, with the miscellaneous gatherings from more distant parts, were all in rapid flight towards their home. The Akhund, with the Khans and people of Swat, alone remained on the crest of the Buner Pass,—not as before with flaunting standards, but behind the hill, out of sight, and all prepared to run in the event of the troops advancing. Thus enabled to act independently, the Buner jirgah (council) returned to Major James on the morning of the 17th, not even talking of terms, but simply asking for orders.

There were two plans open to the Commissioner. The first was to send a strong brigade to Malka to destroy it, and to return by the Chamla Valley to Ambeyla. But as it would be necessary to call up another convoy from Permauli, which would necessitate a delay of seven days in the advance of this brigade, during which time the Akhund and Moulvi would have time to collect their scattered forces and to receive reinforcements of fresh men on their way to join them; and as this would give the Amazai, Mada Khel, Esazai, and other northern tribes, time to collect and organize resistance, and as, too, on the retirement of the brigade there would be no guarantee that the Hindustanis would not be allowed to return to Malka by the neighbouring tribes stirred up by these proceedings, this plan was not adopted.

The second plan was to require the Buner men to destroy Malka without any aid from our troops. Its advantages were, that the success already gained would be at once completed, collision with distant tribes in a rugged country

would be avoided, and the Hindustanis would be cut off from every hope of re-settlement on the spurs of the Mahaban; for the Buner men would be obliged to associate themselves with the Amazai and Mada Khels, and if these tribes committed themselves thus openly against the fanatics, it would be a sure guarantee that they would not re-admit them.

But the destruction was to be real, not nominal; and it would be necessary that some British officers should accompany the jirgah to see the work carried out. This would necessitate the sending of an escort with them sufficient to protect them from any individual or factious acts of treachery. Of more extended faithlessness, Major James had not the slightest anxiety. Half the jirgah were to remain with him. The force was in possession of the Chamla Valley, and Buner itself was at our mercy. At the same time it was known that Malka was deserted, and that there could be no opposition which the Buner tribe would be unable to overcome. Major-General Garvock concurring in the Commissioner's views, the following requisitions were made on the Buner jirgah, to which they unanimously consented:—

I.—To dismiss the army of all kinds on the Buner Pass.

II.—To send a party to destroy Malka completely, to be accompanied by British officers and such escort as might be considered necessary.

III.—To expel the Hindustanis from the Buner, Chamla, and Amazai lands.

IV.—To leave as hostages the whole of their chief men till the above requirements should be fully carried out.

Leaving the greater part of their number with the Commissioner, a few returned to the pass, and by the next morning the army on its crest, including the Swat Khans and people, were hastening to their homes.

Colonel R. Taylor from the first had been unremitting in his enquiries regarding the nature of the country, and to no safer and more chivalrous hands could the important and delicate duty about to be undertaken have been entrusted. He was, therefore, deputed to proceed with the Buner jirgah. Escorted by the Regiment of Guides under Captain Jenkins, and

Colonel Adye, C. B., R. A.

„ A. Taylor, R. E.

Major Roberts, V. C., Assistant Quarter-Master General.

Major Johnstone, Revenue Survey.

Major Wright, A. A. G.

Lieut. Carter, R. E.

a body of the Levies under the Sadum Chief Aziz Khan, and accompanied by the officers marginally noted, the party advanced from Ambeyla on the 19th, and reached Korla at the upper end of the Chamla Valley that evening. Here they were detained on the 20th by heavy rain, and it then became apparent from the diminished number of the Buners that the jirgah intended rather to carry out their engagements by friendly overtures to the Amazai than by coercion. Colonel Taylor fully appreciating the policy which had been adopted, and specially supported by the evident frank determination of the Buner Maliks to fulfil their engagements, determined to acquiesce in this plan of operations.

On the morning of the 21st the weather having cleared, the march was continued. On turning to their right, the party entered the Amazai lands of the valley leading up the spurs on which Malka is situated. From Korla to Nagair is 7 miles. Soon after leaving the former, a narrow defile is entered, which is highly defensible; the road for about a mile follows the stony bed of the nullah and then turns up over a spur of the ridge; this spur, though not a very stiff one, would be a good place to offer opposition to an advance.

On arrival at Nagair, a party of the Amazai appeared on a hill commanding the onward march under their Chief Mouza Khan, in full

warlike array, with standards and drums, and it became known that they had been joined by parties of the Mada Khels.

To those unacquainted with the real nature of the case it must have seemed a critical moment, and undoubtedly it was one requiring the utmost tact and firmness on the part of the political officer; but Colonel Taylor was an officer who eminently possessed those qualities. The Esazais (Mada Khels) had not suffered in the war as others had done, although they had sent men to aid, and had lost a Malik, and another section, the Hasanzais, had too fully committed themselves. It was never cleared up how this large body of Esazais appeared at Nagair.

Report by Major James.
Memorandum by Major-General Taylor.

Colonel Taylor had an interview with their chief Malik, and he was confused and gave a lame account of the matter; it appeared that they were either marching to join the war and had only heard, on reaching the Mahaban Valley, of the complete collapse of the tribes, or that Mouza Khan having heard that the Bunerwals had given in, and were going to force the burning of Malka on the Mahaban tribes, had called the Esazais up to see what aid they could afford to mitigate the evils.

The Buner Chiefs advancing held council with those of the Amazai, and after a long conference the army of the latter withdrew. Mouza Khan and their other headmen now joined Colonel Taylor, and with this accession of strength the party proceeded to Malka, where it arrived late in the afternoon, and where, owing to the delay caused by the above interruption, it took up its quarters for the night.

Memorandum by General Taylor.

Malka was situated on an elevated plateau, on a northern spur of the Mahaban ridge. It was a much larger and more substantial place than any known in those hills, containing several large edifices, among which the Moulvi's hall of audience, barracks for the soldiers, stabling, and a powder manufactory, formed conspicuous objects. There were no regular fortifications, but the outer walls of the houses were connected and formed a continuous line of defence with posterns. There was also a tower at the gateway.

The place was found deserted, and on the morning of the 22nd the Buners and Amazais commenced to burn and destroy it. An effort was at first made by the Amazai, and afterwards by the Buner Khans, to save a large portion of the place on the plea that it had been occupied by men of their tribe and not by the Hindustanis; but Colonel Taylor was firm and determined to destroy the whole place, which was completely done by noon. The escort witnessed the burning, but were in no way employed in the work of destruction.

Memorandum by Major-General Taylor.

Whilst this was going on, information was brought that the Amazais were going down the valley to join the Esazais, who had remained at Nagair, which of course caused Colonel Taylor much anxiety.

The Shirgar Pass by which the column had to return was a difficult one, and if the smouldering sparks in the minds of the hillmen had blown up into a flame, and recklessness of the future had set in, the position would have been a most critical one: but Colonel Taylor never wavered in his determination. Shortly afterwards, Aziz Khan, the Buner Malik, who was in a manner in general charge of the proceedings, sent word that he wished for leave to go down the valley to look after what was going on, and Colonel Taylor agreed at once, putting full trust in the honest intentions of the Buners to carry out their engagements. Matters were speedily arranged by Aziz Khan, who ordered the baggage, which had begun moving towards Koria, but which had been stopped on the above untoward report, to come on.

Colonel Taylor spoke to the Amazais who were present, but they were sullen, and not inclined to answer in good spirit; however, they were saved the trouble by Zaidula Khan, the Buner Chief, who stepped in front of them, and, grasping his beard with his one remaining hand, said—"I am answerable for these men, both for their conduct now, and for their excluding the Hindustanis in future."

This incident illustrates the fact, that the Mahaban tribes, though strong and not to be despised with their stiff country, are yet powerless to resist the will of Buner.

If things at times looked a little lowering and uncertain, it was but the natural result of the position in which this force was placed; their task had taken them through a narrow defile into a cup of wild mountainous country, never previously visited by our troops. The force found themselves in the presence of strong tribes certainly not over well pleased with their visitors, or the errand on which they had come; but from the first Colonel Taylor felt confident that the representatives of the stronger tribe that accompanied him could carry out their engagements, and overcome the would-be recusant.

Colonel Taylor said, the spectacle of a tribe, like the Buner, doing our bidding and destroying the stronghold of their own allies in the war at a distant spot, naturally under the protection of other tribes of well-known prowess and strength, with British witnesses looking on, must have been a thoroughly convincing proof to the surrounding country of the reality of our success, and of the indubitable prostration felt by the powerful Buner tribe, which had been the foremost in opposing us.

The party returned to Korla that evening, and on the morning of the 23rd marched to the camp on the Ambeyla Pass, accompanied by some of the Amazai Maliks.

On the departure of Colonel Taylor the troops had returned to their former position on the pass; and the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 20th Panjab Infantry, commenced their march towards their different cantonments, and now the remainder of the force commenced its return to the plains, all being collected at Naokilla on the 25th December.

Major-General Garvock in his despatch alluded to the hearty co-operation of Major James, the Commissioner, and he expressed his thanks to Colonel Taylor, c. B., Commissioner of the Derajat. He also spoke of the valuable services of Colonel Turner, c. B., commanding the 1st Brigade, and the merits of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, c. B., commanding the 2nd Brigade; of the efficiency of his staff, Colonel Allgood and Major T. Wright; he commended the arrangements of Surgeon Munro, 93rd Highlanders, P. M. O., and of Assistant Surgeon Sylvester, 11th Bengal Cavalry, who was in charge of the sick and wounded at Naokilla, and the efficient discharge of his arduous duties by Captain Jenkins, Commissariat Officer.

The names also of the following officers were most favorably mentioned :—

Major Johnstone, Revenue Survey.

Captain Norman, Assistant Quarter-Master General.

„ Tulloh, Senior Officer, Royal Artillery.

Captains Griffin, Hughes, DeBude, and Salt, commanding Batteries.

Lieutenant Clark, Royal Artillery, Commissary of Ordnance.

„ Tucker, commanding Sappers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn, v. c., c. B., commanding Cavalry.

Lieutenant Hawes, commanding Guide Cavalry.

Colonel Shipley, commanding 7th Fusiliers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Salisbury, 101st. R. B. F.

Major Keyes, commanding 1st Panjab Infantry (who led his regiment, although suffering from a wound received in a previous action).

Lieutenant-Colonel Renny, commanding 3rd Sikhs.

Captain Close, commanding 5th Gurkhas.

Major Morgan, ditto 32nd Pioneers.

Captain Chamberlain, commanding 23rd Pioneers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, 5th Panjab Infantry,
(commanding troops left in camp).

Major Parker, 71st H. L. I.

Major Brownlow, commanding 20th Native Infantry.

Major Ross, commanding 14th Native Infantry.

Captain Tytler, v. c., commanding 4th Gurkhas.

Major Burroughs, commanding 93rd Highlanders.

Captain Ruxton, commanding 3rd Panjab Infantry.

Lieutenant Jenkins, commanding Guide Infantry.

Captain Chester, 4th Gurkhas, { Majors of
Lieutenant and Adjutant Campbell, 71st H. L. I, { Brigade.

Lieutenant Scott, 32nd Pioneers, Baggage Master.

He expressed his best thanks to Colonel Adye, c. b., Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery, and to Major Roberts, Assistant Quarter-Master General, attached to the force on particular service; also to Lieutenant Mackenzie, Staff Officer of the Panjab Irregular Force, and Lieutenant Jarrett, 1st Panjab Cavalry, Orderly Officer, and Captain E. M. Jones, 20th Regiment, Aide-de-Camp.

Brigadier Turner, who commanded the 1st Brigade, also favorably noticed the following officers:—

Lieutenant Brown, B. F.,

" Jackson, 11th Bengal Cavalry,
Orderly Officer,

Captain Warren, R. A., who volunteered his
services,

Surgeon Cheke, 23rd Pioneers,

and added the following names of officers, native officers, and men who were reported to have especially distinguished themselves:—

101st R. B. F.

Private Fergus Hill.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Battery, C. Brigade, R. A.

Captain Butt.

Lieutenant DeLatour.

Hazara Mountain Train.

Gunner Hira Sing (2).

" Vargun Sing (2).

Sappers and Miners.

Naik Mahomed Khan.

3rd Panjab Infantry.

Captain Ogilvie.

Lieutenant Carden.

Subadar Ram Sing.

" Astur Mahomed.

Jemadar Lall Sing.

" Alladad.

Naik Sharkair.

Sepoy Ramjan.

" Fazal.

" Ahmed.

In the 2nd Brigade Brigadier Wilde mentioned the names of—

101st R. B. F.

Major Lambert,

Captain Parsons,

Sepoy Hagrutnur.

" Fandi.

" Kalpa.

" Mir Afzul.

" Wassim.

" Hem Sing.

" Shir Raj.

" Morad.

4th Gurkhas.

Havildar Chamu Gosain.

Sepoy Pertant Sahi.

" Modoram Rasnaik.

" Bhow Sing Kanta.

Sergeant Major A. Delachey.

23rd Pioneers.

Havildar Niho Sing.

Sepoy Bhopal.

32nd Pioneers.

Lieutenant Marsh, twice wounded.

Major Wheler, severely wounded.

Lieutenant Stevens, Adjutant.

3rd Sikhs.

Lieutenant Cook,

5th Gurkhas.

Lieutenant Codrington,

and of the following native officers and men :—

101st R. B. F.
 Private Daniel Flamecey, No. 4 Co.
 Color Sergeant Denis Macgrath, No. 9 Co.
Corps of Guides.
 Sepoy Surjun, No. 1 Co.
 „ Suba Sing, No. 6 Co.
3rd Sikh Infantry.
 Jemadar Rautula Beg.

Pay Havildar Bhoor Sing, No. 8 Co.
 Sepoy Utter Sing, No. 8 Co.
5th Gurkhas.
 Jemadar Ratan Sing.
 Sepoy Kalian Sing, No. 2 Co.
 „ Bag Sing, No. 4 Co.

In his report Colonel Taylor alluded to the services of—

Major Coxe, Deputy Commissioner of Hazara,
 Captain Munro, Deputy Commissioner, who accompanied the force,
 Lieutenant Sandeman, A. C., who had charge of the levies, &c.,

and said the levies did good service both in Hazara and Yusafzai.

And Major James, after mentioning these officers, alludes to the services of—

Lieutenant Powlett, A. C.
 Mr. Faichnie, Post Master.
 Mr. Brown, E. T. D.

Of the services of the Native chiefs, Major James regretted that on this occasion he had but a limited number to notice. He observed general apathy and indifference amongst those who could have rendered us important services, but failed to do so; but the following were a few bright exceptions of men who brought their entire energies and influence to bear in our favor.

Chief amongst these were Ajab Khan and Aziz Khan of Sadum. They are brothers, and allied by marriage to two of the principal Khans of Buner. From first to last their active co-operation was conspicuous, and in the highest degree valuable. They were called upon to furnish a contingent of 120 men, and they not only selected a really useful body, but kept up nearly double the number at their own charges. To these Khans and their men were entrusted a part of the breastworks, the convoy of dâks, stores, and officers, through the Shirdara Pass; and the duties cheerfully performed by them throughout were incessant, and accompanied at times with considerable danger. They afforded a strong contrast to the useless bodies of men furnished by the other Khans of the district, who were unable to take upon themselves even the most trivial duties. Ajab Khan and Aziz Khan were further constantly employed by Major James in difficult and delicate business connected with his negotiations, and in every way they proved themselves loyal and true to the British Government. Closely associated with them was Mean Mahomed Shah of Ismalia, who on all occasions exerted himself honestly in our cause.

SECTION VI.

The coercion of the Jaduns and Utmanzaïs by a force under Colonel Wilde, 1864.

AMBEYLA.

THE sanction of Government was now obtained for a force to accompany the Commissioner for the purpose of requiring security from the Jaduns and Utmanzai, and on the 28th December a Brigade, constituted as follows, marched from Naokilla :—

Report by Major James.
Telegram from Colonel
Wilde, C. B.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde, C. B., Guide Corps, commanding.

Staff.

- Captain Norman, Assistant Quarter-Master General.
- Lieutenant Mackenzie, Staff Officer, Panjab Frontier Force.
- Captain Taylor, Assistant Commissary General.

Political Officer.

Major James, Commissioner.

Troops.

Peshawar Mountain Train.

Hazara " "

101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.

Corps of Guides.

3rd Sikh Infantry.

3rd Panjab "

5th Gurkha Battalion.

2 Companies Sappers and Miners.

Ten days' supplies were carried with the force, with ammunition at 200 rounds per Native soldier, and 140 rounds per British soldier.

The remainder of the troops of the Yusafzai Field Force marched back to their respective cantonments.

The greater part of the Jadun Chiefs had remained with the Commissioner ever since the commencement of operations, but Malik Isa, the Malik most favorable to the Hindustanis and some others, had not done so, and the Commissioner had therefore previously allowed them all to return, with instructions to meet him at Miani, a village in British territory on the borders of their country, and there to give security for the future.

The tribe is divided into two chief sections, the Mansur and the Salar. The former had generally formed the recusant party in all dealings with us under the leadership of Isa Khan, but, associated with him, had been Jehangir Khan of the Salar section. Their attitude during the operations at Ambeyla had been, on the whole, satisfactory. As already stated, most of the chiefs had remained in the camp, and there had been no general collection of any portion of the tribe against us. Individuals had undoubtedly joined the enemy, but to nothing like the extent of our own subjects. After much enquiry the Commissioner had only been able to trace two men of the tribe who had been killed or wounded, and at this time the main body were undoubtedly in a state of alarm and ready to fulfil any thing required of them.

On the 30th December the troops arrived at Miani, and on the following day all the chiefs of the tribe had assembled in the villages of Bisak and Gandap, the head-quarters of the Mansur and Salar sections respectively, and both situated about 4 miles to the front. Isa Khan was with them, but, actuated by fear, he did not come in to the Commissioner with the rest, though he counselled them to perfect submission. However, on Major James again sending for him, he came in and joined the Jirgah.

On the 1st January the Commissioner had a discussion with them on the subject of their offences, which they admitted, at the same time pleading certain things in extenuation; it remained simply to take guarantees for the future.

When the Syads and Hindustanis returned in the previous July, they occupied Mandi, a place adjacent to Sittana, and built there a kind of fort of loose stones. The village itself belonged to Syads not connected with Mobarik Shah's family, and it had been spared in 1858, as they were considered to be blameless for what had then happened. As the Hindustanis had, however, again found the place ready to their hand and occupied it, it became as necessary to remove a powerless as a disloyal colony. By requiring the Jadun and Utmanzai to perform this work, a guarantee in their case would be obtained similar to the security we had in regard to the Bunerwal and Amazai at Malka. Believing this to be a more complete and satisfactory termination than the taking of hostage, regarding which there were several difficulties, Major James made a demand on them for its execution, to which they expressed their consent.

During the night, however, worked on by interested parties, and at the instigation of Jehangir Khan, the men of Gandap left the camp and declined to be parties to the agreement. The ostensible cause was declared to be that it was proposed to take the force *via* Gandap, the direct road to Kabal, which portended mischief to the village. It was a case to be promptly

Telegram from Colonel Wilde.

met, and therefore Colonel Wilde moved out on the morning of the 2nd and occupied the low hills in rear of, and over the village of Gandap. The ascent was

steep and difficult. The village was a strong one, situated among low hills,

Major James's Report.

and consisted of about a thousand houses full of cotton and other property. The place was completely at our

mercy, but being most anxious not to be forced to extremities, the Commissioner sent men of the Jadun Jirgah (all of whom, together with those of the Utmanzai, had accompanied him) to reason with the Gandap people, when they all came in and agreed to join in the allotted work; the troops accordingly returned to camp at sunset without a shot having been fired.

The following day the force proceeded to Kabal, where the Utmanzai were formally associated with the Jaduns; leaving the camp there, Major James proceeded on the 4th to Mandi, accompanied by Colonel Wilde and a portion of the troops. It had been recently much improved, and contained some substantial houses. The whole was destroyed and burnt by the Jirgahs, and the walled enclosure, denominated a fort, was levelled. Sittana was found still a ruin, as it had been left by Sir S. Cotton in 1858. On the 5th the troops returned to Pihur, where the Jaduns and Utmanzai executed fresh agreements individually and collectively, and at their intercession the Gandap men were pardoned for their foolish conduct on the 2nd.

All the objects of the expedition Trans-Indus having been thus accomplished, and the season being too far advanced for any active measures against the Hasanzai of the Black Mountain, Colonel Wilde's Brigade was broken up, and the troops returned to their respective cantonments, being the last of the Yusafzai Field Force.

SECTION VII.

Submission of the Mada Khels, Amazais, and Hasan Khels, and concluding remarks.

MAJOR COXE, the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, had been with the

Report by Major Coxe. troops at Darband watching the Hasanzai and protecting the Amb territory. On the 9th January the Jirgah of the Mada Khels came in to him, asserting that they had entertained no hostile feeling towards the British Government, but had been compelled by a pressure of the neighbouring tribes, which they were unable to resist, to join the hostile movement organized by the Buners and Swatis. They then executed an agreement to maintain in future friendly relations with the Tanawali Chief, and on no account to grant the Hindustanis countenance or habitation within the limits of their country.

Two days afterwards, that section of the Amazai which had not previously waited on the Commissioner at Ambeyla also came in to Major Coxe, and also

Report by Panjab Government. executed an agreement to exclude the Hindustanis altogether from their limits. Later on, he also received the submission of the Hasanzais, with the exception

of Kabal Khan, the son of the chief.

Of the results of the expedition Major James reported: "The Hindustani colony have thus been driven from the whole of the territory indicated by the Supreme Government. They never exceeded 900 in number, and of these fully half have been killed and wounded in the Ambeyla Pass. The remnant are now refugees, partly in the remote mountains of the Trans-Indus Hasanzai and partly with the Moulvi and Akhund on the confines of Swat. It is unquestionable that, in the face of a determined opposition on the part of the most formidable and dangerous combination ever brought against us on the north-west border, the original objects of the expedition have been perfectly accomplished. In endeavouring to defeat those objects, the united tribes have lost in killed and wounded three thousand men; and the power and prestige of the Akhund of Swat, hitherto a decided source of danger, has, in a manner unsought by us, been tested and overborne."

With regard to the conduct of the troops Major James said, that, although their general bearing throughout an unusually harassing and trying campaign would doubtless be brought elsewhere to the notice of Government, there were a few circumstances connected with it which might be appropriately referred to by him. Mischievous rumours were being recklessly circulated throughout the country by officious but irresponsible native agents, that some of the Sikh Regiments of the force were about to declare against us, when there was never the slightest ground for such rumour, and when at the very time the Sikhs were fighting bravely and falling in our cause. It was also a fact well worthy of being noted by Government, that under very peculiar circumstances, the Pathan portion of the troops gave signal proof of their loyalty. It cannot be supposed that to fight against the Akhund was more agreeable to them than to other Mahomedans, and yet in no single instance did his advent amongst the enemy influence their conduct. The casualties amongst the Pathans were fully as numerous as those of any other race: many of our soldiers were closely allied to some of

the hostile tribes; on one occasion, when the enemy came to our pickets to remove their dead, a young sepoy of Buner had the pain of recognizing his own father among the slain!

Colonel Taylor, whilst bearing like testimony to the good conduct of the Pathan soldiery, wrote—"Personal influence of officers will always be found to be the only stand-by for the Government interests when the religious cry is raised, and the fidelity of our troops is being tampered with. Pay, pensions, and orders of merit, may and would be cast to the winds, when the honor of the faith was in the scale; but to snap the association of years, and to turn in his hour of need against the man whom he has proved to be just and worthy, whom he has noted in the hour of danger, and quoted to his family, is just what a Pathan will not do—to his honor be it said. The fact was that the officers in camp were so long and kindly associated with their soldiers that the latter were willing to set them before their great religious Pangendum himself.

In forwarding the despatches relating to the campaign, the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose, stated that he desired to bring to the special notice of the Government of India, Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K. C. B., and Major-General Garvock, who had respectively commanded the Yusafzai Field Force, and to recommend that they might receive a suitable reward for the very important services they had rendered to the State.

He also brought under the notice of Government the very good service performed by Brigadiers Turner and Wilde. The latter officer had served throughout the whole of the operations, and after General Chamberlain was wounded, temporarily exercised the command of the force, during which time he earned the Commander-in-Chief's especial approbation.

The Commander-in-Chief entirely concurred in the encomiums bestowed by Generals Chamberlain and Garvock on the officers and men of the field force at large for the excellent spirit they had displayed. The duties devolving on the picquets was specially prolonged and hard, but the troops, British as well as Native, performed them with a cheerfulness and good feeling characteristic of their high discipline.

His Excellency stated that it was due to military merit and devotion of the highest order, and might be some consolation to the relatives of the officers in question that the Commander-in-Chief should record how nobly three officers of the greatest promise died in action.

Lieutenant Richmond, of the 20th Native Infantry, when about to be relieved at the expiration of his tour of duty, prevailed on his commanding officer, because it was a post of danger, to allow him to remain for four successive days in charge of the "Eagle's Nest" picquet, where he was killed by a bullet through the head.

Lieutenant Chapman, of the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, although knowing that he was dying of a mortal wound, bound up the wounds of a brother officer, and sent an important message to the position.

Lieutenant Davidson, of the 1st Panjab Infantry, rather than retire from his post, died, fighting to the last against overwhelming numbers, with a heroism that elicited the admiration of one of the principal chiefs of the Buner tribe.

The Commander-in-Chief continued—

"So important is the question of supplies in all military operations, that he would not do justice to the most efficient manner in which they were managed in the Yusafzai Field Force, if he did not bring to the notice of the Govern-

ment the excellent services of the Assistant Commissary General, Captain Jenkins. Notwithstanding the difficulties of feeding so large a force in a mountainous country beyond the limits of our own territory, not only was no complaint ever preferred, but the General Officers in command, and Commanding Officers of Regiments, reported that the rations were remarkably good, and that their issue was liberal and uninterrupted throughout.

He added, that Surgeon K. Simpson, M. B., 71st Highland Light Infantry and Surgeon K. Munro, M. D., 93rd Highlanders, on different occasions the senior Medical Officers with the British portion of the force, and Surgeon Buckle, the senior Medical Officer with the Native troops, and the Medical Officers of the force generally, performed their duty ably and successfully under difficult circumstances.

Before concluding his report, Sir Hugh Rose stated it was due to the Native troops employed, particularly to the regiments organized since 1857, that the Commander-in-Chief should submit to the Government of India a practical proof of their discipline and fidelity. Every effort was made by the Akhund of Swat and the hostile tribes to seduce to their cause their co-religionists in the Native regiments opposed to them, but, with the exception of one young Buner recruit, their sense of duty and discipline kept them true.

The following general order was published by the Government of India :—

His Excellency the Governor General in Council, in publishing the despatches received from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, regarding the late operations against the enemy in the Mahaban Mountain and the Chamla Valley, embraces with much satisfaction the opportunity now afforded him of thanking the troops for their services.

The gallantry, fortitude, and endurance, which have been displayed throughout the expedition, are worthy of the highest praise, and His Excellency will have much satisfaction in bringing them to the notice of Her Majesty's Government.

The Governor General in Council cordially acknowledges the very distinguished services of Brigadier-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain, K. C. B., (whose wound and impaired state of health are much regretted by His Excellency,) and of Major-General J. Garvock, in successive command of the Yusafzai Field Force.

“He also thanks the political officers, Major H. James, C. B., the Commissioner of Peshawar, and Colonel Reynell Taylor, C. B., for their valuable services.

“While the acknowledgments of the Governor General in Council are due to the whole of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, composing the late Yusafzai Field Force, for the excellent spirit they displayed from first to last, he desires especially to commend those who have been prominently brought to notice in the several reports of engagements, and by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, more particularly Colonel Turner, C. B., and Colonel Wilde, C. B., in command of Brigades, the latter of whom served throughout the operations, and for a time commanded the whole force to the entire satisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief.

“The Governor General in Council also desires especially to thank those officers who held the command of corps or batteries, or who performed responsible staff duties, and earned the approbation of the Commanders of the Force and of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

“The successful exertions of the Commissariat Department under Captain Jenkins, and the services of Surgeons Simpson, Munro, and Buckle, and of the Medical Department generally, are much appreciated by the Governor General in Council.

"It will afford the Governor General in Council the highest satisfaction to submit to Her Majesty's Government the names of such British officers and soldiers as may be recommended by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for distinction or reward. The reward bestowed by the Major-General Commanding the Force on Native officers and soldiers, in anticipation of sanction, are confirmed by the Government of India.

"The Governor General in Council laments the severe loss sustained by the troops in their gallant encounters with a brave and determined foe, and joins with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in admiration of the noble spirit of the officers named by His Excellency, who died at their posts under circumstances most honorable to their memory."

In acknowledging the receipt of the despatches regarding these operations, the Secretary of State for India stated that they had been conducted with great skill by the military officers employed, and the negotiations with the tribes no less so by the political officers who accompanied the force. That the result had been eminently successful, and that Her Majesty's Government heartily concurred in the commendations which the Government of India had bestowed upon the principal military and political officers who had conducted these operations to a successful close. Sir Charles Wood stated that the services of Sir Neville Chamberlain and General Garvock would be noticed in the Military Department; and that the excellent judgment displayed by Major James in his negotiations with the tribes, and especially the manner in which he converted the Bunerwals into serviceable allies, and employed them in the destruction of the stronghold of the fanatics at Malka, indicated in a still higher degree those qualities which had already earned for him the confidence of the Government of India; whilst Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor had also earned the thanks of Her Majesty's Government by the judicious manner in which he had performed the duties entrusted to him in regard to the operations against Malka.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India.

Memorandum by Secretary P. G. Government.

The subsequent course of events relating to the Hindustani fanatics are given later. But Colonel R. Taylor, in writing of the campaign, expresses his doubts, whether, even had it been known beforehand that the Buner population would certainly take part against our force, the route by the Ambeyla Pass would have been rejected; for it promised paramount military advantages and a position in the valley, affording equal opportunities either for defeating their attacks, or for assuring them of our friendly intentions towards them. In Colonel Wilde's opinion the Buner tribe was much more under the influence of the fanatics than was commonly supposed, and would have aided them by whatever route our advance was made.

The information regarding the pass was not actually incorrect. It was in common parlance an easy one, open to camels, and the ordinary road for traffic from the Chamla Valley. The error lay in the informants being unable to judge of its fitness for the carriage with which the force was furnished.

The other routes were known to be at least as bad as this. There was the great unbroken back-bone ridge of the Mahaban Mountain, with rough steep spurs descending towards the plain. This difficult country had to be entered somewhere, and it was a prize to have found a route by which the whole could be turned, and the tasks accomplished, apparently by occupying country in which our troops could be so placed that they would be as strong as in our own plains, and therefore able to deal with vastly numerically superior bodies of the hill tribes.

Colonel Taylor's Despatch.

One of the reasons originally given by Sir Neville Chamberlain for adopting the Ambeyla route was, that although the Jadun country might be entered by the route of Gandap and Bisak, and the heights of the Mahaban Mountain so reached, so as to place a force in an advantageous position as regards Sittana, yet, if the Jaduns proved actively hostile, the force would have to fight its way at every disadvantage, whilst a line of retreat remained open to the fanatics.

The reasons why the Commissioner did not anticipate hostilities with the Buners have been already stated, and Sir Neville Chamberlain moreover considered that if any of the tribes should prove hostile, or the whole should choose to unite against us, the force which was to enter the hills would be found strong enough to hold its own against any tribe or combination of tribes which might endeavour to oppose it.

The delay in the arrival of the baggage on the crest, and the opportunity for attack afforded to the Buner tribe in the consequent detention of the force in a very extended position, were accidents to which expeditions into mountains must occasionally be liable; a liability, which, in this instance, was increased by the short time allowed for preparation, and the larger amount of baggage required by European troops.

To supplement the camels, which are always the great stand by, and to furnish mule carriage, district officers had used every exertion. The number of animals collected was more than sufficient, for some were sent back from the pass; among so many hurriedly assembled, there must have been some weakly animals, yet no complaint on this subject was made previous to the advance. But, as already explained, owing to the presence of brushwood and large boulders in the roadway, loads were knocked off the mules' backs, or thrown down by animals unfit to take them on again. As night came on, the stores necessary for the Europeans had to be brought up out of order, and a stoppage of the line occurred. The pass at its head was so narrow that only one animal could make its way at a time, consequently all the baggage was not up till the 24th October. But on the previous day the Hindustanis had joined the Buners, and were no longer to be found in their own stronghold; the aspect of affairs was consequently completely changed, and the plan of operations had to be changed accordingly.

SECTION VIII.

Subsequent conduct of the Jaduns, Bunerwals, and Hindustanis.

COLONEL MCGREGOR in his "Gazetteer" gives the following account of the conduct of the Jaduns after the conclusion of the treaty entered into by them with Major James after the Ambeyla campaign:—

The Jaduns.

"In December 1864, they again permitted some of these Hindustanis to reside in Mandi and Sittana, and aided them in plundering expeditions in British territory. In 1865, they continued in this course, and also permitted some of the Syad fanatics to come to Mandi. In 1866, they also committed some infringements of their treaty, the worst being a meeting held with their sanction, and in their country, to consider whether the fanatics should be permitted to re-occupy Sittana. In January 1867, they permitted one of the leading Syad fanatics to occupy Seri, and in April their council (jirgah) made a request that he might be permitted to remain. Being refused, they reiterated their request, but with no better success. They then, on the 27th April, came down and attempted to build a tower near our border at Kall, but, being attacked by the Utmanzai, were worsted and obliged to desist, having lost 13 killed and 14 wounded. They then desisted on the further threat of a blockade.

Their conduct continued to be so unsatisfactory that on the 15th June 1870 a blockade was declared against them. They then commenced raiding in our territory, attacking the villages of Barab, Gazai, and Pihur. They were, however, always driven off by the men of Topi and Maini. On the 14th July, it was reported that they had sent for aid from the Hindustanis at Palosai.

On the 16th July 1870, they assembled in considerable force in a ravine called the Kondel, and erected a high and strong barricade, apparently for the purpose of shelter, in the event of their being driven back in any attack on Panjman, Jhanda, and Boka. At this barricade 300 men were stationed. In the course of two or three days, however, it was swept away by heavy rain, and was not rebuilt.

On the 17th July 1870, a party of Jaduns made a feint of a night attack on Panjman. Shots were exchanged, but without loss on either side. The Jaduns retired at noon of the same day; four or five Jaduns headed by Mirbaz, an outlawed British subject, made an attempt to drive off by stealth a herd of cattle belonging to the village of Jhanda. The manœuvre was discovered in time, and the plunderers got away to the hills, but without their booty.

On the 18th July, a night attack was made on Maini by some 50 Jaduns, but the Maini men, being on the alert, drove off the assailants without loss.

On the 19th July, one Akhtarai, a chain-carrier employed in the settlement, was met as he was going in the evening from Topi to Barab, by a roving band of Ali Sher Khels and Shahi Khels (Jaduns), and murdered, his body being afterwards blown up with powder.

On the 20th July, some zemindars of Maini out ploughing were threatened by 50 Jaduns, who made a descent on them. The armed escort of the zemindars accompanying them fired on the Jaduns, who returned the shots, but fled

as the men of Maini came moving out to the rescue. Later in the day, the watchmen of Datugrah were fired at by a small band of Jaduns, who retired before they could be attacked. The Jadun head-quarters removed from Gujar to Malka Kadeh, and preparations were made for a grand assault on Maini, Topi, and Panjman.

On the 22nd July, an attempt was made during the night to surprise and do some damage to Pihur, but failed, as the police were on the look-out. The outlying pickets of Jhanda and Boka were fired at by straggling parties, but without effect.

On the 24th July, the Jaduns lifted a herd of 15 cattle from the boundaries of the village of Salim Khan.

On the 25th July, Mr. Priestley reported that, notwithstanding these numerous petty attacks, no large force had entered British territory, but they were collected in large numbers at the village of Gujar in a threatening attitude. Their application for assistance to the Bunerwals, Swatis, Amazais, and Hindustanis, was said to have met with a promise of compliance in case they should be attacked.

On the 26th, the Deputy Commissioner visited the border to see the arrangements made for the defence of the villages. Two towers were built at Panjman, and were constantly manned with a force of 125 men.

On the 27th August, a party of Jaduns came down into the Maini lands, and drove off two head of cattle, one of which they afterwards maimed and left.

On the afternoon of the 28th, about 4 P. M., some 300 Jaduns came down and established themselves in a strong position on a mound near Maini, and thence commenced firing at long ranges. The Maini men got together and went out to attack them, but they were largely reinforced, and it was not until near 10 P. M. that the Maini men, reinforced by reliefs from Topi, were able to attack. Four men and a horse of the attacking party were wounded; the Jaduns fled at once. Their loss is not known; one of the wounded Saidula Khan, a Malik of Maini, afterwards died. His death caused a great sensation amongst the Utmanzais, to the family of whose Khans he belonged. On the 3rd August, three cows and three oxen belonging to one Zebar Shah, grazing within the boundaries of Bahinai, were carried off by two Jaduns and an outlawed British subject to the Jadun village, Gujar. There was reason to suspect the Maliks of Bahinai, themselves Jaduns, of complicity.

On the 4th, 100 Jaduns came to Barab, in British territory, on pretence of taking part in the funeral obsequies of Aslam Ali Khan, a man of some influence, who had died there. After the Fatiha, they made a feint of attacking Pihur, but after firing a number of shots without harm retired. On the same date Shahdad Khan of Hund and Ibrahim Khan of Zeda, both of whom with their levies were guarding Panjman at the desire of the Jaduns, met their jirgah on the boundary, they having been authorized by the Deputy Commissioner to open communications with them. The Jaduns expressed their desire for peace and readiness to come in and hear on what terms they could again be admitted to our friendship. At the same time they expressed their readiness to return cattle and other property taken from any British subjects, except Utmanzais, and did in fact in several cases return such property. As to the exception, it is to be remarked that, owing to the position of the Utmanzais immediately on the Jadun frontier, the collisions that have taken place have been, so far as British subjects are concerned, almost entirely with Utmanzais, and the deaths that have taken place on either side have caused a bitter feeling between the two, to which may be added that Kabal, with which the Jaduns have long had a feud, is Utmanzai. It being deemed desirable to

get in the jirgah, the two Khans were directed to encourage their attendance, if they were in reality disposed to come to terms. A guarantee of safe conduct was with the same view forwarded, and the Utmanzais strictly prohibited from hostile demonstrations of any kind; at the same time careful watch was enjoined, lest all this should be a mere feint to throw us off our guard and enable them to make a damaging attack on some of our frontier villages—a not uncommon trick of these people. The Deputy Commissioner was at once informed of the aspect of affairs, and instructions requested as to the terms that should be offered in case the jirgah came in. It was suggested that—

1st. A fine of at least Rs. 1,000 should be imposed, in addition to the Rs. 1,000 forfeited on account of violated engagements, the refusal to pay which had caused the present complication.

2nd. All property destroyed should be compensated for, and all carried away returned.

3rd. Fresh engagements taken from the principal men, binding them under a fine to respect British territory, and not enter it at any time with an armed force.

4th. Khadil Khan's banishment to be insisted upon, only if the temper and disposition of the jirgah should be found to be such that the demands would be likely to be acquiesced in, otherwise not. As to the last point, it would doubtless be a great advantage to have this man, who has been the *casus belli* on this and several other occasions, cast off, and his expulsion would almost certainly heal the feud between the Jaduns and Kabal: at the same time our quarrel with the Jaduns was quite distinct; we were in no way committed to action with reference to Khadil Khan. If, then, the Jaduns, as was not improbable, should make it a point of honor to stick by Khadil Khan, while they were ready to accede to the other terms offered, it became an open question, whether we should insist upon this which would doubtless be the most thorough and efficient settlement of the question, and by so doing indefinitely prolong hostilities or necessitate prompt military action, or be content thus to settle the present difficulty.

On the 9th August, a great number (reported as 6,000 or 7,000, but no doubt greatly exaggerated) of Jaduns came into the Maini lands with flags, &c., and remained some hours, expecting the Maini men to come out and attack them; a body of some 500 advanced to within some few hundred paces of the village and fired upon it. The Maini men interpreting too strictly the orders prohibiting them from aggressive hostilities remained in their village, and after a time the assailants withdrew. No injury was inflicted.

On the 15th August, Captain Waterfield, Deputy Commissioner, reported that the Jadun council had come in to make terms. They were ordered to pay Rs. 3,285, and give security for Rs. 500 more, and also to bind themselves for Rs. 1,000, not to violate British territory.

On the 22nd August, Mr. Priestley, Assistant Commissioner, reported that Shahdad Khan of Hund and Ibrahim Khan of Zeda had brought in the jirgah, 115 in number, fully representing every section and interest in the tribe, and on the 10th September it was finally reported that the above terms had been accepted.

The Bunerwals.

Our next connection with the Bunerwals occurred in November 1868, when a party of Spirsai entered British territory and burnt the village of Spirsai in the Sudum Valley, in the prosecution of a private feud. They were called on to apologize and pay a fine, but refused, and were accordingly blockaded.

They remained so for a time, but in April 1869 they came to terms, rebuilt the destroyed village, and paid a fine to the British Government.

Subsequent conduct, &c., of the Hindustanis.

In 1868, Major Pollock reported—

After their expulsion from Malka, the greater number of the fanatics, led by the Moulvi Abdula, retreated into the Chagarzai country, north of Mahaban and north of the Barando River, a few, including Mahomed Yakub, one of their best leaders, returned to and remained at Malka with Mobarik Shah, son of the Syad Akbar who succeeded Syad Ahmud and was elected King of Swat, dying in 1856-57. After a time the fanatics obtained from the Chagarzais grants of the villages of Tangora and Battora, where they made permanent settlement, and remained undisturbed up to commencement of 1868. Their position was, however, by no means comfortable. The people amongst whom they dwelt made them pay dearly for the protection afforded them, and for the supplies they received; it was only by the greatest efforts that their agents in Hindustan were enabled to forward to them sufficient money for their support. They were, moreover, frequently threatened with expulsion by their hosts, who forcibly prevented the completion of two towers which the Moulvi Abdula had commenced to erect in Battora. The Akhund also looked upon them with no friendly eye, their Wahabi inclinations are abhorrent to him, and their position in the country was a standing menace; for their leaders maintained their position only by intrigue, and were ready tools in the hands of the rival faction in Buner and elsewhere, followers of the Kotah Mula. The reports received during the previous five years showed that the Akhund and the chief Moulvi were at constant feud, the former denouncing the latter as a Wahabi and unbeliever, and the Moulvi in turn accusing the Akhund of having deserted them, and betrayed the cause of Islam by making peace with the infidels and allowing them to destroy Malka.

It is not surprising that, with this constant pressure on them both at home and abroad, the community was several times on the point of dissolution. During the autumn of 1866, Mahomed Isak and Mahomed Yakub made several attempts to open communication with Colonel Becher through the instrumentality of Syad Mahomed (formerly in our service); their letters were received, and messages sent to them, but their plans were entirely frustrated by the vigilance of the Moulvi Abdula, who appears to have gained an entire ascendancy over all the other leaders. Matters remained thus until the beginning of 1868, the fanatics being too much engaged with their own quarrels and intrigues to annoy us or continue the system of highway robbery in our territories, which had first led to the recommendation by the Panjab Government for punitive expeditions in 1858 and 1863. In February 1868, news was received that the fighting men of the Hindustanis, numbering 400 or 500, had moved from Tangora and Battora to Bazkata, in Buner, on the invitation of Azim Khan of Bazkata, an opponent of the Akhund and firm supporter of his rival, the Kotah Mula: Azim Khan offered to give the Hindustanis houses and land in his village if they would bring over their families and settle there permanently; his offer was accepted; and the fanatics abandoned Tangora and Battora, a few only remaining at Malka. Nothing more was heard of them until the 18th of April, when the arrival of Feroz Shah at Bazkata was reported by Azim Khan himself, who wrote to the Commissioner of Peshawar to make his excuses for harbouring men whom he knew to be mortal enemies of the British Government:

Feroz Shah had arrived some months before at Tana, the residence of the Akhund, in great poverty and with only four attendants; he was well received, and reported to be in high favor until the evil news of the arrival in Buner of his countrymen reached the Akhund.

This movement of the fanatics into Buner was fatal to them; at a distance they might have been tolerated, and in time possibly have regained their prestige. The Akhund lost no time in exerting all his influence to get rid of what he well knew would be a fruitful source of trouble to him.

By skilful management he was enabled to conciliate and bring over all the Buner tribes of the opposite faction, Azim Khan, Zaidula Khan, Nawab Khan, and a few other chiefs alone holding aloof. On the 25th May, at a large meeting of all the Buner tribes convened by the "Mirji", the favorite minister of the Akhund, it was determined that the Hindustanis should be expelled from Buner, their presence being displeasing to the Akhund and contrary to the terms of the treaty made with the British Government. In consequence of this resolve, the fanatics, to the number of about 700 fighting men, accompanied by Feroz Shah and Azim Khan, made a precipitate retreat to Malka, where they commenced to re-build their houses, and made arrangements with the Amazai for supplies. In the meantime the Moulvi Abdula in person visited the Akhund and found means to turn away his anger, for the Mirji was recalled and permission given to the Hindustanis to re-settle in Buner; the greater portion of them returned to Bazkata, but had not been there very long before the intrigues of their leaders again brought them into trouble. The Moulvi Abdula was induced to join a league that had been founded by Azim Khan and other Buner Chiefs, together with the Amazais and Mukarab Khan, Ex-Chief of the Khudu Khels, to oppose the influence of the Akhund and obtain for Mukarab Khan recovery of his former possessions and reinstatement at Panjtar. Mukarab Khan, who, after his expulsion from the Totali villages, and the destruction of Panjtar and Mangal Tana by our troops, had come in to the Commissioner of Peshawar, and been allowed to reside in British territory, was the prime mover in this plot, by which he sought to regain his former position; his money cemented the various alliances and purchased the neutrality of some of the Buner Chiefs. On the 2nd of August, Zaidula Khan (Buner) committed the first overt act of hostility, by seizing a number of Swat traders passing through his lands. The Akhund immediately mustered his followers and directed the Buner tribes to break up the league by expelling the Hindustanis and putting to death the refractory chiefs. In pursuance of his orders, the Esazais and Salarzai Bunerwals attacked and killed Zaidula Khan in his house. On the 12th they arrived, together with the Akhund's followers, before Bazkata, and sent a message to the Chief Moulvi giving him one day to remove all his followers, women, and children.

The fanatics at first thought of resistance, and exchanged a few shots with the Salarzais, but were induced by Azim Khan to give in and commence preparations for a retreat. The next day the whole body evacuated Bazkata, the women and children being sent on a head and the rear brought up by a guard of 50 or 60 men armed with rifles. For the first few miles all went well, the Buner men being occupied in plundering and burning the deserted settlement; but as the fugitives neared the pass between Bazkata and Battora, they saw the hills on both sides held by the Akhund's followers. The mass of the fugitives, including the Moulvi Abdula, Azim Khan, and the Buner Chiefs, pushed

was cut off, and after a gallant stand entirely destroyed. From Battora the fugitives fled to Gulima Bori, in Chagarzai; here they obtained a short respite, and even conceived hopes of being able to establish themselves permanently, being promised support in the event of an attack by the Amazais and Jamkhel section of Chagarzais.

The power of the Akhund increased by his complete triumph over the rival faction in Buner was, however, too great for them. The Chagarzais obeyed his order to expel the fanatics, who continued their flight through Tangora to Bihar on the bank of the Indus, where they arrived about the 18th of September with some 20 or 30 wounded men. Later accounts of them are very conflicting, but it is certain that the chief Moulvi, with some hundreds of followers, came over to Judbar, and that many of them remained there till the British force arrived on the crest of the Black Mountain. The fanatics were welcomed and assisted by the Pirzada, son of the late Haji of Kunar, by the son of Bajkhan of Kabilgram, Akhund Khel, and by the Kahil Main, and the Syads of Bihar; through their instrumentality they obtained the grant of a hamlet in Judbar, and were enabled to purchase several "jalahs" or rafts, thus getting the command of the river and making themselves independent of the extortionate Pathan ferry-men whilst at Judbar. The Moulvi received letters (it is said) from Gufar Khan of Tikri, who offered to give the whole body of fugitives an asylum in his fort and land in the Tikri Valley, and from the Allai Jirgah and Chief of Takot, who promised to accompany the Pirzada to Judbar to hold a big council and discuss measures of resistance against the British. Mabarik Shah was summoned by him, and the war party, Cis-Indus, was daily increasing. It seems probable that a month later, the force under General Wilde would have found a powerful coalition and some organised plan of defence, but our rapid approach disconcerting them, the fanatics hastily re-crossed the river, deserting their Chagarzai hosts, thereby departing from their profession as soldiers of the faith, and destroying the last remnant of their former "prestige," already injured by the treatment they had met with at the hand of the Akhund and his disciples. The main body of them then went to Palosai, a village of the Trans-Indus Hasanzais, however who refused to allow them a permanent settlement. From Palosai

they went to Takot, but finding no resting place there moved down the river to Bihar and Judbar of the Chagarzais, but ultimately being obliged to abandon this refuge also, they at last threw themselves on the mercy of the Hasanzais. Here they received some land called "maidan, which was granted them chiefly through the influence of the two leading men of Palosai, Malik Habib and the Pirzada of the Hasanzais. The settlement now comprises a mud fort surrounded by huts, all erected by the Hindustanis themselves. They are said now to muster 400 efficient fighting men, and though not so well equipped and armed as they were at Ambeyla, they are still better armed than the neighbouring tribesmen, which fact, combined with their superior intelligence, gives them a certain amount of influence. They possess percussion muskets with bayonets, and manage to obtain caps for them. They also are reported to have four small brass guns. It is generally given out that they still receive money from Hindustan for their support.

By accident the zeal of a police officer, named Ghazan Khan, led to the discovery that money and men had for many years past been sent up from Hindustan and Bengal to the Hindustani fanatics at Sittana and Malka. Patna, it was found, was the centre of operations. There was the family which supplied some of the principal leaders of the colony; there the pulpits from

which the Wahabi doctrines were systematically preached and the duty of contributing towards the expense of a religious war proclaimed, and from thence natives of Bengal were recruited and sent up in parties of five or six at a time to join the camp in the independent hills. At Tanasar they were received by a Rain Lambardar, named Jafar, a disciple strongly imbued with the Wahabi tenets, and with personal devotion to Syad Ahmad Shah, whom he designated as the "Imam of the world, the middle Mebdi, the Caliph of his time," and whom, though long ago killed in action with the Sikhs, he believed to be still living and about to re-appear.

Ghazan Khan's conduct deserves special notice. He had formerly served on the Peshawar border, and knew something of the doings and appearance of the fanatics. He was thus led to apprehend a party travelling down country. The Magistrate, however, released them. Ghazan Khan then sent his son to Malka, and obtained intelligence concerning the part played by Jafar, who was therefore apprehended.

Another principal agent was Mahomed Shafi, a contractor for the supply of meat for the Europeans in all the cantonments from Ambala to Naoshera. This man's money, position, and numerous servants in so many places, not within the superintendence of the organized police, enabled him to aid the cause effectually. It is not improbable that he communicated with the fanatics *when procuring cattle for slaughter from the hills.*

Eventually, through the exertions of Captain Parsons, Superintendent of Police, who was specially deputed to Patna to investigate the case, the individuals above mentioned, with some of the principal ringleaders, were brought to trial before Sir Herbert Edwardes, the Commissioner of Ambala, and sentenced to transportation for life.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

Yusafzai Field Force.

Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commandant, Panjab Irregular Force, commanding.

Staff.

Major T. Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel Allgood, Assistant Quarter-Master General.

Lieutenant F. N. Mackenzie, Staff Officer, Panjab Irregular Force.

Surgeon Simpson, P. M. O., British Troops.

" H. Buckle, P. M. O., Native Troops.

Captain Jenkins, Commissariat Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Taylor, C.B., R.E., Chief Engineer.

Lieutenant Blair, R.E., Assistant Engineer.

" J. Brown, R.E., Assistant Engineer.

" Carter, R.E., Assistant Engineer.

Major Harding, 2nd Sikh Infantry, Orderly Officer.

Lieutenant Jarrett, Orderly Officer.

" Anderson, " *Artillery.*

Captain Tulloh, commanding.

" Griffin, commanding $\frac{1}{2}$ C., 19th Royal Artillery.

" Hughes, commanding Peshawar Mountain Battery.

" DeBudé, commanding Hazara Mountain Battery.

Cavalry.

Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn, C.B., V.C., commanding 11th Bengal Cavalry.

Captain Hawes, commanding Guide Cavalry.

Sappers and Miners.

Lieutenant Tucker, commanding Sappers and Miners.

Infantry.

Colonel Hope, C.B., commanding 71st Highland Light Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel Salisbury, commanding 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.

" " Wilde, C.B., commanding Guide Corps.

Major Keyes, commanding 1st Panjab Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner, commanding 3rd Panjab Infantry.

" " Vaughan, commanding 5th Panjab Infantry.

Major Hosté, commanding 6th Panjab Infantry.

" Ross, commanding 14th Sikhs.

" Brownlow, commanding 20th Panjab Infantry.

" Morgan, commanding 32nd Pioneers.

Captain Chester, commanding 4th Gurkhas.

Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, commanding 5th Gurkhas.

Political Officers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, C.B., Commissioner.

Major Munro, Deputy Commissioner.

Lieutenant Sandeman, Assistant Commissioner.

Survey Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Johnstone, Revenue Survey.

Lieutenant Barron, Revenue Survey.

With the Troops which subsequently joined.

Captain T. H. Salt, commanding No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery.

Lieutenant-Colonel Shipley, commanding 7th Fusiliers.

" " Burroughs, commanding 93rd Highlanders.

" " Renny, commanding 3rd Sikhs.

Captain C. Chamberlain, commanding 23rd Pioneers.

APPENDIX B.

Present state of the Yusafzai Field Force, Camp Ambeyla Pass, 23rd October 1863.

REGIMENTS.	EFFECTIVE.					SICK.					REMARKS.
	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Buglers, Trumpeters, Pipers.	Rank and File.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Buglers, Trumpeters, Pipers.	Rank and File.	
½ C., 19th Royal Artillery ...	3	...	5	1	46	1	...	13	
Peshawar Mountain Battery	3	3	8	2	115	1	...	9	
Hazara ditto	3	2	145	7	
3rd Panjab ditto	1	1	43	4	
Guide Cavalry ...	2	4	56	1	
11th Bengal Cavalry ...	3	5	75	1	
Sappers and Miners ...	1	1	71	
71st Highland Light Infantry	20	...	21	19	418	1	...	1	...	14	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	20	...	30	18	431	1	...	20	
Guide Infantry ...	4	17	46	19	475	1	1	4	2	29	
1st Panjab Native Infantry	7	10	19	14	308	...	2	5	...	55	
3rd ditto ditto	6	14	30	9	381	10	
5th ditto ditto	6	10	23	12	357	...	2	2	...	17	
6th ditto ditto	5	5	15	12	273	...	3	1	...	28	
14th ditto ditto	4	8	22	9	229	...	2	5	...	79	
20th ditto ditto	6	4	24	6	293	...	1	1	2	36	
32nd ditto ditto	6	1	39	10	479	26	
4th Gurkhas ...	7	11	36	11	333	2	1	40	
5th ditto ...	4	8	30	7	318	1	...	1	...	41	
Total	111	104	347	149	4,846	3	11	25	5	430	

APPENDIX C.

Casualty Return—Yusafzai Field Force.

REGIMENTS.	Date.	Engagement.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		HORSES.		MULES.		REMARKS.
			European Officers.	Native Officers.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	
Hazara Mountain Train Battery ...	22nd October.	Reconnaissance and attack on camp.	1	1	1	1	1	Lieut. Gillies, Hazara Mountain Train, killed.
Guide Cavalry	
11th Bengal Cavalry	1	...	2	
1st Panjab Native Infantry	
3rd Ditto ditto ditto	
20th Native Infantry	2	
32nd Ditto ditto	
Total ...			1	2	...	1	22	1	3	1	1
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers ...	26th Octr.	Eagle's Nest picquet.	Lieut. Clifford, killed. Lieut. Richmond, killed.
3rd Panjab Infantry ...			1	1	2	...	1	
20th Panjab Infantry ...			1	1	8	...	1	27	
Total ...			2	1	10	...	1	30	
Detachment, 71st Highland Light Infantry ...	26th Octr.	With Col. Vaughan.	1	5	Lieut. Barron, wounded.
Hazara Mountain Battery	1	2	
5th Panjab Infantry	3	5	...	1	
6th Ditto ditto	11	...	5	42	
Survey Department	1	
Total	15	1	6	54	...	1	
1-C 19th Royal Artillery ...	26th Octr.	Front attack.	1	1	Lieut. Drake, wounded.
Peshawar Mountain Battery	
Guide Infantry	1	1	
1st Panjab Infantry	1	
32nd Ditto ditto	1	
5th Gurkhas ...		Front attack.	1	1	
Total	2	1	...	4	...	1	
1-C Battery, 19th Brigade Royal Artillery ...	30th Octr. 1863.	Retaking "Crag" picquet.	Officers wounded. Major C. P. Keyes, commanding 1st Panjab Infantry. Lieut. H. W. Pitcher, Adjutant, 1st Panjab Infantry.
Peshawar Mountain Battery	2	
71st Highland Light Infantry	1	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	1	3	
1st Panjab Infantry	4	2	1	16	
5th Ditto ditto	3	
5th Gurkha Regiment	1	4	...	1	7	
Total	1	12	2	2	36	
71st Highland Light Infantry ...	6th Nov. 1863.	When covering working party.	2	...	4	4	Killed Officers. Major Harding, Staff Ensign Murray, 1st Highland Light Infantry, and Lieut. Dougal, 79th Highlanders. Wounded. Lieut. Oliphant, 5th Gurkhas. Lieut. Battye, Corps of Guides.
1st Panjab Infantry	2	5	
5th Gurkha	7	1	...	7	
20th Panjab Infantry	1	15	...	2	14	
4th Gurkha	5	4	
Guides	1	1	...	3	
Staff ...			1	
Total ...			3	1	34	2	2	37	

APPENDIX D.

General Figured Abstract of Casualties in the Yusafzai Field Force from the date of its entering the Ambeyla Pass up to the 16th December 1863.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE;
HEAD-QUARTER CAMP, RAWAL PINDI.

Dated 14th January 1864.

CORPS.	KILLED.					WOUNDED.					TOTAL KILLED AND WOUNDED.					REMARKS.
	EUROPEAN.		NATIVE.		TOTAL.	EUROPEAN.		NATIVE.		TOTAL.	EUROPEAN.		NATIVE.		GRAND TOTAL.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		
General Staff	1	1	1	1	
Royal Engineers	1	1	1	1	
Survey Department	1	1	1	1	
Orderly Officers	1	1	1	1	
½ C Battery, 19th Brigade Royal Artillery	3	...	2	5	...	3	...	2	5	
3rd Panjab Field Battery	
Hazara Mountain Battery	1	7	7	1	7	8	
Peshawar ditto	1	3	3	9	9	12	12	
11th Bengal Cavalry	1	1	1	...	1	1	1	2	
7th Fusiliers	3	3	...	3	3	
71st H. L. I.	...	15	18	1	49	50	4	64	68	
79th Foot	2	2	2	
101st Foot	...	19	22	2	63	65	5	82	87	
1st Panjab Infantry	1	41	43	3	...	3	91	97	4	...	4	132	140	
2nd Sikh ditto	1	1	1	
3rd ditto ditto	4	5	3	35	38	1	...	3	39	43	
3rd Panjab ditto	1	1	3	3	4	4	
5th ditto ditto	6	6	1	...	2	14	17	1	...	2	20	23	
14th Native ditto	1	45	47	1	...	1	69	71	2	...	2	114	118	
20th Panjab ditto	1	30	32	2	99	102	2	...	3	129	134	
23rd ditto ditto (Pioneers)	6	7	2	...	4	40	46	3	...	4	48	53	
32nd ditto ditto	3	3	3	...	1	21	25	3	...	1	24	28	
Sappers and Miners	1	1	1	1	
4th Gurkhas	5	5	1	9	10	1	14	15	
5th ditto	1	27	28	2	...	2	44	48	2	...	3	71	76	
Guide Corps Cavalry	2	2	2	2	
Ditto Infantry	2	2	1	...	2	14	17	1	...	2	16	19	
6th Panjab ditto	11	11	5	44	49	5	55	60	
Total	15	34	4	185	238	21	118	26	504	670	37	152	30	639	908	

APPENDIX E.

Yusafzai Field Force.

Nominal Roll of Officers wounded.

No.	Rank and Names.	Corps.	Date.	Remarks.
1	Lieutenant F. Drake ...	32nd N. I. ...	26th Octr. 1863.	
1	" Barron ...	Survey Dept.	26th " "	
1	Major C. P. Keyes ...	1st P. I. ...	30th " "	
1	Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher ...	1st " ...	30th " "	
5	" W. Battye ...	Guide Infantry	6th Nov. "	
5	" J. S. Oliphant ...	5th Gurkhas...	6th " "	
5	" H. W. Pitcher ...	1st P. N. I. ...	13th " "	Second time wounded.
5	" A. D. C. Inglis ...	14th N. I. ...	18th " "	
5	Ensign C. M. Slockley ...	101st R. B. F.	18th " "	
10	Colonel W. Hope, c. B. ...	71st H. L. I.	19th " "	
10	Major J. P. W. Campbell ...	5th Gurkhas ...	20th " "	
10	Lieut.-Col. J. S. Vaughan ...	5th P. N. I. ...	20th " "	
10	Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K. C. B.	General Staff...	20th " "	
14	Lieutenant Anderson ...	Orderly Officer	20th " "	
15	" Brown ...	Royal Engr. ...	22nd " "	
16	" C. Riggs ...	H. M.'s 101st	15th Decr. "	
17	J. B. McCausland ...	4th Gurkhas...	15th " "	
18	Captain C. Chamberlain ...	23rd N. I. ...	16th " "	
19	Lieutenant C. D. Nott ...	23rd " ...	16th " "	
20	Major Trevor Wheler ...	32nd " ...	16th " "	
21	Lieutenant F. H. Marsh ...	32nd " ...	16th " "	

APPENDIX F.

Yusafzai Field Force.

Nominal Roll of Officers killed in action.

No.	Rank and Names.	Corps.	Date.	Remarks.
1	Lieutenant Gillies ...	Haz. Mn. Batty...	22nd Oct. 1863.	
1	" Clifford ...	3rd P. N. I. ...	26th " "	
1	" Richmond ...	20th " ...	26th " "	
1	Ensign C. B. Murray ...	71st H. L. I. ...	6th Nov. "	
5	Lieutenant Dougall ...	79th Highlanders	6th " "	
5	Major C. W. Harding ...	2nd Sikh Infy. ...	6th " "	
5	Lieutenant J. P. Davidson ...	1st P. N. I. ...	13th " "	
5	Captain C. F. Smith ...	71st H. L. I. ...	18th " "	
5	Lieutenant Jones ...	79th Highlanders	18th " "	
10	" H. H. Chapman ...	101st R. B. F. ...	18th " "	
10	" W. S. Mosley ...	14th N. I. ...	18th " "	
10	Captain R. B. Aldrige ...	71st H. L. I. ...	19th " "	
10	Ensign A. R. Sanderson ...	101st R. B. F. ...	20th " "	
14	Assistant Surgeon W. Pile ...	101st " ...	20th " "	
15	Lieutenant G. Alexander ...	23rd N. I. ...	16th Dec. "	

APPENDIX G.

Disposition of the Force at Ambeyla on Major-General Garvock assuming the command.

First Brigade.

Colonel Turner, C. B., 97th Foot, commanding.
 Lieutenant and Adjutant J. H. Campbell, 71st Highland Light Infantry,
 Brigade-Major.
 Half C-19 Royal Artillery.
 Peshawar Mountain Battery.
 71st Highland Light Infantry.
 1st Panjab Infantry.
 3rd do. do.
 5th do. do.
 20th do. do.
 32nd do. do. (Pioneers).
 5th Gurkhas.

Second Brigade.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde, C. B., Guide Corps, commanding.
 Captain C. W. K. Chester, 4th Gurkhas, Brigade-Major.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 3, Panjab Light Field Battery.
 Hazara Mountain Battery.
 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
 Guide Infantry.
 6th Panjab do.
 14th Ferozpor Regiment.
 23rd Pioneers.
 4th Gurkhas.

APPENDIX H.

Proclamations.

Proclamation to the Chiefs and Maliks of Chamla (other than the Kudu-Khel and Amazais).

Whereas it is well known to you that a British force entered the Mahaban Hill about five years ago, for the purpose of chastising the colony of Syads and Hindustanis located at Sittana, and professing open hostility to the British Government, and that the Jadun and Utmanzai tribes entered into a written agreement not to permit the return of the said Hindustanis to their former position at Sittana; and whereas those two tribes, in contravention of their own written agreement, have, within a recent period, allowed the Syads and Hindustanis to re-occupy Sittana, and the latter, since their return, have omitted no opportunity of displaying their hostility to the British Government, both by inciting the neighbouring tribes to commit aggressions on its territories, and endeavouring to tamper with the allegiance and fidelity of its feudatories: it is hereby notified to the Chiefs and Maliks of Chamla that a military force has assembled, and is about to enter the Mahabun tract for the purpose of chastising the hostile colony of Hindustanis, consisting chiefly of fugitive subjects of the British Government. Should it be necessary for the British force to enter the Chamla territory for the purpose above-mentioned, every care will be taken that no injury be done to crops and villages, and that proper prices be given for all supplies furnished.

CAMP NAOKILLA,
 19th October 1863. }

(Sd.) REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
 Commissioner.

Proclamation addressed to the heads of the Mansur and Salar sections of the Judun Tribe.

You are well aware that, by allowing the Syads and Hindustanis to return to Sittana, you have broken the engagements entered into by you five years ago, and subsequently renewed.

Every opportunity has been given you to retrieve and make amends for the error you have committed, by ejecting the Syads and Hindustanis from Sittana; but you have allowed them to remain up to this time.

You are therefore, by this conduct, liable to any punishment which the British Government may deem it proper to inflict; but, on the other hand, it is a well-known fact that, from the first occupation of this country by the British, the Jadun tribe has been a well-conducted one, and has remained on terms of friendly intercourse with the inhabitants of the British border. It is also apparent that, from the commencement of the present difficulties and the establishment of a blockade, no aggression on British territory or other impropriety has been committed by the Jadun tribe.

We are willing, therefore, to believe that the breach of faith committed in allowing the Hindustanis to return to Sittana was the act only of a section of a tribe, actuated by former relations with the Syads and Hindustani colony, or by cupidity, and it is not our wish that the generally well-conducted Jadun tribe should be ruined by this one offence; but since it is fact that, from the commencement of this difficulty, the tribe has done nothing to recover its good name with the British Government and the continued presence of the Hindustanis at Sittana has been the cause of great expense and trouble to Government and also eventually of the assembly of a force for the chastisement of this professedly hostile colony, it is but right that the Jadun tribe should, on the military force entering the Mahaban tract, be expected to perform some signal service, by which (if zeal and activity are displayed in the Government interests) a more favorable view may be taken of their original breach of faith than could otherwise be the case.

You are now informed that the troops of the British Government are about to enter the Mahaban tract for the purpose of capturing or destroying this hostile colony of Syads and Hindustanis, most of whom are, as you know, fugitive subjects of the British Government; and whereas, in the first instance, the order given to the Jadun tribe was to effect the expulsion of these Hindustanis, you are now required not to permit them to escape.

It is therefore proper that you take immediate measures to close their avenues of retreat; and we would have you know that it is not the desire of the leaders of the expeditionary force unnecessarily to shed the blood of the men composing the Hindustani colony, many of whom we know to be poor misguided individuals, acting under the dictation of a few designing leaders.

Such as may resist will incur the result as God may dispose it, and must of course take the consequences.

If the Jaduns, as a tribe, lend efficient aid in capturing or preventing the escape of the men comprised in this Hindustani colony, their own reconciliation with the British Government will be a matter of easy accomplishment.

Under any circumstances, bearing in mind the former good conduct of the Jadun tribe, the members of the clan may feel assured that whatever measures may be thought necessary for the punishment of their original offence (which would be greatly affected by their conduct on receipt of his communication), they will be carried out deliberately, and with discrimination.

The Jaduns need not fear that without grave cause, the force will enter their country for purposes of chastisement and devastation.

With the object of arriving speedily at an understanding, the Jadun tribe is hereby informed that the British troops are about to enter the hills, and they are required to send accredited representatives from each section of their clan to the British camp, when the force has entered the hills. The position of the camp can be easily ascertained by themselves.

CAMP NAOKILLA,
19th October 1863.

(Sd.)

REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.

Proclamation to the Chiefs and people of Buner.

Whereas it is well known to you that a British force entered the Mahaban Hills about five years ago, for the purpose of chastising the colony of Syads and Hindustanis located at Sittana and professing open hostility to the British Government, and that the Jadun and Utmanzai tribes entered into a written agreement not to permit the return of the said Hindustanis to their former position at Sittana; and whereas those two tribes, in contravention of their own written agreement, have, within a recent period, allowed the Syads and Hindustanis to re-occupy Sittana, and the latter, since their return, have omitted no opportunity of displaying their hostility to the British Government, both inciting the neighbouring tribes to commit aggressions on its territories, and endeavouring to tamper with the allegiance and fidelity of its feudatories: it is hereby notified to the heads of all the tribes of Buner that a military force has assembled, and is about to enter the Mahaban tract for the purpose of chastising the hostile colony of Hindustanis, consisting chiefly of fugitive subjects of the British Government. This intimation is accordingly forwarded to the leading men (chiefs) and people of Buner to apprise them of the intentions of Government and the destination of the force, and in order that they may entertain no anxiety regarding their own possessions, or the objects of this Government, the relations of the tribes of Buner with the British having from the first been entirely friendly.

CAMP NAOKILLA, }
19th October 1863. }

(Sd.) REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.

Proclamation to the Maliks of the Khudu Khel Tribe.

Whereas it is well known to you that a British force entered the Mahaban Hills about five years ago, for the purpose of chastising the colony of Syads and Hindustanis located at Sittana and professing open hostility to the British Government, and that the Jadun and Utmanzai tribes entered into a written agreement not to permit the return of the said Hindustanis to their former position at Sittana; and whereas those two tribes, in contravention of their own written agreement, have, within a recent period, allowed the Syads and Hindustanis to re-occupy Sittana, and the latter, since their return, have omitted no opportunity of displaying their hostility to the British Government, both by inciting the neighbouring tribes to commit aggressions on its territories, and endeavouring to tamper with the allegiance and fidelity of its feudatories: it is hereby notified to the Maliks of the Khudu Khel tribe that a military force has assembled, and is about to enter the Mahaban tract for the purpose of chastising the hostile colony of Hindustanis, consisting chiefly of fugitive subjects of the British Government. Should it be necessary for the British force to enter the Khudu Khel territory for the purpose above-mentioned, every care will be taken that no injury be done to crops and villages, and that proper prices be given for all supplies furnished.

CAMP NAOKILLA, }
19th October 1863. }

(Sd.) REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.

Proclamation sent through Major Coxe, Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, to the Chiefs and Maliks of the Amazai Tribe.

Whereas it is well known to you that a British force entered the Mahaban Hills above five years ago, for the purpose of chastising the colony of Syads and Hindustanis located at Sittana and professing open hostility to the British Government, and that the Jadun and Utmanzai tribes entered into a written agreement not to permit the return of the said Hindustanis to their former position at Sittana; and whereas those two tribes, in contravention of their own written agreement, have, within a recent period, allowed the Syads and Hindustanis to

of displaying their hostility to the British Government, both by inciting the neighbouring tribes to commit aggressions on its territories, and endeavouring to tamper with the allegiance and fidelity of its feudatories: it is hereby notified to the Chiefs and Maliks of the Amazai tribe that a military force has assembled, and is about to enter the Mahaban tract for the purpose of chastising the hostile colony of Hindustanis, consisting chiefly of fugitive subjects of the British Government. This intimation is accordingly forwarded to the Chiefs and Maliks of the Amazai tribe to apprize them of the intentions of Government and the destination of the force. As it is apparent that the line of retreat of the Hindustanis naturally lies through the territory of the Amazais, and that many of the positions now occupied by these Hindustanis are in the same territory, the British authorities consider it just that the Amazais should be required to prevent the escape of the Syads and Hindustanis across the Barando. In consideration of assistance thus given, the Amazai tribe will be looked upon as friends of the British; and, on the occasion of a force encamping upon their lands, care will be taken that no injury be done to crops and villages.

CAMP NAOKILLA, }
19th October 1863. }

(Sd.) REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.

Proclamation sent through Major Cox, Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, to the Maliks and Chiefs of the Mada Khel Tribe.

Whereas it is well known to you that a British force entered the Mahaban Hills about five years ago, for the purpose of chastising the colony of Syads and Hindustanis located at Sittana, and professing open hostility to the British Government, and that the Jadun and Utmanzai tribes entered into a written agreement not to permit the return of the said Hindustanis to their former position at Sittana; and whereas those two tribes, in contravention of their own written agreement, have, within a recent period, allowed the Syads and Hindustanis to re-occupy Sittana, and the latter, since their return, have omitted no opportunity of displaying hostility to the British Government, both by inciting the neighbouring tribes to commit aggressions on its territories, and endeavouring to tamper with the allegiance and fidelity of its feudatories: it is hereby notified to the Maliks and Chiefs of the Mada Khel tribes that a military force has assembled, and is about to enter the Mahaban tract for the purpose of chastising the hostile colony of Hindustanis, consisting chiefly of fugitive subjects of the British Government. This intimation is accordingly forwarded to the Maliks and Chiefs of the Mada Khel tribe to apprize them of the intentions of Government and the destination of the force. As it is apparent that the line of retreat of the Hindustanis naturally lies through the territory of the Mada Khel tribe, the British authorities consider it just that the Mada Khel tribe should be required to prevent the escape of the Syads and Hindustanis across the Barando. In consideration of assistance thus given, the Mada Khel tribe will be looked upon as friends of the British; and, on the occasion of a force encamping upon their lands, care will be taken that no injury be done to crops or villages.

CAMP NAOKILLA, }
19th October 1863. }

(Sd.) REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner.

APPENDIX I.

Translation of a "Persian letter" from Syad Umran and Ubaidula (commonly known as Moulvi Abdula), to the address of Ahmud Khan of Baggra.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,—A large force of the infidels has arrived at Salim Khan Yar Husain, and Shaik Jani, with the object of plundering this country. It is therefore, incumbent on you, immediately on the receipt of this letter, to gird your waist and proceed to Chamla, and after issuing notices to the other allies prepare and bring them up with yourself. We are posted in strength on the crest of the pass, and you ought to occupy Sirpati and Landai, that is, the Chinglai village, and maintain a firm hold of your position. You should not allow a moment's delay in carrying out the above instruction. Should, however, any delay occur, the evil-doing infidels will plunder and devastate the whole of the hilly tract, especially the provinces of Chamla, Buner, Swat, &c., and annex these countries to their dominions, and then our religion and worldly possessions would entirely be subverted. Consequently, keeping in consideration a regard for "Islam," the dictates of faith and worldly affairs, you ought by no means to neglect the opportunity. The infidels are extremely deceitful and treacherous, and will, by whatever means they can, come into these hills and declare to the people of the country that they have no concerns with them; that their quarrel is with the Hindustanis, that they will not molest the people, even as much as touch a hair of their heads, but will return after having extirpated the Hindustanis, and that they will not interfere with their country. They will also tempt the people with wealth. It is, therefore, proper for you not to give in to their deceit, or else, when they should get an opportunity, they will entirely ruin, torment, and put you to many, many indignities, appropriate to themselves your entire wealth and possessions, and injure your faith. You will then obtain nothing but regret. We impress this matter on your attention.

Sealed by SYAD UMRAN,
1263 A. H.

Sealed by UBAIDULA,
1278 or 1275 A. H.

APPENDIX J.

Extracts from a Report on the Commissariat arrangements, Yusafzai Field Force, by Captain J. H. Jenkins.

Definite sanction to the expedition was not received until the 3rd October. The instructions originally received, were to collect mule carriage for a force to consist of 1,200 European and 3,500 Native troops; also, by the 15th October, ten days' supplies for the same at "Swabi," in Yusafzai. On the 6th October, it was further directed that a similar quantity of stores should be laid in at "Naokilla" on the same frontier. As the notice given was so limited, and it was not certain to what extent or how readily native supplies could be locally obtained, Captain Jenkins caused a considerable quantity to be sent from Rawal Pindi and Peshawar, and wrote to the civil authorities to aid in collecting the remainder.

On arrival he found that no supplies had been made over by the civil authorities to the agents deputed to receive them; those sent from Pindi and Peshawar had reached, and were sufficient for five days' consumption. By the aid of Lieutenant Sandeman the Assistant Commissioner, Captain Jenkins was enabled by the 18th

On the 18th, the whole force was collected at Naokilla, and on the 19th, though the preparations were far from complete, it marched with ten days' supplies towards Koga, in the Chamla Valley. The route adopted, was *via* Rustum and the Ambeyla Pass—a pass about which nothing was known; it proved to be almost impracticable, and the last of the baggage did not reach the camp, which had been obliged to halt at the crest, until the 24th. The troops reached on the evening of the 20th: their rations some hours subsequently: this was unavoidable. The men with the greatest difficulty made their way, and everything was stopped to admit of the guns (on mules and elephants) being pushed on. After that there was no irregularity in regard to rations, and their quality gave general satisfaction: biscuits were usually issued, as for some time the ovens were not allowed to be brought up. The road to the plains was considered unsafe, and escorts were rarely available; the position of the camp, situated as it was in a very narrow gorge between high hills, rendering the presence of every man necessary.

The Commissariat stores began to reach on the 22nd October, and were placed in front of the camp. On that evening the first attack was made by the enemy; the grain bags were formed into a breastwork, and considerable damage was done to them. By the afternoon of the 24th the remaining stores arrived, and on counting and inspecting them, it was found that 53 animals with their loads had been lost, that a large proportion of the bags had been torn and broken in the pass, and that there was consequently a considerable deficiency in the contents.


A depôt had been formed at Rustum, about five miles distant from the pass; to this the stores remaining at Naokilla had been removed, and thither Captain Jenkins proceeded on the 27th to organize another convoy: he was there joined by Lieutenant Smith. On the 31st, he started with fifteen days' supply, and returned to camp on the 1st November. On the 8th, as supplies were not coming in, Captain Jenkins again went to Rustum. On the 10th, the depôt was removed to "Permouli," opposite the "Shir Dara Pass," and on the 15th he rejoined head-quarters. On the 10th and 12th, the stores remaining in camp had been moved from the gorge to a new position on the top of the hills to the right, and on the 18th, the whole force moved to the same place. A new communication with the plains was opened, but as it passed close to the enemy's position, the passage of stores, &c., was attended with difficulty, and on the 21st, at the desire of the General, Captain Jenkins proceeded to Permouli to arrange about another convoy, which arrived on the night of the 23rd.

For some time very great difficulty was experienced in getting native supplies. There are no water mills in Yusafzai, and every seer of atta has to be ground by hand. The supplies originally collected for the Commissariat Department were, to a great extent, consumed by the force while it remained in the plain, and on the advance of the force from Yusafzai a further portion was made over to regimental bazars, with which there were to be five days' supplies for man and beast; consequently Captain Jenkins had to obtain the bulk of his supplies from Rawal Pindi, Peshawar, and Hazara; the balance for some time he was obliged to procure through the aid of the civil authorities, without whose pressure none would have been collected. As it was, it was brought in piece-meal, three or four seers often at a time, and as each man had to be settled with direct, each load had to be separately weighed. Subsequently Captain Jenkins got a purchasing agent, by which arrangement he was able, in a great measure, to meet his own requirements. As regards the native supplies, there was a considerable loss; two or three times the grain had been used in lieu of sand bags; in going through the passes, especially the one abandoned, the bags had been more or less broken from the rocks and jungle. These supplies were issued five days at a time; receipts were taken from the different regiments, and the issues at once entered in an abstract. Government had sanctioned the sale of stores at fixed rates favorable to the men.

On the expedition being first sanctioned, Captain Jenkins was informed that mules only could be used, and he drew out a rough estimate of requirements framed on a scale given for his guidance; and as it was evident that a



Sketch
OF THE AFFAIR
AT
NARINJI
BY A FORCE UNDER
MAJOR J. L. VAUGHAN
1857.



SKETCH OF COUNTRY
FROM
SHIRDARRA TO MULKA
ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS
OF THE
YUSUFZAI FIELD FORCE


Georgia H.S.

in December 1863.

Scale 4 British Miles = 1 Inch



Bohingrah G.T.S.





APPROXIMATE HEIGHTS
above SEA LEVEL in FEET.

	In feet.
Crest of Umbeylah Pass	2900
British Position from 3151 to	2500
Umbeylah Village	2177
Crest of Buneyr Pass	2900
Kooria Village	2138
Do. Peak	2547
Mulka Mosque	4110
Do. Peak above	4490

REFERENCES.

Routes, according to Native information	—
British Position above Panj Darra or Umbeylah Pass	—
Base of Hills	—
Principal G. T. Station	▲
Route of Army	—





ROUGH SKETCH OF
CAMP PALOUSE

Mariano Mosier Expedition.

April 23rd 1860.

M A P
 of
A PORTION OF THE PESHAWUR DISTRICT
 ILLUSTRATING
THE MILITARY OPERATIONS
 against
THE HINDUSTANI FANATICS
 and
CERTAIN REFRACTORY VILLAGES.
 1853, 1857, 1858, 1863.

REMARKS

Places named in account of operations	{	Umbeylah Campaign.....	—————
		Sir Sydney Cotton	-----
		Colonel Mackeson

Routes taken by Columns	{	Sir Sydney Cotton	}	-----
		Hazara Column		
		Col. Wildes	}	—————
		Umbeylah Column		

Actions	{	Colonel Mackeson	6
		Major Vaughan	6
		Sir Sydney Cotton	6
		Umbeylah Campaign.....	6

sufficient number of mules could not be collected within the time, he was directed to entertain bullocks as well. This was done, and they were for some time used, but being found ill-suited to these hills, they were mostly afterwards discharged.

At Naekilla, on the 18th October, the scale of equipment was revised, and at least one-third more baggage allowed to the force. Carriage was interchanged by regiments, and as, from the hurried way in which the force had been organized and sent out, no equipment reports had reached Captain Jenkins, no check could be exercised; the object was to move the force, and this was effected. On the 26th, partly on sanitary grounds, partly to relieve the camp of all superfluous followers, cattle and baggage, everything not indispensably necessary were sent to the plains; there the cattle remained, except when employed to bring up magazine or other public stores.

This carriage was collected from various sources and by different people. Owing to the many changes and transfers which had been made, the settlement of the carriage account in detail was found impossible, and the whole expense was originally charged to Government, the hire for the time cattle had been actually used for private purposes being recovered from officers commanding.

Losses were unavoidable, the country was most difficult, and the enemy ever on the watch; a convoy seldom reached until late at night. In view to admit of the cattle being at once returned to the plains, the loads were thrown down without distinction or examination, and as the space allowed was necessarily very limited, consignments could not be weighed or counted, but were taken according to the invoice.

CHAPTER V.

SECTION I.

The Ranizais.

THE Ranizais are a tribal division of the great Yusafzai clan. They are all beyond the British border. They occupy both slopes of the Totai Hills from Hazarnao to Malakand, and the west end of the Swat Valley on both sides of the river including the south slopes of Barangolah Hill. They are reckoned at 13,000 souls, and can muster about 3,000 matchlock men.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

The country inhabited by the Ranizais is an extensive district, which, stretching over the Totai Hills, includes the whole of the lower end of the Swat Valley. It is divided into Sam Ranizai and Bar or Swat Ranizai. The former is a tract of plain at the foot of the hills on the north border of the Peshawar District, between Hashtnagar and Lundkhor.

Sam Ranizai is inhabited by Khataks, Swatis, and Jhalmanis. The whole of the cultivation of this district is dependent on rain, the ravines being too deep, and generally having too little water in them, to permit of their being used for irrigation.

In Bar or Swat Ranizai, which is the lowest or westernmost part of the Swat Valley, the divisions are the same as in the plain portions, and there are 35 villages. The country here is an open plain, in parts encroached on by low hill spurs, and generally sloping more or less rapidly to the river's bed. This district produces ghur, honey, rice, oil, dhal, and a very fine breed of mules. These are all exported to Peshawar, and cotton, trangis, salt, and cloths of all sorts, are taken in exchange. The houses in Ranizai are generally built of stones, with mud plaster.

The proprietary rights in Ranizai are claimed by Shir Dil Khan of Aladand. He is doing his utmost, by alliances with the Khans of Dir and others, to recover his lost rights. Should he succeed, we shall have to deal with him. At present the Sam Ranizai villages are independent, and are entirely at our mercy. They are shut out from Swat by Shir Dil Khan, and if blockaded on our side, they could not exist. Their villages are mostly out in the open, and they fear attack. Any day a large seizure of Ranizai cattle might be made in British territory.

The Malakand Pass from Swat leads into Bar Ranizai, and is the chief route from that country. Although the Ranizai are blockaded by Shir Dil Khan, the trade between Swat and the British territory goes on all the same.

The roads leading between Sam and Bar Ranizai over the Malakand Range are as follow:—Digar, a foot-path; Chapal or Kaldara, a foot-path; Malakand, good road; Warter or Charkotlai, a foot-path; and Nakar Dara, a foot-path.

The Utman Khels.

The Utman Khels are a tribe of Pathans, who occupy the hills north of Peshawar, between the Mohmands and Ranizai, on both sides of the Swat River, from the Koh-i-Mohr to the Khanora Mountain. They are the

descendants of one Utman Baba, who, after having accompanied Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni on his expedition into Hindustan in the year 997, settled in this country.

They are sub-divided into five Khels, *viz.*, Asil, Shamuzaï, Mandal, Aliza, and Korêj, from the five sons of Utman Baba.

The Utman Khels are a powerful clan, and number 17,000 fighting men in all, according to Turner; but Bellew only places them at 5,000 men, and Elphinstone at 10,000.

The Asils are considered the most powerful Khel of the whole, and can muster 10,000* matchlocks. They are chiefly residents of Ambar and Barang, which is a tract of country on the right bank of the Swat River, divided from Ambar by a hill called Koh-i-Mohr, after a "ziarat" of that name on the top. Aurang is also on the same side of the hill as Barang, and is occupied by the Mandals and Alizais. There are a few Asils in the villages situated on the south side of the range.

The Shamuzaïs are divided over Aurang and Barang, and muster 4,000 strong. The Korej are also residents of Aurang. Some few Mandals, however, reside at Makhrani and Kolte, and a few of the Alizais at Shink Serva Mema. The Utmans acknowledge no Khan, or head chief, as most Afghan tribes do; but the Malik of Naodand, together with the Malik of Prang Ghar, are two of the most influential men amongst them. This want of a chieftain is attributed to the emulation which exists between the various tribes to outstrip each other in prowess; so that, should a man be proposed to be the Khan, the opposite Khels immediately oppose him, and though he be considered so by his own people, he can never expect to become headman of the whole tribe. One of the most influential men amongst this people was "Raham Gul, Mian," Kaka Khel, a resident of Abazai. He was held in great veneration, being a Kaka Khel, or a man belonging to the great "ziarat" of that name in the Khatak country.

The whole of the country occupied by the Utman Khel tribe is hilly and difficult, with very few roads leading through it to Swat that a horseman could travel by. It is generally well cultivated, and its chief products are the common articles of consumption, such as ghi, Indian corn, and rice, the harvest depending a good deal on periodical rains. The land which is under cultivation, is usually terraced and of a dark-colored soil.

The Utman Khel are in no way connected with any of the Afghan tribes which surround them, such as the Mohmands, Ranizais, Bajawaris, Swatis, &c., but look upon the Shinwaris, who inhabit the valley of that name, as their best friends; but taking into consideration the geographical position of each, and the fact of the Mohmands having been, till very recently, their enemies, it is difficult to imagine how their friendly intercourse could have been established and maintained.

The Utmans have twice engaged with the Mohmands, once in 1827 and the second time in the commencement of 1850, on both of which occasions the Mohmands showed proof of their superiority. They are now on terms of peace, and the people of the one tribe mix with the other; but there is no great friendship between them. In the event of one or the other having to leave his village or country, as they frequently have to, (as in cases of murder), they always find protection; it being a rule among all Afghans never to refuse it under such circumstances.

The direct road from Abazai to Ambar is most difficult, and only passable for footmen. It crosses the hills to Pindiali, which is situated at a

* Query—W. P.

distance of some 18 *koss*. There are, however, two others, which are far preferable and much more used, being passable for camels, &c. The first of these is the Chirow, or Kripo; it is opposite to Mitchni, where it enters the hills. The second is through the pass of Sikandai, which is situated opposite the village of Matta, but it is not so good as the Chirow road.

The Utman Khels are described as tall, stout, and fair; but it is said that they often go naked from the waist upwards; that the women labor like the men, and that everything among them shows the absence of civilization. They have frequent quarrels among themselves, and they are at feud with the Turkolanis. Their dress is like that of Bajawar, and in their customs with respect to women, they do not differ much from their neighbours. They are a sober people, and have none of the vices of the Yusafzais. They live in small villages of from ten to sixteen terraced houses. On the whole, they are probably less civilized than their neighbours, and the strength of their own country may tempt them to plunder, as it secures them impunity.

Swat Baizai and British Baizai.

The Baizai tribe are a section of the Akozai clan of the Yusafzais, who mostly inhabit the south bank of the Swat River beyond British border. Their country is much scattered in extent. They extend from the Lundkhor Valley in the Peshawar District, through Swat on the left bank of the river, and along the north slopes of the Ilam and Dosara Mountains, into the highlands of Ghorband, and throughout the valleys draining from these into the Indus. Collectively, the Baizai clan is reckoned at 38,000 souls, and they are able to muster 6,000 matchlock men. The Baizai villages in Swat are Thana, Barikot, Galegi, Naokila, Panjigram, Udigram, Gozdara, Balogram, Kambar, Katelai, Mingara, Saida, Charbagh, Gulibagh, Alamgani, Khwaza, Khela, Thikdarai, &c.

The name Baizai is also applied to the following villages of Swat and their inhabitants:—Thana, 1,000 houses inhabited by Khan Khel Pathans; Nal, 80 houses of fakirs; Bakhta, 80 of fakirs; Haibatgram, 80 of fakirs; Jalala, 80 of fakirs; Guniar, 30 of Mians. These belong to the Aba Khel division, but are separated from them by the Musa Khel, and the inhabitants are known as Khan Khel.

Sam Baizai is a division of Swat, situated south of the Mora Range and north of Lundkhor. It is called Sam Baizai, in distinction to the Baizai in the Swat Valley, and comprises the following villages:—

Pali, Shirkhana, Jalalpur, Zormandai, Bazdara, Mora Banda.

These villages are some little distance from the hills, but situated in a country much intersected by ravines.

Of the villages in the Baizai Valley, the Pali men alone cultivate in British territory, and they hold a considerable quantity of land belonging to Surbi.

Pali is said to contain about 156 houses, Shirkhana 80, Zormandai 40, and Bazdara 60.

British Baizai is a portion of the Yusafzai Division of the Peshawar District, consisting of a bay which runs into the hills between the Paja and Malakand Ranges at the extreme north-west corner of the division. It is bounded on the north and west by Swat, east by the Paja ridge, and south and south-west by the Takht-i-Bahi and the Bagiari ravine. Its length is

20 miles, and its breadth 12 miles. The appearance of Baizai is that of a dry plain, interspersed with villages, in which are a few trees; while in every direction communication is difficult, and interrupted by the number of ravines which traverse it in every conceivable direction.

It is surrounded on the north-west, north-east, and south, by hills; those to the north are the spurs of the Malakand and Mora Mountains, and on the east and south are the Paja and Takht-i-Bahi. These are all, so far as they touch Lundkhor, of a very precipitous, barren, and parched nature.

There are no rivers in Baizai, but the drainage of the surrounding hills is carried off by a series of ravines, the principal of which are the Bagiari, Barwaza, Landai, and Gadar.

The upper part of Baizai is open and easy for cavalry and artillery. The ravines are not generally difficult to cross, with the exception of the Kalpani. The soil is rich, free from stones, and much under cultivation, which, however, depends upon rain. The ravines about Kasima, Tazigram, and the village of Lundkhor, appear the most difficult in the valley for artillery. The villages are few and far between, many of them being of considerable size. Water and fuel are scarce, as also grass. *Bhusa* is procurable in abundance in all the villages.

Baizai is inhabited by (1) Baizai Swatis, (2) Utman Khels, (3) Khataks, and a 4th may be added, such as Mohmands, Rowanrais, &c.

(1.) The Baizai Swatis have three villages,—Matta, Shamuza, and Babuzai, all three to the east, and close under the Paja spur from the Sinawar Hill. These are the remnants of the real Yusafzais, this being the battle ground between the descendants of Yusaf and Mandan in their numerous conflicts. Mercenaries were called in on both sides, who eventually succeeded in taking the valley for themselves.

(2.) The origin of the Utman Khels is not known. Major James says they are a branch of the Afridis, who as mercenaries joined with the Khataks. Another account makes out that they are the aborigines. They themselves claim to be the original stock of Arang Barang.

The Utman Khel villages are Kui, Barmul, Mian Khan, Sangao, Pipal, Kharkai, and Ghazi Baba. Barmul was formerly a separate village, and now though amalgamated with Kui, still has its separate sections and maliks.

SECTION II.

Operations in Baizai by a Sikh force in 1847 under Major George Lawrence.

IN October 1847, Major George Lawrence, who was then holding the Peshawar Valley for the Sikhs, was fired on when Despatch from Major G. Lawrence. reconnoitring with Lieutenant Lumsden of the Guides from the village of Babuzai, and as the maliks would not come in to tender allegiance, Major Lawrence determined to attack the village. Babuzai contained about 200 houses, and was situated in a deep *cul-de-sac* formed by two short, steep, and rugged spurs from the lofty ridge of hills which divides Lundkhor from Sadum, and is a portion of the Buner Range. The village was situated at the further extremity of this *cul-de-sac*, which was about 500 yards long and 300 yards broad. A direct attack was therefore unadvisable; indeed the village had the previous year successfully repulsed a superior force under Sirdar Shir Singh.

A reconnoissance, cleverly performed by a duffadar of the Guides, shewed that the heights above the village could be occupied, and Major Lawrence therefore determined to turn the position from those heights. Mir Baba, the Chief of Sadum, (whom Major Lawrence had released from captivity in the fort of Attock,) had tendered his services, which were accepted by Major Lawrence, as Mir Baba expressed great anxiety for an opportunity of evincing his gratitude.

On the 10th October Major Lawrence detached a party, as per margin, with orders to join Mir Baba's men in the Sadum Valley, under pretence of collecting cattle, the property of the enemy, and from thence to ascend the range during the night, so as to gain the heights in time to co-operate with the main attack at daybreak. This party, as soon as it saw the main column in position, was to descend the spurs and clear the village of its defenders.

Major Lawrence struck his camp on the night of the 10th, and after placing his baggage in a convenient and defensible position under a suitable escort, moved with the main body over an open country along the base of the hills. At 6 A. M. the troops advanced to the attack, covered by skirmishers from each of the regiments under Lieutenant Lumsden, the infantry in two divisions, with the cavalry in reserve. The infantry under Colonels Mehtab Singh and John Holmes, and the cavalry under Khan Sing Rosa. A detachment was sent to the left to threaten the entrance to a defile called Barioba, where the property of the enemy was lodged, and to cut off any assistance from the neighbouring villages.

The action commenced by the enemy opening a sharp fire from the right on the skirmishers, when the guns opened without much effect. The skirmishers were now ordered to occupy the spurs on each side of the defile. In trying to effect this, the left column was driven back; but the head of the rear attack being now seen descending on the village, a general assault was ordered, and the village was soon carried,—the Sikh Regiment under Lieutenant Lumsden ascending and clearing the heights, and the Guides pursuing the discomfited foe.

30 Guide Infantry, Mazbi
Company, 97 Ramgoles.

6 Guns, Horse Artillery.
44 Sabres, Khass Dragoons.
56 „ Ghorcharas.
428 R. and F., Sikh Regi-
ment.
399 R. and F. Najibs.
145 ditto Ramgoles.

The village had been deserted, the enemy having previously removed their families and property ; and as there was no other means of punishing the villagers of Babuzai, and of deterring others, Major Lawrence was reluctantly compelled to order it to be fired.

Colonel Holmes.

„ Mehtab Sing.

„ Khan Sing Rosa.

„ Alla Sing.

„ Amir Khan.

„ Fateh Khan.

Major Lawrence said, that throughout the affair, the gallantry, activity, judgment, and coolness, displayed by Lieutenant Lumsden, were conspicuous, and infused a like spirit into the troops, of whose conduct he reported most favorably, specially mentioning those named in the margin.

The Guide Corps in this their first skirmish did good service, and Major Lawrence advocated their being armed with rifles.

A return of the casualties is given in the Appendix. The skill and attention of Mr. Thompson to the wounded were alluded to.

A few days after this affair, ten villages, including Babuzai, submitted to Major Lawrence, several of which had never before tendered allegiance either to the Durani Emperors or the Sikhs. From a subsequent report by Major George Lawrence, it would appear that active operations were undertaken against the village of Pali; but of these there are no records, except in the Regimental History of the Corps of Guides, where it is said :—

“Three days after the affair at Babuzai, the Brigade of Sikh Infantry and guns under Major George Lawrence proceeded to attack the village of Pali in the Bazdara Valley. The Guides, 43 bayonets, under Lieutenant Lumsden, crowned the heights on the left of the village, while the Sikhs occupied those on the right. The Guide Cavalry, 33 sabres, made a successful charge up the valley, losing only 2 horses, wounded.”

The thanks of the Governor General were then communicated to Major Lawrence and to Lieutenant Lumsden, and also to the Corps of Guides, for their conduct and gallantry.

Government letter.

Return showing the number of Killed and Wounded in the action of Babuzai on the 11th October 1847.

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RECORD OF EXPEDITIONS

CORPS.	KILLED.							WOUNDED.							TOTAL KILLED.							TOTAL WOUNDED.							REMARKS.									
								DANGEROUSLY.				SLIGHTLY.																										
	Adjutant.	Subadars.	Havildars.	Duffadars.	Naik.	Drummer.	Sepoys.	Adjutant.	Subadars.	Havildars.	Duffadars.	Naik.	Drummer.	Sepoys.	Adjutant.	Subadars.	Havildars.	Duffadars.	Naik.	Drummer.	Sepoys.	Adjutant.	Subadars.	Havildars.	Duffadars.	Naik.	Drummer.	Sepoys.		Adjutant.	Subadars.	Havildars.	Duffadars.	Naik.	Drummer.	Sepoys.		
Colonel Khan Sing Rosa's Khass Dragoons	1	1		
Colonel John Holmes' Nujib Regiment	...	1	1	...	1	1	1	...	1	1	
Colonel Mehtab Sing's Regi- ment	2	...	1	...	2	1	2	...	1	3		
Ramgole	1	1		
Guide Corps	1	1	1	1		
Total	...	1	1	...	3	1	1	1	4	2	...	1	1	...	3	1	1	1	6	

Names of men killed:

Chungos Loll, Subadar, Nujib Regiment.

SECTION III.

Operations of a force in the Lundkhor Valley under Colonel Bradshaw,
1849.

FROM the time of the annexation of the Panjab, the Swatis uniformly proved themselves bad neighbours to the British. Mr. Temple's Report. The sub-divisions of the Peshawar District adjoining the Swatis, Ranizais, and Utman Khels, are Lundkhor on the north-west corner of Yusafzai and then Hashtnagar, and these tribes seem to have regarded the plains of Peshawar, especially Hashtnagar, as a hunter does his hunting-grounds. Plunderers and marauders, sometimes in bands, sometimes in twos and threes, sometimes on foot and sometimes mounted, issued from Swat, passed through Ranizai, and proceeded to the plains of Hashtnagar and Yusafzai. They would not usually make regular raids, and they would refrain from molesting Pathans, their fellow clansmen; but they would attack persons of all other classes,—cultivators, petty traders, cattle graziers, wayfarers, and the like. They would carry off Hindus in particular, for the purpose of putting them to ransom. Again, the Swatis harboured renegades, refugee criminals, internal malcontents, and external enemies, the names of whom are too numerous to mention. For years the valley was a rendezvous for any and every person hostile to the British Government; and among them were several persons who had been dismissed from British service, and one man named Mokaram Khan, who had been dismissed from the Peshawar Police, in particular, was received with great favor, and enjoyed a large landed grant in Swat. Not only did Swat receive and support enemies of the British, *but it encouraged them to commit depredations in British territory.* Further, the Swatis took every opportunity of inciting British villages to set authority at naught. They invited their fellow Pathans to throw off British yoke and acknowledge a nominal allegiance to Swat. For this purpose they would not only assemble troops in Ranizai or Utman Khel, but they would even send horsemen into British villages, partly as emissaries, and partly as representatives of authority.

In October 1849, it was reported by Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, Assistant Commissioner in Yusafzai, that the whole of the Utman Khel villages of the Lundkhor Division of Yusafzai had positively refused to pay revenue; that they had warned the native revenue collector against sending any Government servants into the country; that the people were all busy, preparing for war. In reporting this matter to Government, and urging the despatch of a military force, Lieutenant-Colonel George Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, said the Sikhs were in the habit of sending yearly from 1,200 to 1,500 men, with two or four guns, to make the Yusafzai collection, which, though it harassed the country, had a salutary effect; and as no troops of ours had up to that time been seen beyond the cantonment of Peshawar, an impression had got abroad among the ignorant hill tribes throughout the frontier, that we had either no force or were afraid to approach their fastnesses.

In sanctioning the employment of such a force, the Governor General recorded that in "all ordinary cases the employment of British troops for the mere collection of revenue is a measure to be avoided. But the refusal of the villages in Lundkhor to pay the little revenue demanded of them is not merely a denial of the revenue which they owe, but is in fact a test and trial of the British power, and of the authority which was

"to be exercised over them. It was therefore quite indispensable that the demands of the Government should be fully enforced, and a conspicuous example made of these men, the first in this newly-conquered province, who had dared to resist the orders of the British officers." It was further ordered, that if resistance should be attempted, it was to be put down severely, but without any unnecessary harshness, and under any circumstances the headmen of the villages were to be brought prisoners to Peshawar, there to await the pleasure of the Government.

It was added, that if any foreigners should aid these villages in force, they were of course to be dealt with like any other enemy, and punished with a severity proportioned to the unjustifiable and predatory nature of the attack they might make.

Immediately after Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence had sent in his report, two forays on British territory were made by horsemen from the village of Pali.

On the 3rd December 1849, the following force moved from Peshawar under Brigadier-General Dundas's Despatch. the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, C. B., Her Majesty's 60th Royal Rifles, and accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner :—

2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery.

1 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.

13th Irregular Cavalry.

200 men, Her Majesty's 60th Rifles.

300 „ Her Majesty's 61st Regiment.

3rd Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.

Staff.

Staff Officer, Captain H. Richards, 3rd Bombay Native Infantry.

Lieutenant St. John, 60th Rifles, A. D. C.

On the 11th December Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, with the force marginally noted, attacked and took the insurgent village of Sangao.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw's Despatch.

2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery.

1 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.

13th Irregular Cavalry.

200 men, 60th Rifles.

300 „ 61st Regiment.

3rd Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry.

Corps of Guides.

100 men, 1st Panjab Infantry.

The village was situated in a very strong position, immediately beneath an apparently precipitous rock about 2,000 feet high, from which two spurs project some 900 yards into the plain, forming a *cul-de-sac*.

This position had been reconnoitred the previous day by Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, who determined to attack it on both flanks and front simultaneously.

The cavalry were to protect the baggage and the left flank of the operations.

The detachment of the 60th Royal Rifles, supported by four companies of the 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, was to crown the spur on the left of the village, covered by the 2 Horse

Left attack.

Artillery guns.

The Guide Corps, supported by the detachment, 1st Panjab Infantry, were to turn the spur on the right, with a view of cutting off the only apparent retreat the enemy possessed.

Right attack.

When these arrangements had been partially effected, the main body, consisting of the detachment, 61st Regiment, supported by the head-quarters, 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, and covered by the 4 Horse Artillery guns, charged and took the village.

Centre attack.

The left attack was met by a heavy fire and showers of stones, the precipitous nature of the ground rendering the advance very difficult; but the heights were gallantly crowned, and the enemy driven off.

The enemy finding his retreat on both flanks cut off, retired up the height in rear of the village by a path before unknown to those who had been directed

to acquire all information respecting the locality of the village, which path was inaccessible to the troops beyond a certain height.

Colonel Bradshaw estimated the strength of the enemy at 2,500 men. The villages had been reinforced by large bodies from the Buner country, and their loss must have been very considerable.

A return of our losses is given in the appendix. Colonel Bradshaw regarded them as very small, considering the difficult nature of the position and the obstinate defence of it for about five hours, remarking that the celerity of the movements of the troops and their effective fire prevented heavier loss.

He said, he had to gratefully acknowledge having received every assistance, support, and information from Colonel Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner; and that he was greatly indebted to Lieutenant Lumsden for his knowledge of the country, and the way in which he had conducted the right attack, ably seconded by Captain Coke.

The names of the other officers most favorably mentioned by Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw were—

Captain Bingham, commanding Detachment, 60th Rifles.
 „ Robert Richards commanding 4 Companies, 3rd Bombay N. I.
 Major Deacon commanding 61st Foot.
 Colonel Hallett commanding 3rd Bombay N. I.
 „ Fordyce commanding Artillery.
 Captain Quin commanding 13th Irregular Cavalry.
 „ H. Richards, 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, Staff Officer.
 Lieut. St. John, 60th Rifles, A. D. C.
 Colonel Bradford, 1st Light Cavalry, who joined the force as a Volunteer.
 Lieutenant Rendall, }
 „ Walker, } Bombay Sappers and Miners.

General Casualty Return of Killed and Wounded of the Field Force, under the Command of LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BRADSHAW, in the attack of the village of Sangao, on the 11th December 1849.

CORPS.	KILLED.											WOUNDED.											EUROPEAN OFFICERS.		
	Date.	European officers.	Native officers.	Sergeants or havildars.	Resaidar.	Kote Duffadars.	Duffadars.	Sowars.	Drummers and fifers.	Naiks.	Privates.	Horses.	European officers.	Native officers.	Serjeants or havildars.	Resaidar.	Kote Duffadar.	Duffadar.	Sowars.	Drummers and fifers.	Naiks.	Privates.	Horses.	Names of European officers killed.	Names of European officers wounded.
13th Irregular Cavalry ..	11th December 1849.																								Captain Bingham severely wounded.
Her Majesty's 60th Rifles ..													1		1								6		
Her Majesty's 61st Regiment															1								4		
2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery ..																									
3rd Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry ..																							3		
Guide Corps ..					1	1	1	1					2						2	1			3	3	
Total ..				1	1	1	1					2	1	2				3	1			16	3	None.	

On the 13th December Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw moved his camp to a position at the mouth of the valley of Bazdara, within 3 miles of the insurgent village of Pali, and of Zormandai and Shirkhana, in Swat Baizai.

A reconnoissance being made, the villages were found situated as nearly as possible in echelon—Pali being the most advanced, and to the right of the other two. On the right of this village a hill of some 1,500 feet arose, which completely commanded it, and was evidently the key of the enemy's position; it was occupied by a mass of not less than 5,000 men. The hills to the right and to the rear of the other villages were also occupied by large bodies of men. The enemy also held the valley in force, his right resting on the hill above mentioned, with the village of Pali in his rear, and his left stretching across to a range of hills which bounded the valley on the left, about a mile distant. From these hill spurs projected at right angles into the valley, which were also strongly occupied.

Finding that the principal strength of the enemy lay on the hill to the right of Pali, Colonel Bradshaw determined on seizing it, and on the 14th the operations were carried out as follow:—

The detachment, Her Majesty's 60th Rifles, 6 companies of the 3rd Bombay Native Infantry, a troop of the 13th Irregular Cavalry, were detached against this hill with 4 guns of the Horse Artillery, which took up a position and commenced playing on the hill with great effect.

The Guide Infantry and detachment 1st Panjab Infantry, supported by 3 companies, Bombay Native Infantry, were detached to the right in view to turning the enemy's left; Colonel Bradshaw seeing that the movement against the hill on his left was likely to prove successful, now pushed forward the remaining two guns, supported by the detachment, Her Majesty's 61st Regiment, and the remainder of the 13th Irregular Cavalry. The Light Company of the 61st moved in extended order to the right of the guns, whilst the guns opened on the enemy on the spurs on the left of their position, when the left of the enemy was admirably turned by the column which had been sent against it.

Having thus succeeded in turning one flank of the enemy and holding the other in complete subjection, Colonel Bradshaw advanced with four guns up the centre of the valley, the other two being left in support of the troops which had carried and were holding the hill to the right of Pali, carrying and destroying the villages in detail, and driving off the enemy who made for the hills in their rear and on their left.

The ground being tolerably favorable, Colonel Bradshaw directed the 13th Irregular Cavalry to charge, which they did with effect, completely driving off the left of the enemy.

All that the Deputy Commissioner desired having been effected, and the enemy dispersed on all sides, Colonel Bradshaw withdrew from the valley covered by a strong and connected line of skirmishes, supported by infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with instructions not to leave a man of the force behind them; this was effected without a shot being fired. Such had been the panic caused by the previous operations.

The inhabitants of these villages had been assisted by people from Swat, to the extent of from 5,000 to 6,000 men, and they had literally been driven like sheep across the frontier, leaving their dead on the field—a great disgrace amongst these tribes—and there had been nothing to prevent our troops

Colonel Lawrence's Despatch.

pursuing them into their own country, if it had been deemed necessary or advisable to do so.

Our losses are given in the Appendix. Colonel Bradshaw regarded them as small, considering the extended field of operation, and that the enemy numbered in all from 10,000 to 12,000 men.

Colonel Bradshaw said, when all officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the force, had behaved so admirably, it was invidious to make distinctions, and he begged to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the gallant conduct of all ranks.

The force then returned to Peshawar *via* Hashtnagar and Doaba, crossing the Kabul River by the pontoon train and two boats, and reaching Peshawar on the 22nd December. Colonel Lawrence stated, he had been unable to carry out that part of the Governor General's instructions requiring that the head men should be brought into Peshawar, as the nature of the country precluded the possibility of surprising them, and there was no opportunity of seizing them either during or after the action. He added, that a most severe punishment had been inflicted on them, not the least of which was the capture of a quantity of grain roughly estimated at 3,000 maunds, which was partly destroyed for want of carriage.

Only one prisoner had fallen into our hands—a priest from Bajawar—from whom it was ascertained that the combination against us among the hill tribes had been very great, and it was afterwards known that reinforcements of 15,000 men were *en route* to join the insurgents, when they received intelligence of their total defeat.

The entire satisfaction of the Governor General, with the steadiness and gallantry exhibited by all of every rank and of every corps, was ordered to be communicated to the officers and men, as well as to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw for his operations, and the thanks of the Government were to be conveyed to all for the service they had rendered. It was stated that the Governor General had much pleasure in expressing to the Deputy Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel George Lawrence, the great satisfaction he had derived from the knowledge of his proceedings on this occasion, and especially from observing the cordial co-operation of the civil and military authorities at Peshawar. His best thanks were to be offered also to Colonel Lawrence, to Lieutenant Lumsden, and the force under their orders.

On Colonel Bradshaw's force returning to Peshawar, the Corps of Guides under Lieutenant Lumsden remained in that portion of the Peshawar District, and were employed covering the erection of a fortified post, the sanction for which had been now accorded.

APPENDIX.

*Casualty Return of the Killed and Wounded in the Field Force commanded by
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BRADSHAW, C. B., in the capture, on the 14th December
1849, of the villages Pali, Zormandai, and Shirkhana, on the frontier of the
Swat Valley.*

CORPS.	KILLED.									WOUNDED.									EUROPEAN OFFICERS.			
	European officers.	Native officers.	Havildars.	Captains or Naiks.	Drummers.	Fifers.	Bheesties.	Sowars.	Privates.	Horses.	European officers.	Native officers.	Havildars.	Captains or Naiks.	Drummers.	Fifers.	Bheesties.	Sowars.	Privates.	Horses.	Names of European officers killed.	Names of European officers wounded.
2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery	None.	Lieutenant Bannerman, a slight sword cut on the leg.
13th Irregular Horse	1	1		
Her Majesty's 60th Royal Rifles.	1	1	7	..		
Her Majesty's 61st Regiment		
1st Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners		
3rd Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry	1	11	..		
1st Panjab Infantry	2	1	..		
Guide Corps		
Total	1	1	1	..	1	..	2	19	1		

SECTION IV.

Expedition against the Ranizais by a force under Sir Colin Campbell in March 1852.

THE rapidity and success of Colonel Bradshaw's operations opened the eyes of the Swat Chiefs to the possibility of a British force one day visiting their own valley, and filled all classes with alarm. In this exigency the oracle was again consulted, and advised that the only chance of making a stand would be by appointing one chief to command the whole disposable forces, and all other chiefs being sworn on the *Koran* to implicitly obey him; and that the land-tax of one-tenth of the produce, authorized by the Mahomedan law, should be at once collected to provide the sinews of war.

This proposal being agreed to, the chiefs commenced a scramble for the command, which threatened to involve the whole of the troops in a general *mêlée*. Ghazan Khan of Dir left the council, declaring that he could never obey any man save the Akhund.

To end this broil, the Akhund proposed that a chief, hitherto unconnected with Swat, should be chosen; and, among other nominations, pointed out Syad Akbar of Sittana, as a man of energy, head, and true Mahomedan principles, qualified for the position, with the advantage of being a Syad.

Syad Akbar was accordingly invited to become King of Swat under the patronage of the Akhund, and shortly afterwards was duly installed with the usual accompaniments of prayers from priesthood and "nazarana" from the chiefs.

This chief was, as already related, a follower of the famous Hindustani fanatic, Syad Ahmad; and when the latter held temporary possession of Peshawar, Syad Akbar joined him in the double capacity of treasurer and prime minister. He was thus thrown in constant contact with the Hindustani soldiers in that chief's camp, and formed a friendship for them which lasted ever afterwards.

The moment his authority was a little established by the Akhund's good offices over the Swat Chiefs, and the first year's revenue collected, Syad Akbar sent for his Hindustani levies; but they refused under some pretext to join him, when he set about collecting a standing army and guns, by the aid of which he hoped to put down any chief who should afterwards dispute his authority. He so far succeeded as to collect five or six guns of sizes, 800 sowars, and 3,000 footmen, all receiving pay in grain directly from himself.

Towards the end of 1851, the Swatis moved bodies of troops, several thousand strong, to the foot of the Mora Mountain and into Ranizai, for the purpose of creating disaffection on our border.

On the night of the 6th March 1852, a party of 180 horsemen, under the leadership of Mokaram Khan, assailed a detachment consisting of 43 men of the Guide Corps stationed at the British village of Gujar Garhi, in Yusafzai, under Resaldar Fateh Khan, as a personal guard to a party of the Great Tri-

Regimental History,
Guide Corps.

Mr. Temple's Report.

approaching party were the Survey officers coming into camp, and the enemy were into camp before the men had time to form. But the assailants were gallantly repelled, leaving 1 dead body and 6 disabled horses in the camp: the Guides losing 1 sowar killed, 2 sowars wounded.

Government letter.

The gallant conduct of this detachment afterwards received the approbation of the Governor General in Council.

On the 11th March the following troops under the command of Sir Colin Campbell marched from Peshawar towards Tangi, as a corps of observation, and to check any further spread of disaffection, till the orders of Government could be obtained :—

Sir Colin Campbell's
Despatch.

1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.
Head-Quarters, 600 R. F., Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment.
Wing, 29th Native Infantry.
66th Gurkhas.
15th Irregular Cavalry.

Mokaram, the leader of the attacking party, held a sort of jaghir from Syad Akbar of Swat, half of which was on this side the Malakand Pass, half on the other; and when wishing to plunder, he used to come into Ranizai, retiring to Swat when danger threatened. It was therefore determined to treat the Ranizai as a confederation, and to punish them in such a way as to make them feel they could not afford to allow refugees from our territory, or bad characters from their own, to embroil them with the British Government.

Colonel Mackeson's
Report.

On the 14th March the people of Ranizai sent in to Lieutenant Lumsden, the Deputy Commissioner, offering to submit to any terms imposed, and to pay revenue; the force under Sir Colin Campbell was therefore halted at Turangzai, and the Maliks of Ranizai summoned. This delay, however, had the advantage of enabling two heavy howitzers with elephant draught to join Sir Colin Campbell from Peshawar.

Colonel Mackeson's Des-
patch.

But the maliks afterwards refused to come in, declaring their intention of opposing us, and that they expected assistance from Swat. It had been now clearly ascertained that Syad Akbar's nephew had been, accompanied by a following, with the party that had attacked the detachment of the Guides, and the force therefore moved on towards Ranizai, arriving at our frontier village of Shirgar, about 8 miles from Shakot (the Ranizai frontier village), on the 21st March.

Colonel Mackeson's Des-
patch.

On the march to Shirgar from Gujar Garhi much rain fell on the hills around, and just after the troops and guns had crossed a very deep nullah, a body of water like a wall came down it suddenly, and for a few minutes a portion of the baggage and its escort and the rear-guard were separated from the main body of the troops.

On the evening of the 21st, the Maliks of the Lundkhor Valley had brought the intelligence to Lieutenant Lumsden that the Maliks of Ranizai wished to tender their submission, when they were told that the troops would not be halted, but would march at daybreak to Shakot. It was further intimated to them, that if they came in on the road and paid the fine originally demanded of them, and gave satisfactory security for the safety of our frontier from the depredations of Swati marauders, and our own malefactors who had refuge in Swat, their villages would not be destroyed, nor their crops injured on this occasion by encamping the force in their valley, but that the troops would

in any event be marched into the valley of Ranizai to enable the General to see as much of it as was desired.

On the morning of the 22nd, Sir Colin Campbell's force marched towards Shakot, of which a reconnoissance had been made the previous evening. On the road the Ranizai Maliks came in, introduced by their neighbours, British subjects of the Lundkhor Valley. They tried to obtain an abatement of the fine imposed, and on two occasions, when it was refused, broke up their council and walked towards their villages. The force then advanced again, when some of the party would return to offer to pay their own share if their particular crops were spared. This farce continued till the force was drawn up within range of their village, when they were all sent away, and given half an hour to bring in unanimous submission to the terms offered, or abide the consequences.

In the meantime, the pioneers commenced making the road down and up the deep chasm in front of the village practicable for guns. After a while, however, the Ranizai Maliks returned with a full submission to the terms, and with ten maliks as hostages for their fulfilment. They then pointed out a practicable road into the heart of the Ranizai Valley—indeed, the high road to Swat, which passed to the right of the drainage chasm, and only crossed a small branch of it higher up the valley, where it was no obstacle.

It was now about 1 p.m. and Sir Colin Campbell gave orders for the camp to be pitched at the former ground at Shirgar, where it had remained ready laden, awaiting orders. The ten prisoners, as security for payment of the fine, were made over to Lieutenant Lumsden's corps, and the force moved on, conducted by one of the Maliks of Ranizai. The road was found to be excellent, although a little narrow, nearly all the way to Dargai; and to reach Dargai nearly the whole breadth of the valley is traversed. This village is situated at the extreme western end and foot of a spur of a hill, which from this point runs up for a distance of 3 miles to the foot of the Malakand Pass, forming with the Malakand Range a narrowing valley. There is at Dargai, under the foot of the hill, a large reservoir of water and encamping ground for a large force. The ground is covered with cultivation, the whole valley being closely tilled.

On reaching Dargai, it was reported that Mokaram Khan had just left that village, and on turning the spur of the hill at Dargai, some of our cavalry saw two or three horsemen in the distance and galloped on towards the Malakand Pass. Sir Colin Campbell also ordered a party of Irregular Horse up from the rear and two guns from the troop of Horse Artillery. Subsequently, five men with standards were seen through a telescope skulking away up ravines towards the pass with about 100 footmen. From the direction in which the men were first seen, there is no doubt that they had been at Dargai all the morning, and had left the hill behind Dargai when they saw the force advancing towards it.

The troops might, had they advanced towards the foot of the Malakand Pass, have driven those people off and over the hill, and looked down into Swat; but it was late in the day, and they would have had to encamp in Ranizai, and thereby broken the engagement with the Maliks, whose hostages were in our camp. Sir Colin Campbell would also thus have engaged in hostilities against the Swatis without having orders from Government to prosecute them to an issue. He therefore waited till he saw, with aid of a telescope, these standards borne on their way steadily up the pass in open flight from before him, and then returned to camp, without having heard a shot fired during the day.

Colonel Mackeson had fixed the fine to be paid by the Ranizais at Rs. 5,000, with reference to Rs. 6,000 being one year's revenue of the Lundkhor Valley, which is, if any thing, larger than the valley of Ranizai; he might have increased his demand in consequence of the message of defiance sent by these Ranizai Maliks, after they had actually given Lieutenant Lumsden to understand they would come in, but he considered their position a difficult one. The Ranizais on this side of the passes are a fractional division of their own tribe, as the majority of the Ranizais live in Swat above the passes. They are, therefore, too weak to control the whole of Swat when bent on hostility; but they are strong enough to check parties of marauders not exceeding 300 or 400 men, from going through their country, (which is the principal road from Swat), to commit raids in our territory. Colonel Mackeson might, too, have kept a larger number of the principal men as hostages, and have concluded no terms until he heard from the Board at Lahore as to whether he was to prosecute hostilities into Swat; but then the force must have remained out well into April, with an attendant expense. Great injury would have occurred to the crops of our own subjects near our encampment; the Swat River and the Kabul River were on the rise, the one might become unfordable and the other might carry away our bridge, when the Mohmand tribes would not have neglected to make raids in the Doaba, seeing the communication of the force with Peshawar cut off. Under these circumstances Colonel Mackeson thought it wiser to make a settlement of the question at once.

Colonel Mackeson said, our display of power in the rich, though small valley of Ranizai, our forbearance to use force when the enemy was at our mercy, and we could have inflicted much injury, and our return to camp in fulfilment of our engagement without any wanton act of injury having been committed in the valley, must have impressed our enemies with a conviction of our good faith, if they are capable of receiving any impressions.

On the morning of the 23rd, Sir Colin Campbell's force marched to Jalala, where it remained on the 24th, in consequence of heavy rain, and resumed its march to Turangzai on the 25th *en route* to Peshawar. The ten prisoners were sent under a guard of Irregular Cavalry towards Peshawar, where they arrived safely on the 27th March.

The satisfaction of the Governor General in Council at the result of these operations was then expressed.

Government letter.

SECTION V.

Punishment of the Independent Utman Khels by a force under Sir Colin Campbell, May 1852.

TANGI is a town in the Hashtnagar Division of the Peshawar District, 29 miles north of Peshawar, 3 miles south-east of McGregor's Gazetteer. Abazai, on the left bank of the Naswar Kanda ravine. Next to Peshawar, it is the largest place in the district.

At the commencement of British rule, Tangi was the residence of a powerful chief, named Ajun Khan, a young man of a restless, proud, and bigoted character. A large part of the village was held by him rent free, but he desired the whole of it, and also exemption from personal attendance at our courts, and from the interference of our revenue and police officials in his village. Finding that these demands were not likely to be complied with, he adopted the course, not unfrequent during the Durani and Sikh rule, of removing to the hills, calling around him a band of adventurers, and leading them in acts of aggression upon British villages, in the hope that the Government would be induced to yield to such pressure and grant him the privileges he sought. A native officer of the Guide Corps was sent to induce him to return, but he refused to do so, unless his villages were given to him rent free, and he was exempted from attendance at any of our courts.

This step led him to believe that we feared him, and ever after he caused annoyance to the Government. To do this most effectually, he aimed at striking fear into our villagers, and causing them to leave their lands uncultivated, by which not only a loss of revenue was to be anticipated, but a general feeling of disaffection and disquietude, leading to internal disturbances. He took up his quarters in the Utman Khel villages to the north of the district, and received some villages in jaghir from the Syad King of Swat, who was himself anticipating the advent of the British, and willingly received such fugitives, locating them in his border villages to act as an advanced guard.

On the night of the 20th April 1852, Ajun Khan with a band of 200 horsemen attacked the large village of Charsada, which was the head-quarters of the Hashtnagar Division. Half of the party came from the Utman Khel villages, and half from those of Ranizai. The revenue buildings had not been constructed. The establishments were located in native houses with mud enclosures, and they could offer but slight resistance. The Tehsildar, himself a Syad, was murdered and cut to pieces. Several other officials were similarly treated, and the *tehsil treasury* was plundered. On the following day, in furtherance of his plans, Ajun Khan came down and occupied Abazai, a village of Hashtnagar, where he remained 24 hours. He then desired the maliks to leave the village with their cattle, and killed 1 man who refused to do so.

Ajun Khan had now taken up his quarters at Prang Ghar and Naodand (Utman Khel villages), and on the 28th April troops began moving out from

Sir Colin Campbell's Despatch.

Sir Colin Campbell established his head-quarters at Abazai, and with him were Colonel Mackeson, the Commissioner, and Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner.

Regimental History, Corps of Guides.

On the 2nd May a picquet of 20 of the Guide Cavalry being placed in advance of the line of out-posts, the enemy were observed advancing in force, when Lieutenant Hardinge dashed through the enemy's skirmishers into a body of matchlock men supporting the skirmishers, and cut up a number of the enemy, checking their advance and capturing a standard. Lieutenant Hardinge, 3 sowars, and 1 horse, being wounded, and 2 horses killed.

On the 11th May the Commissioner having called on Sir Colin Campbell to destroy the Naodand group of villages, the Brigadier moved out with the following troops:—

1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.

Detachment, 2nd Company, 4th Battalion Artillery, 2 8-inch Howitzers.

2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.

300 men, Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment.

300 „ 28th Native Infantry.

300 „ 66th Gurkhas.

The Guide Infantry.

1 Squadron, 2nd Irregular Cavalry.

1 „ Guide Cavalry.

Naodand was about 4 miles from Abazai, the last mile of the approach to it leading over hilly and broken ground. On the arrival of the force the villages were found to be deserted, but many of the hill men were seen scattered round about. As the burning proceeded, the people gradually gathered together on different points, and commenced skirmishing with the advanced picquets of the Guides. This lasted whilst the work of destruction went on, the Guides having 4 men wounded. The ground was too broken to admit of the artillery being brought near the village.

As the troops withdrew, the numbers of the enemy appeared slightly to increase, but the troops retired without loss, the village and large quantities of grain having been destroyed.

During the operations, the 1st Panjab Infantry under Captain Coke, and 2 Squadrons of the 1st Panjab Cavalry under Lieutenant Hughes, joined Sir Colin Campbell. These troops had made an extraordinary march.

The letter from the Commissioner, sent by express to Captain Coke at Kohat, calling for his services, had been purposely withheld by Rahmut Khan, Orakzai, and Captain Coke only got his orders in a second letter sent by post.

The 1st Panjab Infantry, and the squadrons, 1st Panjab Cavalry, marched from Kohat at 2 A.M. on the 8th, and reached Peshawar, 40 miles, the same day. On arriving at the bridge of boats over the Kabul River, Captain Coke found it had been swept away and the boats carried down stream. On the evening of the 10th the troops had got across, and on that night marched for Abazai, halting for two hours under the Shabkadr Fort; and when on reaching Abazai at daybreak it was found the force under Sir Colin Campbell had gone out to attack Naodand, Captain Coke pushed on, joining the force as the attack was commencing, having marched more than 40 miles when Abazai was reached after the operations.

On the 12th the field force under Sir Colin Campbell moved about 7 miles to Gandeyri, with a view to attacking Prang Ghar, which was generally looked on in the country as the stronghold of the Utman Khel tribe.

On the 13th a detail of the strength given in the margin moved a little before daybreak and marched about 5 miles to the foot of the hills, which were broken and very stony, but not inaccessible to artillery.

1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.
Detachment, 3rd Company, 4th Battalion Artillery, and
2 guns, No. 19, Light Field Battery.
Two 8-inch Howitzers, and Detachment, 2nd Company,
4th Battalion Artillery.
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.
300 men each of Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, 28th
Native Infantry, 66th Gurkhas, Infantry of Guide Corps.
6 Companies and Head-Quarters, 1st Panjab Infantry.
Head-Quarters and 1 Squadron, 1st Panjab Cavalry.

Prang Ghar was a large village, with its rear resting on high hills, and flanked by spurs and lower heights.

Preparations had been made for defence. Both the place which was surrounded by good walls, and the adjacent eminences, were crowded with men.

Sir Colin Campbell's Despatch. They quickly opened fire on the advanced guard, which Sir Colin Campbell restrained from advancing until the guns were in position.

The artillery then opened clearing the road, when the men of the 1st Panjab Infantry, the 66th Gurkha Regiment, and the Guide Corps, immediately advanced to the attack, Her Majesty's 32nd and the 28th Native Infantry remaining with the guns as a reserve. The only fault committed was the too great impetuosity of the men which caused the artillery fire to be stopped sooner than Sir Colin Campbell desired.

However, the village was carried at a run, the enemy retreating to the hills behind, whence these inimitable skirmishers drove them from rock to rock far up the side of the high mountain, rendering the destruction of the village easy and safe. The artillery made good practice, effectually aiding the skirmishers.

A desultory fight then lasted until the object, for which the Commander of the force had received the Commissioner's requisition, was effected—the destruction of the village and grain. Of the latter, a large quantity, which had been stacked in a supposed place of security, high up the mountain, was destroyed by our skirmishers.

Considering that no less than ten pieces of artillery opened on their devoted village, it must be owned its people made a gallant defence. But, for our guns, we should have sustained a very heavy loss, the walls and flanking defences alluded to being formidable. As it was, the number of the wounded (see appendix) shows how the villagers held to their ground as soon as the skirmishers had driven them beyond the range of artillery.

The troops retired about 11 A.M., covered by strong rear-guards in extended order, without further loss.

The enemy, who numbered perhaps 1,000 matchlock men, were led by Ajun Khan and his father Hamid, and were assisted by the Utman Khel of the Totai villages, a dependency of Swat, and forming part of Mokaram Khan's jaghir. They only left 3 dead on the ground, but it was believed that they had many casualties.

Three prisoners were made, one a servant of Ajun, who was concerned in the murder of the tehsildar; another prisoner was a student from our own village of Tangi.

Three Persian letters were found in the village by a sepoy of the Guides, one from the Akhund to Ajun, and one from the King of Swat to Ajun, promising him assistance, assigning to him all property of the Hindus and servants of the British in Hashtnagar as lawful prey, and desiring him not to spare them, but to keep his hands from Mahomedans not in our service.

On the 14th the force halted at Gandeyri to make various arrangements, and to allow of more crops being destroyed by the Commissioner.

Sir Colin Campbell stated that since the force had left Peshawar, he had every reason to be satisfied with the readiness and good-will of all the corps and detachments, whether engaged in fatiguing marches through intense heat, assisting the labours of the engineers, or operating against the enemy ; and he begged to return his thanks to—

Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, c. B., commanding Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment,

Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, commanding 28th Native Infantry,

Lieutenant-Colonel Troup, commanding 66th Gurkhas,

Captain Coke, commanding 1st Panjab Infantry,

Lieutenant Lumsden, commanding Guide Corps,

Captain Baldwin, commanding Artillery,

Captain Jackson, commanding 2nd Irregular Cavalry,

Lieutenant Hughes, commanding 1st Panjab Cavalry,

Lieutenant Miller, Guide Corps, who commanded the skirmishers at Naodand.

Sir Colin Campbell said he had also to express his obligations to—

Lieutenant Norman, Brigade Major,

Ensign Lumsden, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General,

Lieutenant Maister, Acting Assistant Field Engineer,

Captain James, Deputy Commissioner,

Lieutenant Woodcock, Horse Artillery,

Lieutenant Walker, Bombay Engineer,

who had never failed in unremitting exertions to assist him in every possible manner.

He wished also to record his strong sense of gratitude to Lieutenant-Colonel Mansfield, Her Majesty's 53rd Regiment, who on this and previous occasions, when his regiment had been in cantonments, had, at Sir Colin Campbell's invitation, accompanied him into the field.

The Governor General in Council fully concurred in the praise bestowed on the several officers named, and in the estimation Government letter. entertained by the Commander-in-Chief of the excellent conduct of the troops employed.

Ajun Khan then fled, and has since wandered about from place to place,—
McGregor's Gazetteer. Kabul, Jellalabad, Lalpura, Swat, &c.

In 1857 he was at Prang Ghar threatening to attack British territory, but was checked by a force moving out from Peshawar under Colonel Shute with Major J. Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner.

In 1872 he suddenly returned, and, with the aid of the men of Totai and other Ranizai villages, built two towers and several houses at a place called Spinkwara, 5½ miles north of Gandeyri. On this the Deputy Commissioner sent to the council of the Ranizai, and to the various men of influence in proximity to our territory, when a hundred men of Prang Ghar surprised Spinkwara, killing 6 men and burning the hamlet ; it was not known, however, what became of Ajun Khan.

In fact, the result of the chastisement of the Utman Khel was to restore order and security to the Hashtnagar Division, and to put a stop to the flight of the chiefs on the border.
Captain James's Despatch.

After the expedition the fort of Abazai was erected.

APPENDICES.

Return of Killed and Wounded of the Force under command of BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., at the destruction of the villages of Naodand, on the 11th May 1852.

CORPS.	KILLED.					WOUNDED.					REMARKS.
	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	
Guide Infantry	4	4	One camp follower severely wounded.
Total	4	4	

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Force under command of BRIGADIER SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K. C. B., at the destruction of the village of Prang Ghar, on the 13th May 1852.

CORPS.	KILLED.					WOUNDED.					Missing.	REMARKS.
	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	Total.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	Total.		
Head-Quarters and 4 Companies, 66th Gurkha Regiment	1	1	..	1	..	3	3	..	Total killed and wounded, 18 men.
Infantry of the Guide Corps	1	1	4	5	..	
Head-Quarters and a Squadron, 1st Panjab Cavalry	2	2	..	
Head-Quarters and 6 Companies, 1st Panjab Infantry	2	2	5	5	..	
Total	3	3	..	1	..	14	15	..	

SECTION VI.

Second operations in Ranizai by a force under Sir Colin Campbell, May 1852.

ON the conclusion of the terms with the Ranizai people in the month of March previous, a conciliatory letter was sent to the King of Swat, to which not only was no reply received, but it was reported that the killing of the messenger had been debated, to mark the King's determination not to hold any intercourse with the infidels.

Colonel Mackeson's Report. Immediate payment of the fine inflicted had not been exacted from the Ranizais, and they had asked a little time to collect it, which had been granted them; but they now withheld its payment, repudiated the hostages, and expelled their families from their territory, declaring their reliance on Swat. Further coercion became therefore necessary.

Mr. Temple's Report on Tribes. On the 15th May the force under Sir Colin Campbell, after operating against the Utman Khels, moved to Shirgar, where it halted the two following days.

Sir Colin Campbell's Despatch. The reports were that considerable numbers were flocking from Swat and elsewhere to the village of Shakot to defend the Ranizai Valley, and that many Ghazis (religious fanatics) had come over the passes to fight in this cause; and it was evident that the people of Swat contemplated an attack on Ranizai as one made on themselves. The Akhund and the King were at variance on the subject of the non-payment of the fine by the people of Ranizai,—the one being in favor of the payment, the other opposing it,—as his influence would be diminished by such a course.

On the 18th the camp was struck, and the baggage driven 2 or 3 miles to the rear under a strong escort*; when the force marched—strength as given in the appendix—to dislodge the people who had taken up a position in the neighbourhood of Shakot, and then to proceed with the punishment of Ranizai.

Shakot was situated between a very deep and broad nullah and the mountains. This nullah swept round in an arc from what had been the left of the camp, and the march of the force lay along the chord of it.

About an hour after daybreak when 2 miles had been accomplished, Shakot being then distant two more, the enemy were discovered on one side of the nullah stretching away in one continuous line to the village which was the left of their position, the ground they held on the margin of the nullah being about a mile and a half in length.

The troops were now formed in line of columns at quarter distance in the direction of the line of march, cavalry being sent to the left to watch the extreme right of the enemy.

The advance then took place in echelon of regiments from the right in open column, Sir Colin Campbell's design being to break the enemy's centre with the Horse Artillery and attack their whole left which was on their line of retreat.

A sharp cannonade was opened by Captain Baldwin's troop of Horse Artillery on the centre of the enemy's position, which however they stood with great firmness, availing themselves of the broken ground for protection.

* Baggage Guard 200 28th Regiment, Native Infantry.
2 Squadrons, 2nd Irregular Cavalry.

The two leading regiments on the right, the Guide Corps and 66th Gurkhas, now "left wheeled into line" and stormed the nullah covered by the fire of the two 9-pounders, and supported by the Light Company of Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment and the 1st Panjab Infantry under Captain Coke.

The attack was very well done by the troops, the first assailants having to encounter a heavy fire and much determination. A company of the 66th Gurkhas were engaged in a hand-to-hand fight, a party of the enemy having actually charged into the centre of them.

The Horse Artillery now rapidly changed position and galloped to the edge of the nullah, which they enfiladed with great effect whenever they could fire without injuring our own men; and as soon as the two 9-pounders could be spared, they were moved rapidly to the right and brought into action opposite the village and a large burial ground at right angles to it, which were both full of the enemy,—the 32nd Foot covering the guns, and the 28th Native Infantry being kept in reserve, ready to move on any required point.

The fire of the guns was sharp and telling, and they were advanced closer and closer to the enemy, as the attack on the nullah showed itself to be successful.

The enemy then broke up, a large body swarming up the hills to the rear of the village, and another making for the Malakand Pass,—the 9-pounders playing on those retreating up the hills, the Horse Artillery going in pursuit up the valley. Three miles from the scene of resistance, the Guide Cavalry, directed at Sir Colin Campbell's request by Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson, C. B., the Commissioner, ("to whom Sir Colin Campbell said his best thanks were due,") sabred a considerable crowd trying to make their escape. The pursuit had been so rapid, that this had happened before the 9-pounders had succeeded in clearing the face of the opposite hills, although no time was lost by the fugitives in that direction.

In addition to the armed villages, about 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, Mr. Temple's Report on all from Swat, had been opposed to the force, and Tribes. the King and Akhund had stationed themselves on the crest of the Malakand Pass overlooking the valley to view the fight.

Great slaughter had been committed on the enemy with a comparatively trifling loss to our troops (see appendix), and large numbers of dead bodies were found all over the ground where the enemy had fought, and on their line of retreat.

Arrangements were now made for the destruction of Shakot, a very large village numbering some 600 houses, many of which appeared to be of much pretension. It was thoroughly burnt, as well as the crops around.

Having echeloned various parties to prevent the possibility of further annoyance, Sir Colin Campbell proceeded to destroy Dargai about 3 miles higher up the valley. This was also a very considerable place, being full of houses of the better sort, and, according to rough calculation, having some 400 altogether.

The village of Sangao was also burnt.

The troops with whom Sir Colin Campbell had so much reason to be pleased, returned to their former ground about 3 P. M.

In his despatch, Sir Colin Campbell said this action, though fought against hill men and amidst the difficulties of a nullah of extraordinary steepness and width, with broken and stony ground in its neighbourhood, was essentially one of the plains, and not of the mountains. The artillery had full scope as had the cavalry. This circumstance accounted for the considerable results, and the very heavy chastisement the force was able

to inflict on the crowds opposed, who could not have been less than 6,000 in number. They had showed great resolution, and had held the nullah in a manner which extorted the admiration of the troops.

Sir Colin Campbell added, nothing could be more satisfactory than the conduct of all, particularly of the Guides and Gurkhas, on whom the brunt fell when making the great assault on the nullah. With the readiness of the Guides under Lieutenant Lumsden, he said the Commander-in-Chief was well acquainted; and he was particularly happy in having been able to employ the 66th Gurkhas under Lieutenant-Colonel Troup, in an operation, requiring all those qualities for which Gurkhas are so justly famous.

He further said, he had to express his thanks to all the Commanding Officers of corps for their great alacrity and good feeling in carrying out his orders, *viz.* :—

Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, c.B., commanding Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment.

Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, commanding 28th Native Infantry.

Lieutenant Colonel Troup, commanding 66th Gurkhas.

Captain Baldwin, commanding the Artillery.

Captain Jackson, commanding 2nd Irregular Cavalry.

Captain Coke, commanding 1st Panjab Infantry.

Lieutenant Hughes, commanding 1st Panjab Cavalry.

Lieutenant Lumsden, commanding Guide Corps.

He added, he was under great obligations to his personal and general staff—

Lieutenant-Colonel Mansfield, Her Majesty's 53rd Regiment, who had placed himself at Sir Colin Campbell's disposal.

Lieutenant Norman, Brigade Major.

Lieutenant Woodcock, Horse Artillery.

Lieutenant Maister, Horse Artillery and Acting Assistant Field Engineer.

Lieutenant Walker, Bombay Engineers.

Ensign Lumsden, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General.

And in conclusion Sir Colin Campbell said he wished to speak more specially of the Artillery under Captain Baldwin. To the readiness and intelligence of the Commander and the great activity of his subordinate officers and men, he was indebted for having passed through the day's work with a comparatively slight loss.

A day's rest having been given to the troops on the 19th, the force marched round the Ranizai Valley on the 20th, destroying the villages named in the margin, together with much grain.

1. Wurtair.
2. Dobandi (1st).
3. Sandasir.
4. Kadam Khel.
5. Harka.
6. Usman Khel, Ghari.
7. Musa Maina.
8. Mirdai.

On this day no opposition was encountered, and but few of the inhabitants of the valley were to be seen. The troops were under arms and in movement from 4 A.M. till half-past 6 P.M.

On the 22nd a detachment, as per margin, marched about 9 miles to destroy the village of Erozhah. This

- 3 Horse Artillery Guns.
- 2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.
- 200 Men, 28th Native Infantry.
- 300 „ 66th Gurkhas.
- 300 „ 1st Panjab Infantry.
- 200 „ Guide Infantry.
- 200 „ 1st Panjab Cavalry.

place had been represented to be in an open valley. It was found, however, to be situated in close ground within matchlock range of the hills at the head of ravines, some 2 miles in extent, up which the troops moved. Besides, being so strong by nature,

was surrounded by a loop-holed wall.

The inhabitants had retreated to a distant range of hills, and the troops were not molested till after the destruction of the village had been effected, and they had commenced their retreat towards camp. They were then followed by matchlock fire till quite clear of the hills and ravines. The retrograde movement having been conducted very slowly and in perfect order, no loss was sustained.

On the 24th the village of Dobandi (2nd), about 4 miles from camp, was destroyed.

On the 25th the force marched 10 miles, to Likpani, with the view of coercing the British village of Sangao, when the Malik submitted to the Commissioner's demands and paid up a fine of Rs. 200.

The decisive affair of the 18th was producing good effects, not only in Ranizai, but all along the border. It was reported on good authority that the rulers of Swat had ordered Ajun Khan, Mokaram Khan, and Kalandar Khan, to quit that territory. The men of Pali had sent in for permission to wait on the Deputy Commissioner, and the Mohmand Chief of Pindiali had also sent in to make a similar request for his son.

The then force marched back through Lundkhor to McGregor's Gazetteer. Gujur Garhi, where it was broken up.

On the conclusion of these operations the following resolution of Government was communicated:—

"The Governor General in Council has much satisfaction in recording his high approbation of the conduct of the troops that Government letter. have been employed upon this service, and especially of those who have received the special notice of the Brigadier.

"The Governor General in Council begs to convey to—
Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment,
Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, 28th Native Infantry,
Lieutenant Colonel Troup, 66th Gurkhas,
Captain Coke, 1st Panjab Infantry,
Lieutenant Lumsden, Guide Corps,
Captain Jackson, 2nd Irregular Cavalry,
Captain Baldwin, Artillery,
Lieutenant Hughes, 1st Panjab Cavalry,
who were in command of their respective corps, the best thanks of the Government for their services against the Utman Khels on the 11th and 13th May."

His Lordship in Council desires also to offer his thanks to—

Lieutenant Miller, Guide Corps,
Lieutenant Norman, Brigade Major,
Ensign Lumsden, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General,
Lieutenant Maister, Acting Field Engineer,
Lieutenant Woodcock, Horse Artillery, and
Lieutenant Walker of the Bombay Engineers, whose assistance the Brigadier has acknowledged.

"To these acknowledgments the Governor General in Council desires to add the expression of his entire approbation of the conduct of the officers and soldiers of the force in the subsequent proceedings in the valley of Ranizai.

"It affords His Lordship in Council the greatest satisfaction to repeat his thanks to the officers above mentioned, in connection with their services in Ranizai; and to concur in the applause which has been justly bestowed on the whole force, and specially on the Artillery, the Gurkhas and the Guides.

"His Lordship in Council has not failed to appreciate the strong terms in which Sir Colin Campbell has noticed the valuable assistance he derived on both occasions from Lieutenant-Colonel Mansfield; Her Majesty's 53rd, who accompanied the force at his request.

"The Governor General in Council avails himself of this opportunity of recording his testimony to the merits of Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell in his command of the troops in the field.

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"His Lordship in Council is desirous of acknowledging, in the most ample terms, the ability, the personal intrepidity and activity, and the sterling soldierly qualities which this distinguished officer has displayed in the military command of the troops at Peshawar upon every occasion on which they have taken the field, as well as during the present operations against the Utman Khels and Ranizai.

The thanks of the Government were also to be conveyed to Colonel Mackeson and to Captain James, for their exertions in connection with the movements of the force."

APPENDIX.

Field Return of the Troops under command of BRIGADIER SIR C. CAMPBELL, K. C. B., employed in the operations against Shakot and Dargai on the 18th of May 1852, with Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, and Ammunition expended.

CORPS.	PRESENT ON THE FIELD.					KILLED.					WOUNDED.					HORSES.		REMARKS.				
	European officers.	Medical officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Drummers and trumpeters.	Rank and file.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Drummers and trumpeters.	Rank and file.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Drummers and trumpeters.	Rank and file.	Missing.		Killed.	Wounded.	Ammunition expended in rounds.	
1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery ..	5	1	..	6	2	76	146	Five 6-pound-ers. One 12-pounder howitzers. Two 9-pound-ers.	
Detachment, 3rd Company, 4th Battalion, Artillery, and of No. 19, Light Field Battery ..	1	3	1	20	65		
Total Artillery ..	6	1	..	9	3	96	211		
2nd Company Sappers and Miners	1	4	1	38	26		
Squadron, 2nd Irregular Cavalry	1	..	4	18	2	79		
Guide Cavalry ..	1	..	11	26	3	158	6	..	1	5	..		
2 Squadrons, 1st Panjab Cavalry ..	1	1	11	24	5	208		
Total Cavalry ..	3	1	26	68	10	445	6	..	1	5	..		
Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment ..	16	2	..	25	12	530	30	One rank and file mortally wounded.	
28th Regiment Native Infantry	7	..	13	21	11	354		
66th or Gurkha Regiment ..	11	1	14	42	12	528	1	3	6	6	2,958		
Guide Infantry ..	2	1	9	45	10	318	1	..	6	4	10	7,500		
1st Panjab Infantry ..	2	..	12	28	14	511	3	10,125		
Total { Infantry ..	38	4	48	161	59	2,236	2	..	8	4	19	20,813		
Staff ..	7	1	..		
Total ..	54	6	75	242	73	2,815	2	..	9	4	25	1	6	..		
Grand Total ..	3,265					11					29					7						

Subsequent conduct of the Swatis and Ranizais.

That Swat had been the head and front of all this offending, is evident; Mr. Temple's Report on Tribes, we had never interfered with them, but they had chosen to make war upon us. Our chief fault in their eyes was, that we were infidels by religion, and that we were the lords of a fair and fertile valley within reach of plunder. It was at one time thought that after the Utman Khel and Ranizai affairs a good opportunity presented itself of dashing up the Malakand Pass and down into the Swat Valley. A separate expedition, on a considerable scale, was also being organized during the summer of 1852. The military authorities at that time, however, considered that various difficulties existed in the execution of the plan, and the Government consented to postpone the expedition until the cold season of 1852-53, but the day of retribution to Swat never arrived. The Swat Government seem to have taken to heart the punishment inflicted on the Ranizai and Utman Khel, and to have dreaded similar operations in their valley; for they then abstained from all annoyance or hostility against the British, and the Peshawar Valley enjoyed immunity from the Swati freebooter.

In June, the month following Sir Colin Campbell's operations in Ranizai, the Ranizai people, finding themselves houseless and unable to re-settle in, or to rebuild their dismantled villages, made overtures for peace. Shortly afterwards, they tendered unconditional submission, offered to pay revenue to the British, and to suffer a fortified post to be erected in their valley. The Supreme Government declined to accept any tribute or revenue from them, only requiring them to behave as friendly and peaceable neighbours. They were accordingly excused from payment of the original fine, and they bound themselves to permit no marauders from Swat or elsewhere to pass through their lands across the British frontier, and to live at amity with the neighbouring British villages, Lundkhor and others. These arrangements were completed in September 1852.

The following is the agreement entered into on this occasion with the Ranizais:—

- I.—If the Government require us to pay revenue, we will do so.
- II.—If the Government desire to build a fort in Ranizai, they are at liberty to do so.
- III.—If we are left by the Government to re-settle by ourselves, we will do so.
- IV.—The Khans agree that they will always be ready to do service for the Government, and will not receive into their country any person evil disposed to the Government, nor give such person a road through their country.
- V.—If an army comes against us too strong for us to cope with, we will come with our families into British territory.

Since this period the Ranizai people have fulfilled their engagements. Our border has not been molested by marauders from that direction, nor has any cause for dissatisfaction on our part arisen. Indeed, so anxious have the Ranizai people been to maintain peace with us, that afterwards, when some of the leading men who had brought about the submission were killed in an internal feud, a deputation came from Ranizai to the British authorities expressly to explain that, although these men were dead, the tribe still adhered to the agreements.

It might naturally have been expected that the Padsha of Swat would have been at the head of all mischief when the troubles of 1857 overtook us. It is a remarkable fact, however, that he died on 11th May, the very day that the first news of the Mutiny reached Peshawar, so that Swat itself was simultaneously plunged into civil war, and entirely pre-occupied with its own affairs. The question was as to the succession—king or no king. Syad Mobarak Shah, son of the deceased Syad Akbar, wished to succeed his father; but the Swatis had grown tired of tithes, and called on the Akhund to excommunicate the heir apparent; both sides called in their friends and allies, and prepared to settle it with arms. It was at this juncture that 500 of the fugitive sepoy of the 55th Native Infantry, who had escaped from Colonel Nicholson's pursuit, burst upon the scene. They were at once taken into the young king's service, but after fighting one battle demanded pay. The king not being in funds borrowed Rs. 100 from the leader of the sepoy, (a grey-haired jemadar,) and distributed them among the mutineers; but when this supply was exhausted, the full extent of their folly and misery seems to have struck the hoary ringleader, for he blew out his brains. The Swatis tied a stone to his body and flung it into the river, which perhaps, after many days, may have carried it down through the cantonment at Naoshera, where the 55th Native Infantry had, month after month, drawn the high pay of the most indulgent Government in the world for doing little but pipe-clay belts, and varnish cartridge boxes.

Had the Akhund of Swat at this time, standing forward as the champion of the faith, preached a crescentade against us, and hushing intestine strife moved across the passes, and descended into the Peshawar Valley with all the prestige of the 55th sepoy in his favor, Colonel Edwardes says he did not doubt that he would have excited among our subjects that spirit of religious zeal which may be overlaid for a while, but which is never extinguished by material prosperity. Instead of this, he suddenly sided with the popular party, dismissed the 55th sepoy with guides to conduct them across the Indus, and expelled the young king from Swat.

After this, we do not appear to have come into collision with the Swatis until the Ambeyla campaign.

SECTION VII.

Expedition against certain British villages of the Utman Khels in the Lundkhor Valley, 1866.

AFTER the operations in 1849, by Colonel Bradshaw, against the Swat villages beyond our border, it was stated that opportunity was taken to destroy the village of Sangao, one of the Utman Khel villages in our own territory. In 1855 the same village was fined Rs. 200, on account of its robberies and molestations of traders from Buner, and, as a further punishment, the village was ordered to be removed from its hill position.

The measure of removal was carried out by a good deal of pressure, and after a considerable time; but in the confusion of 1857 the villagers crept back again.

The fact was only discovered by Colonel Edwardes, in 1858, after the success against Panjtar and Sittana; when thinking there was an opportunity for leniency, he imposed a small fine and allowed the old site to be re-occupied.

During the operations at Ambeyla in 1863, the hostile ranks of the Bunerwals were joined by some few of our subjects from the villages of Yusafzai, and more openly from six of these Utman Khel villages. It was the intention of the Commissioner, Major James, to have made a severe example of this disloyalty, but at the close of the Expedition, and in consideration of their numbers and of the expediency of allaying the excitement of what had been proclaimed a religious war, he contented himself, in March 1864, with summoning the council of this tract and levying a fine of Rs. 2,500. It appears that the deputation which came in represented only a portion of the tribe, many of the principal men standing aloof, partly from a sense of their culpability, and partly from a division among themselves and the malik through whom they were called. The fine was paid by all, but it may be assumed that those who presented themselves were generally of the party disposed towards our rule.

Soon after their return home, dissension broke out among them. There were many latent causes, especially that of the fine; the party who stayed away reproaching the party which presented itself. The spirit of jealousy and faction rose highest among the Ismail Khel clan in the villages of Barmul and Kui. Bazgul Malik was expelled from the former village and took refuge in Kui, and in the same way Malik Samat was expelled from Kui and repaired to Barmul.

The same separation into factions then extended itself among the Dand Khel of Pipal and Mian Khan, and a similar transfer of men took place from one side to the other, and thus the two villages of Kui and Pipal situated in the plains, in its new constitution, comprising the majority of those disposed towards the Government, found themselves opposed to Barmul and Mian Khan, joined by Sangao, which is of the same clan as Mian Khan.

Intimation of approaching hostilities (two villages on one side and three on the other) was given to the Assistant Commissioner in Yusafzai at the beginning of July 1864, and he sent to warn them against committing themselves. On 21st August, however, a regular fight with matchlock and sword

occurred between the villages of Kui and Barmul, in which several lives were lost on both sides, and several men wounded. In this the aid of villages beyond our border was brought in, and a regular warfare between these villages went on for some time. At the end of the year, attempts made by the civil officers failed to bring matters to a peaceable solution.

In February of the succeeding year (1865) a heavy fine was inflicted, and certain of the maliks were retained as hostages. These measures were not however successful, as in 1866 quarrels broke out afresh, and it was evident this state of lawlessness among our subjects must be at once suppressed, or it would infect others, and encourage them to revert to their original Pathan condition, which had only disappeared under a knowledge of our power to maintain peace and order. It was therefore determined to move out a force

Brigadier-General Dunsford's Despatch.

to compel the attendance of all the principal men and to destroy and remove the villages of Barmul and Sangao to a more accessible position in the plains, these villages being then situated in a difficult part of the country on our border with Swat and Buner.

But as three of the Utman Khel villages belonging to the Khans of Pali, beyond our border, had assisted and fomented all these disturbances, it might be necessary that they also should be punished; the position of our own villages was naturally strong, and (though not anticipated by the Commissioner) aid might be furnished, as it had been in 1849, by Swat and Buner; it was necessary therefore, in determining the strength of the force, to be prepared for all contingencies.

On the 7th January 1866, 100 sabres of the 13th Bengal Cavalry and 200 of the 27th Native Infantry were detached from Peshawar to Mardan, to enable the Corps of Guides to take the field.

The 20th Panjab Infantry had been moved up from Rawal Pindi, and a Mountain Battery and the 2nd Panjab Infantry from Abbottabad, and on the 15th January a force, as detailed in the appendix, was assembled at Naoshera under the command of Brigadier-General Dunsford, c.B., with Colonel J. R. Becher, c.B., the Commissioner of Peshawar as Political Officer.

The native troops had brought with them five days' supplies, which were to remain intact until their arrival at Mardan; the Commissariat carried twelve days' supplies for the British troops. All were supplied with sepoy's tents, and the baggage was limited to a minimum consistent with health.

The force moved the next day to Mardan, when the Commissioner reported that of the four recusant villages, the head men of Kui and Barmul had come in, that the village of Sangao had been abandoned, and that it only remained therefore to deal with Mian Khan and the Pali, Shirkhana, Zormandai. Pali villages. On the 16th the force marched to Likpani, where it had to halt the following day owing to heavy rain. The Khans of Pali then presented themselves to the Commissioner, and agreed to pay certain sums that they had obtained from our subjects, at the same time binding themselves not to interfere with any British villages, to submit all claims against British subjects to the proper authorities, and expressing penitence for the past.

On the 19th the force marched to Mian Khan. No opposition was met with; so, leaving half the force to destroy the place, Brigadier-General Dunsford proceeded with the remainder to Sangao, which was also destroyed. The inhabitants of both villages had been warned to remove their property, and it had been intended to spare the wood that it might be used in building the new villages; but notwith-

Brigadier-General Dunsford's Despatch.

Commissioner's Despatch.

standing the efforts to prevent it, some houses were burnt. The Khan of Pali was made to witness the destruction.

As only representatives of the chiefs of the Utman Khel (independent) villages of Shirkhana and Zormandai had come in, the chiefs themselves were summoned under threat of their villages being burnt, whereupon they waited on the Commissioner. The next day rain detained the troops at Mian Khan, and on the 21st the camp was moved to Tanaki, a strong column proceeding to the villages of Kui and Barmul; but as the three former were situated in the plains, and as the inhabitants sued for pardon, they were not destroyed, but a fine of two years' revenue was levied instead from the Pathan inhabitants. Barmul was then destroyed, the inhabitants unroofing the houses themselves, and the walls being destroyed by the sappers and elephants.

The force halted at Tanaki on the 22nd, whilst the Commissioner made arrangements with the Khans of Pali, Shirkhana, and Zormandai; the principal maliks, and those concerned in the late disturbances, of our own villages, were placed in confinement for judicial investigation. On the following day the force was broken up.

Colonel Becher said, the most favorable feature in the matter had been the absence of all interference with our right to punish our subjects, although the tract lay close to the Swat and Buner borders. From first to last, the Akhund of Swat had pronounced that the duty of subjects was to obey their rulers, and abstain from internecine strife. Colonel Becher said, he was much indebted to Brigadier-General Dunsford for the hearty and entire assistance he had given him, and for the advice which he had freely sought from him; and recorded his obligations to Captain Ommaney, Assistant Commissioner, who had accompanied the force, and had very successfully arranged for supplies, carriage, &c.

On the 13th February following, the Assistant Commissioner visited the new villages which had been erected, the old sites having been completely levelled by the villagers.

But the leniency shown towards the Utman Khels had not been fully appreciated by them; for, in 1872, disturbances arose consequent on the settlement operations, when troops were moved out from Mardan, and the village of Kui made over to a Khatak Chief to hold. Afterwards, the houses of the ringleaders at Kui were pulled down, and the people of the three villages of Kui, Barmul, and Mian Khel, who had abandoned their villages, being given to understand that their refusal to return would lead to the confiscation of their lands and houses, they gave in, and have since given no cause for complaint.

Marching out state of the Field Force under the command of **BRIGADIER-GENERAL DUNSFORD, C. B.**

CORPS.	OFFICERS.		RANK AND FILE.		GUNS.	REMARKS.
	British officers.	Native officers.	British.	Native.	Guns.	
D. Battery, F. Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery.	5	..	119	..	6	Four 9-pounder. } Half of the battery Two 24-pounder } with elephant howitzers. } equipment. Two 5½-inch mortars. Two 3-pounder guns; two 12-pounder howitzers.
Attock Garrison Company ..	1	..	20	
Peshawar Mountain Battery..	4	3	..	128	4	
Head-Quarters, 13th Bengal Cavalry.	5	7	..	217	..	* Includes those with Guide Cavalry.
Guide Cavalry	13	..	263	..	
Sappers and Miners, 1st and 3rd Companies.	1	2	4	103	..	
Detachment, 90th Light Infantry.	10	..	218	
Guide Infantry ..	8*	16	..	486	..	
Head-Quarters and Wing, 1st Sikh Infantry.	4	6	..	249	..	
2nd Panjab Infantry ..	7	13	..	579	..	
20th Native Infantry ..	8	16	..	543	..	
23rd Native Infantry (Pioneers)	6	14	..	573	..	
27th Native Infantry ..	8	14	..	529	..	
	57	104	351	3,670	10	

CHAPTER VI.

SECTION I.

The Mohmands.

THE Mohmands are a tribe of Pathans, who inhabit the hilly country to the north-west of Peshawar, between the Kohat and Swat Rivers.
McGregor's Gazetteer.

The Mohmands own allegiance to the Kabul Government, though subject to an almost nominal control; and by treaty made with the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, he undertook to restrain them from hostilities against British subjects. They are tolerably good soldiers, though not equal to the men of the most martial tribes.
Mr. Temple's Report on Tribes.

The Mohmands are divided into six clans, *viz.*,—Tarakzai, Alamzai, Baizai, Khwaizai, Utmanzai, and Dawizai.

Tarakzai includes the Chief of Lalpura, and the Chiefs of Mitchni and Pindiali. The former resides at Lalpura, and the latter occupy the whole of the hills adjoining the Peshawar Valley, between the points where the Kabul and Swat Rivers enter the plains, and to a distance averaging 6 *koss* from the plains. (They can turn out 2,500 fighting men.)

Alamzai includes the chiefs who hold the Panj Pao lands in British territory near Shabkadr, and a strong body of men, inhabiting a district called Kamal, north of Pindiali; their countries lie therefore immediately behind that of the Tarakzai. They are considered the best fighting men of the tribe, and possess great influence, not only from their character, but as being the principal agents for arranging for the transit of "Kafilas" through the Mohmand districts. (They can turn out 3,000 fighting men.)

Baizai is the largest clan. Its chief resides at Goshtah, and it occupies the country between the Alamzai and Bajawar, which is described as the most fertile of the whole. The inhabitants have also the reputation of being more civilized than the other branches of the tribe. (They could furnish from 10,000 to 12,000 men.)

Khwaizai, a small clan towards Kunar, the road to which place passes through their country; they are not possessed of much influence, (and can furnish 800 fighting men.)

Utmanzai, another small clan, occupying the country immediately behind Kamal. They are not considered a warlike people, and are engaged principally in agriculture. They are themselves frequently pillaged by their neighbours, (and are said to furnish only 500 men. Even this is doubtful.)

Dawizai, a similar clan, situated between the Utmanzai and Bajawar. These, too, are agricultural; (their quota of armed men is said to be 900 :—)

Abstract strength of clans.

Tarakzai	2,500
Alamzai	3,000
Khwaizai	800
Baizai	12,000
Utmanzai	500
Dawizai	900
Total						19,700

The natural resources of the Mohmand country are few. Most of the villages in the hills have a small extent of cultivation round them; the cultivable land is divided equally amongst the numbers, and each takes the produce of his fields, paying no portion as revenue.

The Mohmand country is rugged and unfruitful, especially to the south-east or portion bordering on the Peshawar Valley, between the Kabul and Swat Rivers, from which part it is least accessible. The ranges which here intersect it are rocky and void of vegetation, with craggy, broken summits. The roads in most places do not wind through the hills at their base, but generally lead over them, and are impracticable, except for footmen and the beasts of the country. The chief roads, *viz.*, those to Lalpura, Bajawar, and Kunar, and from Pindiali to Lalpura, are the best, and can be traversed by camels and horsemen; but even these are rugged and broken. There is a great scarcity of water throughout, especially in the Gandab and neighbouring districts. Gandab signifies "bad" or unwholesome water. The villages are described as poor collections of houses, situated in the valleys immediately at the foot of steep hills, with a view to their defence, and to afford but one approach to their enemies. Such precautions are necessary, in consequence of their continued feuds, which last for years, unless temporarily suspended during a general rising of the tribe, when private quarrels give away before those of the tribe in general. The houses are formed of stones and earth, and in most villages is found one of the towers well known in this country, where a protracted defence can be maintained. Water is frequently at a great distance from the villages, and obtained from springs whose supply is uncertain, and from small tanks made to retain the rain water. The women are employed in the laborious task of bringing water from those places in skins for the consumption of the village. The villages in one valley or its neighbourhood are commonly designated by one name, though each has its distinct appellation. Thus Pindiali, a district 6 *koss* from Matta, contains thirteen villages, two of which, named Dag (the residence of Nawab Khan), are situated in a plain two and a half *koss* in length and about half a mile broad; the other eleven are inside the hills, but near each other. Gandab is the principal district of the Alamzai, about 10 *koss* from Panj Pao. The valleys are small, and the villages scattered. The breadth of this district is 6 *koss*, and is a succession of hills. The villages are mostly off the road, and difficult of approach. A traveller by the main road would pass, but few, leaving the remainder to his right and left, a *koss* or more from the road. Kamal District is 6 *koss* from Pindiali, and contains eleven villages of twenty or thirty houses each; almost all the villages in the hills are enclosed with small stone "bunds," to retain the rain-water for their irrigation.

SECTION II.

Operations against the Mohmand villages of Dab by a force under
Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., October 1850.

THE Mohmands for the first five years of British rule in the Peshawar Valley gave more trouble than almost any other Tribes.

The Mitchni Mohmands, after annexation, were allowed to hold a fief in Doaba, (the fertile triangle near the junction of the Swat and Kabul Rivers,) from the British Government, of which they collected the revenue. A portion of the lands they cultivated themselves, the remainder they farmed out to other tribes of the plains as tenants.

Many of their clansmen dwelt in the plains of Mitchni, and some in the neighbouring hills. They traded in the Peshawar Valley. The Alamzai Mohmands also had a fief of Panj Pao in British Doaba, chiefly cultivated by tenants. A few of their men lived in the plains, and the majority in the hills. These also traded in the valley. The Pindiali Mohmands at a former period had held a similar jaghir in Doaba, but not since British rule. These had few relations either with the Government or the people of the Peshawar Valley. They inhabited a very strong locality in the hills. The fiefs were originally granted by preceding Governments to the Mohmands, as black-mail to buy off depredations; but molestation was not thus to be warded off.

The first inroad of the Mohmands occurred in December 1850, in an unprovoked attack on the village of Shabkadr, organized by Fateh Khan of Lalpura, who always supported and encouraged the misdeeds of the Mohmands, on account, it was said, of the British having been parties to his temporary deposition from power during the Afghan war. In March 1851,

McGregor's Gazetteer. Lieutenant James, Deputy Commissioner, reported an intended raid on the Doaba by Sadat Khan of Lalpura from Pindiali, and in March and April two attacks were actually made on Matta by Nawab Khan of Pindiali; but both were gallantly repulsed by detachments of the "Guides" under Lieutenant Miller and Resaldar Fateh Khan, respectively.

In the first affair, hearing of an intended raid by the Mohmands, Lieutenant Miller placed two companies of the Guides under Lieutenant Hawes in ambush, when the enemy were attacked on their way back, Lieutenant Miller coming up with the few cavalry he had with him, the enemy losing 5 killed and 6 wounded, the Guides 1 man.

In the second affair, the Guides had 3 men wounded, the Mohmands losing 3 killed and several wounded.

Lieutenant Lumsden's Report. To these attacks minor depredations succeeded in July 1851, headed by one Nur Gul of Panj Pao.

In August 1851, Rahimdad, a headman of Mitchni, deserted and collected 600 matchlock men, and sent them to dam up the water of a Daudzai village, but they were driven off by the villagers with some loss.

In October 1851, the Mohmands of Mitchni made a more serious attack on several British villages, and though opposed by the villagers, they succeeded in destroying many of the

crops. At length, on the 15th October, the Supreme Government deemed it necessary to direct that the Mohmand's fiefs in the Doaba should be confiscated, that the defensive posts should be strengthened, and that British troops should operate against the offending Mohmands and destroy their chief villages.

Accordingly, on the 25th October, a force, as given in the appendix, marched from Peshawar, under the command of Sir Colin Campbell, towards the Mohmand frontier.

The first day's march was to Turangzai, 8 miles, where a bridge of boats had already been constructed over the Kabul River by Lieutenant Lumsden, at Sir Colin Campbell's suggestion, in anticipation of orders for these operations, and here the force was joined by Lieutenant Lumsden with 5 companies of the Guides (about 250 men).

The next day the force continued its march to Manihiter close to the border, having crossed the Adizai by a ford. Sir Colin Campbell might with ease have pushed on to where he intended to operate, but it appeared to him more advantageous to allow time for the Deputy Commissioner to communicate with the influential people of the country, and the moral effect of the expedition to be felt, rather than to advance with greater haste. On the following day the force halted, and Sir Colin Campbell reconnoitred the villages of Dab, the inhabitants of which had been most active in causing annoyance.

The villages were flanked by mud towers commanding the river and surrounding country. The approach to them was over a succession of low, stony hills, which increased in height and precipitousness in their immediate vicinity. The villages were found deserted. On the 28th the camp was moved to within 2 miles of the villages, when news was received that a considerable body of hill men were collecting in the hills in front of Matta, at a place called Kandur.

Captain Jackson was therefore detached with the 2nd Irregular Cavalry to Matta, to protect our villages in the plains; a measure which had the desired effect, as no attempt was made.

During the 28th and 29th, the Dab villages were destroyed by a fatigue party of the Guides, and the towers, some ten in number, blown up under the direction of Captain Oldfield, R.E. The fatigue party was covered by the remainder of the force, and both in advancing and retiring each range of hills was successively occupied. A desultory matchlock fire was kept up by the mountaineers during these two days, to which Sir Colin Campbell did not think it worth while to reply; the retirement on both days was unmolested, and the villages were destroyed without our having a man wounded, and with due regard to humanity.

The force now remained in camp on the position that it had taken up, that Sir Colin Campbell might fix the site of the present fort of Mitchni, and to cover the workmen engaged in its erection. The 2nd Irregular Cavalry was posted at Shabkadr and Matta. For the first two nights, after the demolition of the villages, the picquets were molested, and on the second the hill people seemed to have increased in number; but arrangements had been made for their reception, and after being driven off, they were followed for some distance by the Guides without any loss to us.

Annoyance then ceased, the people of the newly-annexed valley of Mitchni seemed to be returning to their homes, and matters to be taking a pacific turn.

distance round the camp having been cleared and levelled, the people had not really returned to their villages; those that had come down, having done so merely to pluck the heads of their Indian corn, and then going off again to the hills.

On the 22nd a party of Mohmands had murdered 4 of the contractor's butchers in the Peshawar cantonment, wounding 3 others and carrying off some bullocks, and on the following night had set fire to a Government building and killed a man. These outrages had been planned by Sadat Khan, the Chief of Lalpura, who was then about 6 miles from the camp, in the Tartara Hills, on the right bank of the Kabul River, where he had been joined by 80 Jezails, and by Daria Khan, the partizan leader who had conducted the operations against us in the Kohat Pass the year before. He had also sent a threatening letter to Lieutenant Lumsden.

As an attempt by the Mohmands from the hills on some of our villages seemed probable, 120 sabres of the 15th Irregular Cavalry under Major Fisher were ordered out from Peshawar and posted at Mian Khel, 4 miles to the east of the camp, to which place 2 companies of the Guides were also sent, and the bridge of boats over the Kabul River was protected by the throwing up of bridge heads.

The Chief Sadat Khan had been busily engaged in arranging differences which had existed amongst the Mohmands. On the 26th he had moved to Gandao, 20 miles north of Shabkadr, where a meeting took place to determine on operations, and on the 30th November he was joined by the Chief of Bajawar with a large following.

On the nights of the 28th and 29th November, eluding our cavalry patrols, the Mohmands attacked respectively the villages of Oochawala and Mirzai—at the former only carrying off some bullocks, but killing 2 men; at the latter, wounding others, besides carrying off some property: and on the 29th November they burnt a village in the Kalil District, between Peshawar and the hills.

On the 27th a number of the enemy, creeping down from the hills, got into the sugarcane around Matta, but was quickly driven out by the 2 companies of the Guides under Lieutenant Miller.

At this time heavy patrols of cavalry were nightly on the move from Mian Khel, Shabkadr, and Matta, along the frontier, but the numerous nullahs and the broken nature of the ground rendered it impossible to prevent parties passing through to our villages along such an extended line of hills, throughout which were numerous bodies of Mohmands. Besides, the people of the hills are so similar in dress, appearance, and language, to those of the plains, that they could at all times resort to the plains; whilst no party could at any time leave our camps without information being immediately given in the hills; and as, with the exception of the Guide Corps, none of the officers or men knew "Pushtu," Sir Colin Campbell did not like to detach them to hold villages at night.

Strong fatigue parties of the troops were at this time employed carrying on the heavy work necessary for the construction of the fort.

At the beginning of December the gatherings of the Mohmands had increased so considerably, that Sir Colin Campbell deemed it right to draw in Major Fisher's detachment, which had been reinforced with 2 guns and 2 companies infantry from Mian Khel, keeping up his communication with Shabkadr by strong cavalry patrols. At the same time Captain Jackson at Matta was reinforced with 3 companies of "Gurkhas" and 2 of "Guides," having in all 415 infantry, 320 sabres, and 2 guns.

On the 7th, without any previous information having been received, Sadat Khan suddenly moved out of a gorge in the hills to the right front of camp, quickly occupying a range of hills in front with 4,000 foot and 80 or 100 horse. Sir Colin Campbell then moved out with a troop of Guide Cavalry, 2 guns, and 2 companies of infantry, to cover the return of Major Fisher, who was guarding the camels at graze.

Having seen Major Fisher safely in with his charge, Sir Colin Campbell waited till sun-set, and then retired very slowly, to prevent the enemy taking up his ground with the advantage of daylight: he however declined to follow. The practice of the artillery under Captain Carlton was the admiration of every one. The work at the fort, both by the soldiery and hired laborers, had never ceased for a moment during these occurrences.

The hills to the westward, in the neighbourhood of Dab, had also been strongly occupied by the enemy, and some 200 came in rear of the camp by the left bank of the Kabul River, but no night attack was attempted.

The General had, on seeing the force displayed, sent orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Mansfield, Her Majesty's 53rd Regiment, (who was to be at Peshawar the next day,) to march on in the afternoon with Major Waller's 2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery, 6 companies 53rd Regiment, and advance to the bridge of boats on the Kabul River.

On the night of the 7th December a patrol of 1 native officer and 30 men of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry from Matta fell in with upwards of 500 horse and foot close to the village of Banda. After a short skirmish the enemy retreated to the hills, followed by the patrol; 2 sowars were killed, and 2 sowars and 2 horses wounded.

Report by Captain Jackson.

At noon the following day, the Mohmands, numbering about 6,000, under Sadat Khan, advanced from Raghonani, and extending along the low range of hills between that place and Panj Pao, advanced in line on Matta. On the enemy coming within 900 yards the Artillery opened, when the Mohmands inclining to the left, tried to get to the rear of Captain Jackson's position, but were well stopped by the Guides under Lieutenant Miller. A company of the 66th Gurkhas and one of the Guides then advancing in skirmishing order, supported by 2 squadrons of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry, the enemy fell back to his original position on the low hills.

The two guns at Matta were in position, and the enemy in heavy masses on the hills with a nullah in their front, and Captain Jackson could not therefore attack them. All endeavours to draw them on to the plain again proved useless, and nothing further occurred. There were no casualties on our side, but the enemy suffered from the artillery fire.

Sir Colin Campbell, in reporting this affair, stated that Captain Jackson had managed it particularly well, and that great credit was due to Lieutenant Simeon of the Artillery, to Captain Garstin of the Gurkhas, and Lieutenant Miller of the Guides; and he specially alluded to the conduct of Sikandar Khan, the headman of Matta, who turned out with 300 matchlock men and rendered the most efficient assistance, thereby thoroughly compromising himself on our side.

All this day reports were rife that the Chief of Bajawar was collecting men in Pindiali in great numbers, and orders were therefore sent in the afternoon to Lieutenant-Colonel Mansfield to collect what troops he could, to meet this, and to send into Peshawar for a detachment of Her Majesty's 61st Regiment. His force accordingly bivouacked for a few hours, and then marched at 4 A.M. to Shabkadr, on which the enemy altered their intentions, and the point of attack was to be Sir Colin Campbell's camp near Dab.

Orders were now sent to Colonel Mansfield to detach a company to Matta, and to march with the remaining 5 companies, 53rd, and Major Waller's Troop, Horse Artillery, and take the enemy in flank, while Sir Colin Campbell engaged them till his arrival. Colonel Mansfield joined at 3 p.m. on the 9th, the 53rd having marched 42 miles in 30 hours, and the Horse Artillery 30 in 24 hours.

This accession of strength at once told on the enemy, and after much consultation, instead of attacking, the gathering broke up, Sadat Khan decamping to Gandao and then to Lalpura.

In his report of these affairs, Sir Colin Campbell expressed his grateful sense of the willingness and alacrity displayed by the troops of all ranks during the incessant fatigue caused by the alternation of work at the fort, and the necessary vigilance for the safety of the country with the very small force at his disposal. The officers specially named by Sir Colin Campbell, were Lieutenant-Colonel Troup, commanding 66th Gurkhas, 2nd in command of the force, Captain Jackson, commanding 2nd Irregular Cavalry, Lieutenant Hughes, 2nd Irregular Cavalry, who had been in command of a detachment at Shabkadr, Major Fisher, commanding 15th Irregular Cavalry, Lieutenant Hardinge; commanding Guide Cavalry, Lieutenant Norman, Brigade Major, and Major Haythorne, 98th Regiment, A. D. C.; and the Gov-

Government letter.

ernor General directed that the expression of satisfaction with which the Government of India regarded their conduct might be conveyed to Brigadier-General Sir Colin Campbell and the officers named by him. And it was added, that the same expression of satisfaction was due to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the force of whose alacrity and good conduct the Brigadier-General had spoken in terms of merited applause.

After this nothing of moment occurred; the enemy appeared to have entirely dispersed, and the only cases were some of robbery with violence in the neighbourhood of the camp.

On the 25th December the Guide Corps was detached to Yusafzai, as hostilities were threatening on the part of the Swatis, and as the fort was rapidly approaching completion. On the 28th December the detachment 61st Regiment, with 4 guns of the Field Battery, returned to Peshawar, followed on the 2nd January by the remaining 2 guns and detachment 98th Regiment.

On the 1st January as the parapet of the fort was finished, the barracks roofed in, &c., &c., Sir Colin Campbell established his head-quarters at Mian Khel, leaving the garrison* of the fort under Captain Hicks, 15th Irregular Cavalry. On the 2nd the Brigadier-General moved to Panj Pao, where the civil authorities were engaged in settling various points connected with the lands around belonging to individuals of the Mohmand tribe, when the presence of the force had a good effect in hastening the desired settlement. On the 3rd the detachment, 15th Irregular Cavalry returned to Peshawar. Matta was at this time held by the head-quarters, 2nd Irregular Cavalry, and a company of Her Majesty's 53rd and of the 66th Gurkhas.

On the 3rd January a picquet of 23 sabres, 2nd Irregular Cavalry, were posted about a mile beyond the village of Panj Pao, when the enemy showed in considerable force, driving in two of the videttes. Lieutenant R. T. Hughes, 2nd in command of that regiment, proceeded therefore at once to the picquet with

Report by Lieutenant Hughes.

* 12 British Artillery men.
50 Sabres, 15th Irregular Cavalry.
3 Companies, 71st Native Infantry.
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant Boulnois.

20 more men. Advancing to reconnoitre, the party under Lieutenant Hughes came suddenly upon a party of some 50 of the enemy, who from the cover of rocks and brushwood opened a matchlock fire upon them.

When Lieutenant Hughes, displaying great decision and gallantry, and setting an example which was well followed by his men, immediately charged and pursued the enemy to the foot of the first high range of hills, not fewer than 15 of their number being left dead on the ground, many more creeping away, badly wounded, and one being taken prisoner.

The 2nd Irregular Cavalry lost—

Killed	...	1 sowar.
Wounded	...	3 sowars (2 severely).
		1 officer's charger (Lt. Hughes).
		5 troop horses.

The ground over which the charge had been made was ill-suited to the operations of cavalry, being much broken and intersected by ravines; and as the enemy was mustering in masses on the heights above, Lieutenant Hughes did not think advisable to attempt a further pursuit.

On the 3rd February, Sir Colin Campbell returned to Mian Khel to blow up some eleven or twelve towers and several fortified enclosures, the safety of the road to Mitchni requiring their destruction.

On the 7th the force changed ground to Shabkadr, to be present whilst the villages of Panj Pao, close to the hills, were being levelled, as the inhabitants had been made by the civil authorities to remove to a site nearer the fort of Shabkadr, and consequently more under our control,—these villages having been generally the point of rendezvous of the parties who from time to time had started on plundering expeditions into the plains.

A police post at Matta had now been established, and the troops were therefore withdrawn from there.

It was said Sadat Khan was at a place a few miles from Pindiali, but to have failed to obtain assistance from the chief of that tract, who had kept quite aloof from him; and that the Alamzai, who had entered into terms with Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner, early in the previous month, had also refrained from assisting him.

With the additional police arrangements that had been completed, and with the military posts at Shabkadr and Mitchni, the civil authorities considered there was no longer any necessity for the force* remaining out, and it accordingly returned on the 14th February to Peshawar.

* 2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.

Head-Quarters, 6 Companies, 53rd Regiment.

66th Gurkhas.

Head-Quarters, 5 Troops, 2nd Irregular Cavalry.

Peshawar Field Force, October 1851.

Brigadier-General Sir C. Campbell, K.C.B., commanding.

Staff.

Lieutenant H. W. Norman, Brigade Major.

Captain Oldfield, R. E., Field Engineer.

Political Officer.

Captain H. B. Lumsden, Deputy Commissioner.

Effective Strength of the Force.

	OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.		DRUMMERS AND TRUMPETER.		RANK & FILE.	
	European.	Native.	European.	Native.	European.	Native.	European.	Native.
3rd Company, 1st Battalion Artillery, and with No. 17, Horse Field Battery	3	...	5	3	2	...	49	76
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners ...	1	2	1	4	...	1	...	29
Detachment, Her Majesty's 61st Regiment ...	6	...	10	...	4	...	170	...
Detachment, Her Majesty's 98th Regiment ...	6	...	10	...	4	...	171	...
Head-Quarters, 66th Gurkha Regiment ...	12	8	2	23	...	16	...	350
Wing, 71st Native Infantry ...	6	8	1	17	...	8	...	266
2nd Irregular Cavalry ...	4	11	...	43	...	5	...	256
Total ...	38	29	29	90	10	30	390	977
Grand Total ...	67		119		40		1,367	

SECTION III.

Affair at Panj Pao under Brigadier-General Sir Colin Campbell, April 1852.

On the 30th of March news was received at Fort Shabkadr that the Mohmands had collected in the hills in front, and detachments were held ready to turn out at a moment's warning. About 3-30 A.M. of the 31st, a shot being fired at the village of Shabkadr, Captain J. L. Walker of the 71st Native Infantry, commanding the out-post, immediately moved out with 60 of his infantry, but the enemy were in retreat before he could come up with them.

Report by Captain J. L. Walker.

Lieutenant Tottenham, commanding a troop of the 7th Bengal Light Cavalry, had at once detached a division (40 sabres) of the troop, (which had been held in readiness under Subadar Bulwunt Sing,) to cut off the retreat of the enemy, whilst he followed with the remainder.

Lieutenant Tottenham's Report.

The position taken up by this division was most favorable for the purpose, and as 250 of the enemy were advancing on it with a brisk matchlock fire, Lieutenant Tottenham, who had joined it with 8 or 9 men, after posting the 2nd division to cut off the enemy's retreat in another direction, advanced to charge, but with the exception of the Subadar, and a Havildar, Sheikh Husein Bux, and a Trumpeter, Karram Ali, not a man followed him. Riding back, he entreated his men to follow him as the enemy passed their flank, but in vain; and although Lieutenant Tottenham afterwards got this detachment to follow after the enemy to the foot of the hills, no order, no entreaty, no example, could get them to charge. Both the Subadar and the Trumpeter had their horses wounded.

The 2nd division appear to have done well, killing 1 man and having several horses wounded.

The enemy, who numbered 400 foot men and 60 horse, had 2 killed and several wounded, and left several stand of arms on the ground, with two prisoners. Two of their horses were killed, one was recognized as belonging to Naoroz, Sadat Khan's son. Nothing was carried off by the Mohmands from the village, but a policeman had been wounded.

Our casualties had been heavy, viz:—

7th Light Cavalry—killed 2 horses, wounded 2 R. and F. 18 horses.

From the end of the month of March, reports had been rife that Sadat

Sir Colin Campbell's Despatch.

Khan had been making great efforts to conciliate differences among the various Mohmand tribes, in view to again attempting the recovery of the lands we had annexed; and about the middle of April it was said that he had succeeded in his endeavours, and that large bodies of men had collected for the purpose. But the Commissioner, Colonel Mackeson, doubted the truth of these reports and was averse to the display of a force, unless actually required; under the apprehension of investing hostile chiefs with notions of importance as to their power to draw troops out and give trouble.

However as Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner, who was at Shabkadr collecting information, believed the intentions of the hill men were serious, Sir Colin Campbell, bearing in mind his responsibility for the posts held by detachments of regular troops, determined to strengthen Shabkadr, but not

to any great extent with reference to the Commissioner's views, and 2 Horse Artillery guns and 150 Native Cavalry were accordingly sent out. Sir Colin Campbell proceeding himself to Shabkadr to judge with his own eyes if Sadat Khan would show his strength.

In this he was gratified; for on the 15th April, about 3 p.m., hill men debouched from the Permanah direction, in numbers certainly not less than 6,000 matchlock men and about 80 sowars. These people then moved along the foot of the first range of hills, in front of Shabkadr, in very fair order, their cavalry and a crowd of matchlock men coming across a table land, the summit of which overhangs the ruined villages of Panj Pao. The direction of the movement of the main body was towards Matta.

Before displaying a single soldier, Sir Colin Campbell allowed this movement to become quite pronounced. He then issued from the fort with two guns of the 2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant Mackinnon, 87 troopers, 7th Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant Saunders, and 179 sowars, 15th Irregular Cavalry, under Captain Hicks.

The enemy's cavalry with a crowd of matchlock men then occupied the edge of the table land, thus screening the movement towards Matta. Having dispersed this party with a discharge of artillery, the General crowned the low hills at a gallop, and established the guns in rear of the people, whose movement has been described. He was confident that this was the most certain method of averting mischief from Matta. The practice of the two guns was very good, and the enemy soon began to shake in their purpose and to forsake the table land. Sir Colin Campbell followed them, but they showed great dexterity in availing themselves of the ground to avoid the artillery fire. Their masses were now broken. The pursuit lasted for about a mile and a half, being brought to a termination by some low ravines, which were strongly held within half musket shot of the hills.

The wonderful rapidity and determination showed by the enemy, when on account of approaching darkness it was deemed prudent for the force to retire, were very admirable. The guns were hardly limbered up, the gunners had actually not mounted, when a shout ran down their whole line, and swarms rushed forward, taking advantage of every accident of ground, shewing that few equal them in individual action in a broken country. They evidently thought their turn was now come. But the guns were instantly unlimbered, and double charges of grape checked their wild but really gallant attack. It must be remembered that these mountaineers had been for two hours exposed to a cannonade, to which they had no means to reply.

The force then retreated across the table land at a foot's pace, the guns taking up successive positions at every 300 yards and keeping up a fire of grape, loss was thus avoided, and the most perfect order preserved, while the General had reason to know that at this juncture the enemy suffered heavily.

The infantry from the fort had been sent for by Sir Colin Campbell, thinking they might be useful in passing the ruined villages of Panj Pao, but they were not found necessary.

The action had on our side been one of artillery, the duties of the cavalry having been restricted to covering the guns in the face of the very large body opposed to the force. Sir Colin Campbell in his despatch particularly dwelt on the gallantry and steadiness of the artillery under the command of Lieutenant Mackinnon, and Lieutenant Blunt who had accompanied his brother officer as a volunteer. It was owing to the *firmness and dash* of this very slender detachment that he was enabled, he said, to drive back 6,000 men, and to retreat when it was necessary without loss.

Sir Colin Campbell said, he had to return his very particular thanks to his staff officers, Brigade Major Norman, and Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General, Lieutenant Lumsden, and to Captain James, Deputy Commissioner, who acted as Aide-de-Camp throughout the afternoon. He also begged to acknowledge his obligation to Captain Hicks and Lieutenant Saunders, commanding the cavalry detachments, for the steadiness and coolness with which they carried out the directions issued in the perpetual manœuvres required for the protection of the guns.

The strength of the force and the detail of casualties are given in the Appendix.

For some days previously, 500 Rank and File and the Head-Quarters of Her Majesty's 53rd had been held in readiness at Peshawar, to move at an hour's notice with the aid of elephants. And the Deputy Commissioner made such earnest representation of the fear pervading the country in consequence of the paucity of the troops, and the number of armed enemies in the immediate neighbourhood, that 6 companies of that Regiment and 4 guns, 2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery, were ordered out on the 16th, the former coming on elephants.

But the enemy had been so disheartened by their defeat on the 15th, that on the 17th news was received of their having dispersed, and on the 18th the troops which had been sent for, returned to Peshawar.

Sir Colin Campbell alluded in a very particular manner to the successful exertions of Captain Reddie, Assistant Commissary-General, when large detachments had on this and former occasions suddenly moved out, and when every want had been supplied,

The approbation of the Governor General in Council, and the sense entertained by the Government of the political value of striking such a blow, were then conveyed to Sir Colin Campbell and the officers and troops which were under his command, "when the combined Mohmand tribes had been defeated by so small a British force."

Return of Troops under command of Brigadier SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., engaged with the Mohmands on the heights of Panj Pao on the evening of the 15th April 1852.

CORPS.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Trumpeters and drummers.	Rank and file.	Total of all ranks.	Horses.	ORDNANCE.	
								6-pounder gun.	12-pounder howitzer.
Detachment. 2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery ...	2	...	2	1	29	34	40	1	1
Detachment, 7th Light Cavalry ...	1	3	5	1	87	97	97
Ditto, 15th Irregular Cavalry ...	1	10	27	2	179	219	219
Ditto, 29th Regiment, Native Infantry ...	2	4	5	2	155	168
Ditto, 71st ditto ditto ...	2	1	5	2	72	82
Total ...	8	18	44	8	522	600	386	1	1

Return of Killed and Wounded, with Ammunition expended by the Troops under command of Brigadier SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, K.C.B., on the 15th April 1852.

CORPS.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		HORSES.		REMARKS.
	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	Killed.	Wounded.	
Detachment, 2nd Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.	1	Ammunition expended by artillery. Round shot ... 32 Common shells ... 8 Spherical " ... 28 Case shot ... 13 Total ... 76
Detachment, 7th Light Cavalry.	
Detachment, 15th Irregular Infantry.	...	2	2	3	4	11	
Detachment, 29th Regiment Native Infantry.	2	
Detachment, 71st Regiment Native Infantry.	
Total	2	2	6	4	11	No ammunition expended by infantry. <i>N. B.</i> —The police sowars had 3 men wounded, 1 horse killed and 1 wounded.

SECTION IV.

Expedition against the Mitchni Mohmands by a force under Colonel Cotton, 1854.

IN the month of July following, the Mitchni and Panj Pao Mohmands exiled

Mr. Temple's Report on Tribes. from house and lands, and cut off from trade and such like relations in the plains, tendered submission, and prayed for restoration to their fiefs. They were restored on condition of paying a yearly tribute of Rs. 600 for Mitchni, and Rs. 200 for Panj Pao. The amounts fixed were merely nominal; but, for example's sake, it was necessary to demand some payment, lest immunity in this respect should encourage our own subjects to misbehave in the hope of avoiding the just dues of Government, or embolden our neighbours to harass in hope of extorting landed grants. On this, as on other occasions connected with the independent tribes, the Panjab Government declared that revenue was not wanted, but only a quiet frontier.

The Alamzai or Panj Pao Mohmands did not subsequently give cause for dissatisfaction, but remained in the enjoyment of their fief. This tract, however, is just within range of the guns at the Shabkadr Fort.

And the Mitchni Mohmands did not again overtly misbehave, as a tribe, until the autumn of 1854; but towards the close of 1852 Lieutenant Boulnois

McGregor's Gazetteer. of the Engineers was shot by some men of this tribe.

He was engaged in the construction of the Mitchni Fort, and had ridden out with other officers of the garrison to a considerable distance; when leaving them, and incautiously cantering up to a tower near the entrance of a gorge nearly 3 miles from the fort, some men who had been previously concealed, fired a volley and killed him. His body was carried off, but was recovered through the instrumentality of the Thannadar of Mian Khel.

This atrocity, perfectly unprovoked as it was, indicated the worst possible

Mr. Temple's Report on Tribes. spirit. In the autumn of 1854 two years' tribute was due, but payment was withheld, and the Chief, Rahimdad, fled from Peshwar, whither he had been summoned. Under such circumstances flight was tantamount to rebellion. The greatest patience and forbearance had been shewn towards the Mohmands by

Report by Major Edwardes' Commissioner. Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner, in regard to the payment of these arrears; but it was now evident that there remained nothing but attaching their property to the amount of the arrears due, with the addition of a fine for giving so much trouble. The Commissioner therefore requested that a force might be sent out to Mitchni to support the Deputy Commissioner, in case the Mohmands should resist the civil power; that a company of infantry might be placed in Mian Khel for its protection; and that patrols might be sent to seize all cattle moving off to the hills.

2 Guns, 1/3 Horse Artillery. On the evening of the 22nd August, a column of the strength, detailed in the margin, moved out from Peshawar under the command of Major C. T. Chamberlain, 1st Irregular Cavalry.

2nd Co. Sappers and Miners. 3 Cos., 4th Native Infantry. 1 Squadron, 1st Irregular Cavalry. On the orders reaching the fort of Mitchni for the capture of cattle, Lieutenant Brownlow, 1st Sikh Infantry, who was in command there, succeeded in capturing 1,100 head and the horse of Rahimdad's son.

On the 23rd, as it was known that some 200 armed men had come down to the village of Sadin on the invitation of Rahimdad Khan, Major Chamberlain moved out with the artillery and cavalry, and the guns opening on them, they dispersed.

The Commissioner, Major Edwardes, had gone out to Mitchni, and on the 26th August, in a letter to the Major-General commanding at Peshawar, he thus stated our position with the Mohmands.

The capture of Rahimdad's cattle, (in the act of being driven off across the frontier,) secured a much larger amount than the tribute Rs. 600 due to Government. But it was necessary to make arrangements for the lapsed shares of the Mitchni jaghir. The zemindars of the plain, our own subjects, were quite willing to become responsible for the revenue, provided that they were secured from constant raids by the nearest independent villages of the fugitive hill chiefs, viz., Dab, Sadin, and Shah Musa Khel. The two former belonged to Rahimdad, and had been partially destroyed by Sir Colin Campbell's force in 1852. Musa Khel was just beyond them, on the left bank of the Kabul River, 5 miles from the Mitchni Fort, and beyond it there was no other Mohmand village for many miles. If these villages were left close to our border, in the hands of hostile Mohmands, they would become nests of robbers and convenient depositories for plunder. The Commissioner concurred in the Deputy Commissioner's opinion that these villages should be destroyed, and never allowed to be re-occupied. The necessary military measures to effect this were therefore solicited, but the force required to be strong enough to meet any resistance the Lalpura Chief might send to Rahimdad.

On the 27th, the following troops began moving on Mitchni:—

2 Guns, 4 Howitzers, Mountain Train.
1 Squadron, 10th Light Cavalry.
200 Men, Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment.
Head-Quarters, 7 companies, 9th Native Infantry.
1st Sikh Local Infantry.

This force, which was to co-operate with that already at Mitchni, was to be commanded by Colonel S. Cotton, 22nd Foot.

The fort of Abazai was temporarily occupied by 3 companies, 62nd Native Infantry, and a squadron, 14th Irregular Cavalry; that of Shabkadr by 3 companies, 4th Native Infantry, and 1 squadron, 16th Irregular Cavalry—60 Infantry were detached to Mian Khel Thannah, 3 companies of the 1st Native Infantry relieving them at Mitchni.

At daylight on the morning of the 31st August, a force as per margin,

2nd Company, 2nd Battalion Artillery, with Mountain Train attached.

2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.

1 Troop, 10th Light Cavalry.
2 Companies, Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment.
9th Native Infantry.
1st Sikh Local Infantry.

under the command of Colonel Cotton, moved from Mitchni along the left banks of the river towards Musa Khel.

Major Chamberlain's column consisting of—

2 Guns, 1st Troop, 3rd Brigade, Horse Artillery,
2 24-Pounder Howitzers, 2nd Company, 2nd Battalion Artillery,
3 Companies, 1st Native Infantry,
1 Squadron, 1st Irregular Cavalry,

had been previously encamped on the right bank of the river ready to

Colonel Cotton's Despatch. co-operate with the other column.

The 1st Sikh Infantry under the command of Major Gordon, in skirmishing order, formed the advance of Colonel Cotton's (or the left) column;

but no opposition was offered at the villages of Sadin or Dab, the enemy falling back on Shah Musa Khel:

Major Chamberlain had now advanced his artillery under Major Brind to an elevated plateau commanding the town of, and approaches to, Shah Musa Khel, and its fire had partially cleared the village; but this necessarily ceased as the head of the left column approached it, and the 1st Sikh Infantry were met by a sharp matchlock fire from the towers, walls, and houses: however, they quickly cleared the street, driving the enemy to the heights above.

Before the destruction of the village and towers could be commenced, it was necessary to seize all the commanding positions; for which purpose a strong party of skirmishers of the 9th Native Infantry with the Rifle Company under Captain D. M. Stewart, the whole commanded by Captain Murray of the 9th Native Infantry, together with 2 companies of the 1st Sikh Infantry under Lieutenant Brownlow, were ordered to drive the enemy from their several positions and to crown the heights; ably assisted by a well-directed fire from the Mountain Guns under Captain Brougham.

The hills to the north-east of the town being occupied and held by some companies of the 1st Sikh Infantry under Major Gordon.

The village and towns were now completely destroyed under the direction of Lieutenant Hyde Engineers, and Ensign Ruxton commanding the Sappers; about 500 maunds of grain was either carried away or destroyed, the houses were levelled by elephants, and all the timber work burnt, but time did not admit of the trees being cut down.

Although the enemy only numbered some 200, the heights had not been occupied without a struggle, and the troops holding them were during the whole time exposed to an unceasing and galling fire from the neighbouring ridges, causing some loss (see appendix), including Lieutenant C. H. Brownlow, of the 1st Sikh Infantry, and Lieutenant C. A. McDougall, Adjutant, 9th Native Infantry, who were both dangerously wounded, and whose gallantry in holding the heights had been most conspicuous. As soon as the village had been completely destroyed, these covering parties were recalled under cover of the Mountain guns.

The force then retired from Musa Khel covered by the guns on the right bank of the river, and camp was reached at 4-30 P. M.

As far as could be ascertained, the loss of the enemy had been 4 killed and 12 wounded.

On the 2nd September the troops under Colonel Cotton advanced on Dab and Sadin, supported by Major Chamberlain's detachment on the right bank of the river. No opposition was offered by the Mohmands, although they were in as great force as at Musa Khel, the guns on the right bank keeping them in check. The total destruction of these villages having been effected by 2 P.M., the troops returned to camp when their return march to Peshawar was commenced.

Colonel Cotton in his despatch reported most favorably of the conduct of the troops who had shown throughout the greatest activity, gallantry, and zeal. The heat had been at times excessive, and the exposure great.

He alluded to the valuable and cordial assistance of the Deputy Commissioner, Captain James, who had accompanied the force throughout.

The officers whose services Colonel Cotton specially alluded to were—

Major Chamberlain, 1st Irregular Cavalry, 2nd in command of the force.

Major G. Gordon, commanding 1st Sikh Local Infantry.

„ J. Brind, commanding the Artillery.

Captain T. Brougham, commanding the Mountrain Train.

„ G. A. Robinson, commanding Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment.

„ J. Murray, commanding 9th Regiment Native Infantry.

Lieutenant O. Wilkinson, commanding a detachment, 10th Light Cavalry.

„ H. Hyde, Engineers.

Ensign E. Ruxton, commanding 2nd Company, Sappers and Miners.

Lieutenant H. W. Norman, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.

„ P. S. Lumsden, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General.

Captain R. Blackall, Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment, and Officiating Brigade Major.

Major W. W. Davidson, 16th Irregular Cavalry, Aide de-Camp.

With regard to these operations, it was stated that the Governor General

Government letter.

in Council considered the affair reflected the greatest credit on Colonel Cotton, and all who were employed

under him; and directed that the thanks of the Government might be conveyed to Colonel Cotton, and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers under his command during the service. It was further stated: "The Governor General in Council perceives with regret that two officers, Lieutenant Brownlow, Adjutant of the 1st Sikh Corps, and Lieutenant McDougall, Adjutant of the 9th Regiment Native Infantry, have been severely wounded."

"His Lordship in Council observes that, while describing the conduct of all who were serving under him in very favorable terms, Colonel Cotton specially records that 'the gallantry of both of these young officers in holding the heights was most conspicuous;' such conduct, involving them in severe suffering by their wounds, is very highly appreciated by His Lordship in Council."

Immediately after these operations, the well-affected Mohmands of Mitchni, who had remained on the jaghir when Rahimdad fled, deposited their quota of tribute with the Deputy Commissioner, as a proof of their adherence to the original terms pending the final orders of Government.

A settlement of the Mitchni fief was then made. The faithful Mohmands

Mr. Temple's Report on Tribes. who stood by their lands continue to pay their quota of the tribute. The lands of the Mohmands who fled, were farmed out and assessed with revenue. Rahimdad was not restored, and he occasionally committed raids on that portion of our border. Towards the close of 1854, he appeared at Peshawar under a safe conduct to pray for restoration to the fief, but as he did not, and indeed could not, offer any security for good conduct, he was sent back across the frontier and forbidden to re-enter British territory.

Field state of a Force which was employed in the capture and destruction of the Towns of Shah Musa Khel, Sadin, and Dab, under the command of COLONEL SYDNEY COTTON.

TROOPS.	European officers.	Native officers.	Sergeants or havildars.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Privates.	REMARKS.
Horse Artillery ...	1	...	2	6	1	30	{ With Major Chamberlain's force on right bank of river.
Foot Artillery ...	2	...	2	4	1	33	
Mountain Train ...	4	...	2	9	2	76	
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners	1	2	2	4	1	41	
10th Light Cavalry ...	1	2	4	4	...	67	
Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment ...	7	...	10	4	4	186	With Major Chamberlain's force.
1st Native Infantry ...	2	4	13	15	3	192	
9th Native Infantry ...	5	11	36	31	7	389	With Major Chamberlain's force.
1st Sikh Local Infantry ...	3	8	23	26	12	350	
1st Irregular Cavalry ...	2	6	15	...	2	112	
Total ...	28	33	109	103	33	1,476	

Return of Ammunition expended by the Troops under the command of COLONEL S. J. COTTON at the destruction of the Villages of Shah Musa Khel, Sadin, and Dab.

TROOPS.	Shrapnell shell.	Case shot.	Round shot.	Balled ammuni- tion.	REMARKS.
Horse Artillery	17	12	Of which, 8,221 were rifle ammunition.
Foot "	5	...	28	...	
Mountain Train	101	80	30	...	
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners	
10th Light Cavalry	
Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment	1,055	
9th Regiment, Native Infantry	5,553	
1st Regiment, Sikh Local Infantry	10,711	
<i>Troops on the right bank of the Kabul River.</i>					
Detail of Artillery	17	12	28	...	
Detachment, 1st Regiment Native Infantry "	
1st Irregular Cavalry	
Total	140	140	86	17,319	

Return showing the number of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Troops employed under command of COLONEL S. COTTON, at the attack on, and destruction of, the Towns and defensive Towers of Shah Musa Khel, Sadin, and Dab, on the 31st of August 1854.

	KILLED.					WOUNDED SEVERELY.					WOUNDED SLIGHTLY.					MISSING.					TOTAL.
	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	Camp followers.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	Camp followers.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	Camp followers.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	Camp followers.	
Horse Artillery
Foot Artillery
Mountain Train	1	1
2nd Company, Sappers and Miners
10th Light Cavalry
Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment	4
9th Regiment, Native Infantry	1	...	1	1	1	12
1st Sikh, Local Infantry	1	...	2	6	1	2	17
Total	1	...	2	...	2	8	2	2

Detail of Officers wounded.

RANK AND NAMES.	REGIMENT.	REMARKS.
Lieutenant and Acting 2nd in Command, C. H. Brownlow.	1st Sikh, Local Infantry.	Dangerously.
Lieutenant and Adjutant, C. A. McDougall.	9th Regiment, Native Infantry.	Dangerously.

The Pindiali Mohmands continued to misbehave, committing the following raids on British territory :—
McGregor's Gazetteer.

(1.) On the 20th January 1855, 30 of them attacked the village of Garhi Nasir, and wounded 2 of the villagers.

(2.) On the 20th January 1855, a party of unknown strength carried off 57 goats and sheep from the grazing ground after a skirmish with the police and troops.

(3.) On the 21st February 1855, a party of Mohmands came down; and on the 11th March 1855, 20 Mohmands came to Shabkadr after some mischief, when 2 of them were captured.

(4.) On the 14th March 1855, 30 Mohmands carried off 40 bullocks from the village of Matta.

In March 1855, when Sirdar Gulam Haidar Khan was at Peshawar, he interceded with the Chief Commissioner for the restoration of the Mohmand Chiefs to favour, which was afterwards also solicited by the Amir; but it was felt this could not be granted.

On the 24th March 1855, 300 Mohmands carried off 77 bullocks, when the troops moving out from Shabkadr and Abazai, consisting of detachments, 16th Irregular Cavalry, 10th Light Cavalry, 1st Sikh Infantry, and 62nd Native Infantry, under Major Gordon, 1st Sikh Infantry, a skirmish ensued, in which 1 duffadar of police and 1 villager were killed, and Ensign Bradford and 1 sepoy, 62nd Native Infantry, wounded. The satisfaction of Government at the affair was conveyed to the officers concerned.

Report by Brigadier Halifax.

On the 11th April 1855, 10 Mohmands came out of the hills, but the officer in command of the Shabkadr Fort on being informed, moved with some troops and drove the party back into the hills.

On the 5th May 1855, 1,000 Mohmands issued from the hills, and, being met by the troops of the fort, were driven back, with a loss of 2 sepoys killed on our side.

On the 6th June 1855, 15 Mohmands carried off 29 bullocks and 1 villager from the village of Matta.

On the 8th June 1855, a party carried off 25 bullocks from their grazing ground.

On the 11th June 1855, 3 Mohmands carried off 200 bullocks and 1 villager from their grazing ground.

On the 2nd July 1855, 8 Mohmands came out from the hills to raid, but were driven back by the villagers and police.

On the 20th July 1855, 25 Mohmands carried off 70 goats, and wounded 1 villager on the high road.

On the 30th July 1855, some Mohmands carried off 52 bullocks from their grazing ground, but were driven back by the troops from the fort.

On the 20th August 1855, a party attacked the village of Garhi Sadar and killed a villager.

On the 30th August 1855, 6 Mohmands carried off 14 bullocks, and attacked the village of Mian Isa and wounded a villager.

On the 15th September 1855, 200 Mohmands carried off 52 bullocks at graze before aid could be sent.

On the 8th September 1855, 200 Mohmands came out of the hills, robbed and wounded a villager, and skirmished with the troops and police.

On the 16th September 1855, a party of 300 Mohmands came out of their hills and fired at the troops, who had turned out on their approach, wounding 2 sowars and 1 sepoy.

On the 26th October 1855, 10 Mohmands came out of the hills for a raid, and were driven back by the police.

On the 11th November 1855, 12 Mohmands carried off 7 bullocks from the village of Marozai, and wounded 2 villagers.

On the 17th November 1855, a party carried off 3 bullocks from the village of Hasazai, and wounded 1 villager.

On the 27th November 1855, 30 Mohmands attempted to carry off some cattle at graze, but were driven back by the police and troops.

On the 28th November 1855, 16 Mohmands carried off 100 goats and sheep from the grazing ground, with the man in charge.

On the 8th September 1855, 12 Mohmands carried off a man from the village of Chukri.

On the 1st January 1856, 40 Mohmands came from the hills, but were driven back by the troops and police.

On the 7th January 1856, 12 Mohmands carried off 5 bullocks from the village of Ghaziband.

On the 10th January 1856, 52 Mohmands attacked the village of Shahi Kulali, killed 1 and wounded 2 men.

On the 10th February 1856, 300 Mohmands came from the hills and skirmished with the troops and police.

On the 22nd February 1856, 600 Mohmands came from the hills and skirmished with the troops and police.

On the 8th May 1856, a party of Mohmands attempted to carry off some cattle at graze, but were driven back by the villagers and police.

On the 27th May 1856, a party of Mohmands carried off some cattle of the village of Khutki, which were recovered by the police, and the Mohmands driven back.

On the 24th August 1856, 60 Mohmands came down to carry off some cattle at graze, but were driven back by the villagers and police.

On the 21st October 1856, a party of Mohmands attacked some villagers of Matta, who had gone into the hills for stone, and killed 2 of them.

On the 9th November 1856, a party of Mohmands wounded a villager near the village of Matta.

On the 14th November 1856, a party of Mohmands carried off 200 goats and sheep and wounded 1 villager.

On the 2nd January 1857, 15 Mohmands killed a villager of Matta Moghal Khel, who was grazing his cattle towards the hills, and carried off his cattle.

On the 5th January 1857, 3 Mohmands waylaid and plundered 4 people of the Doaba as they crossed a ravine in British territory on the Mohmand border.

On the 5th February 1857, 100 Mohmands carried off 51 cattle belonging to the village of Satmara and Garhi Sadar, which were grazing towards the hills.

On the 24th March 1857, 60 Mohmands carried off 25 bullocks belonging to the villages of Matta Moghal Khel.

On the 30th April 1857, 200 Mohmands made a raid on the Matta cattle, and were repulsed by the villagers, with the loss of 1 man killed and 2 wounded, on our side, but no cattle were carried off.

On the 29th May 1857, a party of Mohmands waylaid a villager in British territory on the Mohmand border and killed him.

On the 28th June 1857, 15 Mohmands carried off 2 boys of Shabkadr, who were grazing cattle towards the hills.

On the 18th July 1857, 12 Mohmands killed a villager of Matta, who had gone towards the hills to cut grass and wood.

These continued raids were made the subject of conversation by Sir John Lawrence with the Amir Dost Mahomed during his visit to Peshawar in January 1857, but no satisfactory result followed.

It was evident that Sadat Khan and others hoped that the British Government would at last be driven, by perpetual annoyances on its border, to grant some rich fiefs, and preliminary arrangements were under discussion for the advance of a force to Pindiali, when the mutinies broke out in India, and our attention was more pressingly directed to other quarters.

Mr. Temple's Report on Tribes.

Notwithstanding that the Mutiny gave the Mohmands an excellent opportunity of increasing their annoyance, yet they showed no signs of profiting by it; their raids continued it is true, but they were not of a more formidable nature.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

But in the middle of August, a fanatical Kunar Syad, named Syad Amir, after in vain endeavouring to raise the Khaibar against us, betook himself to the Mohmands of Mitchni. They received him with open arms and gave him protection, while he sent incendiary letters and arms to the troops at Peshawar.

On the 9th September, with the aid of the Shah Mansur Khel Mohmands and 40 or 50 rebel sepoys of the 51st Native Infantry, he made a night attack on the fort of Mitchni, but the garrison, being composed of a party of the Khelat-i-Ghilzai Regiment, were staunch and beat them off.

The Mohmands were now in a state of the highest excitement, and sent the "fiery cross" to all their neighbours, being evidently determined to strike a blow for the recovery of their fiefs.

As there were no troops to move out against them, Colonel Edwardes had to yield with as good grace as possible. He sent them word that they were going the wrong way to work, and that if they wanted to regain their confiscated privileges, they must render some marked service to Government, instead of adding to the embarrassments of a passing crisis. For instance, if they sent the fanatic Syad away and gave hostages for good conduct till the war was over, Colonel Edwardes said he would gladly ask Government to reinstate them, though not on such favorable terms as formerly. Believing Colonel Edwardes' words, the Mohmands sent in their hostages to Peshawar, packed off the Syad unceremoniously, and sat down quietly to wait for the return of peace in Hindustan. A few days after the news of the capture of Delhi having arrived, the crisis passed over without any further serious danger. Nevertheless, in spite of their professions, the Mohmands evidently did not consider themselves bound to refrain from raiding, and this went on as before.

On the 30th September 1857, 320 Mohmands came down from the hills, and carried off 168 head of cattle from Satmara and Katozai at graze: the police and troops pursued, but were too late to recover the cattle.

On the 4th September 1857, 4 Mohmands came down to raid, but were driven off.

On the 21st September 1857, a party of Mohmands came into British territory for a raid.

On the 12th October 1857, 500 Mohmands under Naoroz Khan, son of Sadat Khan, attacked the cattle at graze, and afterwards skirmished with the police and troops: 3 men of the latter being wounded.

On the 5th November 1857, 400 Mohmands, headed by Syad Amir and assisted by some Hindustanis from the mutinied regiments, came down and attacked the fort of Abazai. One sepoy, 2 policemen, and 2 villagers, were wounded.

On the 19th September 1857, a party of Mohmands carried off a Hindu from British territory.

On the 28th September 1857, a party of Mohmands carried off a Hindu of Shankargarh from the high road.

On the 5th January 1858, a party of 5 Mohmands attacked a water-mill, and killed 1 and wounded 2 men.

On the 21st January 1858, a party of 10 Mohmands attacked a house in the village of Marozai, and carried off a villager and some bullocks.

On the 22nd January 1858, a party of Mohmands carried off 60 head of cattle belonging to Shabkadr, with the villager in charge, from the grazing ground.

On the 14th February 1858, a party of 12 Mohmands attacked some villagers near Marozai, wounded 2 and carried off one.

On the 16th February 1858, 6 Mohmands attacked a water-mill, and wounded 4 men.

On the 20th February 1858, 10 Mohmands attacked a house in the village of Lankhta, wounded a man, and carried off Rs. 30 worth of property.

On the 22nd February 1858, 2 Mohmands killed the servant of an officer who was returning from Peshawar to Shabkadr.

On the 12th March 1858, a party of Mohmands attacked the village of Uchawala and carried off 2 bullocks.

On the 11th April 1858, 4 Mohmands carried off 30 goats from the grazing ground of Matta.

On the 13th April 1858, 4 Mohmands carried off 4 villagers, released 3 at various distances on the road, and took 1 to the hills.

On the 26th May 1858, 4 Mohmands carried off a donkey, the property of a villager of Mian Isa.

On the 30th May 1858, 4 Mohmands came on a raid into British territory, but were captured.

On the 30th June 1858, 200 Mohmands carried off cattle from the grazing ground; were pursued by the mounted police, who recovered the cattle, and lost 1 horse killed, 1 sowar wounded, and 1 horse wounded.

On the 13th September 1858, a party of Mohmands robbed some travellers near Shabkadr.

On the 10th October 1858, 8 Mohmands came into British territory and concealed themselves in a field. They attacked and wounded 5 villagers.

On the 22nd October 1858, 2 Mohmands (one an absconded criminal) came on a marauding expedition into British territory, but were captured.

On the 13th November 1858, 40 Mohmands attacked the cattle at graze, and were driven off by the police, who lost a sowar of mounted police, and a horse wounded.

On the 5th January 1859, 15 Mohmands attacked 2 servants of officers on duty in the fort of Shabkadr, who were returning from Peshawar to the fort, and killed 1 and carried off the other.

On the 21st January 1859, 4 Mohmands carried off a man from the musjid of the village of Garhi Nazir.

On the 5th February 1859, 5 Mohmands attacked a water-mill, and wounded 2 and carried off 1 man.

On the 3rd March 1859, 5 Mohmands carried off 40 goats from their grazing ground.

On the 3rd March 1859, 6 Mohmands carried off 4 men from a water-mill.

On the 15th March 1859, 8 Mohmands carried off the cattle of Shabkadr from the grazing ground; the villagers pursued and rescued the cattle, but 2 were wounded and 1 carried off by the Mohmands.

On the 10th April 1859, 400 Mohmands attacked the Matta cattle at graze, but were resisted by the police, aided by the troops: 1 sepoy and 2 horses were wounded.

On the 8th June 1859, a party of Mohmands murdered a villager of Mian Isa, who had gone into the Mohmand Hills.

On the 25th June 1859, a party of Mohmands inveigled a villager into the hills, and carried him off.

On the 30th August 1859, a party of Mohmands carried off some donkeys from near Shabkadr.

On the 1st September 1859, 2 Mohmands carried off a villager from British territory.

On the 26th October 1859, a party of Mohmands attacked a villager near the village of Lakhtu, and wounded him.

On the 28th September 1859, 15 Mohmands attacked a house in the village of Dab; killed 1 and wounded 2 villagers.

On the 31st December 1859, 200 Mohmands under Syad Amir attacked the village cattle guard and skirmished with the police, by whom the robber party were driven off, when 1 policeman and 2 villagers were wounded.

On the 4th January 1860, a party of Mohmands under Syad Amir came down, and after skirmishing with the villagers, police, and troops, were driven off, with a loss of 1 sepoy wounded.

On the 4th March 1860, 300 Mohmands attacked the Matta cattle at graze, but the villagers, police, and troops coming up to the rescue, a skirmish ensued, which lasted half the day, 1 policeman being killed and 4 sepoys wounded.

The question of sending a punitive force against the Mohmands was now under consideration, but it was determined still to see what would be the result of resolutely refusing to restore the confiscated jaghirs, the cause of all these complications.

And about the 20th March, the first really hopeful sign of a satisfactory issue to this policy occurred, when Naoroz Khan the son and adopted heir of Sadat Khan sent in asking for permission to come into Peshawar, and stating that he had been engaged punishing the Shinwaris for an attempt made by one of that tribe on the life of Fateh Khan, Khatak, when carrying despatches from Peshawar to Kabul. Naoroz Khan was accordingly invited to come in.

In seeking to make peace with us, Naoroz Khan's great aim was to get back the forfeited jaghirs; but finding that Colonel Edwardes, the Commissioner, was firmly opposed to this ever being brought about, and knowing that the Kabul Government had signified their intention of interfering to stop the

lands held by some of the Mitchni Mohmands in the Peshawar District, who were in rebellion, might hold good if peace was made, and that prisoners might be released; this was promised in regard to political prisoners, but not in regard to criminals, who, it was declared, must be dealt with according to law.

The result of this conference was the grant of the following terms to the Mohmands:—

1stly.—That Government should accept the assurances of Sadat Khan, Chief of Lalpura, and his son Naoroz Khan, of their desire to live on good terms with the British Government, and to be responsible for the peace of the frontier, and overlook all past causes of hostility.

2ndly.—That the blockade against the Mohmands should be raised, and the tribe be free to resort to our territory, individual notorious criminals being of course responsible to the tribunals.

3rdly.—That Nawab Khan, Chief of Pindiali, and all his branch of the tribe, be included in the amnesty.

4thly.—That such of the Mohmands as went out with Rahimdad Khan, be also included on the same terms.

5thly.—That no confiscated land or jaghir be given to any one.

6thly.—That all Mohmands who may have been apprehended during the blockade, merely because they belonged to a hostile tribe, but not taken in the commission of crimes or raids, be released on payment of the reward given for their capture.

Colonel Edwardes' letter to Sadat Khan regarding these terms is given in full:

"I have received your letter, and as I have no desire to injure you in any way, I can assure you that the coming in of your son Naoroz Khan was a great pleasure to me. From all he said, and from all you write, I believe you sincerely desire to put an end to the disturbances on the Mohmand frontier, and to come to friendly terms. I have this day addressed my own Government in your favor, and asked that your past offences may be forgiven and by-gones be by-gones; and as your son Naoroz Khan undertakes to be responsible for the rest of the Mohmand Maliks, such as Nawab Khan of Pindiali and others, I have recommended that the pardon be extended to all other Mohmands, (except such individuals as may be known to have committed murder or other serious crimes, of which justice must take notice,) and that the blockade be taken off, and the Mohmands be admitted to come and go, and trade in the Peshawar Valley. For, I conceive it is beyond my discretion to forgive and condone an old-standing enmity like this, though I have every hope that Government will listen to my representations.

"As to any jaghirs that have been confiscated, I do not think it at all advisable that they should be released; for they will only be a future bone of contention. Whoever sits on a barren hill side and enjoys a fine estate in the plain below for doing nothing must necessarily get wind in his head. He thinks he owes it to his own strength, and the fears, not the generosity, of Government. So after a year or two he gets full and proud, and rebels; and then the whole fight comes over again, and the tribe is plunged into war to please him, and many lives are lost. In short, jaghirs in the plain are not good for the men on the hills, and they will never be given with my consent. Don't think I say this for the sake of the money. To a great Government the sum is of no consequence; but it is bad for the administration. If there be any Mohmand mortgages in the hands of our subjects, the Mohmands will be free to sue in our courts, where every justice will be done them. And

“as to my prisoners in our jails, to please you, I will release every Mohmand
“who has been seized, merely because he was a Mohmand, on consideration that
“he pay whatever reward was given for his own seizure. But no highway-man,
“or murderer, or other criminal, will be released ; justice must take its course
“with such offenders.

“My friend, I have spoken my mind out, for it is best to be plain. For
“the rest, I desire the honor, and welfare, and strength of you and your family,
“and I conceive that they will be better served by the friendship than by the
“enmity of the British Government.”

SECTION VI.

Affairs with the Mohmands, December and January 1863-64.

AFTER the submission of Sadat Khan and Nawab Khan, who came in to
 McGregor's Gazetteer. Major James, the Mohmands desisted from troubling
 our border until the occasion of the Ambeyla expedition in 1863, when the emissaries of the Akhund of Swat were sent all over the hills bordering on the Peshawar Valley, but were only successful in exciting disturbance among these Mohmands. Sultan Khan, son of Sadat Khan, owned the Akhund's religious supremacy, and was moreover ill-disposed towards us. He was a man of bad character altogether; began life by murdering his eldest brother, and was often at feud even with his own father. Collecting a body of Mohmands, who were joined by a miscellaneous rabble of Safis, Bajawaris, and the like, he came down on the 5th December 1863.

Captain J. M. Earle, who was commanding the fort of Shabkadr, hearing firing on the Abazai road, moved out with 55 sabres, 6th Bengal Cavalry, and 96 bayonets, Native Infantry. Captain Earle's Despatch. The enemy were estimated at about 500, 300 of whom were posted on the summit of a slight eminence. Captain Earle advanced against them with his infantry in skirmishing order, and the cavalry on the flanks. On nearing the enemy, the cavalry charged well and gallantly from both flanks, and succeeded in killing 7 or 8 of the enemy and wounding some 20; but Lieutenant Bishop, 6th Bengal Cavalry, who was gallantly leading the division on the left, fell, mortally wounded; a sowar of the 6th Bengal Cavalry—wounded, being the only other casualty.

Before the infantry could come up, the enemy had gained the crest of one of the hills in the first range, when Captain Earle, having accomplished his object by driving the enemy beyond our frontier, retired leisurely towards the fort, the enemy making no attempt to follow up, but coming down immediately afterwards to collect their killed and wounded.

The Shabkadr garrison was then reinforced by troops from Peshawar under Colonel Jackson, 2nd Bengal Cavalry. On the 7th of December, the enemy having advanced from the hills and taken up a position on the ridge in front of Shabkadr, Colonel Jackson moved out with his force; as he topped the ridge, the enemy fell back, and were driven in half an hour to the end of the plateau into the ravines and broken ground at the foot of the hills, from the sides of which they kept up a strong fire: Lieutenant Fitz Hugh with the detachment of the 4th Sikhs was closely engaged on the left front of the line, and kept the enemy at bay for some time. Evening setting in, Colonel Jackson recalled that officer and retired the force. As it fell back, the enemy followed, keeping up a fire the whole way, but at a long distance; it was dark when the force reached the fort, and a party of the enemy having got into the village about 800 yards from the fort, they were shelled out.

Our loss was, 2 sepoy of the 4th Sikhs killed, 1 jemadar and 1 sepoy of the 4th Sikhs and 2 sepoy of the 8th Native Infantry wounded.

Towards the end of December, Sultan Mahmud Khan took up a menacing position at Regmianah, a small village in the hills about 5 or 6 miles distant from Shabkadr.

Major Munro's Report. Another son of Sadat Khan, Naoroz Khan, had recently joined, but the father, Sadat Khan, remained in the hills to the westward of Mitchni, pretending inability to restrain his sons, but really affording them countenance by his presence in the neighbourhood.

McGregor's Gazetteer. When Sultan Mahmud Khan arrived at Regmianah, the number of his followers did not exceed 400 men. Naoroz Khan brought an accession of 300 more, and occupied the Mohmand village of Chingi, north-east of Regmianah.

Sultan Mahmud Khan was accompanied by a band of Mulas from Ningrahar and other parts of Afghanistan, who assisted him in collecting the tribes with the avowed object of carrying on a religious war. Their success in stirring up the Mohmands after the actions of the 5th and 7th December was not great at first. Occasional accessions of small bodies under Mahomedan priests, and a few absconded leaders of robbers from Government territory, were received; but it was not until the 31st December that the importunities of the priests, and the efforts of Sultan Khan, had collected a miscellaneous assemblage estimated as under:—

Mohmands of the Baizai Branch	600 men.
" " Kawazai Branch	1,000 "
" " Halimzai "	1,500 "
" " Asufkar "	200 "
Mulas and a mixture of Ghilzis, Shalmanis, and others	500 "
Total				<u>3,800</u> "

On the evening of the 1st January these numbers were augmented by the arrival of 800 more Baizais under Mahomed Khan, 500 Halimzais, and 500 men under Naoroz Khan.

Having thus assembled a force which may be estimated at from 5,000 to 7,000 men, Sultan Mahmud Khan, after consultation with his brother and with Mahomed Khan, Fateh Khan Hazarkhani, Mahomed Didar, and other leaders, and more particularly at the pressing instigation of the priests, resolved to move out to meet the British force stationed at Shabkadr.

This force had been considerably increased, was under the command of Colonel Macdonell, C.B., of the Rifle Brigade, and now consisted of the following troops:—

	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	
D. Battery, 5th Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery	2	49	3 guns.
7th Hussars	5	140	
2nd Bengal Cavalry	5	231	
6th " "	1	95	
3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade	27	691	
2nd Gurkha Regiment	7	453	
4th Sikh Infantry	1	93	
Total	<u>49</u>	<u>1,752</u>	

On the morning of the 3rd January 1864, the Mohmand and other tribes that had gathered at Regmianah made their appearance at about 11 A.M., debouching from the gorge north-west of Fort Shabkadr, and gradually forming under their leaders on the plateau* in front of it to the number of some 5,000 matchlock men and 40 horsemen.

Colonel Macdonell's Despatch.

* Vide sketch of ground in the affair at Panj Pao.

By 2 P.M. the enemy being fully collected, their formation presented the appearance of a crescent. Having reason to believe that they would not venture far from their line of retreat, Colonel Macdonell, with a view to tempt them down, occupied with 2 companies of riflemen* the village of Badi Shamberi in front of his centre, posting a squadron on the Mitchni road to attract their skirmishers to the plain, which partially succeeded in drawing the enemy's right wing forward.

On this the cavalry dashed forward, turning and gradually folding the enemy's right on its centre.

Simultaneously 3 guns of the Horse Artillery, having taken up a position in front of Badi Shamberi, raked the retiring wing of the enemy with some effect.

The cavalry continuing the turning movement, (three times were the Mohmands charged by the 7th Hussars,) Colonel Macdonell advanced the 3rd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade in skirmishing order, when the enemy were driven beyond the border, and the troops returned after sun-set unmolested.

Colonel Macdonell stated he had from all received the most ample and intelligent support.

Our loss was as noted in the appendix. The enemy, it was believed, lost some 40 killed and as many wounded.

Naoroz Khan had led his men against the cavalry in one of the charges, the movements of the main body of the enemy being immediately directed by

Captain Munro's Report. Mahomed Khan and Mahomed Didar; whilst Fateh Khan Hazarkhani superintended the whole, having with him a reserve of some 1,500 men; but this reserve made off at an early period of the action.

Many Mohmands of the Tarakzai section, including the Kasim Khel, Sufkar and others, proceeded straight to their homes after their defeat, and a defection of at least 1,000 men took place the next morning on the plea of scarcity of provisions, and the necessity for burying the dead at the usual places of interment. The effect of the action had, too, the most dispiriting effect on the leaders, and, notwithstanding the endeavours of the priests, the gathering gradually dispersed.

The satisfaction of Government with the measures adopted were then expressed to Colonel Macdonell.

Government letter. On the requisition of the Commissioner of Peshawar, the Amir of Kabul

McGregor's Gazetteer. now interfered in the Mohmand matters, Shir Ali Khan sending his son, Sirdar Mahomed Ali Khan, by Jalalabad to eject Sadat Khan and replace him with the son of his former rival, Torabaz Khan.

Sadat Khan and his son Naoroz Khan were carried off prisoners to Kabul. The old Khan was afterwards released, and died soon after. Raza Khan then took possession of Lalpura, which he considerably strengthened. He was attacked by Sultan Khan and a body of Mohmands; but he repulsed them with heavy loss, and Sultan Khan then wandered about amongst the Mohmands, trying to invite them either to assemble and retake Lalpura or to commit raids upon the British border. In August 1866, he was joined by some of the Chiefs of the Khwaizai and Baizai sections, who had lost friends in the former attack on Lalpura. Their object in coming together appears to have been two-fold: 1st, to retake Lalpura; and, 2ndly, in the event of failure, to punish

* 1 Company Rifle Brigade.
1 Do. Gurkhas.

some of the Mohmand Tarakzai villages above Mitchni, and close the caravan routes by Karrapa and Tartara to Peshawar.

When some 4 or 5,000 men had collected, dissensions broke out, fomented by our ally Nawab Khan, Chief of Pindiali. Of the Mohmand sub-divisions, the Tarakzais from about Mitchni, and also of Pindiali, sided with Raza Khan's party. Sultan Khan found adherents amongst the Baizais and Khwaizais of Gandao, and also in that portion of the Halimzai section who are not followers of Ahmad Shir, Malik of Mardana, in our territory near Shabkadr. But all these came to nothing, and beyond petty raids the Mohmands have not given trouble since, except in the case of the dastardly murder of Major Macdonald in March 1873.

APPENDIX.

Casualty Return in the Doaba Field Force in the action on the 2nd January 1874.

CORPS.	Rank.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	REMARKS.
7th Hussars ...	Non-commissioned				
	Officers	1	...	
	Privates ...	2	7	...	
3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade ...	Horses ...	3	10	1	
	Privates	1	...	
2nd Bengal Cavalry ...	"	8	...	
	Horses	5	...	
2nd Gurkhas ...	" ...	1*	* Adjutant's charger.

Total killed ... 2 men.
 " " ... 4 horses.
 " wounded ... 17 men.

Total wounded .. 15 horses.
 " missing ... 1 horse.

CHAPTER VII.

SECTION I.

The Afridis.

THE AFRIDIS are a large tribe, inhabiting the lower and easternmost spurs of the Safed Koh Range, to the west and south of the Peshawar District, including the valley of the Bara and a portion of those of Chura and of Tirah. To their east, they are bounded by the Khataks of Akora and the Mohmand and Khalil Division of the Peshawar District; to their north, they have the Mohmands; west, the Shinwaris; and south, the Orakzais and Bangash.

The origin of this tribe, owing to want of written records, is very obscure. Their traditional records, however, says Major James, would lead us to believe that, in common with other Pathan tribes, they are the descendants of Khalid Ben-Walid, a Jew, who embraced Islamism, and whose descendants had possession of great tracts in the western portion of Afghanistan in the tenth century, at which time, upon the convulsions in the country, owing to the advance of Mahmud of Ghazni, a chief, by name of Afrid, owing to his enormities and feuds, was obliged to fly from his country and seek refuge with a kindred spirit, by name Vazir, in the wilds of Shiritilla. Here he seems to have settled, and remained with his family for a considerable time. Turner gives something like the same story, *viz.*, that Afrid, an individual of unknown country and parentage, came to Ghor, and there had an intrigue with a woman of the Kirrerai tribe, the eventual result of which was the tribe of Afridis. James says that Afrid had four sons, Aka, Adam, Ulah, and Miri, who went off and formed for themselves settlements in the adjoining Tirah, where their descendants remain to the present day.

The strength of the Afridi clans, as generally accepted now, is approximately as follows, *viz.* :—

1. Kuki Khel	3,500 fighting men.
2. Malikdin Khel	3,500 "
3. Kambar	3,500 "
4. Kamar	1,500 "
5. Zakha	4,000 "
6. Aka	1,200 "
7. Sipah	1,500 "
8. Adam	3,500 "
Total		...	22,200 "

Of these, the following are serving in the ranks of the Panjab Frontier Force :—

1. Kuki Khel	75
2. Malikdin Khel	210
3. Kambar	210
4. Kamar	64
5. Zakha	24
6. Aka	3
7. Sipah	10
8. Adam Khel	72
Other sections	28
Total					696

The returns of the Bengal army furnished do not show with sufficient clearness the sections to which the Afridis serving in its ranks belong; but the total number returned is 468. The largest number of Afridis in any one regiment of the Bengal army is in the 20th Panjab Infantry, *viz.* 101; in the 26th Panjab Infantry there are 88, and these are nearly all of the Malikdin section. In the Bombay army there are only 9 Afridis returned, and in the Madras army there are none. Thus the total number in the army is 1,164, or about 5 per cent. of their fighting strength. This, however, does not, of course, represent the number of Afridis, who are more or less trained soldiers, as there are doubtless many in the police and in the service of various native chiefs; and, besides, an Afridi very seldom remains long in the service, and his place is always filled up. Thus Colonel McGregor thinks that not less than one-third of the fighting strength of the Afridis have received a more or less efficient training in our service.

The Mita Khel sect of the Afridis is not now found amongst the other divisions. It is said to have been deported to Haidarabad and the Dakan by Jahangir, and their descendants are believed still to exist there. About a thousand families are settled in the Dakan, and some 40 or 50 are at Panipat; regarding these Colonel McGregor in vain endeavoured to get information.

The Afridi in appearance is generally a fine, tall, athletic highlander, whose springy step, even in traversing the dusty streets of Peshawar, at once denotes his mountain origin. They are lean, but muscular men, with long, gaunt faces, high noses and cheek-bones, and fairish complexions. They are described as brave and hardy, and make good soldiers, but are apt to be somewhat home sick withal. They are careful shots and skirmishers, waiting with the greatest patience for the chance of an easy shot at an enemy. This quality is less shewn when, as soldiers of the British Government, they are supplied with unlimited ammunition, but still their *specialité* is hill fighting. They wear a coarse home-manufactured blue shirt, loose trousers closing in tight round the ankles, neat sandals of straw or the leaf of the dwarf palm on the feet, a large turband placed jauntily on the head, with a waist-band to girt up the loins. From this may be seen obtruding the handle of a Khaibari knife, one or two pistols with old flint locks, together with all the paraphernalia required to carry about a magazine, in the shape of a powder-horn, cartridge-cases, flint and steel, with a huge knife, or *choora*—and to complete all, a matchlock, with a wooden fork attached to the barrel for a rest. Generally speaking, there is no doubt that the Afridis are now better armed than they have ever been; almost every fighting man possesses a gun or pistol besides other arms; many of the fire-arms are rifled, and some have percussion locks. Altogether it is probable that there are not under 20,000 matchlock men in Afridi land.

Of the moral attributes of the Afridis, it is quite impossible to say anything in praise. Mackeson, writing of them, says: The Afridis are a most avaricious race, desperately fond of money. Their fidelity is measured by the length of the purse of the seducer, and they transfer their obedience and support from one party to another of their own clansmen, according to the comparative liberality of the donation. Unlike Mahomedans in general, the Afridis are said to have but little regard for the sanctity of marriage rights, although in other respects strict observers of the precepts of the *Koran*; and such is their shameless and unnatural avarice that frequent cases occur of a man in good circumstances—in the first instance marrying a good-looking girl, but as times get harder, exchanging her for one of fewer personal attractions and a bag of money. Their women appear at all times unveiled in public, and are always willingly offered to the embraces of those

who can pay for the indulgence. And it is a custom among them to marry the widows of their departed brothers.

Ruthless, cowardly robbery, cold-blooded, treacherous murder, are to an Afridi the salt of life. Brought up from his earliest childhood amid scenes of appalling treachery and merciless revenge, nothing can ever change him: as he has lived—a shameless, cruel savage—so he dies. And it would seem that notwithstanding their long intercourse with the British, and that very large numbers of them are or have been in our service, and must have learnt in some poor way what faith and mercy and justice are, yet the Afridi character is no better than it was in the days of his fathers.

Yet, he is reputed brave by those who have seen him fighting. Hardy he is in his own hills, but he is very impatient of heat, and does not like work in the plains, but immediately longs for the cool breezes of Tirah. As soldiers of the British Government, they have gained a greater reputation for fidelity than at any other stage of their career. Much has been said of their fidelity in fighting against their own people for us; but when it is remembered that an Afridi generally has a blood feud with 9 out of 10 of his own people, the beauty of this attachment fades. They have always been more noted in action for a readiness to plunder than fight, as was the case with Shah Sujah at the battle of Ispahan. On the whole, says Elphinstone (generally so eager to record anything good of Afghans), “they are the greatest robbers among the Afghans, and I imagine have no faith or sense of honor; for I never heard of anybody hiring an escort of Khaibaris to secure his passage through their country,—a step which always ensures a traveller’s safety in the lands of any other tribe.”

Notwithstanding this estimate, which Colonel McGregor fears some will consider harsh, the Afridi is, on the whole, the finest of the Pathan races on our border. His appearance, too, is much in his favor, and he is really braver, more open, and not more treacherous than other Pathans. This much is certain, that he has the power of prejudicing Englishmen in his favor, and there are few brought into contact with him who do not at least begin with an enthusiastic admiration of his manliness. Again, with a tight hand over him, many of his faults remain dormant, and he soon develops into a valuable soldier.

Hospitality is said to be one of the virtues of an Afridi, and it is possible that if there was no chance of robbing, if not of murdering, a traveller before he came to his door, he would offer such cheer as was forthcoming; but the wanderer who breaks bread with an Afridi must be cautious; for his host, even while providing his best, will surely be concocting some devilry to entrap his guest as soon as he has left the confines of his lands, or even the shelter of his roof. Still there are not wanting instances of their giving refuge to a fugitive and laying down their lives in his defence.

The Afridis are very ignorant, and, although nominally under the rule of their Maliks, have but very little respect for anything like authority. The men who have most influence amongst them are their Mulas and Syads. They are all of the Suni persuasion of the Mahomedan faith, except the Sipahs, who are Shias.

The Afridis are seldom at feud with their neighbours as a tribe against tribe, whatever may be the relations of individual members with those of neighbouring tribes. For some years past their extra-tribal feuds have been in a state of quiescence; but amongst themselves they are eternally at feud. Generally, the quarrel is confined to the two sections between whom the dispute happens to be; but in cases where the general interests of the

whole tribe are concerned, the clans range themselves in the two great factions of Samal and Gar,—the Samal faction including the Malikdin, Zakha, Aka Khel, Sipah, and Kamar Khel sections; and the Gar, the Kambar Khel and Kuki Khel. The Adam Khel belong to neither faction, but side with one of the other as their interests may dictate.

Though in themselves the most disunited of people in the event of a threatened invasion of their country, it is probable that the Mulas and Maliks would induce them to lay aside their petty animosities and unite to face the common danger and defend their common faith. On such occasions it is usual to assemble a council composed of the heads of villages in each clan, and through the medium of priests to patch up their internal disputes.

They manage this in rather a primitive manner; each negotiator takes a stone, and, placing it on the top of that of his clansman, swears a sacred vow, that until the common cause be finally settled, and these stones removed, the feud between the two parties shall be dormant; and their oaths on these occasions are seldom violated. These councils also arrange all the plans of the campaign and the number of men required from each branch of the tribe, which are furnished in quotas from villages in proportion to their numerical strength, and each party is headed by its own Malik. On taking the field, each man brings with him a sheep skin full of flour and the amount of ammunition that he can manage to collect; but should hostilities be protracted beyond the time that the supply of provisions will last, the tribes are either kept together and fed by contributions from villages in the neighbourhood, or disperse for a few days to make ammunition and to replenish their commissariat; but, should the latter contingency be adopted, it frequently happens that mistrust in each other, and the fear of treachery in their neighbours, prevent their again uniting.

When no external enemy is in the field, the different tribes of this race are continually warring amongst themselves, and it is no uncommon occurrence to find even one-half of a village out carrying on a skirmish with matchlocks with the other half; and this may be carried on for two or three consecutive days, the parties firing from towers, or from behind rocks, or any other shelter upon each other. When, after seven or eight casualties have occurred on either side, or all their ammunition is exhausted, the point at issue is settled by interchange of marriages.

When not engaged in plundering, the Afridis do simply nothing; time hangs heavily on their hands; for all the common necessary duties of daily life are performed by their women, while the men sleep or talk of the last midnight murder or robbery. All such domestic labours as fetching wood and water, and cooking, fall to the lot of the women, as they do in more civilized countries; but to whom, in addition, falls nearly all the out-door labor in the fields. The consequence is, that they are anything but womanly in appearance, habits or manner; indeed they are said to be deadly shots with stones, and to frequently distinguish themselves in the defence of their homes. But the Afridis round the Kohat Pass are different. Their minds have become more open to the beauties and the results of industry. They are great traders, or rather carriers. They convey the salt from mines in the Kohat District to Swat, Bajawar, and even Chitral. They also cut, and sell the firewood of their hills to the British garrisons of Peshawar and Kohat. By these means they are relieved from the old necessity of robbing, and procure a comfortable subsistence.

The Afridis in their mountains, which they chiefly inhabit in the summer, have moveable huts of mat. They come down in the low hills in the winter,

when they chiefly live in caves cut out of the earthy part of the hills. They are migratory in their habits. In the autumn months they descend from the pasture grounds about Maidan and Upper Bara with their families and flocks, and pass the winter in the Khaibar, Bazar, Kajurai, Bagyarai, and Lower Bara districts. In these several localities each clan has its own apportioned limits, and in all they generally live in caves, which are formed in long galleries in the cliffs and banks of ravines in all parts of the hills. None of the sections live in tents. They have few villages formed by a collection of houses close together. As a rule, each family has its own separate dwelling, proportioned in size to the numbers of the household and their cattle and flocks. Generally, a family of brothers, with their respective children and blood relations, constitute the little communities of these separate dwellings, which are always fortified by walls and towers, and are located on commanding sites on the hills. Sometimes these little forts contain 30 or more separate houses within the enclosure. In April and May they again move up to Maidan. The Adam Khel, Aka Khel, and Kuki Khel, are the only sections who reside in the lower settlements all through the year.

Some families of each of the clans sharing Bara and Maidan hold on to their possession at all seasons. The majority, however, with their cattle and flocks, avoid the winter snows, and pass the cold season in the low valleys and hills bordering on the west of the Peshawar basin, between the Khaibar on the north and the Kohat ridge on the south. The elevation of Maidan above the sea is probably not much under 7,500 or 8,000 feet. Snow is said to cover the entire Maidan to a depth of 3 or more feet for some three months or so. The Maidan clans are, as a rule, certainly fairer in complexion than the clans located at a lower level. The Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, and Kamar Khel, with some of the Kuki Khel, are notoriously fairer than other Afridis. The elevation of Dwatawi and Tordurra is, perhaps, above 6,000 feet. Below this, the Bara Valley is said to fall rapidly till it enters on the Peshawar Valley. Maidan is covered with orchards and corn fields. A good deal of rain falls, and violent storms are of frequent occurrence in the summer and autumn chiefly. Walnuts and the edible pine are found as low down as Dwatawi and the neighbouring portion of middle Bara.

None of the Afridi clans are located westward of the Safed Koh or the Rajgal ranges. Individual families, who have been forced out of their own tribe by feuds, are to be found both in Nangrihar and in Kuram; but they are there only on sufferance as refugees.

The Afridis have no steady and free intercourse with the territories westward of their own country. The routes existing are with difficulty practicable only to footmen during the summer season, and then only under protection of a convoy, or '*badraka*'. The most frequented route from Bara towards Kabul is through Bazar and the Khaibar to Jalalabad. Peshawar is the market to which the Afridis resort for the disposal of their country produce and the supply of their domestic and other wants. It is also the great field for the practice of their thievish propensities.

Of late years the Afridis have become very wealthy, and it is said their clans have all considerably increased. They have had no great feuds with their neighbours, and even private feuds amongst individual clans and sections are said to be on the decline. Between 3,000 and 4,000 of the tribe are scattered over India in the military service of the British Government and of native chiefs. All the clans are represented in these emigrants, except the Zakha Khel, who, according to report, do not leave their own country.

The great security of the Afridis lies in the strength of their country for defence, and the unanimity of the clans on the approach of a common danger.

Their great point of weakness lies in the facilities with which they can be shut up in their own hills, and cut off from communication with the outer world, provided adequate measures are adopted to effect such a purpose.

In their relations towards the British Government, the Afridis are uniformly hostile, and where they find an opportunity they rarely fail to take advantage of it.

Their relations with the Kabul Government are not much better. So long as they are paid for a passage through their country, and are not otherwise interfered with, they are content to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Kabul Ruler, and will fight for his cause if properly remunerated.

Under these conditions they would act similarly towards the British or any other Government which acceded to their demands and left them alone, which is only natural, considering the advantages of strength and position which they possess.

The Afridis derive their importance from their geographical position, which gives them command of the Khaibar and Kohat roads, and the history of the British connection with them has been almost entirely with reference to these defiles. Their history before the date of their connection with us can have no interest for any one. Whatever the dynasty has been, whether *Jangiz*, *Timur*, *Babar*, *Nadar*, *Ahmed Shah*, *Sikh*, or *Farangi*, has reigned, it has ever been a record of broken faith.

The boundary of the Afridi country runs thus: Commencing from the point where the easternmost spur of the Tataras ends, in the plains north of Jamrud and due west of Regiha, it ascends to the Tataras Peak; thence it runs along the crest of the northern range of the Khaibar defile to the spur which connects it with the south range, and over which is the Landikhana Pass; thence it descends to the pass, and again ascends to the crest of the south range, whence turning north-west it keeps to the crest of the watershed of the Bara River, following it round the sources of that river and turning south-east, south south-east, and finally due east, according to the turning of the range,—at this last turn dividing the Afridis from the Orakzais; then descending the Mula Jhar Range to its end in the Bara, it crosses that river, and taking to a spur over which the path from Akhor to Bazoti leads, it runs along its summit to a point west of Bosti Khel, where the hills of the Basi Khels are connected by a ridge with the great range bounding the Orakzais on the south. This ridge is half-way between the Bazoti Ublan and the Kohat Kotal. From it the boundary descends sharply south to the British border, about 2 miles due north of Kohat. From this point the southern boundary of the Afridis runs east, and is the same as the northern boundary of the Kohat District as far as Narai Sir. Thence it runs north to half a mile east of Kishto Banda, whence it turns up a spur to the Dargai ridge, turns north-east to Hinki Sir, descends to the plain at Tuta, then going over the shoulder of Jalala, turns west along the crest of the range for 3 or 4 miles, and then runs down the spur east of Sarobi towards Shamshatu; then turning west, the boundary is the frontier road passing Shamshatu, Aza Khel, Fort Mackeson, Jani Garhi, Bara Fort, Jamrud.

The country thus described has an extreme length of about 80 miles, and a breadth varying from 8 miles, nearly due south of Fort Mackeson, to 38 miles on a line drawn roughly from Tataras to the northern end of the Tirah River. It is mountainous throughout, and consists briefly of the valleys of the Chura and the Bara, and the spurs of the Orakzai Hills, which to the east form the abode of the Akhori Khataks. But little is known of it,

though we have been intimately connected with these tribes for more than 20 years, no Englishman has ever entered Afridi land as a friend.

The divisions of the Afridi territory are those of the different sects of the clan, *viz.*, Kuki Khel, Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamar Khel, Zakha Khel, Aka Khel, Sipah, and Adam Khel. It is impossible to lay down the boundaries of the divisions as the tribes are ever changing; in the cold weather they come down to the lower hills, in the hot they retire to the cool recesses of the Upper Bara Valley. But with the Aka Khel and Adam Khel sections it is easier. Their trade as carriers of wood and salt keeps them more to their own villages. The first of these inhabit the outer slopes of the Afridi Hills, extending to the west from a couple of miles above Bara Fort to near Bazid Khel; while the second occupies the whole country east of Akhor and the Orakzai boundary to the Khatak limits at Jalala Sir, Hinki Sir, and Narai Sir.

In the northern portion of the Afridi country we have the Khaibar Range, barren, rugged, and inhospitable to the last degree; to the south is the water-shed of the Bara River. Of the higher portion of these ranges nothing is known, but it is believed that there are many delightful, well-watered little valleys and plateaux. The lower portion of this range, as well as those inhabited by the Aka Khel and Adam Khel, partakes of the sterile nature of the Khaibar Range,—here, however, relieved by the existence of small flat valleys, to a great extent cultivated and tended; yet, even in these there is a bare, uninviting, craggy and burnt look that is quite oppressive.

The rivers of the Afridi land are the Chura and Bara, together with smaller ones.

The only notice which can be found of the mineral productions of Afridistan is in Irwin, who says that there are two lead mines in the country.

The hills produce a quantity of stunted bushes, which are cut for firewood for the garrisons of Kohat and Peshawar.

From the nature of their country agricultural pursuits are limited. Rice and the common cereals are the main products of their country. These crops are raised mostly in the Bara Valley and the Maidan of Tirah. The principal crop in Bara is rice, a considerable portion of which finds its way to the Peshawar market. Most of the clans possess great stock in cattle. Cows, sheep, and goats, are in plenty; but buffaloes are scarce, except amongst the Adam Khel and Aka Khel inhabitants of the plain, who, alone of all the Afridis, possess camels. Most of the clan possess a number of mares and donkeys, and breed mules largely. The Afridi donkeys and mules enjoy a local notoriety for the superiority of their breed.

The Afridis have no manufactures, except coarse nets of grass, and a little very coarse cloth. Even their arms are imported, mostly if not entirely, from British territory. The love of fire-arms is quite a trait in their character; they will enlist or work in order to get the wherewithal to buy a matchlock or a rifle, the latter being preferred; and if an Afridi at the end of his service has not sufficient to buy one, he makes no scruple of walking off with his rifle and ammunition.

They have nothing to give, save fuel, in exchange for our commodities, and so there is no trade properly so called; yet intercourse with us is necessary to them, as their own country does not produce sufficient to feed them, and consequently a strict blockade is a serious measure to most of the sections, especially the Adam Khel and Aka Khel.

British connection with the Afridis commenced in 1839, when Sir Claude Wade with a contingent of Sikh troops forced the Khaibar, but we have never yet come into collision with them as a tribe.

The Kuki Khel.

The Kuki Khel consist of the following sections :—

1 Shirkhan Khel	550 fighting men.
2 Katti	„	700 „
3 Mashu	„	350 „
4 Farid	„	220 „
5 Abdul	„	800 „
6 Tawar	„	360 „
7 Sikandar	„	450 „
Total				... 3,430 „

This is an important and powerful clan ; it has a standing feud with the Shinwaris. The Kuki Khel are in two great divisions, separated from each other by the Zakha Khel, in Bazar. During the summer months most of the clan reside in Bar Bara and Tordurra ; in winter they move down to their settlements, at the mouth of the Khaibar and the caves in Kajurai.

The Kuki Khel are entirely confined to the eastern slopes of Rajgal. On the western slopes are the Sangu Khel, enemies of the Kuki Khel. There is no free intercommunication at any time, but a safe conduct can be arranged on due payment. The Kuki Khel are noted and desperate robbers. Their fixed villages are Jamrud, Kadam, Gagri, Tangi, at the mouth of the Khaibar, Lala China, and Ali Masjid in the Khaibar, and Sikandar-khelogarhi, Kardara, Tordurra, Sarawela, Malanokas, Sparwarai, Babari, Baragat, Torawela, Khasi Kot, Kuka Ghoz, and Patai, in Upper Bara.

Robbing is the general occupation of this section. They are physically fine men, and many of them are entertained in the British army, and some of them have distinguished themselves as native officers ; *e. g.*, Ahmad Khan, Subadar of the 6th Panjab Infantry, was shot at Ambeyla, fighting bravely on our side. They frequent the city as well as the cantonment of Peshawar, and are notorious for robbery and other offences. The hills in which the whole section resides, are of the most desolate and dreary nature, with a few springs here and there. Adjustment of matters with this tribe is effected by Government through Arab Abdul Majid Khan in particular. The Maira around Jamrud is a sort of neutral ground ; beyond, close to the ravine or water-course issuing from the Khaibar Pass, are the villagers of the Kuki Khel, who trade with Peshawar chiefly in firewood. The villages may be seen of a morning coming into cantonments from the direction of Burj Hari Sing ; their land is very unproductive.

In January 1857, when the Amir Dost Mohammed was encamped at Jamrud after his interview with Sir John Lawrence, whose camp was a few miles nearer Peshawar, a party of young officers rode beyond the Amir's camp towards the pass, and were fired on by the Kuki Khel. One of the number, Lieutenant Hand, was so severely wounded that he died during the night. The crime having been brought home to men of the tribe, they were blockaded, and many of their men fell into our hands. During these hostilities the mutiny broke out, but the blockade was continued in full force, and was so injurious to the interests of the tribe that they paid down a fine of Rs. 3,000, and entered into the following agreements, *viz.*, not to harbour criminals ; to resort to our courts in regard to quarrels with British subjects ; to send, when required, an agent to the Deputy Commissioner, &c. &c.

The Malikdin Khel

Are divided into three main sections: I, Ghulab Khan Khel; II, Umar Khan Khel; III, Kala Karamna, collectively called Dreplara.

The Ghulab Khan Khel consist of the following sub-divisions:—

1.	Daolat Khel	650 fighting men.	
2.	Nattu „	80	„
3.	Janda „	120	„
4.	Matta „	150	„
5.	Nasrat „	80	„
					This is the Khan, Khel, or Chiefs' tribe.
Total					1,080 „

The Umar Khan Khel consist of the following sub-divisions:—

1.	Katti Khel	400 fighting men.	} All in the Maidan of Tirah, west of Shalobar.
2.	Rawra „	350	
3.	Shahi „	320	
Total					1,070 „

The Kala Karamna consist of the following sub-divisions:—

1.	Darwe Khel	300 fighting men.	
2.	Miri „	80	„
3.	Bahram „	200	„
4.	Gar Mahammad Khel	150	„
5.	Alai Khel	180	„
6.	Kala „	260	„
Total					1,170 „

All three sections of the Malikdin Khel are located close together, in the central part of the Tirah Maidan, between Shalobar and Kahu; whence they come down to Kajmai and Bajiarai and Lower Bara for the winter months. Between 300 and 400 of this clan are serving in the ranks of the Police, Panjab Frontier Force, and Line Regiments.

Kajurai is a tract of country on the Peshawar border, situated north of the Bara River, and comprising the bay at the foot of the hills to the west of the Bara Fort. It is hilly, and is occupied in the winter by parties of the Sipah, Kamar Khel, Malikdin Khel, and Kambar Khel Afridis. This joint occupancy was very inconvenient to the British authorities, as it permitted numbers of other tribes to pass through their settlements for purposes of robbery and theft, in which cases the responsible party could seldom be ascertained.

These tribes for a long time refused, on various pretexts, to become jointly responsible; but in the early part of 1861, a party of villagers from British territory, who were grazing their cattle in the vicinity, were attacked by some Zakha Khel, who had been residing in Kajurai: 1 was killed, 3 were wounded, and their cattle were plundered. On this, some of the Kajurai

men were seized, and further proceedings threatened, unless immediate reparation was made, and an agreement entered into of joint responsibility for the future. The tribes concerned, sent their representatives to Peshawar, paid a fine of Rs. 1,000, and entered into the desired agreement, which closed that corner of the district against the Zakha Khel and other robbers. The agreement with the Sipah and Kamar Khel tribes was made on the 24th April 1861; that with the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel shortly afterwards, and was of the same tenor, *viz.*—

“We agree on our own parts, and in behalf of our respective tribes, of our own free will and accord, as follows:—

“I.—During the six months of the cold weather, when we reside in the lands called Kajurai, we will be responsible that no theft or crime is committed on any British subject by any member of our tribes, or by any member of the Zakha Khel or other tribes passing through the said lands of Kajurai.

“II.—So long as the Zakha Khel may remain at feud with the Government, we will not allow members of that tribe to take up their residency in the Kajurai settlements.”

The Kambar Khel.

The Kambar Khel are a section of the Afridis, who are entirely located in the Maidan of Tirah in two great divisions, separated from each other by the Malikdin Khel, who occupy the central portion of the Maidan. They consist of the following sub-divisions:—

1.	Darbi Khel	...	460	fighting men.	In Kahu.
2.	Zana	...	300	”	Shalobar Batan, the Chief's tribe.
3.	Mutkhan	...	280	”	In Batan and Kahu.
4.	Khoja Ali	...	400	”	} In Kahu.
5.	Ali	...	450	”	
6.	Shekmal	...	580	”	} In Shalobar.
7.	Pabi	...	360	”	
8.	Yiran	...	180	”	
9.	Miran	...	150	”	} In Bar Bara.
10.	Watar	...	200	”	
Total			...	3,360	”

About 1,500 of the Kambar Khel are located in Shalobar, where they have the Kuki Khel to the east and north, the Kamar Khel and Ali Khel to the south and east, the Aka Khel to the south and west, and the Malikdin Khel and Zakha Khel to the west; the remainder, about 2,000 fighting men, are located in the glens of Kahu and Batan. (The Zana Khel, or Jana Khel, or Nekzan Khel, is the Khan Khel, or chief's tribe. The Watar Khel, though originally Sangu Khel Shinwaris, have long since been incorporated with the Kambar Khel. They are located separately in Bar Bara amongst the Kuki Khel. In winter most of the Kambar Khel come down to the caves in Kajurai and Lar Bara. About 250 of this clan are in the Police, in the Frontier Force, and in the Panjab Regiments, and others under the Commander-in-Chief.)

The Kambar Khel have not many dealings with British territory, though they sometimes come to steal, and sell “patha” ropes and mats at Peshawar. All dealings with them are managed through Arbab Abdul Majid.

In 1861 they entered into an agreement with the Commissioner of Peshawar in regard to Kajurai, as already narrated under the head of the Malikdin Khel.

The Kamar Khel.

The Kamar Khel consist of the following divisions:—

1. Khudadad Khel	...	260	fighting men	} Residing in the Sank Dara, and on the spurs of the Takhtazai Hills.
2. Aimal	"	350	"	
3. Pain	"	480	"	
4. Tor	"	380	"	
Total	...	1,470	"	

This is a small clan, scattered about the hills south of Dwatawi Pass to Tirah Maidan, and in the glens of the Takhtazai and Chauk Dara. They have the Sipah on the east, the Kuki Khel on the north, the Shalobar Kamar Khel on the west, and the Ali Khel Orakzais on the south. Their principal villages are Karna Khel and Kamar Khelogarhi, on the north and south of the Bara River respectively, a little below the junction of the Maidan Toi. Most of the clan, however, are scattered over the hills in detached hamlets or single huts. They are rich in cattle, and lead much of a roving life within their own limits. In winter they move down to the hills about Lar Bara and Kajurai.

They are on friendly terms with the Sipah.

The Zakha Khel.

Inhabit the Khaibar Pass from Gar-gora to Garhi Lal Beg, on the boundary of Lohargi. Their total number is estimated at 3,000 families, but is probably now somewhat larger. This tribe has always been divided by internal, inveterate, and hostile factions. Ali Masjid forms their boundary towards the Kuki Khel.

The Zakha Khel clan are thus divided by Bellev:—

1. Shan Khel	...	500	fighting men	} In Bara and Tirah Maidan.
2. Zaodin	...	450	"	
3. Paendeh	...	600	"	} In Bazar, Bara, and Maidan.
4. Khasrozai	...	550	"	
5. Mohib Khel	...	380	"	} In Bara and Khaibar.
6. Pakhai	...	500	"	
7. Nasr-u-din Khel	...	400	"	} In Bara, Bazar, and Maidan.
8. Bari Khel	...	550	"	
Total	...	3,930		

The Bash Khel section who number about 500 families, and are settled in Bazar, are the most notorious and desperate robbers, thieves, and assassins, and derive their means of subsistence exclusively from the practice of these crimes. The soil which they cultivate is insignificant in extent, and is dependent entirely on rain.

The Zahha Khel is the most important and most powerful of all the Afridi clans. They can muster between 4,000 and 5,000 fighting men. Their several sections hold land in the Maidan of Tirah, in Bara, in Bazar, and in Khaibar.

Their winter quarters are in the caves and hamlets of Bazar and Khaibar, and their summer quarters in Maidan and Bara. Their fixed villages in Bara are Shan Khel, Paendeh, Butan Kala, and Zaodin, situated on the river banks between the Sipah on the west and the Aka Khel on the east. Bazar, from Churawestward, belongs entirely to them, and is their great winter retreat. In the Khaibar they possess Bostan Kala, Lala Beg, and Allahdad Kala. The Zakha Khel are the proudest Afridis. They are scarcely ever known to take service in the army or in the police, but there are a dozen or so of them in the Guides.

This tribe has always been noted as the most active thieves in the Peshawar Valley, although the authorities have never had any misunderstanding with them as a tribe. In 1857, when the Mutiny broke out, although they were under blockade for innumerable highway robberies, strange to say, they did not take advantage of the opportunity afforded them of troubling us, and on the 14th August two out of the three sections were induced to make their submission and to enter into the following agreement:—

1st.—To abstain from raids, &c.

2nd.—Not to harbour thieves or murderers taking refuge.

3rd.—To afford reparation for abduction of women from British territory.

4th.—To refer matters of complaint against British subjects to the courts.

5th.—To send an accredited agent when required.

6th.—To pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 for non-compliance with any of the above terms.

In 1861 the Zakha Khel having made a raid on British subjects in the neighbourhood of Kajurai, agreements were taken from the other tribes of Kajurai making them responsible for the future behaviour of the Zakha Khel.

The Aka Khel

Are a large section, who inhabit the hills to the south-west of Peshawar from the Bara River to near Akhor, and are divided by Bellew as follow:—

1.	Basi Khel	600 fighting men	} Living at Aimal, Chabutra, Bara, and Tirah Maidan.
2.	Mada	200	
3.	Garara	120	
4.	Shir	300	} Collectively styled the Kamal Khel, and residing in Bara, Maidan, and Eromela.
5.	Rahimdad	60	
6.	Kali	100	
7.	Miri	80	
8.	Sultan	350	} At Bara and Maidan.
9.	Sanjal	200	
10.	Isazai	200	} On the plain north of the Kohat defile.
Total				2,210	

This clan is distributed into three principal gatherings or settlements, *viz.*, in Maidan, Bara, and the plain west of Fort Mackeson and Matani. This locality and Bara are their winter quarters, Maidan and Bara being their summer quarters. (Their number at Waran, in Maidan, is reckoned at about 1,200 families.)

The Miri Khel, formerly a separate section, does not so exist now. It only numbers a couple of hundred families, who are, in equal divisions, incorporated with the Aka Khel and the Kala Karamma sections of the Malikdin Khel.

The hills on which the Aka Khel live are dreary in the extreme. They are drinking water from springs, and cultivate some wheat and barley. In

summer they proceed with their women and families to Tirah, and return in winter. They do not construct houses for their residence, but live in caves, or "gara." They sell wood in the Peshawar city and cantonments. Their intercourse with the British territory is frequent, and they are as notorious for theft and robbery as the Zakha Khel with whom they associate. They are of a strong physique and of reddish-white complexion. Matchlocks and "churas" are their chief arms, and almost all of them possess them. "Putha," a grass with which mats are prepared, grows abundantly in their territory; it resembles a small palm tree, but with softer leaves. It is used especially in preparing mats, baskets, ropes, &c., which are in great request both in Peshawar and the Panjab. Not more can be said in praise of the moral attributes of the Aka Khel than of any other section of the Afridis.

The Sipah.

The Sipah is a section of the Afridis, which consists of the following subdivisions:—

1. Abubakar Khel	...	800 fighting men, who reside on the north side of Bara.
2. Hormaz	"	650 " }
3. Landi	"	60 " }
		on the south side of Bara.
Total	...	1,510 "

It is a small clan located in Bara, between the Kamar Khel and Zakha Khel. In Mid Bara they are separated from the Zakha Khel of Bazar by a long range of hills called Surghar. To the south of the Sipah are the Ali Khel Orakzais, the Torghar Range intervening. The winter quarters of the Sipah are in the caves in Kajurai, in the vicinity of Gandao and Mehmani. The Sipah quota of the Khaibar Pass extends from the Bagiari ravine to the Shagai bridge.

The Sipah cultivate the soil and rear cattle and mules, and, with others, supply the Peshawar market with charcoal and wood for fuel.

In winter they come down to the south-west of Peshawar, on the left of the Bara River, in the following villages: Speroh, Alamgudar, Gandao, Momanai, Tandai at the foot of Besai Spur, and Dora. This tract from Besai south to Bara is called Dasht-is-kajurai.

This tribe was included in the agreement made regarding Kajurai.

Adam Khel.

The Adam Khel is a large section of the Afridi tribe, who inhabit the hills between the districts of Kohat and Peshawar. Though a branch of the Afridi clan, this tribe cannot be regarded as a part of it in any other than from an ethnological point of view; for, whether it be viewed with reference to its strategical position, its interests, or its habits, it is a distinct community.

It is divided as follows:—

I, Gali Khel; II, Jawaki; III, Hasn Khel; IV, Asha Khel.

The Gali Khel are thus sub-divided:—

1. Tor Sapar	300 matchlocks.
2. Zargun Khel	300 "
3. Sharaki	200 "
4. Bosti Khel	100 "
Total	...	900	"

They live in the Kohat Pass and its tributary glens, with the exception of the Tor Sapar, whose village is situated on the ridge which divides the Gali from the Jawaki. Their villages are Zargun Khel, Shpalkar, Tor Sapar, Suni Khel, Kui, Sharaki, and Bosti Khel.

Their principal occupation is carrying salt on camels to Peshawar, and their revenue is assisted by a subsidy of Rs. 5,000 paid by the British Government for the safety of the road leading from Peshawar through the Kohat Pass.

II. The Jawakis are divided into :—1, Haibat Khel; 2, Kimat Khel.

The total number of the Jawaki section does not probably amount to more than 1,000. The Jawaki Afridis live in the hills to the east of the Kohat Pass.

Colonel Coke says of the Jawaki Afridis :—

“They are almost the sole wood carriers of Kohat. Large quantities of grass, too are brought in from their hills to cantonments. They possess a large number of camels, which are constantly employed either in carrying wood, grass, or salt; and the trade they derive in this way is very great.”

III. The Hasn Khel are divided into two great sections—(1) Tatar Khel, or Akhorwal, and (2) Janakhori.

The villages of the Hasn Khel are—Akhori, Janakhori, Kui, Musadara, Taruna, Ispargai. They are said to number about 1,900 men in all.

Their means of livelihood are bringing in wood and charcoal to Peshawar, and in cultivating some “lalni” land belonging to Mohmands of Shamshatu and Zakhet. They would become very hopeless if blockaded.

IV. The Ashu Khel consist of the following sections :—

1. Kandao	100 matchlocks.
2. Ali Khel	60
3. Kala „	460
4. Pridi	50
5. Mahamadi	30
Total			700

They are located to the south of Fort Mackeson, on the first range of hills, and in the Uchalgada Valley. They live in villages of the same names as the sections. They are an insignificant section, and are hardly recognized in the Adam Khel council.

In 1863 it had been intended to punish the Ashu Khel of Kandao for their share in the depredations on the Peshawar border, for which Bori was destroyed; but they gave in a timely submission, and with the Hasn Khel signed the agreement. Since then they have only troubled the authorities in the cases of the villages of Kandar and Kandao.

Thus the Adam Khel number as follows :—

1. Gala Khel	900
2. Jawaki	1,000
3. Hasn Khel	900
4. Ashu „	700
Total			3,500

The Adam Khel section is thus one of the most numerous and most powerful of the Afridi clans. Located in the hills and glens westward of Jalala Sir, and in the glens on each side of the defile leading from the Peshawar Valley to Kohat, it holds the entire pass in its grasp. They are, however, as already stated, largely engaged in the salt carrying trade, and possess many camels.

They are permanent residents, and their villages are substantial, strengthened by towers, or situated for the most part in defensible positions. They have considerable tracts of cultivation about them, but their chief agricultural labor is expended on the unirrigated waste lands in British territory belonging to our villages of Chandangarhi, Adizai, Aza Khel, Yusaf Khel, and Pasani. These villages were assigned by the Sikhs to the Arbabs of the Mohmand divisions, in order to avoid coming into immediate contact with the hill men, whose payment of revenue was uncertain and precarious, and with whom the jaghirdars were forced to maintain a good understanding.

The Adam Khel have always been a very independent tribe, and have never acknowledged any authority.

In former days the villages of Bori and Janakhor maintained bands of robbers to plunder the Atak road, and it was owing to their depredations and the difficulty of managing them that the Sikhs were induced to assign the district of Kohat to the Barakzai Chiefs.

Cavagnari, however, says in one of his reports : " The whole of the Adam Khel Afridis are entirely dependent for existence on their trade with British territory, and a protracted blockade would at all times be sufficient to reduce them to any terms."

All transactions with this tribe are carried on by the Deputy Commissioner at Kohat.

During the summer months about 2,000 families from the different sections of this clan are located in Tirah Maidan, and about 250 families are permanently settled there in the glens between Waran and Batan.

The dealings of the Adam Khel with the British have chiefly been with reference to the Kohat Pass.

SECTION II.

Operations against the Adam Khels.

The Expedition against the Afridis of the Kohat Pass, February 1850.

THE Gali, or Kohat Pass, is the direct and best route from Kohat to Peshawar. The Government post runs usually by this route. Immediately after annexation, the British Government, following the example of all its predecessors, concluded an arrangement with the Afridis in respect to this pass, and agreed to pay them Rs. 5,700 per annum, for which they were to protect the road through the defile. This was effected in April 1849. In February 1850, a party of Sappers and Miners, (part of the Durbar troops which had been transferred to the British service on the annexation of the Panjab,) with some Irregulars and workmen, were employed in constructing a road from Kohat to the crest of the "Kotal" Pass over the mountain in British territory, when they were surprised by a party of Afridis. The assailed had not even time to arm themselves, when 12 were killed and 6 wounded, the assailants numbering, it was said, about 1,000.

Colonel George Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, at first supposed the aggression was no indication of any hostile combination of the hill tribes, but merely an effort of the clan, through whose territory the road was to pass, to prevent our labors and thus purchase forbearance.

Subsequent information pointed to a coalition between the Afridi tribe and the men of Akhor in particular. The instigator and leader was reported to have been a prescribed freebooter, named Daria Khan; and the avowed object of the aggression was to compel reversion to the rates at which salt used to be sold from the Kohat mines. In Colonel Lawrence's own opinion, however, the chief cause was the making of the Kohat road, which would throw open the fastnesses of the neighbouring tribes, and make them accessible to regular troops.

Regarding this outrage Mr. Temple said: "The chief causes were
 Mr. Temple's Report on Tribes. "probably the innate ferocity of the Afridis, their
 "distrust of a civilized Government, and the machinations of a noted freebooter, who had previously to
 "annexation forfeited for his crimes a jaghir in the Peshawar District, and
 "who hoped, by disturbing the passage of the defile, to induce the British
 "to conclude terms with him. But other causes were at the time attributed.
 "It was by some supposed that the increased taxation of salt, the construction
 "of a road through the pass, and the non-receipt of the stipulated allowances
 "by the Afridis, were circumstances of provocation. But each of the three
 "points admit of explanation. In the first place, the British tax on
 "Trans-Indus salt did not injuriously affect the Afridis. The duty leviable at
 "the mines was, indeed, higher than the former taxes, but this was the only
 "duty; while town and transit market duties to which the salt had been previously liable were remitted. The aggregate of the three kinds of previous
 "taxes exceeded the single duty of the British at least two-fold in all cases,
 "and even four-fold in some cases. But the rate of duty, while it might affect
 "the western tribes or the consumers of the plains, in Peshawar or elsewhere,

"*would not injure the Afridis, who are great carriers and not great consumers.*
 "If the price of salt were high, the consumer might suffer, but the carrier
 "would realize his full dues. Moreover, experience shows that when the price of
 "Trans-Indus salt is increased, the profits of the carrier rise to a still greater
 "degree. This fact has been repeatedly admitted by the Afridis themselves at
 "conferences, so that some have thought that if the present duties were to
 "be enhanced, the Afridis at least would be actual gainers. But the duties
 "have never been raised from the rate originally fixed, (2, 3, and 4 annas per
 "maund); while in the Panjab the duty amounts to Rs. 2 per maund, and has
 "always been cheerfully paid. Furthermore, if the duties had been vexatious
 "to the Afridis, which they were not, still they had not come into operation
 "when the party of sappers and miners were murdered. The temporary
 "closing of the mines pending enquiry might, perhaps, have created some
 "mistrust; but they had been reopened *just before* the outrage took place. As
 "for the road, no such work was being carried on within Afridi limits, nor
 "through any part of the pass. The unfortunate sappers were working within
 "*our* territory, near Kohat, at a place where a regular road has since been
 "constructed. As for the allowances being paid not to the Afridis, but to
 "another party who failed to pass it on to the proper recipients, the British
 "officer at Kohat deposed that the money was disbursed to the Afridi Malik
 "*in his own presence.*"

Two regiments of the Panjab Irregular Force, the 1st Panjab Infantry, and the 1st Panjab Cavalry, were at the time under orders for Kohat, and their departure was stopped.

About this time the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Napier, had arrived at Peshawar, and on the 7th February 1850 orders were issued for an advance through the Kohat Pass.

The force which was detailed for this duty was under the immediate command of Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, but the Commander-in-Chief was to accompany it in person.

General Order by Commander-in-Chief.

Fourteen days' provisions were to accompany the force: 4 officers taken from regiments that did not form part of the force were to accompany it as Baggage Masters. Any man found plundering would be hanged or flogged. Officers were to march in the lightest order, and no plunderings, burning, or reprisals, were to be done by the troops.

The object of the expedition was two-fold: first, to strengthen Kohat by the 1st Panjab Cavalry and 1st Panjab Infantry, and, secondly, to punish the offending tribes.

1 Troop, Horse Artillery, with separate elephant transport.
 2 5½-inch mortars carried on one elephant.
 2 Companies, 60th Rifles.
 2 " 61st Foot.
 2 " 98th "

23rd Native Infantry (Commander-in-Chief's escort).
 31st Native Infantry.
 15th Irregular Cavalry.
 1st Panjab Infantry.
 1st " Cavalry.

The force which was detailed for this duty is given marginally; and on the 9th it marched to Matani, entering the Kohat Pass on the 10th.

The advance was covered by the 1st Panjab Infantry. As the column entered the pass, it was met by some deputies from the village of Akhor, who endeavoured to exculpate themselves; but Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner, being assured that this was one of the villages which had taken part in the massacre of the sappers, Sir Charles Napier's answer to the deputies was that the villagers must within an hour surrender themselves and their arms. At the end of the hour the Malik returned,

stating that their companions would not listen to the terms, when the Commander-in-Chief ordered Sir Colin Campbell to crown the heights round the village, but not to fire unless fired upon.

The enemy were posted chiefly on the heights, only a few occupying the village. Colonel Lawrence had assembled about 1,600 of the Militia of the country under their Arbabs, or chiefs. These were, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, ordered to ascend the heights; those on the right in support of a detachment of the 60th Rifles and 1st Panjab Infantry under Captain Coke, and those on the left in support of detachments of the Guides and 1st Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant Lumsden of the Guides.

Colonel Lawrence's Despatch.

Regimental History, Guide Corps.

The brunt of the skirmishing fell on the 1st Panjab Infantry. Strong opposition was offered by the enemy who were behind breastworks; but covered by the fire of 2 Horse Artillery guns, these breastworks were speedily carried.

Regimental History, 1st Panjab Infantry.

The Militia had gone up boldly enough; but once there, nothing could induce them to come down until the village had been taken, and it was quickly evident that little assistance was to be expected from the Militia.

Colonel Lawrence's Despatch.

The village of Akhor was then partially destroyed under the orders of the civil authorities.

The obstruction to the entrance of the defile being thus removed, the column moved forward towards the village of Zargun Khel, leaving at the head of the pass a large number of the Militia, and the 15th Irregular Cavalry under Major Fisher.

On nearing Zargun Khel, the enemy were again found posted on the heights above the village, from whence they were driven by detachments of the 60th and 98th Regiments, assisted by the Horse Artillery, when this village was also burnt.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

On encamping for the evening in the valley, which in this part is commanded from the heights on either side, the enemy crowned the hills and kept up a desultory fire on the camp immediately below them, killing and wounding several of the force, when 2 companies of the 31st Native Infantry under Captain Hampton and a company of the 1st Panjab Infantry cleared the heights on both sides and held them for the night. The enemy continued to annoy these picquets throughout the night.

Previous to the column moving forward on the morning of the 11th, a detachment consisting of 2 guns on elephants, the Grenadier company of the 61st Regiment and 5 companies, 1st Panjab Infantry, 2 Troops, 1st Panjab Cavalry, and 600 Militia, the whole under the command of Colonel Fordyce, and accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, proceeded to the village of Kui. The advance was covered by the 1st Panjab Infantry, which had 1 man wounded. Resistance similar to that previously experienced was met at Kui, which was burnt.

Regimental History, 1st Panjab Infantry.

On the return of this detachment the column resumed its march through the pass, which after leaving Zargun Khel, becomes extremely narrow and difficult, being commanded by the heights which immediately overlook it, and which were held by the enemy. These heights were taken by 3 companies of the 1st Panjab Infantry on the left, whilst a detachment of the 60th Rifles, supported by one of the 98th, crowned the steeps on the right.

Meanwhile the rear-guard, composed of the 23rd Native Infantry and 2 Horse Artillery guns, under Major Platt, met with considerable annoyance from large bodies of the enemy, who pressed heavily on his rear and flanks, and occupied each height as soon as it was vacated by the rear and flanking parties, until he reached the village of Sharaki.

Sharaki was found deserted and destroyed, and the march of the force was continued to the foot of the Kohat Kotal, where the force encamped.

At this time Kohat was held by some irregular troops with artillery under Lieutenant Pollock, Assistant Commissioner, and the force was joined at the foot of the Kotal by 2 guns and these Irregulars.

Colonel Lawrence's Despatch. In the afternoon the 1st Panjab Cavalry continued its march to Kohat.

The heights overlooking the front of the camp were occupied by a company of the 23rd Native Infantry, which immediately after dark was attacked by a party of the enemy, who were, however, driven off before the arrival of the in-lying picquet which had been sent up when the firing was first heard.

About 8 o'clock on the following morning, 2 companies of the 31st Native Infantry, which under Captain Dunmore of that regiment had held the heights overlooking the rear of the camp, and which had remained unmolested during the night, were ordered down, as no enemy were in sight, to enable the men to procure water and regular food,—it being the third day they had not cooked. As this order was being conveyed to Captain Dunmore, a party of 20 men of the 31st Native Infantry was detached under a Native Officer, with particular instructions to ascend the heights in a direction pointed out to him as more easy of access, and to hold the position during the temporary absence of the 2 companies.

The Native Officer, instead of obeying his order, proceeded direct upon Captain Dunmore's detachment, at this time in the act of descending the steepest part of the hill by alternate companies, when the rearmost company under Ensign Sitwell, still some distance up the steep, as well as the Native Officer's party which had just reached him, were suddenly attacked by a body of the enemy, who opened a very severe fire and rolled down huge stones. Ensign Sitwell, together with several of his men, were struck down by the first discharge; and so sudden and impetuous was the attack of the mountaineers, that it was with the greatest difficulty that certain men of his regiment succeeded in rescuing Lieutenant Sitwell's body.

The retreat of this party was covered by a Horse Artillery gun, which prevented the enemy following up their first attack.

At the same time the other picquet of the 23rd Native Infantry was attacked; to reinforce which a company of the same regiment was immediately sent under Lieutenant Hilliard, who was severely wounded in driving the enemy off.

Colonel Lawrence's Despatch. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Napier, then rode over to inspect Kohat, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, and during the day the flank companies of the 98th Regiment, 2 companies 31st Native Infantry, 2 companies 1st Panjab Infantry, with Horse Artillery, the whole under the command of Major Haythorne of the 98th, were detached to cover a party employed in burning the three villages of Bosti Khel,—the enemy offering resistance as on the previous occasions, but the duty being effected without a single

On the morning of the 13th, the force was put in motion to return to Peshawar, the baggage being in the centre of the column, and every precaution taken for its protection as in the advance.

The 1st Panjab Infantry remained on the ground for some time after the column had moved, and Lieutenant Pollock's force was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to make a demonstration towards the Bazoti Hills, so as to draw off the enemy from the column; when Captain Coke moved on Kohat.

Colonel Lawrence's Despatch.

Regimental History, 1st Panjab Infantry.

Colonel Lawrence's Despatch.

Captain Coke had taken the precaution to order 2 guns and the 1st Panjab Cavalry to be at the foot of the pass on the Kohat side, and the 1st Panjab Infantry crossed the pass and reached Kohat without molestation, although a large number of the Bazotis were on the hills around. During the operations in the pass, the conduct of Captain Coke, Lieutenant Lumsden, Lieutenant Keyes, and the 1st Panjab Infantry, had been the admiration of the whole camp.

Sir Colin Campbell's column had commenced its march about 7 A. M.; on the advanced guard nearing Sharaki, the enemy opened fire from the neighbouring heights, and from this point until the rear-guard reached the immediate vicinity of Akhor, nearly the whole length of the defile, the Afridis contested the ground, opposing the force in front, and hanging incessantly on its flanks and rear, with greater perseverance even than they had manifested in our advance; but not a single beast of burden or article of baggage were lost throughout these operations.

On the return march another attempt was made to induce the Peshawaris to attack without success.

However, a small portion of the Irregulars behaved very differently; for Colonel Lawrence said there was a small band of Khaibaris of the Malik Din Khel under Subadar Fateh Khan, (who had done such good service in the defence of Fort Attock under Major Herbert,) which was ever foremost, Fateh Khan and his standard bearer leading the van. So much pleased was Sir Charles Napier with their conduct, that he directed that Fateh Khan and his standard bearer should be mounted on an elephant with the standard unfurled, and should precede the troops on their march into Peshawar.

The loss in these operations was 1 officer (Lieutenant Sitwell), 1 native officer, 2 non-commissioned officers, 15 rank and file, killed; and 1 officer (Lieutenant Hilliard), 1 native officer, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 68 rank and file, wounded—of these casualties, 27 had been in the 1st Panjab Infantry.

Captain Coke's Report.

The force encamped outside the pass on the evening of the 13th, and returned to Peshawar the following day.

Sir Colin Campbell alluded to the admirable conduct and steadiness of the force, and, amongst others, to the following officers:—

“Captain Simpson, Assistant Commissary General; Lieutenant Norman, Brigade Major, especially for his exertions in carrying away the wounded of Ensign Sitwell's party; Lieutenant Paton, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General; Lieutenant Peyton, 98th Regiment, Aide-de-Camp. Baggage Masters, Captain Staples, 7th Light Cavalry; Captain Young, 7th Light Cavalry; Ensign Murray, 70th Native Infantry; Ensign Perkins, 71st Native Infantry. He added, he had had the greatest pleasure in being associated with Colonel Lawrence, the Deputy Commissioner, to whom was due his warmest acknowledgments for the cordial and obliging readiness which he evinced at all times to render assistance to himself and the troops whenever in his power to do so.”

The following General Order was then published :—

“The Afridi tribe inhabiting the mountain range, which separates Peshawar from Kohat, received certain sums of money from our Government to protect the communications between the above-mentioned towns. Instead of doing so, they, on the 2nd instant, assembled in great numbers, fell by surprise on a detachment of sappers and miners peacefully employed in repairing the road over the pass at Kohat, and massacred the unoffending soldiers.

“Such treacherous and sanguinary conduct required chastisement, and it also became necessary to reinforce the post of Kohat, which by the insurrection of these Afridi tribes was cut off and placed in danger.

“The Commander-in-Chief therefore marched to reinforce Kohat and punish the Afridi tribe, which objects have been effected by Sir Colin Campbell, commanding the troops, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, commanding the civil force. The able manner in which both these officers made their respective arrangements demands this public expression of the Commander-in-Chief’s approbation.

“The admirable practice made by the artillery in dislodging the enemy from the heights, does much credit to Lieutenant-Colonel Fordyce and those under his orders. Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw commanded the advanced guard, both in going to and retiring from Kohat, and that excellent officer exhibited as thorough a knowledge of his duties as he did when he commanded the force in the Lundkhor Valley. Lieutenant-Colonel Corfield in returning, and Major Platt in advancing to Kohat, commanded the rear-guards, and distinguished themselves by the cool judgment and skill with which they repulsed the attacks of an active enemy.

“In short, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, composing this moveable column, did their work admirably.

“The fighting and labour fell upon those who had to scale the precipices, to secure the camp and (when marching) to protect the front, flanks, and rear of the column, while passing twice through a dangerous defile of 13 miles in length under a constant fire from matchlock men.

“The personal activity and intrepid conduct of those whose good fortune gave them the opportunity of thus distinguishing themselves in sight of their companions in arms excited the admiration of the Commander-in-Chief, and added one more proof to those on record,—that wild and undisciplined mountaineers have but little chance of success when opposed to disciplined battalions. It is said that in making this march to Kohat, Ranjit Sing lost 1,000 men. The Commander-in-Chief does not know whether this story is correct or not, but Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell has lost but 20 ; nor was there one bit of baggage taken by our enemies, though they are renowned for being the most daring and dexterous plunderers in the world. It is right that young military men should notice these facts, because they teach practically the vast power of discipline against which mountains and plains, and rivers, and jungles, all cease to be insuperable obstacles.

“The Commander-in-Chief cannot close this order without expressing his deep sorrow for the gallant men who have fallen. No soldiers ever died on the field of battle more gloriously than young Sitwell of the 31st Native Infantry ; and the self-devoted soldiers Havildar Golab Ditchit, Naik Madhu Sing, and Sepoys Mirwin Opadiah and Dinband Panday, who fell in trying to save the wounded officer, although this heroic young man called upon them to leave him and save themselves, which they refused to do, and died with him. Europeans and Natives must alike feel proud of these noble men.

“The brave Lieutenant Hilliard of the 23rd Native Infantry and his small band equally sustained the honor of the Indian army; and though this valiant officer’s wound is severe, there is reason to hope that he and the rest of the wounded will in time be restored to their duties.

“As Captain Coke and the 1st Panjab Regiment of Infantry sustained the brunt of this skirmishing, the Commander-in-Chief thinks it due to this admirable young corps and its excellent leader to say that their conduct called forth the applause of the whole column.”

The cordial thanks of the Government were then conveyed to Lieutenant-Colonel George Lawrence, to Captain Coke, Captain Lumsden, Lieutenant Daly, and the officers and men of the corps under their orders, for their gallant conduct.

The Governor General in Council recorded that he had always anticipated the occurrence of such forays and outrages on the part of the border tribes for some time to come, and that he conceived that their own lawless and predatory character was sufficient to account for attacks similar to that made on the sappers whenever they might occur.

SECTION III.

Arrangements, &c., regarding the Kohat Pass.

Soon after the events related in the preceding section hostilities commenced afresh. On the 28th February 1850 a jirgah assembled among the hill men, who determined to capture the police tower on the summit of the Kohat Pass. The next day the Afridis of the Pass with the Bazoti and Utman Khel tribes surrounded the tower and took possession of the road, driving back the detachment of the Multani Police which had gone to the aid of the men in the tower.

Regimental History, 1st
Panjab Infantry.

The ammunition of the police was all but expended when Captain Coke arrived at the foot of the Kotal with 450 of the 1st Panjab Infantry*, 2 of Lahora Sing's guns, (which could only throw round shot,) and a squadron, 1st Panjab Cavalry. There were from 1,500 to 2,000 Orakzais and Afridis on the hill, the road up which is commanded on all sides.

Captain Coke then attacked the hill with the 1st Panjab Infantry, leaving the guns at the foot protected by the cavalry. The enemy were driven back, and a company of the 1st Panjab Infantry put in the tower with a supply of ammunition and food.

The 1st Panjab Infantry behaved most satisfactorily, and their loss was severe considering the number of men engaged, *viz.* :—

Killed ... 1 Non-commissioned officer, 10 sepoy.

Wounded ... 1 Non-commissioned officer, 14 „

The thanks of Government were conveyed to Captain Coke for his gallant conduct, and also to Lieutenant Daly, who commanded the 1st Panjab Cavalry, and to the officers and men of the 1st Panjab Infantry and 1st Panjab Cavalry.

On the 2nd March Daria Khan arrived in the pass with the Hasn Khel Afridis and a number of the Khaibar Afridis, and being joined by the Bazotis and Utman Khels (Orakzais,) and by the men of the pass, he attacked the tower in the evening, but was beaten off. During the night the enemy pushed on close up to the tower under cover of the rocks, cutting off the water which was in a small pukka tank about 150 yards down the hill; they then erected breastworks across the road up the hill. The attacking force consisted of some 2,000 men, and the Subadar in command of the tower, Mahomed Khan, had with his party defended the place with great spirit.

It was now imperative that a movement should be made for the relief of the tower, and Captain Coke moved out with 450 of his men and some 500 Bangash Volunteers. After a conference between the Bangashes and the Afridis, and Orakzais, the latter withdrew from the hill, when Captain Coke withdrew his men and the police from the tower. The pass had been closed since the Commander-in-Chief had entered it, and the tower was untenable and useless.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

On the 22nd March Dr. Healy proceeding *via* Kashalgur to join the 1st Panjab Infantry at Kohat, was attacked by a party of hill men believed to have been Gali Afridis. He had gone on in advance of his escort, and was cut down when within about 6 miles of Kohat, near the village of Togue, dying shortly afterwards from the

Report by Captain Coke.

At the beginning of April several of the head men of the Gali Afridis came in to the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, denying that Dr. Healy's murder had been committed by the tribe, and suing for terms. And on the 24th April, the head-quarters, and 2 squadrons, 1st Panjab Cavalry, marched through the Kohat Pass to Peshawar, meeting with no opposition, but on the contrary finding the head men and others offering every facility for their progress.

Report by Colonel Lawrence.

Report by Lieutenant Daly.

At the end of April the chief Maliks of the Adam Khels came in to Colonel Lawrence of their own accord, begging for forgiveness, &c. The terms offered by the Government were as follow, and the whole of the Afridis in British territory were to be ejected in the event of their not acceding to them :—

Report by Colonel Lawrence.

Minute by the Governor General.

1st.—The Maliks to engage to keep the pass open at all times, safe and free.

2nd.—The Maliks to receive the same allowance as in 1849, and to be admitted to the same terms in respect to salt as other tribes.

3rd.—For the fulfilment of these conditions, hostages were to be given.

On the 6th June 1850, all the assembled Maliks of Akhor, Zargun Khel, and Sharaki, accepted the conditions and promised hostages.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

But it soon became obvious that the body of the tribes, represented by these Maliks, was not prepared for submission. On the 9th June, a Subadar returning from Kohat was plundered, the dâk papers were torn up and the carrier beaten, and an intended attack on the Assistant Commissioner of Kohat was reported.

Report by Captain Coke.

Orders were now issued both at Peshawar and Kohat for shutting out the offending tribes and seizing such as happened to be in British territory. This was followed by numerous seizures,—some of women,—which gave particular anxiety to the tribes.

At this time the Jawaki tribe offered to open a road through the Jamu and Bori Passes, and to carry the dâk regularly; (an account of these arrangements will be found in the narration of the hostilities with the Bori branch of the Jawakis).

As regards the renewal of hostilities, Government prohibited any extensive aggressive movement till after the rains, considering it safer to await the result of the blockade already established.

The infraction of the agreement was followed by an incursion into British territory, and the plunder of the village of Jani-ki-garhi on the night of the 26th July. The assailants belonged to the villages of Zargun Khel, Sharaki, and Bosti Khel, and numbered about 400.

On the 18th September, the Commissioner, Peshawar, brought to the notice of the Board of Administration that the Afridi tribe had again sued for terms, offering the head men of the new pass as the security. He pointed out the advisability of entering into a treaty, as there was every reason to believe the present submission was sincere. He also drew attention to the great importance of maintaining permanent possession of the Kohat salt mines, and to the advantages to be gained by having strong out-posts at these points; because an exclusion for six months of any tribe habitually frequenting the mines must reduce them to submission or starvation.

The Board, in soliciting the orders of Government, recommended a treaty with the Afridis, and, though concurring in the necessity for posts at the salt mines, deferred sanction-

Panjab Government letter.

of mature experience. Willing to treat the Afridis considerately, the British Government consented to renew their old allowances on condition of their being responsible for the security of the pass. In order to strengthen the arrangement, Rahmat Khan, a Chief of the neighbouring Orakzais, was admitted to a share of the responsibility, and was granted a personal allowance of Rs. 2,000 per annum, and Rs. 6,000 as the pay of a mounted guard to be maintained on the crest of the ridge near Kohat. These revised payments aggregated Rs. 13,700 per annum.

From this time till 1853 the pass remained open, occasional robberies only being committed, but the Afridis regarded the share which Rahmat Khan had in the pass arrangements with extreme jealousy, and the ill-feelings thus raised culminated in October of that year, when they attacked and seized Rahmat Khan's post on the Kotal, in which there were only 20 (instead of the stipulated 100) men. The pass was then closed, postal communication stopped, and British officers were fired upon by the Afridis.

The Chief Commissioner soon after this, (November 1853,) arrived at Peshawar, and directed Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner, to arrange for the attendance of the Maliks of the Kohat Pass. These men accordingly came in, and had a long conference with the Chief Commissioner, during which Major Edwardes, the Commissioner, Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, and Captain Coke, the officer in charge of Kohat, were present.

There were four modes of arranging for the reopening of the Kohat Pass which appeared feasible—1st, to restore matters to the old status, *viz.*, to give Rahmat Khan (Orakzai) Rs. 13,700 per annum for himself and the Afridis, making them responsible, as formerly, for the security of the pass; 2nd, to give the Afridis for the pass (but only as their own share of the old allowances) Rs. 5,700; 3rd, to divide the pass into sections, making separate arrangements with the heads of those tribes who held each portion; and 4th, to hold the Kotal or summit of the pass ourselves, and make an arrangement with the Afridis for the remainder.

To the first plan all our officers were opposed. They felt that the Afridis were opposed to further connection with Rahmat Khan, who had proved his incapacity to conciliate and control them. The second plan was that to which Captain James inclined as most acceptable to the Afridis themselves; the third was the proposition of Captain Coke; and the last, that of Colonel Mackeson, the late Commissioner of Peshawar, to which the Chief Commissioner himself inclined. This last was eventually given up, not simply because it entailed considerable expense, but because it did not appear probable that any reasonable number of the undisciplined Irregulars unconnected with the tribes in the vicinity of the pass could hold the Kotal.

The discussion was therefore narrowed to the second and third plans, and though Captain James still inclined to his former views, it was agreed that the one of making separate arrangements promised the best security and the greatest permanence. Our officers were unanimously of opinion that it was out of the question giving the Afridis a rupee in excess of their former emoluments. Rahmat Khan was their own selection. He may have treated them ill, but it was not right to allow them to benefit by their own wrongful acts. They had repeatedly broken this engagement and shut the pass. They had even, when enjoying our allowances, permitted travellers to be murdered and

of our districts from whence they sallied out to plunder. The Afridis had finally crowned a series of misdeeds by attacking the posts of their chosen leader and expelling his men.

The following therefore were the propositions which it was decided should be offered to the Afridis:—*1st*, that the whole crest of the Kotal and the side of the hill towards Kohat down to Captain Coke's first choki at the Kohat entrance of the pass should be made over to the Bangash tribe, who out of their allowances would satisfy and be responsible for the good conduct of the Bazoti, Utman Khel, Feroz Khel, and other minor tribes, and that the allowance for this duty should be Rs. 7,700 per annum; *2nd*, that from below the Kotal (or the Peshawar side) down to Akhor and the Basi Khel boundary, should be made over to the Afridis on Rs. 5,400 per annum; *3rd*, with the Basi Khel Afridis an arrangement should be made for the rest of the road (being the broken ground outside the pass on the Peshawar side) for Rs. 600.

A conference then took place on the 5th November with the second party, the Gali or Hasn Khel Afridis, who, with Rahmat Khan (Orakzai), had hitherto engaged for the whole pass.

The Chief Commissioner on this occasion carefully recapitulated the past history of our engagement, showing how great had been their perfidy, ingratitude, and inconstancy. They replied that they were prepared to be faithful to their promises for the future; that in fact they had never broken them, but that Rahmat Khan had defrauded them; and that for the future they wished to have no chief over them.

The Chief Commissioner then told them the arrangements which he promised, by which they would be responsible for that portion of the pass which goes through the lands of their own tribes. This they refused, saying they would alone engage for the whole pass and take all the allowances; and added, that rather than not have the whole line to themselves, they would accept the responsibility on their former share of the allowances, *viz.*, Rs. 5,700.

At that moment there was much excitement among the Afridis, and it struck the Chief Commissioner that this offer was merely an exaggerated mode of expressing their great repugnance to allow any other tribe or party to share in the charge of the pass. Moreover, he wished to avoid, if possible, making over the whole management to them. He therefore took no notice of the offer at that time, but bore it in mind as an arrangement which it might become necessary to discuss if the more desirable proposition was finally negatived.

The Afridis positively refusing our terms, the Chief Commissioner broke up the conference, and desired them to withdraw and consider over the proposition quietly among themselves, and return in a couple of hours with their final resolve. Half an hour afterwards, he was told that they had left Peshawar for their homes.

On hearing this, though the Chief Commissioner felt that no faith could be placed in these Afridis, though he did not believe that they would accept the engagement, or that if they did they would adhere to it, still he was sorry that the Maliks had left Peshawar while a prospect of an arrangement existed. He therefore sent after them on the plea that their final answer should be formally given. On their return he requested Captain James, whom they considered most friendly disposed towards them, to ascertain their wishes; that officer after upbraiding them for going away in so unceremonious a fashion, said he would endeavour to mediate and obtain for them the engagement they had desired, *viz.*, responsibility for the whole pass on the allowance of Rs. 5,700 per annum.

This might be thought so far a concession, that it gave up to the charge of the Afridis the Kotal which we had hitherto held at our own disposal, and which they had never occupied. But, on the other hand, it was a punishment, inasmuch as it doubled their responsibility without increasing their allowance. The Chief Commissioner therefore felt that, as a whole, it was no sacrifice of dignity. The question was, whether, having accepted the terms, they would have adhered to their engagement.

But the Afridis refused Captain James's offer, saying that nothing but the full allowance would satisfy them, thus proving that their first offer was not sincere. On this they received their dismissal and set off for the pass. They had not, however, reached the pass before they again desired to negotiate, and sent in a message by one of our police sowars who had followed them to see them safe out of the valley, proposing to return next day and endeavour to effect an arrangement.

This the Chief Commissioner refused; for even Captain James considered it unadvisable. The fact is, that had the Afridis accepted the terms, there was not the slightest security that they would fulfil them. No tribe or party would go bail for them, and they could give no pledges of any real value for their sincerity. The system among hill tribes of giving hostages is little check on them when dealing with us, for they know that we shall not oppress their people. Under native rule, the hostages of a tribe who grossly infringed a treaty would be put to death, or at least mutilated.

It may, perhaps, be asked, why the Afridis of the pass were anxious to enter into engagements which they would not maintain. The reply is, that since the closing of the pass a number of their tribe had been arrested at Kohat, whom they were anxious to see released; several had been seized after the fight with a part of Captain Coke's corps. Again, this was the height of the salt season; the closing of the pass at this time to *them* was a great advantage to *us*, for it stopped their carrying trade. If, therefore, we had to force the Afridis into terms which, however distasteful to them, they would have great difficulty in breaking, this was the best time for effecting our object.

By the old arrangement Rahmat Khan (Orakzai) got Rs. 8,000 per annum; Rs. 2,000 as his personal allowance, and Rs. 6,000 for the pay of 100 men to hold the Kotal. He appears to have kept up 20 men in two small posts below the summit on the Kohat side of the hill, spent a few rupees among the Malikis of tribes, and appropriated the rest. The Gali and Hasn Khel Afridis received Rs. 5,700, out of which they had to satisfy the Basi Khel.

The latter were at feud with the Afridis of the pass, and from their position outside on the left of the road leading to Peshawar possessed great facilities for plundering, of which they never failed to avail themselves. It was useless therefore including them in any arrangement with the Gali and Hasn Khel Afridis.

The very smallest sum which the Gali thieves could pay those of Basi Khel was Rs. 300 per annum, and this sum was accordingly deducted from the allowances of the former and added to an equal sum out of that which Rahmat Khan formerly enjoyed. Thus Rs. 7,700 remained for the Bangash Pathans.

It has been remarked that it was the wish of Colonel Mackeson not to make over the Kotal to any tribe, whether Afridis or Bangash; and the Chief Commissioner inclined to the same view. He did not wish however, as Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson proposed, to place there a body of undisciplined Irregulars collected from distant places, as he believed that with no cover, and

no water, they could not have held their position. But the Chief Commissioner wished Captain Coke should select men of the Bangash, Bazoti, Utman Khel, Orakzai, and other tribes in the vicinity of the pass, and place them in charge; Captain Coke, however, assured him that the men of these tribes would not enlist for such employment.

The Chief Commissioner then sent Captain Coke back to Kohat by the Mir Kalan route, and empowered him to make an arrangement with the Bangash tribe of Pathans, and to repair the two old towers and to build three new ones on the Kotal. If successful, of which that officer entertained no doubt, it must place the Afridis entirely at our mercy. Their hills did not afford them sufficient subsistence; they existed mainly by carrying salt from the Kohat mines into the Peshawar Valley, and thus it would be impossible for them to do anything against our consent in the face of the Bangash Pathans backed by our troops. Shut out from Kohat, and blockaded by a force in front of the pass on the Peshawar side, they might emerge from their defile as individuals to steal and to plunder, as they formerly did when enjoying the bounty of Government, but nothing more.

It had long been contemplated to build a fort on the Peshawar side of the pass, near its mouth; so a force was now moved out to that point, and the work on the post known as Fort Mackeson was commenced.

On his return to Kohat, Captain Coke assembled all the Bangash Maliks, and asked them if they were ready to undertake the holding of the Kotal against the Afridis on the allowances granted by Government; and as they almost all agreed to do so, Captain Coke ordered them to furnish their separate quota of men, and on the 11th he moved with them to the Kotal, taking a wing of the 1st Panjab Infantry and 3rd Panjab Infantry and 2 guns to be kept in reserve at the foot of the pass.

The top of the Kotal was gained without an Afridi being seen or a shot being fired. There being no water of any kind, it became necessary to make immediate arrangements for its supply, not only for the use of the men but also for building the towers. These arrangements being completed, on the morning of the 12th the party commenced building the towers, repairing the walls, &c. These works were all in progress, when about 10 o'clock the alarm was given that the Afridis were coming down. They pushed boldly up the Kotal from the glen on their own side, and got above the Bangashes on the left, where they had entrenched themselves with loose stones on the summit of a hill. The picquet of the Bangashes on this hill now gave way and ran in on the others. Captain Coke was on the hill with 10 or 12 men of the 1st Panjab Infantry, by one of whom the leading Afridi was cut down; but there was a general panic among the Bangashes, who made a rush down the hill, evacuating all the strong positions before the force from below could support them. Having covered their retreat, and brought them out into the plain, Captain Coke found they were too disheartened to attempt anything again that day, and he therefore strengthened the camp at the foot of the Kotal with another regiment of infantry and 2 more guns, and sent Kwaja Mahommed Khan to bring up his Khataks, hoping with the aid of the Bazotis and Jawaki Afridis to again push up the hill.

Captain Coke and 3 of his men were wounded in this skirmish, and 3 of the Bangash Maliks killed, as well as other casualties.

After this an arrangement was entered into, by which the Bazotis, Sipahs, and Jawaki Afridis, agreed to aid the Bangashes in the defence of the Kotal;

and to receive as follows, *viz.*, Bangash Rs. 3,200, Bazotis Rs. 2,000, Jawakis Rs. 2,000, and Sipahs Rs. 500.

In the meanwhile the Gali Afridis were suffering from the blockade. The British authorities had acted on the principle, that if the Afridis would not keep the pass open, the doors of the pass must be shut upon the Afridis; so the Gali Afridis tendered submission and offered to reopen their part of the pass. This offer was accepted. The Basi Khel section, who dwell near the Peshawar end of the pass, were also admitted. The aggregate allowances of the pass were then divided as follow :—

					Rs.
Bangashes	3,200
Bazotis	2,000
Jawaki Afridis	2,000
Sipahs	500
Gali Afridis	5,400
Basi Khels	600
Total					13,700

This arrangement was concluded by the close of 1853. At the same time, also, Rs. 6,000 was paid in cash by the British Government to those friendly clans who had furnished our troops with supplies. From that time the pass remained open, with the exception of one brief interval of twenty-six days.* This interregnum was occasioned by a feud among the Afridis of the pass, during which some robberies were committed. The heads of the confederacy traced the perpetrators to one of the villages in the pass, by name Bosti Khel, when Major Coke sent the Bangashes down to Bosti Khel and compelled the inhabitants to make good the value of the plundered property, and to pay a fine besides.

* Mr. Temple's Report is dated in January 1856.

SECTION IV.

The Expedition against the Bori Section of the Jawaki Afridis, by a force under Colonel Boileau, November 1853.

ABOUT the time that the events occurred in the Kohat Pass, which led to the expedition under Sir Charles Napier, the Afridis of the Jawaki Pass proved troublesome. In 1851 Lieutenant Lumsden reported that several serious raids had been committed on Kohat and Kushalghur by the Jawakis of Paia and Ghareba, who had also attacked one of the Khatak villages; and he recommended that these villages should be destroyed by Kwaja Mahomed Khan, whilst Major Coke with a force prevented any co-operations by the villages of Tenkai and Senkai. Even among the Afridi clans the Bori men were considered particularly daring and ferocious.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

Reports by Colonel Mackeson and Captain James.

Mr. Temple's Report on Tribes.

Reports by Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, and Mr. John Lawrence Chief Commissioner.

When the Afridis (Gali) of the Kohat Pass misbehaved, the Jawaki tribe offered to engage for that pass, or to conduct the communication through their own, the Jamu and Bori Passes, and to carry the dāk regularly. The Jawaki route was actually used for a short time, but the Jawaki Afridis soon proved themselves to be worse even than their neighbours. They committed numerous raids and murders in the Kohat and Peshawar Districts, and even robbed boats on the Indus. They were also concerned in the murder of Dr. Healy; and on the 23rd August 1853, Major Coke, the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, wrote that the punishment of that portion of the Jawaki tribe of Afridis holding the villages of Bori and Kandao, with the Hasn Khel villages of Janikhor, Pestani, Musadara, and Kui, appeared not only desirable but absolutely necessary, as there was no insult or outrage that it had been in their power to commit on the Government subjects and territory that they had left untried. But towards the

Mr. Temple's Report.

end of the year, seeing a force in the field employed in covering the erection of Fort Mackeson, the other Jawaki Afridis at the Peshawar, or north, end of the pass executed satisfactory agreements, with one exception. This exception was the Bori clan.

This clan had during the first years of our rule given an immense deal of trouble to the authorities; and on the 8th June 1853, Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, reported that the boldness and frequency with which the Bori Afridis committed raids in the Peshawar District called for serious notice, as their village had become an asylum for every noted robber.

During 1852 they had committed the following raids:—

In October a party of 10 horsemen had lifted 24 camels in Government employ, and in December they carried off 9 more.

In 1853 their raids were as follow:—In January they murdered a man, carrying off property valued Rs. 1,000. In February they carried off 8 camels and a driver.

In March they lifted 104 head of cattle from Yusaf Khel, and 22 bullocks from Sarozai, wounding a man.

In April they carried off 14 bullocks, wounding a man.

In May they carried off a party of Hindus, who were however released by a pursuing party of villagers.

In June they made an attack on some merchants, killing one and wounding another.

At the same time Captain Coke, the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, had also frequently to complain of the trouble given by the Boris.

Whilst the Deputy Commissioner of Rawal Pindi represented that men who robbed and murdered in his district found refuge with the Boris; among others, Fateh Khan of Naorah, a noted criminal, charged with murder.

The amount of plunder taken by the Boris in 1852-53 was said to have surpassed that of any former period, and Captain Coke reported that there were in every house half a dozen stolen cattle.

But Colonel Mackeson, the Commissioner, believing that as in most of these raids and outrages the gang of Afridis had never exceeded more than 30 in number, and had not averaged more than 12, considered that these disorders were of a nature that could be put down by police arrangements; and urged the establishment of police posts from Matani to Akhora along the Afridi and Khatak border, at the same time advising that at a convenient season a severe example should be made of the Bori men.

In September 1853, Colonel Mackeson was assassinated, and was succeeded by Major Edwardes; and in November 1853, Mr. John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, having proceeded to Peshawar, held a conference on the 15th November with the Maliks of all the villages connected with the Jawaki Pas*s, and also with those of Bori.

All these villages, except Bori, lie at the foot of the outer range, in positions however difficult of access, by no means so inaccessible as Bori. Their inhabitants cultivated land in the plains, were great carriers of salt and wood to the Peshawar market, and they had therefore many inducements to accede to our terms. They had no doubt on various occasions plundered, and perpetrated other crimes in the valley, but they were by no means so notorious for their misdeeds as the men of Bori. And with every desire to avoid if possible hostilities, the Chief Commissioner arranged with all the villages of the Jawaki Pass, except Bori, that the interdict to their resort to the salt mines, and markets of Kohat and Peshawar, should be withdrawn on the following conditions:—

- 1st. That neither they, nor any person living in their villages, should commit crimes for the future in British territory, in return for which they should have full permission to trade and to cultivate within our boundaries.
- 2nd. That they would not give a passage through their lands to depredators coming into British territory, or to criminals passing therefrom.
- 3rd. That they would on no account afford an asylum to criminals and outlaws flying from justice.

The Chief Commissioner was most anxious to get these Afridis to agree to seize and surrender such criminals as had taken refuge in their villages; but this they stoutly refused, simply stipulating that they would send them away.

* Janikhor, Taraoni, Kandi, Musadara, Kui, Kanda, Kula Khel.

To the third condition they also evinced great repugnance, and it was only on their seeing that a refusal on this point would lead to a continuance of the blockade that they gave a reluctant consent.

These Afridis stated with truth, that it was the immemorial custom of their clans never to refuse an asylum to any one demanding it, and that to surrender an individual who had obtained refuge with them, or even to deny him their hospitality, was a great disgrace. Afridis will be found in any number, who, for reward, will murder a refugee in cold blood and produce his head, but none will consent to surrender a fugitive who demands an asylum.

The Chief Commissioner was impressed with the belief from the conduct and bearing of these Afridis, that they were sincerely desirous as a body for peace. The way in which they discussed each question, and the resolution with which they refused to accede to those points to which they objected, gave some assurance that they were in earnest. The fact however that it is for their interest to be on good terms with us, is doubtless the strongest lien on their good faith.

The Chief Commissioner was even willing to make terms with the Bori men. The desire of Government to avoid a recourse to hostilities, the unsatisfactory state of affairs with the Afridis of the Kohat Pass, and the extraordinary sickness among the troops at Peshawar,—all pointed out the advantage of this course.

But the Bori Afridis would make no atonement for the past, and give no security for the future; their arrogance went so far as to ask that a number of their youth should be admitted to service. To the different queries put to them, they answered with amazing effrontery—"Yes, we have committed murders, we have robbed, we have now a Hindu prisoner, and when his ransom is paid he shall be released; but give us service, make us an allowance, and we will be your servants."

The terms which were offered to them, were—

1stly. That they should make restitution for all property proved to have been stolen or plundered during the past year; on their pleading their poverty this point was modified, to the surrender of the horses of the mounted robbers, but this was also refused.

2ndly. That they should release any prisoners detained for ransom.

3rdly. That they should surrender certain outlaws of the Cis-Indus districts who had found refuge with them. But each and all these propositions they rejected.

Nothing therefore remained but to send a force against them, and advantage was taken of the presence of the force at Bazid Khel covering the erection of fort of Mackeson.

Colonel Boileau's Despatch. The Bori villages are situated in a valley separated from the plains of Bazid Khel and Aza Khel (Peshawar Valley) by a low range of hills.

The villages were known respectively as Toto Khel, Issintang, and Bori.

McGregor's Gazetteer. The first was to the east of the road; the second, on the road; and the third, further on, situated at the mouth of a very difficult pass. These had 30, 20, and 40 houses, respectively; besides which the first and third had towers, about 16 or 17 in number. Water was procured from a spring in the hill behind the first, and from a stream in the pass beyond the third.

The valley is about 12 miles long, and has an entrance at each extremity; but as they are narrow and very defensible defiles, it was determined to cross

practicable path ascended through the village of Kandao, a second was known to exist to the south of that village; but general information represented the Shir Gasha, which crosses the outer range between the Kandao and Taraoni entrance, to be the most practicable road, and it was therefore chosen. It had

Colonel Edwardes' Despatch. also been decided to avoid the Kandao in entering the Bori Valley, so as not to alarm the Afridis of Kandao, who had made peace with us a short time before, as already narrated.

But Colonel Napier Bengal Engineers having reconnoitred the ground on the day preceding the advance of the force, had Colonel Edwardes' Report. advised that the heights should be occupied from this point, so as to turn the flank of all opposition at the Shir Gali Pass.

At 4 A.M. on the 29th November, the force (see appendix) marched from camp Bazid Khel under the command of Colonel Boileau, and guided by Captain James, the Deputy Commissioner.

Advance—

Guide Corps.

Mountain Train.

Main Body—

66th Gurkha Regiment.

Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment.

20th Native Infantry.

2 9-Pounder Guns.

Sappers and Engineer stores.

Rear-Guard—

200 Gurkhas.

Squadron, 7th Irregular Cavalry.

The first part of the road, which was some 5 or 6 miles in all, was over a good hard plain, but the approach to the Shir Gali (Gasha) for the distance of about a mile lay through ravines and low hills.

The Guide Infantry under Lieutenant Hodson were detached to ascend the path leading through Kandao, and to crown the outer range of hills to prevent the enemy from defending the Shir Gasha. Captain James had taken the precaution of having the maliks of all the friendly Afridi villages in attendance on him, and a Malik of Kandao was now sent on to his own people to assure them of our peaceable intentions; nevertheless, though they abstained from hostilities, they could not rely on our good faith, and numbers fled up the hill with such property as they could hastily carry off.

Colonel Edwardes' Report. Although the road had been good, and there had been a faint moon between 5 and 6 o'clock, it was 7 o'clock before the foot of the Shir Gasha was reached. Here a reserve of 2 companies of Infantry and the Cavalry were left, the main body reaching the summit of the pass at 10-30 A. M., where the Guide Corps had already arrived, having found a good and easy road from Kandao leading to Bori, the existence of which was not previously known to us.

The Shir Gasha is the proper pass of the men of Bori. It is steep, winding, narrow and long, and though quite practicable for horses and any beasts of burden, it will only admit of troops ascending in single file. If, therefore, it had been disputed by the Afridis, Colonel Napier's manœuvre would have been essential to the success of the main column; but there was no indication of any opposition having been contemplated here.

The smouldering ashes of the Bori watch-fires were alone found on the crest of the Shir Gasha, with the half-washed heads of maize, which their picquets had abandoned at our approach.

Colonel Boileau had ordered that the 9-pounders should remain at the foot of the hill with the reserve, until he could ascertain from the summit of the range the nature of the ground on which the operations were to be carried on. The villages of Bori were now in sight on the further side of a small

valley, occupying a considerable extent of ground, and lying between spurs of the opposite range, of the most abrupt and precipitous character. From the difficulties of the Shir Gasha road, and the extent of work to be done in destroying the villages, it was apparent that the elephants with the 9-pounders could not be taken on with advantage, and orders were given for their remaining at the foot of the hill with the reserve.

The sappers, and their materials for blowing up the towers of the Bori villages had been placed with the 9-pounders; as in case the force had met with opposition, the mules with the sapper park would have encumbered the advance up the Shir Gasha, for the Mountain Train occupied much ground. By some mistake, the order for detaining the 9-pounders and their elephants

Colonel Boileau's Despatch.

had not been delivered until they had accomplished part of the ascent, and their return down the pass so obstructed the road, that Ensign Ruxton, commanding the Sappers, in spite of every exertion, was unable to come up in time.

time.

The Sappers were awaited until 11 o'clock, when, as there was no time to lose, it was determined to go on without them, and to abandon the idea of blowing up the towers. Leaving a picquet of a company of Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment under Captain Powlett, and a company of the Guides under Lieutenant Tyler, 20th Native Infantry, on the crest, (and from which point the operations were viewed by Mr. John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner,) the force descended into the valley of Bori, and advanced across the plain covered by the Light Company, Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment. As the extreme parts of the Bori village, or rather cluster of villages, lay near the Taraoni entrance of the valley; and as Colonel Boileau was assured by the Commissioner, Major Edwardes, and the Deputy Commissioner, Captain James, of the neutrality of the men of Taraoni, whose village is built in the gorge of that defile, Colonel Boileau determined to withdraw from the valley by that route, and his plan of operations was made accordingly. In arriving at this decision, the most valuable assistance was afforded by the advice of Fateh Khan (Khatak), late a Ressaldar in the Guides, who was in personal attendance on the Chief Commissioner, and who had lived in these strongholds for some years.

The spurs commanding the main portion of Bori were crowned in the most brilliant manner by Lieutenant Hodson with 3 companies of the Guides, and by Lieutenant Turner, his 2nd in command, with 2 companies of that Regiment and 25 men of the 66th Gurkhas armed with Minie Rifles, who drove the Afridis before them up to the highest peaks with a rapidity, steadiness, and intelligence, which was watched by the whole force with admiration.

Lieutenant Turner's party had carried the village *en route*, and swept 15 or 20 of the Afridis before them up the hill; and when the Mountain Train coming up played upon the towers, the last lingering defenders abandoned the village to its fate. The enemy being thus removed to a distance, the first village was entered, and its fort set on fire by Lieutenant Walker of the Engineers, ably seconded by Fateh Khan (Khaibari) and his police.

In the meantime, the 22nd Regiment under Colonel Cotton, and 2 Detachments of the Gurkhas under Captain Ross and Lieutenant Law, had, covered by the artillery fire, driven the enemy from the other two villages and fired them successively, the Afridis making no stand in the plain, but taking to the hills, from whence they poured down a matchlock fire till driven to a distance by our skirmishers. By 12 o'clock heavy columns of flame and smoke were rising from every Bori village.

While the work of demolition was being thus leisurely carried on below, the contest on the heights above grew warmer every hour, as friends and allies from Pestonai, To Sapat, and Jamu, came down the higher ranges to assist their clansmen of Bori.

The struggle of the day was for the peak of the centre hill, where the Afridis had, by erecting a breastwork on an isolated point, made an almost impregnable position. Here Lieutenant Turner with about 20 men were brought to bay; and such showers of stones and bullets were rained upon them that an advance was impossible, while to retire would have been fatal.

The Afridis in the breastwork were seen from the opposite height to draw their knives; and watch intently for the first movement in retreat, as the signal to leap down upon the Guides. But no wavering was to be found in that little band. They at once sounded the bugle for help, and stood their ground, returning the fire of the Afridis. On seeing Lieutenant Turner's position, Lieutenant Hodson had sent a company of Guides from his own party; but they were unable to reach Lieutenant Turner. A company of the 66th Gurkhas under Subadar Tala Gorrang was then sent up, and shortly afterwards a second company under Ensign Sweeny; the former arrived first, and gallantly carried the enemies stronghold, led on by Assistant Surgeon Lyall of the Guide Corps, and aided by a Sowar Dal Sing of the Guide Cavalry.

It was now nearly 3 o'clock, the work of the day was done, and the declining sun and the mustering Afridis both gave warning to retire, while there was yet light; the troops were therefore recalled, the main body being drawn up in the centre of the valley. The Guides and Gurkhas were most skilfully withdrawn from the heights by Lieutenant Hodson, a party of Gurkhas under Captain Ross, and 2 Mountain Train Guns under Lieutenant Pulman, being posted in front of Tota Khel to cover the retirement; this detachment of Gurkhas with the Corps of Guides then formed the rear-guard.

There had undoubtedly been the severest trial to the discipline of both these corps in withdrawing from these heights. The Afridi seldom meets, but always follows his assailant, and after being driven doggedly from height to height during a long day's fighting, takes fresh breath and heart when the wearied enemy retires, and with knife and gun comes leaping down his native hills more like a demon than a man; and none but first-rate soldiers could have performed the retirement that was effected that afternoon.

A little after 3 P.M. the column was set in motion towards the Taraoni Pass. The 20th Native Infantry and Mountain Guns in advance, followed by the 66th Gurkhas and the 22nd Foot.

The Bori mouth of the Taraoni defile is split into two roads by an isolated hill. The main column defiled down the lower one, while 2 companies of Her Majesty's 22nd under Captain Anderson skirmished with great steadiness along the upper.

The enemy in considerable force attempted to press the rear-guard, but were checked by Lieutenant Hodson, who charged them with a small party of Guide Cavalry, which had made its way through the Taraoni Pass during the day; every subsequent attempt was met by so hot a fire from the rear-guard, (in which the steadiness and coolness of Captain Anderson's skirmishers were conspicuous,) that not the slightest impression was made, and shortly after passing Taraoni all molestations ceased.

Captain Powlett's detachment, which had been left on the ridge of the Shir Gasha Pass, had in the meanwhile conformed to the movements of the main column, and had moved along the crest of the hills parallel to the march of the force, checking an attempt of the enemy to intercept the line of march and covering the left flanks as far as the Taraoni defile, where it joined the main column.

During the attack on Bori, the outer range of hills above Janakhor, Kui, and Taraoni, was covered with armed Afridis, quietly watching the progress of events; and as the head of the column neared Taraoni, considerable anxiety was felt as to the part which our new Afridi allies in that and the other villages would play on the occasion.

Despatch from the Chief Commissioner.

Colonel Edwardes' Despatch.

Certainly they had been admitted to treaties with us, and allowed to trade when the salt mines were closed to the other tribes; but it was a great temptation. The "Infidels" were in the pass, harassed by a long day's work, and still engaged with an enemy in the rear! The Afridis sat in hundreds on the hill, and saw that they had only to descend it in front and place the column between two fires; yet they refrained and kept their faith, and even sent deputies to the men of Bori to warn them not to come beyond their border;

Chief Commissioner's Despatch.

Colonel Edwardes' Despatch.

whilst the Taraoni men actually brought water at the Chief Commissioner's request up to the top of the ranges for the Europeans who held the pass. This action on the part of these Afridis Colonel Edwardes attributed greatly to the presence of the Chief Commissioner at that point, and to his holding friendly intercourse with their Maliks. The next day a small present was made to each of them by Mr. John Lawrence.

Thus the force moved out on to the plain through friends and by an easy level road, instead of having to fight its way in darkness over the steep passes of Shir Gasha or Kandao.

Night closed upon the column as it emerged from the pass, and the foremost did not reach camp till 8 p.m., the main body not till 10 or 11, after being more than 18 hours under arms, marching, climbing or fighting the whole time. The British soldiers had food in their havresacks, but the majority of the force had none; and all were without water, the springs at Bori being far up a ravine, were in the hands of the enemy.

The loss on our side had been 8 killed and 29 wounded (see appendix), and that of the Afridis something less.

In his despatch Colonel Edwardes made the following observations regarding these operations:—

1st. That the Hindustani sepoy was physically incapable of doing the work that had been done by the Guides and Gurkhas. The men of the 20th Native Infantry were so done up by the ascent of the Shir Gasha and the want of water, that they could not be put on the rear-guard in the retirement, which was therefore allotted to the Guides and Gurkhas, although they had been fighting all day.

2nd. That a small gun, like that used in the Kashmir army, was much wanted. These, called *shir buchas*, or young lions, are a long iron or brass piece, throwing a ball from 4 ounces to half a pound in weight, elevated by a tripod, and carried up the steepest hills by from 2 to 4 men. Their range is twice the distance of the common matchlock, and thus infantry can advance under the cover of their fire and drive the enemy before them with great ease and trifling loss. Even the Mountain Train was felt during the operations to be heavy, but these *shir buchas* can go wherever men can stand.

- 3rd. The bullets for the Minie Rifle of the Gurkha Regiment, which had been served out from the Peshawar Magazine, did not fit the bore, and the pieces after a few rounds were useless.
- 4th. A large number of small *massaks* had been served out by Captain James to the troops, but were not filled under the expectation of finding water at Bori. Water should be carried in small quantities by all whose prejudices are not against it.
- 5th. Small hill doolies made up of blankets slung to poles, at the suggestion of Colonel Napier, were found invaluable in fetching off the wounded from awkward places.

Of the results Colonel Edwardes said, the real loss of the Bori Afridis was not, however, to be found in killed and wounded, or even in the destruction of their homes and stocks of winter fodder for the cattle, but in the loss of prestige, in the violation of their hills as an "alsatia" for proclaimed criminals, in seeing that even our heavy regular army contains, and can produce, when need requires, some troops who can take to the hill side as lightly as themselves, and drive them off their roughest crags with weapons of superior range, who may be in fact to the tribes of the mountains what our Europeans are to the tribes of the plain. This was, indeed, a loss inflicted by these operations, which he believed would be felt throughout the whole Afridi tribe.

Colonel Boileau said, it was for him to do justice to the troops for their conduct throughout the day. The duty to be done called for the utmost exertions of every officer and man of the force; and well indeed had the call been answered. The most arduous achievement, that of taking the heights of Bori by Lieutenants Hodson and Turner with the Guide and Gurkha detachments, had been effected with a dashing gallantry which nothing could surpass; the Gurkhas and Guides fighting step by step, it was hard to say which was foremost. First in the advance, and last in the retirement, the exertions of Lieutenant Hodson and his Guides had never ceased throughout the day.

Colonel Boileau said his warmest thanks were due to Colonel Cotton, commanding the 22nd Regiment, his 2nd in command, Major Craigie, commanding 20th Native Infantry, Captain Brougham, commanding Mountain Train, and Captain Garstin, commanding 66th Gurkhas.

He added, he was much indebted to the following officers who volunteered their services as staff officers:—

Major Macpherson, Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner.

Captain Norman, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.

„ Graham, Brigade Major.

„ Macdonald, 20th Native Infantry.

Lieutenant Macbean, S. A. Commissary General.

„ Hawes, 1st Native Infantry, Assistant Commissioner.

He alluded to the excellent service and assistance rendered by Lieutenant Walker, Bombay Engineers, who superintended the destruction of the villages, and Ensign Lumsden, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General; and expressed his great obligations for the general directions and advice afforded him by Major Edwardes, c. B., Commissioner, Captain James, Deputy Commissioner, and Colonel Napier, Civil Engineer; adding that his special thanks were due to Colonel Napier, from whom he had received the greatest assistance throughout the day, especially in the retirement of the troops through the Taraoni Pass.

The President in Council then desired that the satisfaction of Government might be expressed at the excellent arrangements adopted under the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Napier

Government letter.

and Major Edwardes, and the admirable conduct of the troops employed, especially the Guide Corps.

A few days after, the men of Bori made overtures of submission to Colonel Edwardes through a holy man named Syad Gul Mian, who however broke off the negotiation when told that no terms would be made till the refugee criminals were expelled from Bori. This he said was hopeless, because it was contrary to the customs of Pathan hospitality.

Early in December 1853 the Boriwals applied to Captain Coke, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, for terms of peace. Captain Coke was in friendly alliance with the Jawaki, of whom the Boriwals are a branch, and that officer was authorized to receive their submission and admit them to friendly intercourse on the one condition that they expelled all refugee criminals with them, and promised to receive no more.

On the 11th January 1854, Captain Coke wrote to Colonel Edwardes that the Maliks of Bori had come in to him and agreed to everything except the expulsion of refugees; and as they were willing to admit no more in future, they hoped this point would be waived.

This however Colonel Edwardes refused, because the principle at stake was worth more than peace with Bori.

On the 17th January Captain Coke wrote that the Bori deputies had at last agreed to expel the refugees if two months' leave were given them; but they wished to be allowed free intercourse with British territories at once, and on this understanding they had signed a treaty of submission, which Captain Coke sent for sanction.

In reply Colonel Edwardes said he regretted to be hard on them, but the treaty of friendship and friendly intercourse could only begin from the date of our enemies being expelled from Bori.

On the 8th February Captain Coke reported the unconditional submission of the Boriwal to all our terms, and the actual expulsion of the British criminals. Accordingly, the following agreement was signed by them on the 24th February 1854:—

- I. "We will abstain hereafter from committing raids, highway robberies, thefts, or other crimes within British territory.
- II. "If any criminal comes to our settlements from British territory, we will promptly eject them; and if we ascertain that he is in possession of stolen property, we will make restitution of the same to Government.
- III. "If any resident of our settlements is apprehended for crime in British territory, we will not intercede for him; and if such person comes with stolen property to our settlements, we will make restitution of the same, and punish the thief according to our Afghan usage, and not permit him to return to British territory for the perpetration of crime.
- IV. "In regard to certain criminals who have taken refuge with us from the other side of the Indus, we agree within two months to eject them from our settlement.
- V. "We will associate ourselves with the rest of our tribe in any service which the district officer may call upon them to perform.
- VI. "Whereas the Pakhi Afridis have always been associated with us in our former evil deeds; we agree to be responsible for them also.
- VII. "We give as our securities Mir Mobarak Shah, Naib Mahomed Syad Khan, and Bahadur Shir Khan; if we commit any breach of the above engagements, the Government is free to call them to account.
- VIII. "In consideration of the above agreements, we shall be allowed to come and go in British territory.

IX.—“In consideration of the same the Government will be asked to release 7 men of our tribe now in imprisonment.

X.—“We will bring no evil-disposed person with us into British territory.”

Return showing the Number of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Force under command of COLONEL S. B. BOILEAU, at an affair at the village of Bori, on the 29th November 1853.

TROOPS.	KILLED.				WOUNDED.				MISSING.				REMARKS.
	European officers.	Native officers.	Sergeants.	Rank and file.	European officers.	Native officers.	Sergeants.	Rank and file.	European officers.	Native officers.	Sergeants.	Rank and file.	
Mountain Train	1	2 mule syces wounded.
Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment	* 6	* One mortally.
20th Regiment Native Infantry...	
66th Gurkhas	1	3	...	1	...	9	
Guide Corps	4	12	1 horse wounded.
Total	1	7	...	1	...	28	

Return of the Number of Ammunition expended at an affair at the village of Bori, on the 29th November 1853, under command of COLONEL S. B. BOILEAU.

TROOPS.	Number of rounds.	REMARKS.
Mountain Train ...	86	
Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment ...	4,729	
20th Regiment Native Infantry ...	154	
66th Gurkhas ...	14,465	
Guide Corps ...	10,887	
Total ...	30,321	

Return showing the Strength of the Force engaged at an affair at the village of Bori, on the 29th November 1853, under the command of COLONEL S. B. BOILEAU.

TROOPS.	European officers.	Native officers.	Sergeants and Havildars.	Rank and file.	REMARKS.
Mountain Train ...	4	1	12	91	
Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment ...	13	...	25	400	
20th Regiment Native Infantry ...	11	4	8	146	
66th Gurkhas ...	11	12	24	467	
Guide Corps ...	3	20	49	428	
Total ...	42	37	118	1,532	

SECTION V.

Affairs with, and expedition against, the Aka Khel Afridis, 1854-55.

For the first years of British rule in Peshawar, the Basi Khels behaved very well ; but in 1854, not finding themselves admitted to a share in the allowances of the Kohat Pass, they commenced a series of annoyances and depredations on the Peshawar border, with a view of extorting from Government a participation in those allowances. Amongst other acts, they murdered a syce belonging to the force at Matani, collected and threatened that village, and finally filled up a well which was being dug at Aimal Chabutra.

On this, Captain Craigie commanding a detachment at Bazid Khel, went in pursuit, but was too late to catch them in the plain, when the Basi Khel fired at our troops. On the 9th December 1854, a Khatak British subject was murdered near Akhor by them, in order to implicate the Adam Khels with whom they were at feud, and it became necessary to institute a blockade of the Basi Khels.

At this time the camp of Lieutenant Hamilton, Assistant Civil Engineer, together with his office and treasure chest, happened to be pitched at Badabir, near the foot of the hills, and on the night of the 9th February the Basi Khels descended on this camp to kill and rob. Lieutenant Hamilton fought bravely for his life, shooting 1 of the assailants ; but 16 of his people were killed and 30 wounded, the Basi Khel carrying off some Rs. 10,000 of Government treasure and property, besides some private effects.

Mr. Temple's Report. Detachments were now sent out to Matani and Bara Fort to watch the Aka Khel border.

McGregor's Gazetteer. Soon after, Major James, Deputy Commissioner, who was out on the frontier, reported that those branches of the tribe whose winter settlements are between Jani Garhi and the Bara River, continued to bring their cattle into the grazing grounds at the foot of the hills, as they felt themselves secure from any sudden attack in consequence of the broad and stony plain, about 9 miles in breadth, lying between them and the nearest point where troops were located, (the crossing of which would give them ample notice of any attack). On this Major Eld, commanding a detachment at Bara Fort, attempted to surprise the village of Alam Gadur by marching across the plain at night, so as to arrive there at early dawn. The march was made in excellent order and perfect silence ; the detachment arrived at a ravine, about a mile from the village, an hour before daybreak ; but as it was entering broken ground, it became necessary to halt till the dawn of day, and some scouts were sent on to reconnoitre ; but when these had advanced a short distance from the head of the column, they suddenly found themselves confronted by a picquet of 20 men in a hollow. Being surrounded they were compelled to fire, and the picquet fled to the village, firing signals as they went. The detachment then advanced as soon as the light admitted, and found the Afridis had reached the hills, up which they rapidly retreated. To have pursued them further, would have involved the troops in a day's skirmishing on the hills without the prospect of inflicting much injury upon the enemy, and it was therefore considered better to return to camp and await another opportunity.

On the 23rd February there was a spirited little affair between a force noted

Lieutenant Tyrwhitt's Report.

14th Irregular Cavalry. 62 men.
70 Sabres. Akhor men, 200.
9th Native Infantry. Bahardur Shir Khan, 26 Sowars.

in the margin, under Lieutenant E. Tyrwhitt, 14th Irregular Cavalry, and the Basi Khels. The cavalry patrol from Fort Mackeson, finding a

body of Basi Khels in a ravine under the Akhor Hills, were pursued, the Akhor people joining in the pursuit, and setting fire to the first Basi Khel village, when Lieutenant Tyrwhitt, coming up with the Native Infantry, drove the Basi Khels from the hills above.

The enemy now came down on to a small plateau about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile off; on this Lieutenant Tyrwhitt charged them with the cavalry, driving them up to the village of Zu, when he had to retire, coming under the matchlock fire from the hills. The retirement, which was pressed by the enemy, was very steadily covered by the 9th Native Infantry, although the enemy were in considerable numbers.

The enemy lost some 7 wounded. Our loss was—

Wounded.

14th Irregular Cavalry—2 sowars, 2 horses.
9th Native Infantry—1 sepoy.
Bahardur Khan's men—1 sowar, 2 horses.

After Major Eld's operations the cattle were not brought out of the hills for some days, but the Aka Khels gradually re-acquired confidence, and every day advanced further into the

McGregor's Gazetteer.

plain, putting out strong picquets at night. On the 26th February the scouts brought in the intelligence that the flocks had come down to the grazing grounds near Sadat Garhi. Major James thought, therefore, that by locating a party in one of the ravines in that neighbourhood he might be enabled to intercept them. He accordingly arranged a plan for doing so with Major Eld, and considering it better to carry out the design at once, Major Eld marched from Bara at 3 A.M. with the Rifle and Light Companies, 9th Native Infantry, and a troop of the 16th Irregular Cavalry. The march was performed without the least noise, and the men were located before dawn in a ravine lined with tangled grass and brushwood, scouts being placed in the trees in the vicinity and other places. The detachment remained quiet in this situation for about six hours, and at 11 A.M. the Afridi cattle were seen emerging on to the plain, with a party of armed men in advance, who narrowly inspected the brushwood and broken ground about them, the cattle following at a distance. Had they continued in this way an hour longer, they would have placed the detachment between them and the hills, and a large number of cattle and men would have fallen into its hands. Unfortunately however the bearers with two doolies who had fallen to the rear found themselves at daybreak in the plain without a sign of the detachment, and returning to camp they set out again under the escort of a few sowars to join the detachment. The Afridis soon observed them, and began to return with their cattle. Seeing this, Major Eld determined to pursue them, and took the cavalry towards the hills for that purpose; the infantry also advanced at a rapid pace over the low hills in their front, when all were soon engaged with detached parties of the Afridis, who did not expect to be so warmly pursued. The detachment succeeded in capturing 100 head of cattle, killing, as far as could be ascertained, 3 of the Afridis, and wounding 5; though probably more were wounded. Major Eld now arranged for the retirement of the detachment; this was effected in excellent order, the

skirmishers holding the Afridis, who had gathered to the number of upwards of 300, in check. The detachment returned to camp at 4½ P.M., with a loss of only 1 man wounded.

After this raid the cattle of Aka Khel were taken further south, to the village of Mandan, which appeared to offer a perfectly safe retreat, as the village is situated close to the Basi Khel villages, is strongly placed between two hills, and is approached only by a stony road passing over much broken ground and several ravines with eminences, upon which their watches were placed to guard against surprise. For some days the cattle went into the ravines to graze, but on the 5th March Major James arranged with Major Eld to attempt another surprise.

Accordingly, at 11 P.M., that officer moved out of camp with 300 men of the 9th Native Infantry and a troop of the 16th Irregular Cavalry; the party was conducted by Major James in the direction of Matani, and up a ravine which leads to the Basi Khel villages. At about a mile from Mandan a good place of concealment was found, where the detachment remained quiet till break of day. As soon as the dawn admitted of an examination of the vicinity, scouts were placed on all the commanding points, and the approach of the cattle awaited; at about 11 A.M. strong guards came out of the village and carefully examined every bush and ravine in their front, picquets were placed on various hills upon which low breastworks had been erected, and a party even came down a portion of the ravine in which the detachment was concealed. It was evident that they only anticipated attack from the direction of the camp, and they did not suspect that by making a circuitous march the detachment could get in rear of them.

The above precautions having been taken by the Afridis, their cattle emerged from the village, and were soon grazing on the low hills in front of it. It was not deemed advisable to wait much longer, for the neighing of a horse might now have discovered the detachment, which was not in a position to receive a large party in case of attack. It therefore moved a little further up the ravine, and then gaining the high ground advanced rapidly towards the village, thus intercepting the party that had gone out with the cattle.

Major Eld obtained a commanding position in front of the village, and parties were sent to collect the cattle, the whole of which was soon on the road to camp. The Afridis were taken so much by surprise, that they fled precipitately until they gained the hills in the vicinity of the village, where they rallied; and their numbers increasing with incredible speed, they attempted to cut off some of the parties returning with the cattle. A company was detached to cover the latter, and when the animals had been all secured, the detachments were called in, the cavalry sent to the rear, and the retirement covered by the riflemen of the 9th. All was effected in perfect order, but the Afridis pressed the detachment warmly for about 3 miles till it had cleared the broken ground. At this point the infantry proceeded towards the camp, the cavalry remaining to meet the hill men, should they venture on the plain; for this, however, they were not prepared, and returned to their village. The detachment arrived in camp about 4 P.M.

On this occasion Major Eld secured 1,000 animals, including bullocks, cows, donkeys, sheep, and milch-goats. Three of the Aka Khels were killed, one of whom, Gul Khan, was a man of much influence and wealth, and 3 others were wounded, but those who were watching state that more were carried away. The loss sustained by the detachment was very trifling,

This section of the Aka Khels then evinced their submission in a mode most humiliating to the Pathans, by sending in a deputation of their chief women to sue for peace on any terms. Major James informed them that he would allow the elders of their portion of the tribe to come to him and state their willingness or otherwise to conform to what might be dictated to them, including of course the restitution of the property plundered at Badabir, and the furtherance of the punishment of the remaining portions of the tribe.

On the 25th March intelligence having reached Major James that the Aka Khels had returned with their cattle to the villages of Alam and Miri Khel for the purpose of grazing, he suggested to Colonel Craigie, who had succeeded to the command of the troops, the expediency of driving them out of those places, and compelling them to give up the idea of re-settling in the low hills without permission, when, too, some of their cattle might be secured.

Colonel Craigie's Despatch.

Mountain Train.
Detachment, 4th Native Infantry:

9th Regiment Native Infantry.

20th Regiment Native Infantry.

2 Troops, 16th Irregular Cavalry.

At midnight, on the 26th March, Colonel Craigie moved off from his camp at Mashu Khel with a force marginally noted.

To engage the Basi Khels and to prevent their coming to the assistance of the ~~Aka~~ Khels a force of 500 Infantry were to move from Fort Mackeson at 2 A.M. towards the ~~village~~ of Zu, whilst the Akhor men were to act on the left of this detachment above Akhor.

On arriving at 6½ A.M. on the crest of a ridge of hills overlooking those occupied by the Aka Khels, Colonel Craigie who was accompanied by Captain James Deputy Commissioner, detached 300 men of the 4th Native Infantry under the command of Major Patterson to the village of Alam, a short distance to our left front, with instructions to destroy it and then rejoin; which was done.

A party of similar strength from the 20th Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Shuldham, followed after a short interval by the main column, was detached to the right to Miri Khel, a village upon the Bara, the occupants of which fled on the approach of the troops, when the village was destroyed, as also a number of wood stacks.

The main column then proceeded towards the hills on which the Aka Khel men had posted themselves, covered by the Rifle and Light Companies of the 9th and 20th Regiments under the command of Major Eld of the former corps, (who volunteered for the duty).

The hills over which the troops had to advance were rocky, most of them steep and affording complete cover to the enemy, whose numbers amounted, it was ascertained, to 1,000 men; and Colonel Craigie was obliged, from the number of hills they occupied, to throw out additional skirmishers both to front and flanks, so much so that two-thirds of the infantry were thus employed. The force advanced about a mile and a half, driving back the enemy from hill to hill,—the sepoys behaving most gallantly; and as in their eagerness to close with the enemy, they neglected to take full advantage of the cover afforded by the nature of the ground, they suffered more loss than they would otherwise have done. See appendix.

At 8 A.M., seeing that the country in front was apparently much stronger than that over which the troops had passed, and Captain James being of opinion that no advantage would be gained by proceeding further, Colonel Craigie decided upon retiring. The crest of the hills in the rear was accordingly occupied successively by skirmishers, and the Mountain Guns sent back

to take up a position on the range of hills from which the column had in the first instance descended.

The detachment then began to gradually retire; on which the enemy returned in very large numbers, and were enabled, from their knowledge of the ground, to press heavily on the troops, their matchlock fire continuing very heavy until the troops neared at 10½ A.M. the ridge of hills where the Mountain Guns were in position.

The return march towards camp was commenced at 11 A.M., skirmishers having been previously thrown out to the rear and right flank of the column until the ground became sufficiently open for cavalry; when the cavalry under Lieutenant Smith formed the rear-guard, but the enemy were too wary to attack the cavalry, only firing a few long shots.

Colonel Craigie said he was much indebted to all for their steady and gallant conduct, and mentioned the following officers:—

Captain Brougham, commanding the Mountain Train.

Major Patterson, commanding Detachment, 4th Regiment Native Infantry.

Captain Taylor, commanding 20th Native Infantry.

Lieutenant Smith, commanding Detachment, 16th Irregular Cavalry.

Lieutenant Barber, Detachment Staff.

The principal object of the expedition had been fully attained; the Aka Khel tribes had been driven out of an apparently secure retreat, which they could never re-occupy so long as they were under blockade, and which would cause them great distress.

APPENDIX.

*Return of Killed and Wounded in action of the Troops under the command of
BREVET LIEUT.-COL. CRAIGIE, C.B., on the 27th March 1855.*

DETAIL.	KILLED.					WOUNDED.				
	European officers.	Native officers.	Sergeants and havildars.	Buglers and drummers.	Rank and file.	European officers.	Native officers.	Sergeants and havildars.	Buglers and drummers.	Rank and file.
The Mountain Train
Detachment, 4th Regiment Native Infantry	6	1	1	1
9th Regiment Native Infantry	3	7
20th Regiment Native Infantry	1	..	1
Troop, 16th Irregular Cavalry
Total	9	1	1	2	..	21
Total killed and wounded ..	9					25				

Name of Officer wounded :

Major C. Patterson, 4th Native Infantry, slightly.

*Return of Ammunition expended in action by the Troops under the command of
BREVET LIEUT.-COL. CRAIGIE, C.B., on the 27th March 1855.*

DETAIL.	MOUNTAIN TRAIN, NUMBER OF ROUNDS.		INFANTRY AND CAVALRY, NUMBER OF ROUNDS.	
	Shells.	Round shot.	Cartridges balled, musket rifle, carbine.	Caps.
The Mountain Train ...	18	55
Detachment, 4th Regiment Native Infantry	7,634	11,451
9th Regiment Native Infantry	9,364	9,504
20th Regiment Native Infantry	24,388	27,571
Troop, 16th Irregular Cavalry	70	70
Grand Total ...	18	55	41,456	48,596

The tribe was then forced to seek a temporary settlement amongst the
Sipahs, and at a spot higher up the river, where
McGregor's Gazetteer. there was, however, but very little pasturage for their
cattle, and they were therefore soon forced to return to Tirah.

Throughout the ensuing hot weather but little went on, the Aka Khels
being at their summer quarters at Tirah. On the
Colonel Edwardes' Report. return of the cold season, the Basi Khels again came
down from their mountains to the plains; but the
Commissioner, Colonel Edwardes, obtained orders to keep up the blockade till
the tribe surrendered at discretion.

The blockade was accordingly resumed, and not a man of the Aka Khel
section could venture into the Peshawar market; their wood trade fell into
the hands of the other mountain tribes exclusively: unusually large demands
for wood in the public works raised the price of that article to an unprecedented
height.

About December the loss of annual profits began to be intolerable, and
the council of the Aka Khels took into their serious consideration the question
whether it would be better to make another burst of devilry upon the frontier,
in hopes of being bought off, or to give in and accept any terms that might
be imposed.

Consequently, all the police posts were strengthened and put on the alert
while this point was under debate.

Deputations from the Aka Khels went about from hill to hill beseeching
the co-operation of neighbouring tribes in one more campaign, but the
neighbours had got the wood trade and declined.

All this while the flocks and herds of the Aka Khels could not be grazed
upon the open plain for fear of being surprised by the police, and another
hungry winter was setting in.

Occasionally a Basi Khel scout, relying on the neutrality of the Arbab
Mahamand Khan, ventured into his estate to get some news; but the Arbab
also had learnt a lesson, and he seized them one after another. Among these
prisoners happened to be two leaders—Bilal, son of the notorious thief priest
Mula Sadik, and Sultan Mahamand, a Sipah refugee.

The case being hopeless, in the middle of December the Aka Khel sent in overtures of submission.

But looking back to the origin of these annoyances, the Commissioner now determined to transfer the charge of Basi Khel relations to Kohat, so that one Deputy Commissioner should not be played off against another. The Basi Khel ambassadors were therefore referred to Captain Henderson, to whom instructions were sent to accept their overtures of peace on the following conditions:—

1^{stly}.—A fine of Rs. 2,500.

2^{ndly}.—Forfeiture of all black-mail for the future. (They had a Rs. 600 share of the Kohat Pass allowances.)

3^{rdly}.—Refund to Government of all rewards paid for capturing members of the tribe.

After the usual number of “deputations,” and excuses, and evasions, the terms dictated by Captain Henderson at Kohat were agreed to by the tribe.

Still Colonel Edwardes refused to take off the blockade until the payment of the fine. The tribe urged, that if allowed to bring their wood to market at Peshawar, they would realize the amount immediately; but that officer replied that justice required the fine to be paid before the slightest kindness was shown to them.

They then proposed to pay in wood, and as the Executive Engineer required all he could get, it was settled that they might deliver wood to the amount of that fine at two out-posts,—one being Badabir, the scene of their crime.

But, remarked Colonel Edwardes, “getting a fine out of Afridis, is getting blood out of stone.” There was no alacrity in paying up even with the certainty that they could not get at the Peshawar market till it was done. With heavy hearts and at lazy intervals they brought in the loads, but at last, seeing the cold season drawing to a close, they made up their minds to part with the rupees; even then they came repeatedly with Rs. 500 short, Rs. 300 short, Rs. 50 short, or a security for Rs. 20: however, at last the contest ended by about 49 of the Maliks coming in and depositing the cash in two leathern bags upon the floor, and the blockade was at once removed, and the Basi Khel bullocks streamed into Peshawar.

Thus, said Colonel Edwardes, ended the struggle of the Akha Khel Afridis with a settled Government. Instead of haughtily exacting from the British black-mail for the safety of the Kohat road, they paid a judicial fine for a highway robbery.

They estimated their own losses as follows:—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Value of cattle taken by us in various reprisals ...	9,500	0	0
Half a cold season's wood trade lost in 1855, average profits ...	25,000	0	0
Nearly a whole season in 1856 ...	40,000	0	0
Fine on submission ...	2,500	0	0
Ransom of prisoners ...	120	0	0
Total loss ...	77,120	0	0
Deduct plunder realized by the Akha Khel in attack on Lieutenant Hamilton's camp ...	5,000	0	0*
Actual loss to the tribe in the campaign ...	72,120	0	0

* The loss was estimated by Lieutenant Hamilton to be in public and private property Rs. 10,121-9-9; but much was lost in the night, and carried off by straggling allies from other tribes.

That this is not an exaggerated estimate, will be at once evident from the following rough calculation:—

The Aka Khel tribe numbers about	2,500 men
The poorest has 1 bullock, the richest 8 or 10; take them all round	7,500 bullocks
at 3 bullocks	15,000 maunds
Load of wood for each bullock, 2 maunds	1 rupee
Average value of dry and green wood, 4 maunds	3,750 rupees
Value of each journey	22,500 rupees
They say they come into market every fourth day, but say six journeys a month, realized monthly	1,35,000 rupees
The season lasts for six months, and would yield therefore	67,500 rupees
Deduct for expenses, bullocks left at home, and other casualties, one-half

leaving Rs. 68,000 annual profit, which corresponds very closely to their own assertion that they never go back for the summer to Tirah with less than Rs. 50,000 in hand.

It may therefore fairly be said, that the Aka Khels were as severely punished for the Badabir atrocity as if they had been British subjects.

An agreement was then entered into with the Aka Khels, by which they bound themselves, in addition to paying the above fine, to abstain from raids, not to harbour refugees and criminals; in dispute with British subjects, to refer the matter to our tribunal, &c.

The reason of the Basi Khels having been originally admitted to a share in the pass allowances, was in consequence of their claiming a portion of land called Kalamsada, extending from Kotkai to Aimal Chabutra, and it was in consequence of the constant fighting on this piece of land between the Basi Khels and Akhorwals that Captain Coke made the arrangement that the former should receive Rs. 300 out of the allowance of the latter. This allowance was afterwards increased out of the Bangash allowance to Rs. 600, but was now forfeited by their misconduct.

In 1859, the Basi Khels again came forward with their claim to the Kalamsada, and consequent share of the allowances. In February 1859 an agreement was made, by which both parties bound themselves to refrain from fighting on the road near the disputed ground for five years. This was afterwards extended to one year more, February 1865. Disputes had also been going on for some time between two sections of the Akhor villages about the relative proportion in which the share of each should be paid.

These and the Basi Khel dispute had caused fighting in the pass about Akhor, and the Commissioner being unable to induce them to come to some agreement, the pass was closed and allowances stopped. And it was not until October 1866 that these differences could be adjusted.

But the Basi Khels and Hasn Khels still continued their opposition to the terms offered them; and the Basi Khels demanded a right of interference in the management of the pass unwarranted by former usage. For their contumacy the tribe were debarred from access to British territory, when after a brief interval they submitted; and on consideration of their renouncing their claim to the disputed tract of Kalamsada, the allowance heretofore paid them as guardians of the Kohat Pass was increased from Rs. 600 to Rs. 1,000 per annum.

There was no doubt some apparent loss of dignity in thus treating with these wild races for the purchase of peace. But they are exceptional races,

and the circumstances of our connection with them are altogether exceptional. There appears to be no alternative in selecting the mode of dealing with them save—

1. To take a high hand and coerce them into obedience.
2. To withdraw altogether from intercourse with them, punishing them only when they are guilty of aggression.
3. To treat them as wayward children, and make them all concessions which are possible, without open confession of weakness.

In the present instance, as we had extorted a recognition of our strength, the grant of indulgence appeared admissible and expedient.

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SECTION VI.

Demonstration against the Hasn Khel Section of the Adam Khel Afridis, 1867.

In 1866 the Hasn Khels, having insolently refused to make reparation for a series of outrages committed against British subjects in British territory, were subjected to a strict blockade. After the institution of the blockade more outrages were perpetrated: a policeman on duty at an out-post was carried off by a band led by a notorious Hasn Khel freebooter; a party of police were fired at while patrolling; shots were fired at our posts; lastly, the Government mail, *en route* from the Indus to Kohat, was plundered on the high road by men of the Hasn Khel.

The council of the tribe were then summoned to Peshawar, but at the end of ten days they firmly declined, by letter, to give way on the points at issue.

2ndly.—They sent delegates to the Basi Khel tribe, closed their feud with them, and established an alliance with them.

3rdly.—They promised, and made no secret of it, that when the Basi Khels attacked the village of Akhor, they would co-operate with them by occupying in force a position in the Afridi Pass, in view to cutting off the other villages in the pass, and preventing their assisting Akhor.

4thly.—A mixed band of 60 Kandaos and Gadia Khels collected to surprise the small post of Aimal Chabutra, only returning as they found the garrison on the alert.

In the meanwhile preparations for their coercion had been going on, and the following force was assembling :—

Field Force.

		Men.	Guns.	
McGregor's Gazetteer. Report by Colonel Allgood, Assistant Quarter-Master Ge- neral.	Royal Horse Artillery ...	84	4	Under the com- mand of Colonel Bright, C.B., 1-19th Regiment.
	Peshawar Mountain Battery ...	143	4	
	5½-inch Mortars ...	21	2	
	Sappers and Miners ...	88		
	19th Bengal Cavalry ...	300		
	42nd Royal Highlanders ...	104		
	1-19th Regiment ...	400		
	23rd Native Infantry ...	617		
	24th Native Infantry ...	577		
	28th Native Infantry ...	561		
	45th Native Infantry ...	85		
	Hazara Mountain Battery ...	148	4	Under the com- mand of Colonel S. J. Browne, C.B., Guide Corps.
	Squadron, 3rd Bengal Cavalry ...	148		
	5th Gurkhas ...	624		
	20th Native Infantry ...	590		
	Guide Infantry ...	601		

The first column was to have moved from Aza Khel or Kui and Janakhor, while the other, having bivouacked on Charat on the previous night, was to have moved along the ridge over the Jalala Sir, descending the spur on Janakhor and closing the enemy's retreat towards the Jalala Sir.

It had been ascertained that a Mountain Battery could move along the ridge and take part in the movement.

The troops were ordered to take the field with five days' food in their bazaars: ten days' food for British troops was to accompany.

100 rounds, including that in pouch, were to be taken by the infantry.

Troops of all arms were to take great coats and blankets only.

The Commissioner was desirous of destroying Janakhor, Kui, and Taraoni, and of returning to camp the same evening; but it is questionable if the troops could have got back the same night.

These preparations, however, soon changed the aspect of affairs. The Hasn Khels who had hitherto mistaken forbearance for weakness or indifference, on perceiving the preparations for their chastisement at once submitted unconditionally to the terms imposed upon them, and gave hostages for their future good conduct.

The happy result of this affair, which at one time appeared could not be brought to a termination without extreme measures, was in the opinion of the Government of India attributable to the firm yet temperate measures adopted throughout: and the Governor General in Council desired that the cordial thanks of Government might be conveyed to Brigadier Wilde, c.b., for the valuable assistance which he was able to give by his advice; and to Major Pollock, Major-General Hayley, c. b., Mr. D. McNabb, and Lieutenant Cavignari.

Concluding Remarks.

Since the settlement in 1867 the pass has not again been closed. In 1870 Lord Mayo rode through it on his way to Kohat, and a few days after, on the night of the 15th April 1870, 2 muleteers and a servant of Captain Stainforth were murdered, in the most cowardly and brutal manner, in cold blood, while all the property they had with them was plundered. The murderers belonged to Zargun and Bosti Khel. Captain Macaulay, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, at once seized all the men and property of the pass, and by the evening of the same day had Rs. 10,000 worth of property in his possession, consisting principally of camels laden with salt. The surrender of the criminals was then demanded by the Deputy Commissioner, but not acquiesced in by the Afridis, when in lieu they were offered the following terms: 1st, the destruction of Malik Bashu's village; 2nd, the destruction of Shir Dil's (one of the murderers) house in Zargun Khel; 3rd, the destruction of Yasin's (another murderer) house in Bosti Khel; 4th, the prohibition against ever again building these without the permission of Government; 5th, the expulsion of the 3 criminals from the pass for one year; 6th, the payment of Rs. 1,000 by each of the murderers as compensation for the blood of the murdered men. These terms were agreed to after some demur, and carried out under the superintendence of Ata Mahamad, brother of Bahadur Shir; the compensation was also paid. Security having been taken for the future good behaviour of the criminals, the pass was declared reopened after having been closed for ten days. One of the murderers, however, Nazr Ali of the Zakha Khel, was not included in this arrangement, and on 7th August of the same year he was captured by the villagers of Akhor, brought in, and hung on the 19th on the crest of the Kohat Kotal.

M A P
 OF
A PORTION OF THE PESHAWUR DISTRICT
 ILLUSTRATING
THE MILITARY OPERATIONS.
 against
THE AFRIDI TRIBE.
 1850, 1853, 1855.

REMARKS

Places named in account of operations.....

Sir C. Napier.....	_____
Col. Boileau.....	_____
Col. Craigie	}.....
Major Eld	

Route taken by Col. Boileau's Column _____

Actions.....

Sir C. Napier.....	✕
Col. Boileau.....	✕
Col. Craigie	}.....✕
Major Eld	



CHAPTER VIII.

SECTION I.

The Bangash Tribe.

THE Bangashes are a tribe of Pathans, who inhabit the Miranzai Valley as well as the valley of Kohat in British territory, and the valley of Kuram in Afghanistan.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

The Bangashes have suffered a good deal at different times from the raids of their neighbours,—the Orakzais, Turis, and Vaziris; the Bangash formerly owned the whole of Kuram.

The Emperor Baber (1504) enumerates Bangash as one of the fourteen provinces then dependent on Kabul, so that the settlement of the Bangash tribe is of very ancient date.

The country of the Bangash is divided into "Uliah," or upper, and "Sifiah," or lower. Upper Bangash has always been considered a dependency of Kabul, and extends from the Pekar Kotal (Pass) at the head of the Kuram Valley to the boundary of Billand Khel at the head of the Miranzai Valley. Lower Bangash has at the same time always been a dependency of Peshawar, and beginning with Billand Khel on the Kuram, extends to Gandiali below Kohat; all Miranzai therefore, whether Upper or Lower, belongs to the Lower Bangash. It is now about seventeen generations since Miran, one of the Upper Bangashes, came from Kuram and took possession of the country thus defined. A glance at the two first generations of his descendants will give a key to the distribution of both Upper and Lower Miranzai.

MIRAN

1	2	3	4	5	6
Hussun	Ali Sher	Mir Ahmud	Buddu	Dar Samund	Billand
Ibrahim	Murdu	Kamal	Yusaf	Muddeh	Yusaf
Raeis	Ujji Miran	Mallik	Khakeh	Tuppeh Layauah Ubzah	Mohamed

Miran considered the land as Rs. 3,000 or shares, and distributed them as follows among his six sons:—

Billand	500 shares	} Upper Miranzai.
Dar Samund	500 "	
Buddu	500 "	
Mir Ahmud	500 "	} Lower Miranzai.
Ali Sher	500 "	
Hassan	500 "	

It was about four generations back that Turis first began to take root in Bangash; but little by little they have gradually dispossessed the Bangash, until these now say they have only Shilofzan and Ziran under the hills, and Aza Khel in the plains, that are free; the rest is in the hands of the Turis, and the Bangash have been reduced to the position of dependants. Now, every Bangash is obliged to attach himself to a powerful Turi, who is called his "naik," and who protects him from other Turis. If a Bangash leaves a son or a brother, the property is generally allowed to descend by inheritance, but often not, the Bangash naik declaring it a lapsed estate. The Bangashes of Shilofzan and Ziran, who are strong in numbers and position, hold their own, but none of them can travel about the rest of Kuram without taking a Turi safe conduct.

The numbers of the Bangash, according to their villages, are as follow:—Shilofzan 2,000, Ziran 1,500, Bagaki 200, Jallandar 120, Shakkardara 100, Aza Khel 200, and Bolyamin, Makazai, and Bogzai together, 1,500; total 5,620.

The Bangash of Kuram join in all the Turi wars, but not often in raids; if they are summoned and fail to join, they are fined when the expedition is over.

The Bangashes are all of the Shiah persuasion, of the Mahomedan faith, and are Gar in politics. Agha Abbas, a Persian, mentions that he had often met Bangashes performing the pilgrimage to Mishad of their great saint (pir), Madat Shah, and they appear to hold him in extraordinary reverence. If they are seated and his name is mentioned, they immediately rise and press the four fingers of their right hand, half closed, first to their lips and then to their foreheads.

The last census of the Panjab showed the number of the Bangash in our territory to be 31,744 souls, (so that it is more than probable that Temple's estimate of 15,000 men, as the muster of fighting men, is very much exaggerated.) They are not thought much of as soldiers compared to other Pathans.

During the Kohat Pass difficulties in 1853, the Bangashes came forward and asserted their right to the crest of the Kotal Pass as a part of their own boundaries. They asserted that in olden times they had received an allowance from the Mahomedan Emperors, and they had viewed the usurpation of Rahmat Khan, Orakzai, (he being chief of a distant clan,) as an injury and indignity, and they therefore asked to be allowed the responsibility of that portion of the pass from the Kohat side to the top of the Kotal on the same emoluments as were enjoyed by Rahmat Khan. Their offer was accepted with the results already shown.

The Zaimukhts.

The Zaimukhts are a tribe of Afghans, who inhabit the hills between Miranzai and Kuram. They are divided into Khwaidad Khel and Mahamadzai. The Khwaidad Khel number 2,000 fighting men, and the Mahamadzai number 2,500 men.

The country of the Zaimukht Afghans may be described as a tract about 25 miles long, lying between two ranges of mountains, which are connected by the water-shed line having three slopes, each with its distinct line of drainage. The first forms the Shakali stream, and has on its banks the villages of Torawari, Dumbakai, Yasta, Zaowar, Spirkot, and Thana; the second forms the Sangroba rivulet, near the sources of which are the two largest villages in the district, Manattu and Chinrak, besides Tanna, Sangroba, Hadmelah, and Dolraga, sprinkled along its banks; while the third slope contains the villages of Gawakhi, Lorahmela, and Dolraga,

(the two last belonging to the Orakzai tribes,) on the deep ravines which fall into the Kuram River in Makhezai.

Their country is generally covered with jungle, and cultivation is only to be seen in the immediate vicinity of villages, owing chiefly to the number of internal blood feuds in this clan, which preclude the possibility of agricultural operations being carried on at any distance from support.

The Zaimukhts are physically a fine looking, powerful race, forming in this respect a striking contrast to their Turi neighbours. They are on the Samal side of politics, and are said to be the descendants of a tribe of Tor Tarins, who immigrated from their own country and colonized this nook. They do not move about so much as other tribes, but remain in their villages all the year round. They are at feud with the Bangashes, but are friendly with the Orakzais.

Captain Coke said the Zaimukhts have 5,000 infantry and 400 cavalry, the last the best he had seen on the border. Agha Abbas says, they have from 20 to 30 forts, and breed large numbers of mules.

There is a bitter blood feud between the two sections of this tribe, but a truce was concluded between them in 1866 by the efforts of the Miranzai people. The Khwaidad Khel own the village of Torawari, in Miranzai, and pay a revenue of Rs. 1,000 to Government. They are responsible for their clansmen living in independent territory.

They have never given much trouble except on one occasion, when the Torawaris refused to pay their revenue, which will be alluded to hereafter; but their conduct doubtless is owing to the very considerable hold we have on them. Trade with Kuram and Kabul by the Pekar route almost entirely passes through the Zaimukht Hills, and the tribe derives much benefit from the fees levied for the safe conduct (badragga) of caravans. Travellers save a day's march by taking the route through this country in going from Kohat to Kuram, but they have to pay heavily for a badragga.

When with the force in Miranzai in 1856, Brigadier N. Chamberlain examined the ground in the neighbourhood of the Zaimukht villages of Dolraga and Adhmelah, and rode through the gorge leading to the villages of Khana and Sangroba, obtaining a view of the valley, and found them more accessible than reports had made them out. And on the march from Ibrahimzai to Haizar Pir Ziarut, the western entrance to the Zaimukht country was explored.

Sketches were taken, and the fact established that the Zaimukht country was more accessible than had been supposed. The Lieutenant-Colonel Edwards' Report. Commissioner wrote, that the country as far as it could be seen, for about 10 miles, was very broken, and intersected with low and rather precipitous ravines with little or no clear open ground, there being a good deal of low bush jungle cover; and the country further on, with the exception of Chinrak, where there was a good deal of cultivated land, was much the same, presenting no great difficulty against the operations of a force, but still affording ample opportunity for an active enterprising enemy to harass the troops engaged.

The villages of the Zaimukhts are generally open, but have towers. They are made of stone, and have flat roofs.

Miranzai.

Miranzai is a division of the Kohat District, comprising the valleys of the Hangu River and the Shakali River from Rais to Thall, and between the Zaimukht and Orakzai Hills and those of the Khataks. Its north boundary runs with that of the Kohat District from Akachor on the Kuram River to the ridge north of Hangu;

McGregor's Gazetteer.

then down it to Rais; then generally along the foot of the hills south of Ibrahimzai Togh, Mahamud Khoja, Sturizai Mamuzai, to the Kuram River, whence to Akachor. The length of the country thus bounded is 40 miles, and the breadth 7 to 3 miles.

It consists of numerous small, circumscribed, and well-cultivated valleys, in which the plane, poplar, willow, fig and mulberry, together with the apple, apricot, and other orchard trees, flourish abundantly; whilst, on the other hand, the raviny wastes of the upper division are covered with a brushwood of the wild olive, the wild privet, the jujube, mimosa, and other thorny bushes, broken here and there by grassy tracts,—the summer grazing grounds of the Vaziris, who wander from one to the other with their families and flocks.

The dwarf palm abounds all over Miranzai, and is applied to a variety of useful purposes by the inhabitants.

The wealth of the inhabitants consists principally of cattle, goats, and sheep. Of these, the cows are a lean and dwarf breed, and produce but little milk. A good number of horses are bred in different parts of Miranzai. The soil, which is for the most part gravelly, with only a scanty deposit of alluvium, was not much cultivated, before British rule, owing to constant feuds among the inhabitants, who are Bangash, as well as the scarcity of water.

A considerable portion of the cultivation is dependent on the rains for irrigation. That which is regularly irrigated by artificial means, is watered by streams issuing from springs, or from tanks of rain water in the neighbourhood. Wheat, barley, and pulse, are gathered in the spring harvest, and millet, madge, pulse, and cotton, in the autumn harvest.

The best season for operations in Miranzai is from the end of March to the end of May, which gives two full months. The climate of Miranzai is much colder than that of Kohat, its elevation being greater: constant hail-storms cool the air throughout this period; it is quite cool in Miranzai in April, warm in May, but not disagreeably so till June. The spring crops are not ripe until the middle of May. In the first week of April it was difficult to find them high enough for fodder. Grass of the best quality abounds throughout the valley, and horses get into fine condition. The spring crop is the most important one in Miranzai, and therefore the people at this season have most to lose.

A most important feature is the retreat of all the pastoral hill tribes about the 1st April to higher regions, when they are absent till the middle of October. The only object of an expedition in the autumn would be to give these tribes a meeting. But in autumn the days are short and the nights are long.

At the time of the Sikh rule, Miranzai, which is an extension of the valley of Hangu, and which was under Kohat, was held together with Lower Miranzai by Sultan Mahmud Khan. On the annexation of the Panjab, however being an outlying territory, it was overlooked when the rest of Kohat was taken possession of. The Kabul Government then lost no time in arranging for the occupation of Miranzai, which appeared to have been vacated. So Sirdar Azim Khan, Governor of the Kuram Province, in 1851 summoned the Miranzais to surrender, but they petitioned the British to include them in Kohat.

Their request was acceded to, and in August 1851 a proclamation was issued, declaring Upper Miranzai a portion of the Kohat District, and at the same time orders were sent to each village that, in case of attack, they were to aid each other with all their disposable men, as they were quite able to protect themselves from any Vaziri or Orakzai inroads,—the village of Kui having, in 1848, successfully resisted for three months the attacks of 8,000 Vaziris.

Report by Colonel Edwards.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

Captain Coke's Report.

For 14 years there had been no rule in Miranzai, and even before that time it had only been controlled by the presence of a large force which came down to collect revenue and to destroy. The people were entirely lawless, constantly engaged in blood feuds with each other, and the more considerable fights between the Ghar and Samil factions.

The seven Miranzai villages could turn out, if united, 3,500 foot and 200 horse. The relations of these villages with each other and with the neighbouring tribes,* were as follow:—

The village of Billand Khel, situated on the right bank of the Kuram River, and which belonged to the Bada Khel Bangash, had up to 1851 been a portion of Miranzai; but as the river was now declared by the Government to be the British boundary, it was given up.

This village was entirely in the power of the Kabul Khel and Malik Shir Vaziris, who had during the preceding 50 years, by purchase or mortgage, possessed themselves of the greater portion of the lands.

Thall was also a village of the Bada Khel Bangash; it was at feud with Billand Khel, and was always assisted by a tribe of Turis from Kuram to the extent, if necessary, of 1,500 or 2,000 men. The Turis were at feud with the Vaziris.

Dar Samund was continually being attacked by the Zaimukhts and Vaziris and Torawari villages. Torawari, situated at the entrance of the Zaimukht Valley, although nominally Bangash, was in reality Zaimukht, and was on the best terms with the Vaziris. Although the inhabitants only number 600, they were backed by the whole Zaimukht Valley.

Colonel Edwardes' Report. About 120 years ago, the Zaimukht Afghans had taken this commanding site, and hence a perpetual blood feud raged between the Zaimukht and Bangash. With the exception of Torawari, all the villages were walled and defended with towers, but it was doubtful if they would stand much battering from 9-pounders; they could all be approached with field guns, but there were hamlets of the villages in the hills where Mountain Guns were required; such as, Chapari, Zergarhi, Dolraga, and Adhmela.

In his report on Miranzai in 1855, Major Edwardes, after alluding to the extraordinary fertility of the soil, said that, as usual, man's angry passions were the only curse in the country, and thus described its state.—The patches of cultivation around the villages were very small in comparison with the extent of rich arable land lying waste on account of feuds. The plough worked as far as the rifle reached. The men of Nariab could not turn to account the rich land which lay before them, because the Zaimukht interlopers of Torawari were always on the look out to plunder and kill.—Torawari did not venture to steal more of the open country, because there the Bangashes of Nariab could reach them.—Dar Samund had abandoned its best lands at Mammuzai and Gundiawr, because they lay in the paths of the Vaziri camps, and their feuds with the Zaimukhts compelled them to concentrate†.—Thall

* An account of the Turis is given in Section IV of this Chapter, and an account of the Orakzais and Vaziris will be found in Chapters IX and X.

† The feud with the Vaziris commenced thus about 1842:—

The Vaziri herds were grazing before Kahi, when Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan sent a party of Durani horse to plunder them. This party masked Dar Samund by leaving their grass-cutters and yabus there, to mark out a large camp, and to pretend that the Sirdar himself was coming with a force, of which this was only the vanguard. This kept Dar Samund quiet. The Duranis came back with a large spoil, and then the grass-cutters joined them, and all went back to Kuram. The Vaziris considered that the Dar Samund men were accomplices, and ought to have sent word; and from that time the feud had raged. The village was too strong for the Vaziris to

was reduced to one-fourth of its culturable lands, leaving three-fourths to the vengeance of the Vaziris.—Kahi alone was comparatively out of harm's way, and its cultivation was proportionally extensive. But Kahi also has its feuds.

Major Edwardes relates the following anecdote as illustrating the then lawless state of the valley:—

“Brigadier Chamberlain and I one morning sat under a tree at one of the hamlets on the hill behind Nariab, (I think it was Shinowri,) and the lusty Alizai Malik of the place told us he was on the look out to catch the men of Kahi, for they were *one dead man ahead of him*. We asked our host, (who had brought his charpoy for us to sit on,) how such a big man could sleep on such a little bed. He said, it had the advantage of making a man sleep light with his knees up, and if a row took place in the night, he could turn out in an instant; but once a man stretched his legs full length, there was no waking him.”

The marked peculiarity of Upper Miranzai was its being in immediate contact with four powerful independent tribes,—the Orakzais, Zaimukhts, Turis, and the Vaziris.

The Orakzais were kept quiet by privileges of grazing and cultivation on the Bangash slope of the Samana Range. These accorded to one branch of Orakzais, kept off all others.

The Turis of Kuram were not unfriendly to the Bangashes, and were indeed the sworn allies of Thall against their mutual enemies, the Vaziris.

The Zaimukhts and Vaziris had hitherto leagued together to squeeze Miranzai between them, and they formed the great difficulty of the valley. They had a common end in view, *viz.*, to provide for their own hungry, landless tribes in the rich plains of the Bangash land-owners. The transition from pastoral to agricultural, from migration to settlement, was the invariable law which both Zaimukht and Vaziri were obeying. The Zaimukht had got into the heart of the valley and settled at Torawari, but he wanted more land for his countrymen still left upon the mountain. He harried Nariab and Dar Samund with feuds, and prevented cultivation.—That being the first step, appropriation of the deserted fields gradually followed. The Vaziri process was at the same time hastened by greater strength. The Zaimukhts were under 5,000; the Vaziris were a nation of whom the mere branches that were within reach of Miranzai could muster full 12,000. About October they descended from their summer pastures in the Suliman Range, and putting their countless flocks and herds before them, they crossed the Kuram and dispersed to their favorite haunts. The Kabul Khels took the country between Miranzai and Banu, a series of grassy table-lands elevated and concealed from casual observation by rugged hills. The Tazi Khels plunged into Khatak. The Khajul Khels overran Miranzai.—The stream was irresistible: if any village had injured them, they drove their whole herds into the cultivation, and destroyed it in a few hours. Year after year they thus keep waste large tracts belonging to Thall and Dar Samund, and waited patiently till they could occupy and settle without resistance.

SECTION II.

The Expedition to Miranzai under Captain J. Coke, 1851.

AT the end of September 1851, the Vaziris collected near Billand Khel for the purpose of attacking Dar Samund; and although their advance had been checked by Kwajah Mahomed Khan, the Khatak Chief, who had assembled his people for the purpose, it became advisable to move troops into the valley, not only for the dispersion of the Vaziris, but to enable the Deputy Commissioner to make a circuit of this part of his district, to settle the revenue, and to arrange a system of defence amongst the villagers, who were, as already shewn, many of them at feud with each other. The following force accordingly marched from Kohat under Captain Coke on the 4th October :—

The 1st Panjab Cavalry under Lieutenant Daly.

3 Guns, No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery, under Lieutenant Sladen.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Company, Panjab Sappers.

1st Panjab Infantry, Captain Coke. The force being augmented in Miranzai by—

145 Horse,
510 Foot,

under Kwajah Mahomed Khan.

For the protection of Kohat the following troops were left :—

1 Troop, 1st Panjab Cavalry.

3 Guns, No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery.

4th Panjab Infantry.

The column proceeded to Kui, Nariab, Torawari, and Dar Samund, up to which place the troops were well received, and not was a shot fired. On arriving at Thall there was some firing at the picquets; and at Billand Khel, where the column was halted from the 26th to the 30th, both inclusive, this increased considerably and was continued nightly. On the night of the 30th, intelligence was brought of the Vaziris being assembled in force, and during that night there was a sharp attack on the picquets, especially on that held by Kwajah Mahomed Khan's Khataks; but as the picquets were placed a great distance from camp, and were protected by a breastwork, the attacks were repulsed without loss. During the day no attempts were made on the camp, but one of Kwajah Mahomed Khan's horsemen on guard with the grass-cutters was killed, and two camp followers cut up. In these night attacks there was no doubt the villagers of Billand Khel took part with the Vaziris.

On the return of the column to Thall on the 31st, attacks were again made on the picquets at night but with more spirit than before, and it was found necessary to aid one of the picquets on a hill near camp with some shells from the battery. As there was no doubt the villagers were here also implicated, they were warned that, if the attacks were repeated, their village would be burnt.

The necessary civil arrangements having been made in regard to revenue, &c., and hostages having been taken from certain villages, the force returned to Kohat on 12th November, after much hard work and unpleasant night duty.

Casualties.

1 Sepoy, 1st Panjab Infantry	} killed.
1 Levy Sowar	
1 Sepoy, 1st Panjab Infantry,	wounded.

SECTION III.

Second Expedition to Miranzai under Brigadier Chamberlain, 1855.

BUT, although the people of Miranzai had petitioned to be included in the Kohat District, they were in their hearts hostile to the British Government, as indeed they were to any Government whatever. Thus, after the return of the force under Captain Coke in 1851, Miranzai was as unsettled as ever.

In 1854 it was reported that no revenue had been paid by certain villages for three years; that two of the largest of the Hangu villages on the Miranzai border had betaken to arms for the settlement of a dispute arising out of some ordinary judicial proceeding of the criminal court at Kohat; and that the maliks when summoned to answer for the affray had refused to obey the order of the Deputy Commissioner, going off instead to Miranzai and Kuram. The Deputy Commissioner wrote, that the valley was fast becoming the asylum of all the robbers and murderers of the Kohat and the adjoining districts, who looked upon it as a place the Government were either afraid or unable to control. That the Vaziri, Turi, Zaimukht, and Orakzai tribes, joined with the villages of Miranzai, and made that valley a rendezvous, from whence they could assemble to plunder all the well-disposed villages on the Hangu and Khatak frontier; at the same time the distance of Kohat from the Turis and others, rendered any pursuit unavailing.

And yet the moment the people of Miranzai were threatened from without, they were loud in their calls for aid, urging absurd reasons for their past misconduct.

It was therefore determined by the Government of India that an expedition should be sent to enforce the submission of the Miranzai villages.

The numbers with which the force might have to contend, were thus estimated by the Deputy Commissioner. The villages of Billand Khel, Thall, Dar Samund, Torawari, Nariab, Storozaï, Kui, and Mahomed Khoza, could each turn out from 600 to 700 armed men, or about 5,000 in the valley, backed by the Orakzai tribes that border on Hangu and the Miranzai Valley, and

who were estimated, the Orakzais at 13,500, the Zaimukht Afghans at 5,000, to say nothing of the Turis of Kuram, and the Vaziris.

The force which was to take part in the expedition consisted of—

4th Panjab Cavalry	...	} From Kohat.
No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery	...	
Detachment, Panjab Sappers	...	
1st Panjab Infantry	...	
3rd do. do.	...	
Scinde Rifle Corps from Derah Ismal Khan.		
Detachment, No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery, with 3 Mountain Guns, from Banu.		

Wing, 66th Gurkhas, from Rawal Pindi.

Six elephants with gear for the transport of the guns and howitzers, No. 3 Panjab. Light Field Battery, were ordered from Peshawar: only animals with good sound feet were to be selected.

Kohat was to be held under the command of Captain Green, 2nd Panjab Infantry, by—

4th Company, 8th Battalion, Foot Artillery, from Peshawar.

1 Squadron, 3rd Panjab Cavalry, from Banu.

Head-Quarters' Wing, 2nd Panjab Infantry, then at Kohat.

Wing, 1st Sikh Local Infantry, from Peshawar.

As the out-post of Bahadur Khel was situated on the borders of the Vaziris, against whom the troops might have to act, its strength was increased by—

1 Troop, 3rd Panjab Cavalry, from Banu.

30 Foot Artillery men from Kohat.

4 Companies, 2nd Panjab Infantry, from Kohat.

The posts of Nari and Lattamar were held by one company infantry, and 10 and 28 sabres respectively.

The cavalry were to take 100 rounds ammunition per man, the infantry 200 rounds, with the exception of the 66th Gurkhas, which had 120 rounds per man.

Ammunition.

The requisite number of camels for carriage, in excess of that kept up by regiments, was to be got from the civil authorities, as well as for 15 seers of baggage per man.

As there was only one British officer with each of the Panjab Light Field Batteries, the services of two Artillery Officers from Peshawar were made available for duty with the artillery proceeding to Miranzai.

On the 4th April the Expeditionary Force (*vide* appendix) was assembled.

To subjugate such a people as the Miranzais, two courses were open,—

Major Edwardes' Report. either to march in and punish them by force of arms without asking any questions, or first to offer them the alternative of giving full and reasonable satisfaction.

The Commissioner did not think the former would be just, because these people had been less accustomed to the requisitions of a regular Government than any other on the frontier. It had never been their habit to pay tribute annually. They used to be left utterly alone for several years, and then a Barakzai Sirdar would come from Kohat with a force and exact all he could by violence and plunder. It therefore seemed unreasonable to expect them all at once to pay regularly and behave well; and, as a matter of policy, it was unwise to weaken our own subjects. Already had the rich plain of Upper Miranzai been encroached on by hungry mountain tribes; and to level a village, or decimate its fighting men, would be only to let in a new stream of enemies from the hills. We desired to interfere in Miranzai as little as possible, and to keep it as a barrier on our frontier. Our policy therefore was not to weaken it, but to keep it strong. For these reasons it was determined to give the people every opportunity of satisfying the demands of Government without using force.

The force marched from Kohat on the 4th April 1855 in progress to Miranzai, arriving at Togue on the 7th. The head men of all the villages were formally summoned to come in at Togue, which is a few miles only from the border of Upper Miranzai. In the course of two days they all presented themselves, except the Maliks of Torawari, which was supposed to indicate that the Zaimukht interlopers who had settled in that village were the least inclined to be dictated to. On the 11th the troops moved to Kahi, where a halt of five days was made.

Immediately on arrival at Kahi, the Brigadier and Commissioner reconnoitred the village.

The men turned out and stood on their houses during the reconnoissance, and conversed in a very independent tone when spoken to; but no collision took place. In the evening the missing Maliks of Torawari also came in, and in a full durbar all the chiefs of the valley were informed of the respective quotas of revenue which every village would have to pay; that the arrears of the last three years would be rigidly exacted, and that fines would also be levied for every criminal offence that stood against them. They submitted to these terms with the air of men who would have resisted if they could, and they then dispersed to their several villages to make arrangements.

It appeared the Torawari men had sent emissaries to the camp at Togue to see the strength of the force, and that the report being "just a little too much," the maliks had come in. One of the Maliks of Kahi, in a friendly chat with Brigadier Chamberlain, went further and said to him, "We could manage this force, but we don't know what is behind."

The strictest discipline was enforced in camp. No plundering of any kind was allowed. Everything required was fairly bought and paid for, and the people seeing themselves protected, instead of robbed (as they had always been by the Barakzais), soon took confidence; and old men, women, and children, might be seen bringing wood into the camp to sell, and fearlessly bargaining with the soldiers. On two successive nights a few shots were fired at the advanced cavalry picquets; the villagers were suspected, and on being warned by the Deputy Commissioner that the village would be fired if the practice was continued, it at once ceased. Arriving at Nariab on the 17th, the troops were halted there till the 27th. On the night of the arrival at Nariab, a camel man who had left camp contrary to the strictest orders was killed within 300 yards of the village.

It was at first proposed to surround the village and demand the surrender of the murderer; but as it was satisfactorily shown that it had been the work of a Zaimukht, to which tribe the destruction of Nariab would have been the greatest triumph, it was spared.

The picquets were here fired on nightly, but with a worse result to the enemy than to the troops, as the latter were protected with breastworks, and of the former the son of a Zaimukht Malik was mortally wounded, besides other losses to the enemy.

On the 28th the troops marched to Dar Samund *via* Torawari, that the defences of that place might be examined. Lieutenant Lumsden, the Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General, who had gone on to mark out the ground near Dar Samund, was fired on from the hills near the village by Zaimukhts. The camp was pitched as far from the hills and broken ground as possible; and being well protected by picquets in "Sangars," it was not annoyed here at night.

On the evening of the 29th April some 4,000 Afridis took up their position on the top of a mountain in rear of the village of Dar Samund, and to the front of the camp, and there passed the night over their watch-fires, having previously given out that it was their intention to make a night attack upon the camp. The majority of the enemy were Afridis of the Khaibar Ranges, but the Basi Khels were of the number.

Their ostensible reason for assembling was to fight the infidel "Feringhis," and they came as "Ghazis."

At 10 A.M. on the 30th, they descended from the main range, and to the number of about 1,500 occupied a small ridge of hills which rose immediately behind Dar Samund, and which was only separated from the high range in its rear by a very narrow glen; there they remained for some time, firing their guns, beating drums, and shouting the hill war cry.

Brigadier Chamberlain's
Report.

Finding that the troops remained inactive, they became emboldened, and some few of them commenced descending into the more open ground, and advancing towards the cavalry picquet. This being seen, Captain Jacob was instructed to have a party of cavalry in readiness to cut them off whenever they should advance sufficiently far from the hill; and between 1 and 2 o'clock the opportunity was afforded.

A portion of the enemy were now approaching the front cavalry picquet through the jungle, and Captain Fraser, 4th Panjab Cavalry, advanced with 35 sabres to cut them off; when, as the enemy opened fire on the picquet, Captain Fraser, whose detachment was reinforced by the 15 sabres of which the picquet consisted, charged them in a very gallant manner under a heavy fire from the hills. He was immediately joined by a few Pathan horse, led by Captain Coke, belonging to the Khatak Chiefs, Kwajah Mahomed Khan and Ghulam Hyder Khan; these being shortly followed by 30 sabres, 4th Panjab Cavalry, under Captain Jacob.

The Afridis attempted to regain the hill, whilst their brethren, who were in large numbers on the hill side, opened fire to protect their retreat, but with little avail, for the cavalry conducted themselves with much spirit.

In the meanwhile, Lieutenant Travers of the 1st Panjab Infantry, who was on picquet duty with a company of his regiment, marched to the support of the cavalry, and immediately attacked the enemy on the hill. During this time a body of 50 dismounted men, 4th Panjab Cavalry, from a breastwork, and 250 of the 1st Panjab Infantry from the camp, were advancing to the assistance of our own parties, and on their being united, they soon drove the Afridis from every point, with the loss of 12 or 15 bodies left on the ground, in addition to any killed or wounded carried away. Our loss was small,—see appendix.

The enemy were so completely routed and panic-stricken, that on reaching the foot of the high range of mountains they appeared only to think of ascending to its summit, and at dark not a flag, or man, or watch-fire, were visible.

The Brigadier considered that the conduct and spirit of those engaged were most soldierly, and merited the approbation of Government.

Up to this time it had been the boast of these hill tribes, that were it not for our guns we could never oppose them; and therefore not the least advantage of this engagement was their having been made to experience the falsity of their assertion. Other hill tribes were assembling and sending their quotas, but the ignominious defeat of the first body at once put a stop to any further exhibitions of fanaticism.

There was a grave feature in this affair. The Ghazi movement was purely a Mahomedan one against the Christians, and all those who by bearing

arms in their service placed themselves in the category of "infidels." A very large proportion of the troops in camp happened to be Pathans, all of whose homes were on the Trans-Indus border; many among the very tribes who had then assembled. This was especially the case in the 1st Panjab Infantry and 3rd Panjab Infantry. The first corps had already distinguished itself on many occasions, the latter had not then had the good fortune to find an opportunity; both were picked specimens both as regarded material and spirit; yet it was decidedly felt that the purely religious appeal made by the Ghazis on the hill was so powerful, as to be a great pain to the men, and a great anxiety to their officers. It was mentioned by a native officer of the 1st Panjab Infantry—himself a Pathan—that the father of one of the best non-commissioned officers was on the hill, and that there were many similar cases. Emissaries could not possibly be

excluded, but the good spirit in the corps was shown by the fact being at once reported to Major Coke. In the same way, an Afghan native officer of the 3rd Panjab Infantry earnestly urged his commanding officer "to get blood spilt between the troops and the Ghazis before night-fall if possible," so as to stop the sympathy between them.

However, then, as subsequently, the conduct of these men, when acting even against their own brethren, was all that could possibly be desired.

Whilst touching on this subject, the Commissioner, Colonel Edwardes, alluded in terms, (which the events of 1857 made truly prophetic,) to the danger of not having mixed races in the native army.

On the 6th May the troops were moved to Thall, where a halt was made till the 16th, to enable a settlement to be made with the Turis and the Vaziris. The settlement with the former tribe was satisfactorily accomplished. The settlement with the Vaziris is thus graphically described by Colonel Edwardes.

The Vaziri Maliks had been summoned, but they declined to come in: they said they were afraid, knowing they had opposed Major Edwardes' Despatch. Captain Coke in 1851. The Commissioner then wrote to assure them, that they would be honorably treated if they would come in and hear what he had to say; when, if they did not agree to his terms, they should be free to return. He even told them to keep his messenger as a hostage; but nothing could move their distrust, and their only answer was to retire to the adjacent hills. So two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry with some guns were moved across the Kuram.

Arrived at Billand Khel, the infantry and guns were left before that village, whilst the Brigadier and Commissioner pushed on with the cavalry a few miles down the high bank of the river. There the Vaziri harvest was spread out beneath them in a waving sheet of ripening corn as far as the eye could reach, dotted here and there with Shishum trees, and profusely watered by the passing river. A more peaceful or beautiful landscape could scarcely be imagined, and it was resolved to exhaust all measures of conciliation rather than disturb it. As none of the Vaziris were to be seen, a last message was sent to them in the hills that there was no wish to injure them or their crops, and an hour was given them to come in. Thus a body of British officers remained on their horses in the sun on a hot May morning to give these savages a chance!

The stillness of the scene was disturbed occasionally by the angry drums of the men of Thall, who with sword and sickle, and beasts of burden, had come across under cover of the force to wreak vengeance on their Vaziri enemies. One of them, a decrepit old man, gathered up all his strength for this occasion, and, unobserved by the British officers, swam across the Kuram to a narrow strip of Vaziri lands at the foot of the hills on the left bank. Presently he was seen plunging into the stream on his way back, pursued by screaming women and shouting men; while a dense volume of smoke, rising from a threshing floor on the opposite bank, proclaimed that he had fired the corn stacks of his own particular enemy. Arrived safely on our side, the old man seemed beside himself with joy.

First, he threw himself at the feet of Captain Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner, as if worshipping the Nemesis who had brought such righteous things to pass, and then he performed a war dance in front of the regiment, relating between whiles the injury he had sustained, the years he had watched for revenge, and how comfortable he now felt that the account was cleared. This was the only act of violence that day.

At last the patience of the Commissioner was rewarded by the arrival of a Vaziri Malik, named Mazullah, as a hostage for whose safety our own

messenger had been detained upon the hill. The bitterness of the feud with Thall here showed itself again. One of the head men of Thall calling out, "That is not a malik, I know him; he is only a common fellow." It afterwards turned out that Mazullah was the leading man of all the Vaziris then in the plains, but he had eloped with the Thall man's sister. A few minutes' conversation sufficed to convince him that all those English officers, and all those soldiers, had not been standing for hours in the sun with any hostile feelings towards his tribe, and that it only required a word to be spoken to let loose the whole force, including the men of Thall, into the crops. He struck his big hand upon his chest and swore, that if the force was drawn off, he would bring in all the Vaziri Maliks to camp by sun-set. This was agreed to. He was warned that if he did not keep his word, the troops would be back there again by sun-rise next day and the crops cut without further parley.

True to his word, Mazullah arrived at sun-set with 30 or 40 Vaziri Maliks, and from that moment no difficulty arose. In the presence of the Thall and Vaziri Chiefs the Commissioner took the accounts of the losses of men and cattle suffered (during British rule) on both sides, and they proved to be quite equal.

The Commissioner then advised them to cry, quits and make friends, as Government could not permit this state of things to continue. Both parties seemed to feel this proposition a relief, and the Vaziris especially entered into the details of an agreement with a heartiness which showed that they were sincere. The negotiations lasted three days, and closed with both sides swearing on the *Koran* to abstain from further feuds.

A translation of the characteristic agreement made between these two wild tribes is subjoined.

"We, the Kabal Khel Vaziris and Maliks of Thall, hereby agree—

Firstly.—That whatever bloodshed, or plunder, or any other kind of loss, has been between us up to this date, is hereby forgiven. Let by-gones be by-gones.

Secondly.—In future we will be friends, and cease from hostilities.

Thirdly.—If any man of Thall, or any Bangash of Miranzai, in future injure a Kabal Khel Vaziri, the Vaziris shall not take the law into their own hands, but send a petition about it to the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat through Hazrat Nur, or any one else they can trust, who shall take it to the Tehsildar of Hangu, and the Government will then be responsible to see justice done.

Fourthly.—If any Kabal Khel Vaziri shall injure a Government subject, we, the Maliks of the tribe, are responsible as follow:—

If a man is killed or wounded, we will give up the criminal or pay the 'make up' for blood.*

* It was explained that the "saz," or make up for blood, was as follows:—

	Rs.
1. For killing a Pathan	1,200
2. For killing an inferior man	360
3. For laming a Pathan in hand or foot	500
(For which giving a daughter counts as Rs. 80.)	
4. For laming an inferior man, give a daughter and do penance at the injured man's door.	
5. <i>Scale for fingers</i> —	
A Pathan's thumb or forefinger	60
The other three fingers	60
An inferior man's finger ... {	Only necessary to take a goat or sheep to his house; kill it and have a jirga to eat it.

If robbery takes place, restitutions to be made, on proof on solemn oath.

Fifthly.—The Thall men agree not to assist the Turis in any way to injure the Kabal Khels in future.

If the Turis pass to or fro between the points Bakkar Khanah and Sirragudai to rob the Vaziris, we are responsible, and we will neither let them rest in our village, going or coming on such a journey.

Sixthly.—This agreement is now made by us (Vaziris) in the name of the whole Kabal Khel. The Malikshai branch is not present, but the representatives of the Meami, Saifula, and Paihali, are here, and we will be responsible for the Malikshai. As to the Mahomed Khels, Turi Khels, and Amazais, who are not Kabal Khel and who do not come into British territory to graze, but who are enemies of Thall, we cannot undertake to say that they will join this agreement; but we hope they will, when we go to Shiwal and tell them of it. If they do not agree, we are responsible that between the boundaries of Shinkai Kundas, Trans-Kuram and Ghara, Sirprai, Kirrai Zyarut, Cis-Karam, we will not let them pass to injure the Bangash."

"Dated 15th May 1855."

On the 17th the force commenced its return to Kohat, where it arrived on the 21st, and was then broken up.

Many indications proved that the Zaimukhts viewed with great dislike the presence of our force in the valley, though for the
 Commissioner's Report. nonce unable to prevent or resist it; so *en route* the heads of the tribe were called in, and they were warned of the penalties of future misconduct, and told what was known against them.

The conduct of the troops had been unexceptionally good. There had been no plundering or misconduct of any kind, nor a
 Brigadier's Report. single complaint against any soldier of the force.

Although the weather was getting hot for the last fortnight of the time the force was out, the health of the troops was always very good. Supplies were always abundant.

The expression of the Governor General's high satisfaction at the dispersion, on 30th April, at Dar Samund, of the large body of Ghazis, as well as the results generally of the expedition, was subsequently conveyed to Brigadier Chamberlain and the officers concerned.

APPENDIX.

Miranzai Field Force, 1855.

DETAIL.	European officers.	European non-commissioned officers.	Native commissioned officers.	Native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.	Elephants.	Horses.	Yabus and mules.	Howitzers.	Gun.
No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery ...	2	2	2	135	6	133	36	1	5
Detachment, No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery, with Mountain Train Guns ...	1	1	1	36	...	2	39	2	1
4th Panjab Cavalry ...	4	...	10	483	...	501
Wing, 66th or Gurkha Regiment ...	7	1	10	564
1st Panjab Infantry ...	4	1	15	852
3rd Panjab Infantry (7 Cos.) ...	3	2	13	793
Scinde Rifle Corps ...	3	...	11	770
Detachment, Panjab Sappers	3	33
Total ...	24	7	65	3,666	6	636	75	3	6

Return of Casualties in parties, 4th Panjab Cavalry, 1st Panjab Infantry, and Pathan Irregulars, at Dar Samund, on the 30th April 1855.

	4TH PANJAB CAVALRY.						1ST PANJAB INFANTRY.					PATHAN IRREGULARS.		TOTAL.	
	European Officers.	Native commissioned officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Trumpeters.	Rank and file.	Horse.	European officers.	Native commissioned officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Buglers.	Rank and File.	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.
Killed	4	1	...	5
Severely wounded	1	1	...	2	...
Slightly wounded	1	...	5	3	1	5	8	12	...

SECTION IV.

The Turis.

THE Turis are a tribe of Afghanistan, who inhabit the valley of Kuram. Little is known of the origin of this tribe. They and their neighbours, the Jajis, are supposed to be descendants of two Mogul brothers, Tor and Jagi, and are not considered Pathans, there being a marked difference between them in physical appearance, dress, and many customs. Edwardes says, the Turis are Khattar Hindkis in origin, from Gariāla, on the banks of the Haru River, Rawal Pindi District.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

Colonel Edwardes' Report.

Lumsden says, the Turis can turn out 3,000 foot and 500 horse, and are divided into the four sections of Dapazai, Sargali, Gandi Khel, and Alizai.

Edwardes, however, divides them into—

1. Gandi Khel	1,000
2. Alizai	500
3. Mashu Khel	1,000
4. Hamza Khel	1,000
5. Dapazai	1,500
Total					5,000

These five branches are called Panjpadri, or five fathered; and when they first got possession about the Pekar Pass, they parcelled it out into five equal portions, to each branch a portion,—a custom which they have strictly followed with each successive acquisition in the valley, without any reference to the comparative numbers of the five branches; and possession continues in this manner at the present day, except in individual cases of sale or other voluntary transfer.

Those Turis who chose, took to building houses on their lands; but there are still a large number who remain "Kuchis," living in tents all the year; in winter about Bolyamin, and in summer in the Safed Koh.

The Turis are not in general large men, and their dark complexions mark their eastern origin; but they are strong, hardy, and courageous. The dress of the common people consists simply of a blanket shirt. As horsemen they are as superior to their neighbours, as the Vaziris are as footmen. A mounted Turi is a perfect model of a moss trooper: his horse is small, but active and enduring, and carries his own clothing under the saddle; while at the saddle bow, in leathern wallets, hang food for man and horse, spare shoes, nails and a hammer in case of accident, and an iron peg and rope to picket the horse anywhere in a moment.

The object of horsemanship with them is to commit distant and daring raids, rather than for defence; and any distinguished highway man earns the honorable title of a "Khlak," or crack-man.

A profusion of arms covers every horseman,—one or two short brass bound carbines at his back, two or three pistols and knives of sizes and sorts all round his waist belt, and a sword by his side. The introduction of revolvers would save them a good deal of weight!

James says of the Turis:—

“They are far inferior to the Vaziris in courage and all manly qualities, with coarse sensual features; there is much of the savage about them. On scenting prey, their eyes dilate, and they evince all the greed and ferocity of wild beasts. In their raids they are ruthless, and spare neither sex nor age.”

Lumsden says, they are generally short, compact, though rather sickly-looking men, with either a skulking or cunning look about them. They wear earrings, and dress in a sort of loose frock coming down to the knees, either of a dark-blue colour interspersed with patches of white, or a white garment patched with blue,—with a common blue or white turban and “kamr-band,” and with breeches loose above, but fitting tight from the knee down to the ankle. They wear sandals. They are armed much in the same way as other Afghans. Their horsemen, mounted on sorry-looking jades, small but very wiry, are adepts at border frays, and have a great local reputation. The footmen are thought little of, though a considerable number are to be found in the service of the Governor of Kuram.

The Turis are all Shiah, though Bellew, probably through a slip, says they are Sunis. Masson mentions a curious custom which is said to be prevalent among them. When they see a stranger, they ask him if he is straight or crooked, putting at the same time their forefinger to their forehead and holding it first in a perpendicular position, and then in a contorted one. If desirous of being civilly received, the stranger had better reply that he is straight, by which they understand that he is a Shiah.

The shrine of Fahui-i-alam (in Kirman), the father of Nadar Shah, is considered very sacred by the Turis.

They have a peculiar custom of firing numerous shots with matchlocks over the head of a newly-born male child, as an introduction to the ordinary scenes of this life, and to accustom him to the sound, so that he may not shrink from the fire of his enemies in after life.

The Turis are at feud with the Vaziris and Zaimukhts, Mangals and Jagis, but are friendly to the Bangashes. The Bangashes join the Turis in all wars, but not often in raids. If they are summoned and fail to join, they are fined when the expedition is over.

The feud with the Jagis is very bitter, and each is always on the watch to pounce on some unfortunate or unguarded member of the opposite tribe; consequently none of either tribe dare transgress the limits of the other by crossing the intervening hill except at the risk of his life.

The Turis were formerly “Kuchi,” or a wandering tribe. Their seat was at Nilab, on the Indus, and they moved to and fro between that point and Kabul with their flocks and herds. By the Bangash accounts it was about four generations back when the Turis first took root in Kuram. The Bangashes had rebelled against their Kabul sovereign, who sent a force, reduced them, and imposed on them a tax; to pay which they sold the village of Barakar, near Pekar, to the Turis. After that the Turis got Pekar by another bargain, by which they were bound to supply Asad Khan, a Bangash Chief of Shilofzan, with wood. Thus, little by little, the Turis availed themselves of Bangash dissensions to seize new villages, until the Bangashes say they have now only the villages of Shilofzan and Ziran under the hills, and Aza Khel in the plains, which are free. The rest of Kuram is in the hands of the Turis, who have reduced the Bangashes to the condition of “humsayahs,” or dependents.

Every Bangash is obliged to attach himself to a powerful Turi, who is called his “naik,” and who protects him from other Turis.

There is war between the Turis and Bangashes of Shilofzan and Ziran; but the latter are strong from numbers and situation, and hold their own. But no man of theirs can travel about the rest of Kuram without taking a Turi "badragga," or safe conduct.

Nevertheless, the conquered Bangashes out-number the conquering Turis. On one occasion the Turis defeated Shir Ali Khan and Mahamed Amin Khan, and killed 500 Duranis on the Jagi border, and would have killed more had not a nephew of Khan Sharin Khan, named Sultan Ahmed Khan, a Kazlbash and Shiah, come between them and begged for quarter.

When the Turi thieves were lurking about the Durani camp to steal horses, the Kazlbashis used to call out from inside their tent the Shiah war cry, "Yah Ali! Yah Haidar!" On hearing which, the Turis left that part of the camp and went on to plunder the Afghans.

SECTION V.

The Kuram Valley and the Pekar Kotal.

KURAM is a modern name borrowed from the river which flows through it.

Colonel Edwardes' Report. The old name was Bangash, from the tribe that possessed it. It is now less the property of the Bangashes than the Turis. The valley is a dependency of Kabul, lying at the foot of the southern slopes of Safed Koh Range. Colonel Edwardes thus describes the valley after the expedition there in 1856:—

"The length of this district may be about 60 miles, with a breadth varying from 3 to 10 miles.

"The appearance of the Kuram Valley is exceedingly beautiful, and in some respects grand. Above is the ever-white Spinghar or Safed Koh, looking down in grave majesty on the smiling green fields and pleasant orchards stretched at its feet, and cleft by the noisy babbling Kuram, whose waters are as clear and crystal as the snows from which they come. Below, whichever way the eye turns, it is met by an expanse quick with the life of villages, fields, orchards, and groves, and topped by grand mountains coming close down, and covered with dark pine, till their height, as it were, raised them from such encumbrance, when they stand out clear, naked, and white."

The mountains of the district consist of the spurs from the Safed Koh, which stretch out to the south; at first very steeply, then in the glacial like slopes, which are mentioned by Griffiths as occurring at the foot of the Hindu Kush. The principal of these spurs is the Pekar ridge, which starts out from the Sita Ram Mountain, and going south, ere it is stayed by the river, splits out into two branches, one of which goes parallel to the Kuram River, and the other south-east, parallel with that of Pekar. Another great spur comes from the ridge to the south of the Karmana Valley, and, stopping the direct drainage of the mountain, forces it to turn west ere it resumes its normal direction. This spur drains on the north into the Kirman Dara, on the south into the Kuram and the Karmana Valley.

Of the south ridge we have not much information, the only spur of which anything is known, is that crossed by the Darwaza Pass.

Besides the main valley, there are a number of smaller glens which run into the hills on either sides. These are of little width as a rule, but all are watered, and afford some space for cultivation. The largest of them is the Kirman Dara, inhabited by Bangash.

The rivers of Kuram, besides that from which the district takes its name, are the Hariab, Keria, Mangal, Ahmad Khel, Kirman, and Karmana.

The climate of Kuram is very agreeable. For a month or six weeks in mid-winter the weather is described as very severe, owing to the elevation of the valley above the sea and its proximity to the Snowy Range; but on the other hand the hot months are tempered by cool and refreshing breezes from that region.

During the time of Lumsden's mission, the average of seven days' temperature, from 22nd to 28th March inclusive, was at 5 A.M. 54°20' Fahr.; at 1 P.M. in sun 98°20', in a tent 75°; at 8 P.M. 58°30' Fahr. On the return of the mission later in the season, the average of six days' temperature, from

11th to 16th June inclusive, was at 8 A. M. 63° Fahr.; at 1 P. M. in sun 118°, in a tent 65° Fahr.; and at 8 P. M. 73° Fahr.

The principal diseases of Kuram appear to be fever of the intermittent type, with enlarged spleen. Fevers are said to be most prevalent during the months of July, August, and September, the season during which the rice harvest is gathered.

Kuram is inhabited by the Bangash, Turi, Jagi, and Mangal tribes. The two last inhabit the upper portion of the valley to the crest of the Pekar Kotal, and on the south of Chamkani, and are semi-independent.

The numbers of these tribes are thus estimated—

Mangals	at	8,000 fighting men, by Lumsden.
Jagis	"	800 " " "
Bangash	"	5,620 " " Edwardes.
Turis	"	5,000 " "
Total	...	<u>19,420</u> "

Taking, then, the number of families to be equal to that of the fighting men, and multiplying them by $4\frac{1}{2}$, the population of Kuram would be 77,680 souls; an estimate which does not seem excessive when the number of villages and fertility of the soil is considered.

Nearly every village is a fort. These villages are generally placed along the course of the river near each other. Each is enclosed by a square mud wall, with a tower at two of the diagonal angles flanking the sides. The gate is in the centre of one side, and usually the top of the wall all round is armed with a *chevaux-de-frise* of thorn bushes, as a protection against robbers at night. Many of the villages are ornamented by stately plane trees of great height and beauty.

The grain in Kuram is generally stored in caves, the apertures of which are then built up, and being always in the sides of some small conglomerate hillock on which the villages are built, or in their immediate neighbourhood, are easily defended. Water is abundant everywhere, (except at the base of Safe! Koh, which is occupied by a stony and uncultivated plateau some 20 miles by 5) and irrigation is rendered facile by the water of the river, and that of the numerous streams flowing from the adjacent mountains towards it, which is led off in water-courses in all directions, and at various heights.

The sides of the mountains above Kuram are clothed with forests of pine, and these have been brought into use by the British Forest Department, the timber being floated down the river to Banu.

The Kuram Valley has one peculiarity. Placed in the midst of an Afghan population, the whole of its tribes are of the Shiah persuasion; a fact which is of considerable importance.

The government of Kuram is usually under one of the relations of the reigning Amir of Kabul. The Governor, however, seldom visits the country, but governs it through a deputy (naib). The revenue can never be collected except by a considerable force, which, when necessary, is sent from Kabul.

The population of Kuram, being all Shiabs, bear no good-will to their Suni masters; and when Colonel Edwardes was there in 1856, he was informed by Mirza Gul, the most powerful and intelligent man in Kuram, that he was deputed by the council of the Turis to say that, whenever the British wished to take their country, they were ready to help them.

In politics the Turis belong to the Gar faction.

SECTION VI.

Miranzai Field Force, 1856.

*Expedition into the Kuram Valley.**

“THE expedition into the Miranzai Valley in May 1855 had been attended by the best effects, and for some time afterwards peace continued to prevail there. Subsequently Dar Samund, one of the most distant and largest village, withheld the land revenue due from it. Numerous raids were also committed on our Khatak, Bangash, and Vaziri subjects resident in the valley, by the Turis, whom the Afghan Government were unable to control,” and these incursions were abetted by the Zaimukht Afghans.

The Turis, on the first annexation of the Kohat District, had given much trouble.

They had repeatedly leagued with other tribes to harass the Miranzai valley, harbouring fugitives, encouraging all to resist, and frequently attacking Bangash and Khatak villages in the Kohat District.

In August 1853, Captain Coke moved from Bahadur Khel with 100 men, 1st Panjab Infantry, and 45 sabres, 1st Panjab Cavalry, to seize a large armed Turi caravan. Pushing on with the cavalry after a march of 40 miles, the Turis were come up with at Darbund, and after some resistance, in which 1 Turi was killed and 1 wounded, 37 Turis with all their property were captured, and their goods taken as security for the re-payment of the value of plundered property, the men as hostages for their tribe. This measure was soon followed by an embassy from the tribe, whose petition ran thus—

Report on Tribes by Mr. Temple. After compliments,—“Our caravan cattle and many of our tribe have been seized.

“This is the just punishment of evil doers. Before the British Government came to this country, we had evil intent against Khatak and Bangash, and carried off their cattle.

“Since the arrival of British Government, we have, through evil counsels, done the same.

“But since we find there is a British officer who protects his subjects, both Bangash and Khatak, and has retaliated on us, we beg that our caravan may be released, and we bind ourselves to abstain in future from raids on British territory, and the Turis will trade with the Khataks and Bangashes.

An agreement was then concluded with the tribe; the value of plundered property was made good, the prisoners were released, and 5 Turis were made over to the British as hostages; but within one month the tribe again gave way to “evil counsels,” and in the following March (1854) a serious attack was made by the Turis with 2,000 men (foot and horse) on a Miranzai village—lives were lost on both sides, and the Turi hostages were then incarcerated in the Lahore jail.

This instance of misconduct was followed up by other raids. In the autumn of 1854, when the expedition against the refractory British territory of Miranzai was designed, it was under consideration whether the opportunity

should not be taken of punishing the Turis; but as they were subjects of Kabul, and negotiations with the Amir were shortly expected, the Government decided on first arranging with His Highness on the subject.

During the negotiations for the treaty of Peshawar in March 1854, it was explained to the Afghan representative that either the Kabul Government must restrain the Turis from incursions on British territory, or else the British Government itself would undertake to chastise them; but it was resolved that another trial should be given to the Turis before further measures were taken, as the Kabul Government promised to control them. The expedition to Miranzai was effected, as already shown, in May 1855, and the Turis, having seen that display of force, desired to make peace with us, when another agreement was concluded, and their hostages released from confinement.

But in spite of these measures the Turis continued their raids.

In June 1856 no less than 13 were recorded against them, in which 1 Khatak, 4 Vaziris, and 2 Bangashes, were killed; 4 Khataks and 2 Bangashes wounded, and nearly 500 head of cattle carried off. These were followed by another raid, marked by unusual atrocity—the murder of a young girl.

In regard to the Zaimukhts, their object had long been to encroach on the valley of the Bangash, in which they had already acquired the village of Torawari; and it was therefore determined to send a force to punish the Turis and to compel an understanding with the Zaimukhts, and to make an example of the refractory village of Dar Samund. But previous to the advance of the force, the recusant village of Dar Samund paid up its revenue, together with a fine of Rs. 1,000 imposed.

With regard to the time of year for the operations, the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Henderson, remarked that it would then (in the autumn) be fine and settled weather; that forage would be abundant, water plentiful, and the Kuram River at its lowest; and that, moreover, it was very advisable the Mianazai Valley should be visited at as an early a date as possible.

Records Staff Office, Panjab Frontier Force. The troops which were to take part in the expedition were—

No. 2 Company, Panjab Sappers and Miners, (then in the Kohat District,) and also a body of Khatak horsemen.

The 4th Panjab Cavalry from Kohat.

Detachment, 1st Panjab Cavalry, from Dera Ismail Khan.

Ditto Peshawar Mountain Battery, from Peshawar.

Ditto No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery, from Banu.

Ditto No. 3 Light Field Battery, from Kohat.

Ditto 66th Gurkhas, from Rawal Pindi.

1st }
2nd } Panjab Infantry, from Kohat.
3rd }

6th from Dera Ismail Khan.

Six gun elephants were to be provided from Peshawar.

Kohat was to be held by No 4 or Garrison company artillery, 1 troop, 3rd Panjab Cavalry, from Banu, 1 troop, 4th Panjab Cavalry, (to be left at Kohat,) 1 company, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Panjab Infantry, and the Head Quarters and Wing, 5th Panjab Infantry, from Banu (this regiment also furnishing a company for the Nari and Latarmar post, and 2 companies for Bahadur Khel); the cavalry detachments, 4th Panjab Cavalry, at these posts were relieved by the 3rd Panjab Cavalry from Banu.

The number of rounds to be carried by the Mountain Batteries were—

128 shell.

160 round shot.

The howitzer being a more useful piece for mountain warfare than the gun, No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery was to furnish a detachment to work the two Mountain guns and howitzers belonging to that and No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery; 48 mules or yabus, to be completed from the Battery at Dera Ismail Khan, were to be brought for service with No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery, which was to carry the full proportion of service ammunition for two howitzers (24-pounder) and four 9-pounder guns. Carbines for night duties were to be taken by the artillery.

The troops were to be provided with nimchas, great-coats, and warm bedding, and the camp followers to be warned of the certainty of great cold. Arrangements were made through the civil officers for a suitable building at Hangu, as a magazine for reserve ammunition.

The Deputy Commissioner of Kohat was to be informed of the daily requirements of each regiment, &c. He was requested to collect supplies for the force, and to arrange for forage, &c., along the line of route; and if fire-wood was scarce in any parts of the country, to have supplies of it stacked at the nearest possible places.

Officers were to march as lightly equipped as possible.

On the 21st October the Miranzai Field Force (as detailed in appendix), under the command of Brigadier N. Chamberlain, marched from Kohat towards Hangu, where it arrived on the 22nd. On the 23rd the force moved to Togue, on the 24th to Rai, (the border village of the Upper and Lower Miranzai Valleys,) and on the 25th to Nariab.

Despatches from Brigadier N. Chamberlain and Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwards, Commissioner.

A great difference was perceptible in the feeling of the people. In 1855 the walls and houses had been covered with armed men; now all was quiet: no notice was taken of the arrival of the troops, and the men and women of the villages pursued their usual avocations. They had already paid their revenue, and, having defied no orders, seemed perfectly to understand that they were safe, though 5,000 soldiers were encamped under their walls. Nothing had tended more to create this confidence than the strict discipline which Brigadier Chamberlain invariably enforced.

Advantage was taken of the move to Nariab to surprise the village of Torawari. This village, which was not walled, is situated at the entrance of the Zaimukht Valley. Its position was well adapted for defence, and retreat on being pressed. The hills are close to it on both sides, the front only being open to the Miranzai Valley. At Rai, the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Henderson, had received intelligence that a large number of Miranzai criminals had taken refuge in Torawari, which was inhabited by Zaimukht settlers from the hills north-west of Miranzai. In the expedition of 1855, greater consideration had been shewn to Torawari, than to any of the other villages, through the good offices of Kwajah Mahomed Khan, the Chief of the Khataks, who, to gain the friendship of the Zaimukht clan, went so far as to pay the most of the Torawari revenue. In consequence of this prompt payment, the force had then no occasion to encamp at Torawari even for a single day. But, as usual, mild treatment was attributed to weakness, and not only the Zaimukhts but their Bangash neighbours came to regard Torawari as an impregnable fortress; hence, every runaway blackguard in the valley, as the force again approached, sought and received asylum in this redoubtable Zaimukht village.

Amongst these refugees was a special ruffian, named "Mir," who got his livelihood by catching Hindu traders in by-paths, and hanging them up by the heels till they were suffocated into delivering up their money.

It was decided to surprise them; but neither the officers of the force, nor the most friendly chiefs in the camp, were informed. Orders were given for the usual march to Nariab the next morning. The Nariab road was reconnoitred by the Engineers, and improved by the Sappers, and ground at Nariab was selected for the camp.

An hour before the time appointed, the troops were turned out.

From Rai to Torawari is about 9 miles, and for half the distance the road is the same as that to Nariab. Up to this point the whole force proceeded leisurely, and none but commanding officers knew what was going to happen. At last, however, the troops broke into two columns, one keeping the road to Nariab, and the other striking off to Torawari. The friends of the Zaimukhts became uneasy, but no man was allowed to go ahead.

When within 4 miles of the place, and as day was fast breaking, the cavalry pushed on in two bodies, (one led by Captain Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner, the other under the Brigadier, accompanied by the Commissioner,) the broken nature of the ground prevented any rapid movements, but by keeping a tolerable wide circle, the cavalry succeeded in surrounding the place before the inhabitants had any warning. The enemy made no attempt to break through the investment; the uncertain nature of the light at first did not admit of their counting the troops, and as the light became clearer, the sight of other troops hurrying up must have discouraged any attempt of the kind.

About an hour after the arrival of the cavalry, the Peshawar Battery and 6th Panjab Infantry came up, shortly followed by the Mountain Guns of No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery, and the 1st and 2nd Panjab Infantry. As soon as the cavalry had got into position, the Commissioner had summoned the elders out to treat; but after two hours' negotiations nothing could be settled, and they were sent back with the intimation that they must either surrender the criminals known to be harboured by them, pay a fine for previous misconduct, and give security for future good behaviour, or stand the consequences.

No sign of compliance with the demands being evinced, a further quarter of an hour was granted, to enable them to send out their women and children; and during this period every endeavour was made to induce them to place their families in security, but with no effect; and the time having expired, a few rounds of blank ammunition were fired by the artillery as a warning, and then the eight Mountain Guns opened fire on the place. After some thirty shot and shell had been thrown into the village a flag was waived from the mosque, and the fire being checked some old women advanced towards the troops bearing *Korans* on their heads in token of submission.

The terms then imposed were, that the whole of the male population should come outside the village and throw down their arms, all but the criminals being promised their lives. After some hesitation a portion of the men came out, but as it was found that they had not brought their arms, nor given up the criminals as required and promised, the 1st and 2nd Panjab Infantry were ordered to enter the place for the purpose of turning all the men out and seizing all arms. Finding that the villagers still hung back, and a man of the 2nd Panjab Infantry being severely wounded by a Zaimukht villager, who was killed on the spot, the place was ordered to be fired, when in the course of a very short time the whole of the population and cattle were gathered outside.

The troops were then recalled, and the villagers allowed to extinguish the flames, by which about one-third of the village had been destroyed.

The 12 criminals (of whom the Deputy Commissioner had a list) were then seized and made over to the troops for safe custody, and 182 of the principal inhabitants were brought into camp, as security until the fine of Rs. 2,000 inflicted on the village should be paid.

The number of arms seized was 221, and of cattle captured 1,200 head, including ponies, cows, buffaloes, and mules, which were made over to the civil authorities.

Two or three lives only were lost on the side of the Zaimukhts; 2 soldiers were wounded in the scuffle in the village.

The troops reached camp about 2 o'clock, no one attempting to molest them during their retirement.

The force halted at Nariab from the 29th November to the 4th December, when it marched to Dar Samund, and on the 5th to Thall.

Before marching from Nariab all sickly men* were sent back to Kohat, the excessive variation of the temperature, (there being a difference of nearly 40° Fahr. between the day and the night,) affecting of course the health of the troops.

The Deputy Governor of Kuram had been ordered by the Amir of Kabal to meet the Commissioner with the Tori Chiefs at the frontier village of Thall, to answer for their misdeeds; but as he was unable, or unwilling, to carry out his instructions, it was determined to cross the Kuram.

The 6th and 7th were passed by the whole of the infantry in fortifying a position on the left bank of the Kuram, wherein (sickness having again increased) the sick and convalescent soldiers and followers were to be left, as well as all superfluous equipage and non-combatants; of the latter, the smallest possible numbers were to accompany the force on its onward march.

On the 8th November the force crossed the Kuram, and, after marching up its banks for 10 miles, encamped for the night near a hamlet called Sarra Khoa; neither a village nor a man were to be seen throughout the march, and for the whole distance the hills bounded the river on both sides.

The following day the march was continued to Haizar Pir Ziarut, 15 miles, a rather difficult and tedious one for the guns and baggage, and it was near sun-set before the rear-guard reached camp. The road was either on the banks, or along the bed of the river. The Kuram Valley and the Tori lands were entered immediately on leaving Sarra Khoa, when the valley increased in breadth; villages were numerous, and the whole country bore signs of careful cultivation. The force was this day met by a representative of the Kabul authorities, and the principal Tori and Bangash Maliks.

During the march a low Kotal was crossed by the cavalry and infantry, but which was impracticable for artillery, though easily capable of improvement, and the artillery had to follow the bed of the stream. The narrowness of the path, which for a time ran along the face of a hill, delayed the baggage greatly.

The artillery generally proceeded along the bed of the Kuram; the river was low at this season, and its bed found easier for guns than the road along its banks.

From Haizar Pir to the Sirdar's Fort there are two roads, one being up the bed of the river and past numerous villages, the other by the Dirwaza; the latter was said to be the most practicable, and had therefore been adopted.

* Cavalry ...	29	} Camp followers included.
Artillery ...	85	
Infantry ...	153	

As it was desirable that the settlement with the Turis should take place near the fort (occupied by the Kabul Sirdar when in the valley, and at that time by his Deputy), and as the opportunity for seeing and surveying the country was a favorable one, the troops continued their march on the 10th, passing through narrow valleys covered with high grass, but destitute of any signs of man; although later in the year these lands are occupied by the migratory Gilzais, who return to their hills on the approach of summer.

The camp was pitched at the mouth of the Dirwaza defile (11 miles).

The following day the column proceeded through the Dirwaza, pitching camp after a 12-mile march on the right bank of the Kuram, about $1\frac{1}{4}$ mile from the fort, on the opposite side of the river.

The defile was about 8 miles in length, and although large working parties were employed to improve the road, and a regiment of infantry was detailed to assist the Light Field Battery, the axles of two of the four pieces gave way, and it was sun-set before the Battery was in camp.*

For the first 6 miles the pass is so narrow, to that it is commanded by hills at matchlock range from both sides. The chief difficulties of the road were found in the first 3 miles. The nullah draining the pass had frequently to be crossed, the ascents and descents being occasionally steep and rocky. In one place the path had been cut away by torrents, and there was a perpendicular drop of 20 feet into the nullah. The hill above was very difficult to work in—rocky, covered with stunted palm bushes, and of a steep slope, and it was found necessary to build up a road for the passage of the artillery.

The Sirdar's Fort is situated in the widest part of the valley, which is there about 12 miles across; the cultivated portion extending for about a mile on either side the river. The villages were thickly clustered, and situated on these cultivated strips of land, with the exception of a few built at the gorges in the hills where there were springs.

Up to this time not a single shot had been fired into the camp; but at Haizar Pir the head men had been warned by the Brigadier that he would not submit to the indignity of being annoyed at night, and that if his picquets were fired upon, every village in the neighbourhood of the camp would be destroyed.

The force was halted at Kot Miajal from the 11th to the 23rd November. There was some difficulty about grazing for the camels, the nearest procurable being in the Dirwaza, 6 or 7 miles from camp. As supplies were running short, little having been brought in by the people of the country, foraging parties had to be sent out with cattle and money, and a compulsory sale enforced in the neighbouring villages; but, although the operation was a tedious one, going from house to house to fill up the bags, no difficulty was experienced by the troops employed, and after a day or two the people of the country began to bring grain into the camp. A strong detachment of Khawaja Mahomed's horsemen was also sent back to Thall to bring up supplies, this detachment taking only two marches in reaching camp from Thall.

The Turis who at first intended to refuse compliance with our demands, hoping they would induce the surrounding tribes to unite against us, very

* Note.—In Brigadier Chamberlain's opinion, pieces of a lighter calibre, with a larger proportion of howitzers, were better adapted for the countries in which the frontier regiment must be prepared to act.

soon changed their language and policy; and our claims against them* having been amicably arranged, the 21st was spent by the Brigadier and the Commissioner, and others, in visiting the Pekar Pass. On the first arrival of the force in the valley, the Commissioner had mentioned to the Deputy Governor and head men his intention of doing this; but as further notice might have led to difficulties, the determination was only made known to the Pekar Maliks, who were in camp, late in the night of the 20th, when they were warned to accompany the party. The escort consisted of 200 cavalry. (For a description of the pass, see appendix.) The people were civil, ready to afford any information, and appeared quite to have made up their minds that they were shortly to expect a British occupation.

In camp the cold was now very trying at night, the thermometer falling 10° Fahr. below freezing point, and the sick list was again on the increase;—chest and bowel complaints being most common.

On the 23rd the force commenced its return towards Thall.

The first day's march, 12 miles, was to Ibrahimzai; the cavalry and artillery had to follow the bed of the river, the infantry marching by a narrow path on its right bank leading along the foot of a low range of hills. The second day's march was to Haizar Pir Ziarat, 11 miles,—the road again following the bed of the river. This route was found to be much better than the Duranis had stated, and in the autumn and winter, when the river is low, it is preferable to that *via* the Dirwaza.

A halt of three days was made here, to enable the Kabul authorities to collect the remaining stolen cattle which were in the neighbouring Turi villages; and advantage was taken of the second day's march for the Brigadier, the Commissioner, and others, to explore under the escort of a strong party of cavalry, and accompanied by the Zaimukht Maliks, (who, however, were most unwilling to show the road,) the western entrance into the Zaimukht (Independent) Valley. This object was attained, although after a short time the heights being crowned by some of the tribe, it became unsafe to proceed any distance up the valley.

On the 26th the 2nd Panjab Infantry, and a wing, 4th Panjab Cavalry, marched towards Hangu, and were employed afterwards in bringing out treasure for the camp.

On the 27th the camp moved from Haizar Pir Ziarat, reaching Thall on the 28th. A troop of cavalry had, on the requisition of the Commissioner, been placed at the disposal of the Deputy Governor of Kuram for the day, to aid him in recovering from certain villages the value of cattle stolen from British subjects, and which was duly paid.

On the afternoon of the day in which the force returned to Thall, 4 grass-cutters were killed, and 1 mortally wounded whilst out cutting grass. Their ponies carried off by the murderers, were recovered by the cavalry guard with them; but, from the nature of the ground, the cavalry could not succeed in coming up with the murderers.

The troops remained at Thall till the 5th December, when the murder of the grass-cutters having been clearly brought home to the Miami branch of

			Rs.	A.	P.
* Losses proved	17,010	6	0
Reprisals, &c.	4,430	8	0
			<hr/>		
		Balance	12,579	14	0

Of this, 4,219 0-0 was realized in Kuram, and 8,630-14-0 guaranteed by the Deputy Governor, Kuram.

the Kabal Khel Vaziris, and their maliks having declined either to wait upon the Deputy Commissioner, or to afford any reparation, no alternative was left but to obtain redress by force of arms.

Although their conduct did not call for any consideration at our hands, both the Deputy Commissioner and the Brigadier were of opinion that the future peace of the frontier, and the interests of Government, would best be secured, could punishment be inflicted upon the guilty only; and as the names of those actually implicated in the murder, and their precise location, had been made known to Captain Henderson, (who was in political charge, the Commissioner, Colonel Edwardes, having gone into Peshawar,) the operations were to be restricted, as far as it was possible, to their apprehension alone.

But to have required the surrender of criminals without being in a position to enforce the demand, would have been considered by the Vaziris as an idle menace, and have been treated with contempt; and therefore, before any call of the kind could be made, it was necessary to bring the whole branch of the tribe under our control. It was only possible to effect this by a surprise, and arrangements were made accordingly.

After the murder of the grass-cutters, such of the Miami as had previously been encamped on the right bank of the Kuram crossed the river, and the whole of the tribe pitched their tents at the foot of a range of mountains which they had been accustomed to consider inaccessible, and where they supposed themselves secure from any attack except in front, and consequently cared not for the proximity of our camp.

For the surprise to be successful, two conditions were indispensable, *viz.*, the possession of the mountains in rear of their encampments, and the cutting off of their retreat down the left bank of the river.

To Major Coke was assigned the first of these operations. At midnight this column* was awake and fell in without the slightest noise, when, led by most expert guides provided by the Deputy Commissioner, it commenced its march for the summit of the mountains by a circuitous and difficult path.

Two hours after the departure of Major Coke's column, the remainder of the troops fell in, crossed the Kuram opposite camp, and marched down its right bank under Brigadier Chamberlain.

On their reaching the village of Billand Khel the day began to dawn, so leaving the infantry and guns to follow, the Brigadier pushed on with the cavalry; the Deputy Commissioner accompanied Khawaja Mahomed Khan's horsemen for the double purpose of cutting off retreat by the river bank, and of reconnoitring the river down stream for a place practicable for infantry. On crossing the river and entering the broken ground, the cavalry came suddenly on an encampment of the Miami, who, warned of their approach, were carrying their families and cattle up the steep mountain path in their rear. Here a few shots were exchanged, we having 1 horseman wounded and 2 horses killed, the Vaziris losing a man.

About this time intimation was brought that Major Coke's column had been seen on the summit of the mountain, so there was no longer any doubt as to his success; and the Gurkhas and Mountain Train having come up with the cavalry, this column soon turned the southernmost point of the Miami encampments, and ascended the mountains, thereby completing the chain. Major Coke's column was above them, and completely closed the few paths which led up the mountain. The 3rd Panjab Infantry and the Field Battery threatened their front from below; and lower down again, the Gurkhas and

* 1st Panjab Infantry.

6th do. do

Two 3-Pounder Guns, No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery.

Mountain Guns had the command of the hills; whilst the cavalry cut off all retreat by the plain.

But Major Cokes' column had not reached its position without great difficulty; the column was accompanied by 3 guides and a man of the Miami Khel tribe, who was to prevent firing on the troops from any Vaziri Khiris (encampments) the column might pass. Passing the village of Mahamadzai, where a guard of 14 men with a guide was placed to prevent any men leaving the village to give the alarm, the column ascended the hills by a gorge to the south.

The ground was very difficult, only one man could pass at a time; and when, at half-past 5 A.M., the head of the column was halted to allow the rear to close up, it was found that the 6th Panjab Infantry and the guns had lost their way,—misled it afterwards appeared by the man of the Miami tribe, who was with the guns (and who then effected his escape). As it was near daylight, Major Coke determined to push on with the 1st Panjab Infantry, and after some 3 miles came upon a Miami encampment; and as this could not be passed without the inhabitants giving the alarm, 2 companies under Lieutenant Lumsden were sent to surprise it, when 1,000 sheep and some cattle were captured, and the Vaziris driven over the hills away from the villages against which the column was proceeding. Major Coke was here joined by the Mountain Guns and the 6th Panjab Infantry, led by a guide, who had been sent back under escort to them when their absence was first discovered. Continuing its march, the column arrived at the crest of the hills overlooking the villages, and which were now completely surrounded.

As soon as all the troops were in position the precise object of the visit was fully explained to the enemy, and they were assured they would not be injured unless they resisted. Seeing any attempts at escape or opposition to be useless, they at once gave up all who were present and called for; when, by way of guarantee, several hundred head of cattle and sheep were brought away, to be restored when terms were definitely settled with the tribe. With the exception of one Vaziri shot by a man of the 1st Panjab Infantry when trying to escape up the mountain side, there were no other casualties.

As it was found that it would be impossible to convict the suspected men if tried in a criminal court, a fine of Rs. 1,200 was levied on the tribe.

Before the operations, the precaution had been taken of sending messages to the other (neighbouring) branches of the Kabul Khel Vaziris not to interfere in support of the Miamis, and no aid was given them.

The troops returned to camp at 4 P.M. after a very hard day's work, and after being for nearly twenty-four hours without food, as any measures for its preparation and carriage by the men would have at once destroyed the secrecy absolutely necessary.

In concluding his report, Brigadier Chamberlain attributed the success mainly to the way in which Major Coke had carried out his instructions, and to the very correct information, as well as to the good guides, furnished by Captain Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner.

After two days spent in a settlement with the Miamis, the force moved to Gandawar, where it was encamped till the 21st December, pending the adjustment of certain difficulties with the Zaimukhts, as a party of Zaimukhts having no quarrel with the people of Dar Samund, and solely with the object of outraging the British Government, had on the 14th December seized 3 men of that village, 1 of whom afterwards died of his wounds.

The Zaimukhts in the plains were not participating in this crime, and were powerless to procure the surrender of the culprits; but the demands of the Deputy Commissioner, backed as they were by the presence of such a large body of troops, had the desired effect, as a deputation was sent in and a fine of Rs. 1,000 paid.

The ground in the neighbourhood of the Zaimukht village of Dahragha and Adhmelah, and the gorge which leads to the villages of Khana and Sungroba, were reconnoitred by Brigadier Chamberlain, and found more accessible than native reports had stated them to be.

The payment of the fine imposed on the Zaimukhts for the murder of a British subject leaving nothing further to be done, the force after marching to Torawari on the 22nd December, where it halted four days, was on arrival at Kohat broken up.

The conduct of the troops had been most exemplary; not one single act of violence had been committed either against property or person during the whole period.

No stronger indications of the increase of our power and influence in these valleys could have been afforded than the fact, that not a single shot had been fired at the camp at night; that with the exception of the murder by the Kabal Khel Vaziris of the grass-cutters, no camp follower had been cut up, nor had a single animal been carried off.

Of the experiences gained, it was found that the Camel Kajawahs and, in a less degree, the Dandis, which had been lately sanctioned for the conveyance of sick and wounded in the Panjab Frontier Force, were of the greatest utility; and although the sick list had been large, there had never been the slightest difficulty experienced in providing every one with carriage who required it. The leathern Cartouches which had been recently adopted for carrying a proportion of the infantry ammunition on mules or yabus were found to answer very well, and met with unanimous approval.

The expenses of the expedition were not great, being only that of marching batta for the Gurkha Detachment, and some extra carriage for the Panjab Frontier Force Regiments, and Rs. 2,360 for Khwajah Mahomed Khan's sowars.

The whole expenses probably were under Rs. 10,000.

With regard to the best season for carrying on operations in these valleys, Brigadier Chamberlain stated that the result of his experience confirmed him in the opinion that the spring of the year is the proper season for punishing both the Zaimukhts and Vaziris; for it is the season when the troops are most healthy and able to undergo fatigue and exposure—the corn crop is then on the ground, (it is for the most part dependent on irrigation, and therefore not subject to failure from drought,) and whilst it affords most excellent forage for our own animals, its destruction is one of the severest losses we can inflict on the people.

On the other hand, the autumn is the most sickly season throughout the year, and if any delay is permitted on that account, nothing but bare walls are to be found. Our horses have no grass and the camels little forage, and both soldiers and camp followers suffer from the cold.

Brigadier Chamberlain added, we have never entered the Kuram Valley in the spring, and do not therefore know the amount of rain-fall at that season; but the health of the troops in the field is an object of such primary importance, that he considered, under any circumstances, the spring would be a more preferable time for operations in Kuram than the autumn.

The rising of the river is the only difficulty to impede guns or infantry in the spring and summer months, and this could be surmounted by the aid of elephants or pontoons. We had learnt that the country could always be made to support a force, if necessary.

Of the route to Kabul *via* Miranzai and the Kuram Valley, he said as far as the Peshawar Pass there is nothing to impede the march of troops,—water supplies, forage, and wood, are procurable, and the general line of the road is sufficiently open to be easily controlled. What the difficulties are beyond the Hariob on the north-west side of the pass, it is difficult to say; for no native information on such points is to be relied on.

It was known, however, that two, if not three more passes had to be crossed, and he believed that, in a military point of view, the road from Hariob onwards would present much greater difficulties than are to be found this side of Peshawar if the tribes were hostile; but he added this route, however, must always possess the great advantage of being altogether free from Afridi or Mohmand influence, and might therefore be travelled with perfect security when the Khaibar and Tatar Passes were closed.

Compiler.

The route over the Peshawar Kotal was afterwards taken by Colonel Lumsden when proceeding on his mission to Kandahar.

† The operations against the Kabal Khels for the murder of the grass-cutters were considered by the Supreme Government highly creditable to the officers and men. The excellent

Government letter.

arrangements made by Brigadier N. Chamberlain, commanding, and by Captain Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner, as well as the excellent conduct of the troops, excited the admiration of the Government; and an expression of approbation was to be conveyed to all who were engaged in the expedition, and to the Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes.

In 1859 the expeditionary force against the Kabal Khel Vaziris moved through the valley of Miranzai, when Major James, the Commissioner of Peshawar, who accompanied it, thus spoke of the good fruits which the expeditions into the valley, and the wise policy inaugurated, had brought forth. He said, one who had known the valley, in past years would scarcely recognize it in its altered state. There were still, of course, as amongst all Pathans, feuds and factions; but the former rarely led to bloodshed, and the latter were not based upon men's favor or hostility to a Government which all had been taught either to fear or to respect.

Protected from foreign enemies, the whole country had been brought under cultivation, and at certain seasons it would have been impossible in many places to have encamped the force without injuring the crops. The migratory herdsmen were not only restrained from trespassing, but paid a tax for the use of the pasture lands, and under threat of expulsion were as amenable as the resident tribes. Several abandoned villages had been re-established, and were now thriving settlements; whilst towers and walls, formerly so indispensable, were in many places suffered to crumble away.

The Commissioner on entering their villages was met by no sullen band of men paying their revenue in order to save their houses, but by a civil troop of grey beards proffering hospitality, and by crowds of merry children. The cases which came before the Deputy Commissioner were no longer of raids, of plundered harvests and whole families murdered, but of inequality of assessment, of assistance required to dig water-courses, construct dams, or the request of some youth clamorous for service.

The Commissioner did not wish it to be believed that their nature had changed, or that, if left to themselves, they would not return to their former

habits and predilections; but their passions were restrained, their children were not nurtured in scenes of blood, and we might surely hope that the first and great step had been taken towards their civilization. Nor could any more forcible illustration be adduced of the policy of such expeditions than that of the history of Miranzai.

Miranzai Field Force, 1856.

Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, commanding.

Staff.

Captain R. R. Adams, Staff Officer, Panjab Irregular Force, Staff Officer.
Lieutenant A. Garnett, Engineers, (Executive Engineer, Kohat,) Engineer Officer.

Lieutenant P. Lumsden, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General, Peshawar Division.

Lieutenant Nicholson, Orderly Officer to Brigadier-General.

Cavalry.

One Troop, 1st Panjab Cavalry, Lieutenant W. Fane commanding.
4th Panjab Cavalry, Major O. Jacob commanding.

Artillery.

Detachment, No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery, Lieutenant J. R. Sladen commanding.

No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery, Lieutenant R. Meham commanding.
Detachment, Peshawar Mountain Train, Captain Brougham commanding.

Engineers.

No. 2 Company, Panjab Sappers, Lieutenant A. Garnett commanding.

Infantry.

Wing, 66th Gurkhas, Captain Thackery commanding.

1st Panjab Infantry, Major J. Coke commanding.

2nd Panjab Infantry, Captain G. W. G. Green commanding.

3rd Panjab Infantry, Captain B. Henderson, Deputy Commissioner, commanding.

Detachment, 5th Panjab Infantry.

6th Panjab Infantry, Captain C. P. Keyes commanding.

Civil Officers.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, c. B., Commissioner, Peshawar Division.

Captain B. Henderson, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat.

Levies.

Khatak horsemen under the Chief Kwajah Mahomed Khan.

DETAIL.	European officers.	European non-commissioned officers.	Native officers.	Native non-commissioned officers—rank and file.	Elephants.	Horses.	Yabocs and mules.	GUNS.				REMARKS.	
								Field.		Mountain Train.			
								24-Pounder howitzers.	9-Pounders.	12-Pounder howitzers.	3-Pounders.		
Staff	4	
4th Panjab Cavalry	4	...	12	407	...	418	
Detachment, 1st Panjab Cavalry ...	1	...	3	97	...	98	
Ditto, Peshawar Mountain Train.	3	1	2	56	81	2	2	2	
Detachment, No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery.	2	1	1	59	...	3	52	2	2	2	
No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery...	2	2	3	114	6	132	36	2	4	
Detachment, 66th Gurkhas ...	6	1	12	680	
No. 2 Company, Panjab Sappers and Miners.	2	40	
1st Panjab Infantry	3	...	12	778	
2nd Ditto	5	...	10	769	
3rd Ditto	5	...	10	747	
5th Ditto (Detachment) ...	1	...	4	188	
6th Ditto	5	...	6	688	
Levies under Khwaja Mahomed Khan.	156	
Total ...	41	5	77	4,773	6	651	169	2	4	4	4	4	

Detail of Troops belonging to Miranzai Field Force left at Thall, October 1856.

DETAIL.	European officers.	Native officers.	Native non-commissioned officers, rank and file.	Horses.	Yabocs and mules.	Bullocks.	FIELD GUNS.		REMARKS.
							24-Pounder howitzers.	9-Pounders.	
Staff	
4th Panjab Cavalry ...	1	...	39	41	
1st Ditto (Detachment)	18	17	
Peshawar Mountain Train (Detachment)	8	...	10	
No. 1 Light Field Battery (Detachment)	1	...	2	
No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery ...	1	1	35	38	...	7	...	2	
Detachment, 66th Gurkhas ...	1	1	80	
No. 2 Company, Panjab Sappers	6	
1st Panjab Infantry	72	
2nd Ditto ...	1	...	76	
3rd Ditto	1	106	
5th Ditto (Detachment)	19	
6th Ditto	94	
Khwaja Mahomed Khan's horsemen	30	
Total ...	4	3	593	96	12	7	...	2	

Report on the Pewan Pass by Brigadier N. Chamberlain.

The party*, escorted by 200 cavalry, left camp shortly after 3 A.M., and reached the village of Buner about

* Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, C. B.
Brigadier N. Chamberlain.

Major J. Coke, 1st Panjab Infantry.

Captain Thackery, 66th Gurkha Regiment.

" T. Brougham, Peshawar Mountain Train.

" B. Henderson, 3rd Panjab Infantry.

" R. R. Adams, Staff Officer of the Force.

Lieutenant J. R. Sladen, No. 1 Panjab Battery.

" Garnett, Executive Engineer.

" T. Frankland, 2nd Panjab Infantry.

" C. P. Keyes, 6th Panjab Infantry.

" C. Nicholson, 2nd Panjab Cavalry.

" W. Fane, 1st Panjab Cavalry.

" P. Lumsden, Deputy Quarter-Master General

Assistant Surgeon Campbell, in medical charge, Detachment 66th Regiment.

Assistant Surgeon C. M. Garden, 6th Panjab Infantry.

7½ A.M. To the foot of the pass took another hour and twenty minutes, and its actual ascent a quarter of an hour more; the party then descended on the Kabul side, and after a ride of half an hour entered the valley of Hariob. Here a halt was made for a short time to enable Lieutenants Garnett and Lumsden to make a hurried survey of the country, and some of the villagers coming up to the Commissioner much useful information was obtained from them. On again reaching the summit of the pass, some time was spent in taking

angles back in the direction of what had been the line of march from Thall. Camp was reached at sun-set.

Judging of the distance by the time occupied in going over the ground, from the camp to the village of Buner, was 17 miles. From the village to the foot of the pass, 5½ miles—the pass itself ½ mile—and from the summit into the valley of Hariob, 2 miles more; this gives 25 miles, probably rather under, than over the mark.

To the village of Buner is a gradual ascent the whole way, over a stony, barren plain, intersected by several large water-courses (nullahs), which have their commencement at the foot of the Safed Koh, and terminate in the Kuram; they were quite dry, but after heavy rain in the mountains, or in the first melting of the snow, they must become the channels of large streams of water.

Beyond the village of Buner the road becomes more steep and stony, and after crossing two deep ravines, leads up the centre of a small well cultivated valley, (enclosed by two spurs from the pass range) until it reaches the foot of the ascent of the pass. The ascent is a steep ziz-zag, with sharp turnings, and, as it exists at present, would be a serious obstacle to the passage of artillery or wheeled carriages of any kind; but had it been necessary, Brigadier Chamberlain did not question that he could have taken the guns over by hand. The soil is good, and could be easily worked; and, if necessary, a road might be cut at any gradient.

The descent on the Kabul side is by a very good road, at an easy, equable slope, and guns could be taken either up or down it by horses with perfect facility.

Captain Thackery (in command of the detachment, 66th Gurkhas) calculated the camp at Kot Miajal to be 4,500 feet above the level of the sea; the village of Buner he computed at 5,000, and the summit of the pass at 7,000.

The Buner Range is thickly covered with firs, pine, and oak trees, and water is abundant. Between 9 and 10 A.M., the ice on the pools on the top of the hill bore a man, and it must have been freezing in the shade for the greater portion of the day.

The people were civil and ready to afford any information, and from their conversation appeared to have quite made up their minds that they were shortly to expect us for good.

CHAPTER IX.

SECTION I.

The Orakzais

ARE a tribe of Pathans, who inhabit the mountains to the north and west of the Kohat District, and whose country is generally known as Tirah.
McGregor's Gazetteer.

They are bounded on the north by the Afridis, from whom they are separated by the main water-shed of the Bara and Tirah, (except in the case of the Feroz Khel,) east by the Adam Khel Afridis, from whom they are separated by the west water-shed of the Kohat Pass, south by the Kohat District, and west by the Safed Koh.

Their origin is buried in obscurity; though they resemble the Afghans in language, features, and many of their customs, they are rejected by them as brethren and assigned a separate origin, their names not being found in the genealogy of the Afghans. They call themselves Pathans, and are said to belong to the tribe of Karani.

The Orakzais are divided into four main sections:—

I, Daolatzai; II, Ismailzai; III, Lashkarzai; IV, Hamsayas.

I.—The Daolatzai are sub-divided into—

1. Bazoti	...	500 fighting men, Suni religion, Gar - politics, side with Samal.
2. Utman Khel	...	600 " " " Samal "
3. Sipah	...	300 " Shia " Gar " side with Samal.
4. Feroz Khel	...	800 " Suni " Samal "
5. Mani Khel	...	800 " Shia " Gar "
6. Bar Mahomed Khel	1,000	" " " "
7. Abdul Aziz Khel	400	" " " "
8. Usturi Khel	...	500 " Suni " " "
Total	...	4,900

II.—The Ismailzai are sub-divided into—

1. Rabia Khel	...	600 fighting men, Suni religion, Samal politics.
2. Mamuzai	...	300 " " " Gar "
3. Aka Khel	...	500 " " " " "
4. Sada Khel	...	80 " " " " "
5. Isa Khel	...	100 " " " " "
6. Khadizai	...	250 " " " Samal "
7. Brahim Khel	...	140 " " " Gar "
8. Masuzai	...	6,000 " " " Samal "
9. Mahamadzai	...	500 " " " Gar "
Total	...	8,470

III.—The Lashkarzai are sub-divided into—

1. Mamuzai	...	3,000 fighting men, Suni religion, Gar-politics.
2. Alishorzai	...	3,000 " " " " "
Total	...	6,000

IV.—The Hamsayas have the following sub-divisions—

1. Mishti	...	3,000	fighting men, Suni religion, Samal politics.
2. Ali Khel	...	3,000	" " " Gar "
3. Shekhan	...	2,500	" " " Samal "
4. Mula Khel	...	1,000	" " " " "
Total	...	9,500	

Therefore the Orakzais number—

Daolatzai	4,900
Ismalzai	8,470
Lashkarzai	6,000
Hamsaya	9,500

Total ... 28,870

Sunis.	Shias.	Gar.	Samal.
26,307	2,500	13,070	14,900

But, though the Orakzais are thus mentioned as one tribe, they can only be considered so ethnographically. To regard them as one politically, would only mislead; and so to attempt a description of our relations with the Orakzais as one body, would be impossible. Yet, it must not be forgotten that, though swayed by many different feelings and interest, the lust of plunder, or hatred of the infidel, would unite much more heterogenous elements than these.

Tirah is the country of the Orakzais, and is bounded on the north by the water-shed between the Tirah and Bara Rivers, which is known in the west as the Aranga, in the middle as the Shatapi, while at its end it is called Mulagarh; on the east by the crest of the range between the Tirah Toi and the Kohat Pass, and to the west of Samalzai by the Landukai and Mazeoghar ridge; on the south by the Orakzai Range from the Ublan to Landukai, and from the west of Shahu Khel by the Samana ridge; west, it is bounded by the Zanaghar Spur of the Safed Koh.

The mountains of Tirah may be divided into three great chains, all of which emanate from the Safed Koh. The first and most northern of these is that which is called at various parts of its stretch Aranga, Shatapi, and Mulaghar. The only portion of this range, which is visible from British territory, is the Mulaghar end. This is not covered with forest, and seems to be about 7,000 feet in height. As it stretches away to the west, the range probably gets higher, and may be covered with fine forests. The second range, which runs parallel with the first, may be termed the Orakzai Range. It is visible from Mazeoghar to the Ublan. At Mazeoghar it is probably not under 9,000 feet in height, and here the range bends north, rising like a wall looking from Kohat, but east of Landukai it rapidly decreases in height. At the Marai Kohat it cannot be more than 5,000, and though between this and the Ublan it again increases, it never reaches an elevation of more than 7,000. The range, as far as can be seen, is very steep and rugged, with few trees, except on Landukai and Mazeoghar, which appear to be clothed with pine on their northern slopes. To the west of Mazeoghar the range resumes its east and west course, and is called Dupa and Sanpokh. The last range is the Samana.

Tirah has only two rivers, Khankai and Masturi or Toi; but considering the height of their bounding ranges, these must be fed by very numerous streamlets. In fact, one of the chief blessings of Tirah is its abundance of water.

The natural divisions of Tirah are those formed by its two valleys and their feeders; and, politically, it has as many divisions as there are sections of the

Orakzais, in addition to the divisions caused by the difference of the Suni or Shia tenets, and Gar and Samal factions.

The first four sections of the Daolatzais are situated in the extreme east of the Orakzai country, nearest the Adam Khel Afridis and Kohat. The Bar Mahomed Khels are situated at the back of Bar Marai, in Samalzai, as far as the valley opposite Mela Mian Azghar.

The Mishti Khels are next them, from the exit of the Khukai River and up it for 4 or 5 miles. The Shekhan occupy the hills at the back of the Bar Mahomed Khel, and coming round to the exit of the Khunkai River.

The Rabia Khels commence behind the Mishti Khel, and over the Samana Ghar to the Kohat boundary. The A'khels are above them, in the valley of the Kohat Bara. The Ali Khels are above the A'khels.

The Ali Sherzais and Mamuzais at the head of the Khunkai Valley, under the Rajgarh ridge. At the head of Tirah are the Chamkanis, then the summer quarters of the Mula Khels, Ali Khels, Mishtis, Shekhans, Mani Khels, Bar Mahomed Khels, Daolatzais, and Abdul Aziz Khels, in the order mentioned.

Captain Tucker, who visited Lower Tirah in 1872, gives the following information regarding it. It is probably about 5,500 feet above the sea level, and is almost circular, with a diameter of nearly 5 miles. The Tirah Toi is a perfectly clear stream.

Above Sultanzai is Karsha, and beyond this Upper Tirah, which seems to be a valley rising gradually as it stretches westward, and opening out wider and wider for a distance of from 15 to 20 miles.

Below Sultanzai the valley narrows very much, but opens out again after about 3 miles into the little basin of Aud Khel. Leaving Aud Khel the river turns to the south, and is shut in for some distance by perpendicular cliffs, and in 5 miles enters the little valley of Zera.

Tirah is probably very like an ordinary Kohat Valley on a large scale. It is, of course, higher and cooler, and the bounding hills are higher, but in its main features, in the succession of open spaces along the banks of its rivers, each divided from the other by narrow "tangis;" and in the surrounding of bare rugged hills it is the same. It is not a large valley like Kashmir, but rather consists of a succession of basins completely closed in by hills.

Agha Abbas found the inhabitants much divided against each other, part of them being Sunis and part Shias. Apples, grapes, mulberries, walnuts, pears, and pomegranates, were produced in plenty. In the hot weather the climate is peculiarly pleasant.

Madat Shah seemed to be the great saint of the Shia. He found the Samal and Gar politics prevalent here. In every village was a Hindu's shop. The Hindus of both sexes wear the same clothes as the Mussulman, and cannot easily be distinguished from them by a stranger. The inhabitants dress in loose trousers confined at the bottom, and in long shirts sewn double and treble, reaching to the knee and sometimes to the ankle; dark-blue "lungis" composed their head dress. The women wear rows of silver coins as buttons on their vests.

The inhabitants of Tirah use bullocks principally for the transport of their trade; but mules and donkeys also are bred and used. They have no horses, and camels are not used. They have large herds of cattle and goats, which they bring to graze in British territory.

The population are all Orakzais, a few Hindus excepted. The Orakzai is a wiry-enough looking mountaineer, but they are not by any means fine men. There seems to be a difference of opinion about their martial qualities, and Colonel McGregor says he is not inclined to place them very high, but that

they are probably not worse than their neighbours in respect to the usual deceit, avarice, and cruelty of their race. He says no one would doubt that an Orakzai, as much as any Pathan, would not shrink from any falsehood, however atrocious, to gain his end;—money would buy his services for the foulest deeds; cruelty of the most revolting kind would mark his actions to a wounded or a helpless foe, as much as cowardice would stamp him against determined resistance.

In Tirah the Orakzais live in houses built of stone and mud, and in these are congregated the communities of men who have no feud with each other. They are not generally walled, but all the houses face inwards, and the villages are only entered by small wickets; are often in excellent positions, with well placed towers protecting them. During the winter they come down with their flocks to the low hills about Miranzai, and there live either in caves or in rude grass huts.

The trade between Tirah and British territory must form a very considerable item in the wealth of the Orakzais. The following statement is taken from the Panjab reports of the last few years :—

		Quantity. Mds.	Value. Rs.
1868-69 ...	{ Imports	... 12,293	1,04,611
	{ Exports	... 7,019	16,237
	Total	... 19,312	1,20,848
1869-70 ...	{ Imports	... 13,998	81,951
	{ Exports	... 20	1,000
	Total	... 14,018	82,951
1870-71 ...	{ Imports	... 18,100	1,87,214
	{ Exports	... 728	2,171
	Total	... 18,828	1,39,385

This, however, includes Afridi Tirah.

It is needless to say there is no government in Tirah, but religion supplies to a certain extent its place; the Orakzais are as superstitious as they are impatient of control, and consequently we find the Syads exerting a good deal of influence amongst them. Syad Mohamed Husen has a considerable preponderance in the councils of Tirah, and, according to Captain Tucker, Mohamed Usman Khan of Sultanzai leads a portion of Lower Tirah. There are also men in our own territory who have influence with them; but there is no man, or body of men, in Tirah who can be said, in the mildest acceptation of the word, to govern. Yet, there is a power they all acknowledge, and that is gold.

The Daolatzai Orakzais are a tribe especially difficult to deal with, owing to their having little or no trade to lose by the enforcement of a blockade, and to the fact that both their summer and winter settlements are in very inaccessible localities, the former being in the high table-land of Tirah, and the latter in the Bazoti Valley, cut off from British territory by a difficult pass over the Ublan Mountain, 6 miles from Kohat. There is a road from Akhor, but General Stewart, who traversed it with a force, in 1869, states it is of so difficult a nature as to require a large

Memorandum by Secretary to Panjab Government.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

SECTION II.

Punishment of the Ismailzai and the Hamsaya Divisions of the Orakzai Tribe in the autumn of 1855, by a force under Brigadier Chamberlain.

*Hangu Field Force.**

Up to 1855, the Orakzais, though occasionally committing petty depredations on the border, and known to be capable of mischief, if so inclined, gave no positive trouble to the British authorities, but in the spring of that year many of the Orakzais were concerned in the demonstration and attack on the Miranzai Field Force. (Section II, Chapter VIII.)

Report on the Frontier Tribes by Mr. Temple.

They then commenced depredations upon the Bangash people of the Kohat District. About this time some fifteen raids were committed, several hundred head of cattle were carried off, and some British subjects killed. In these the Shekhan and the Mishti sections were concerned, but the Rabia Khels were conspicuous. Then a feud commenced between the Orakzais and the Hangu people. The Chief of Hangu was murdered by one of his own relations, and the murderer fled to the Orakzais. On the 15th July 1855, Major Coke, Commandant, 1st Panjab Infantry, who was commanding the Kohat District, and who was also Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, reported that on the night of the 12th the Orakzais had carried off 660 head of cattle of the village of Shaha Khel near Hangu, and that he had at once proceeded there with a troop of the 4th Panjab Cavalry. He added, that a hostile movement also was apparently going on among the tribe or a portion of it, and that as he felt apprehensions for the safety of the village of Hangu, 250 men of the 1st Panjab Infantry had been sent out to protect it.

Letters from Major Coke and Military Secretary, Lahore.

The raids of the Rabia section of the tribe still continuing, Major Coke reinforced Hangu by—

150 3rd Panjab Infantry,

150 2nd Panjab Infantry, and

2 Mountain Train Guns, No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery.

With this force, Major Coke reported, he proposed attacking the village of Nasin (Rabia Khel); and with the aid of our Bangash subjects of Togue and of Khawaja Mahomed (Khatak), he hoped to be able to check the hostile movement of the Orakzai tribes in general, and the Rabia Khel section in particular with whom the hostilities first arose.

The Chief Commissioner (Mr. John Lawrence), however, directed that no hostile movement should be undertaken beyond the British boundary without his orders, adding, however, that if the tribe could be attacked to advantage *within our territory, there would be no objection to its being done.*

Brigadier Chamberlain was also averse to the employment of troops against the Orakzais at that time of the year (July), unless political reasons absolutely required it. His reasons for suggesting delay were—

That operations against the Orakzais would probably involve complications with other tribes; and at that season the difficulty of moving troops would be great, with the certainty that regiments would

* See general map of the frontier.

suffer much from sickness. The Commissioner of Peshawar (Major Edwardes) fully concurring in these views, instructions were sent to the Deputy Commissioner that defensive measures only were to be adopted.

If the border villages could not be protected from Kohat, a small portion of the Kohat force was to be cantoned at Hangu, and Major Coke was authorized to offer a reward of Rs. 1,000 for the seizure of the murderer of Ghulam Haidar Khan the Tehsildar of Hangu.

On the 13th August news was received that at a jirgah (council) of the Rabia Khel, Mamuzai, and Ali Khel sections, it was agreed that if the Ali Khel and A'Khel would join, the combined clans should make an attack on British territory either before or after the "Eed Kurban" (25th August).

It was hoped by the Deputy Commissioner that the A'Khels and Ali Khels would hold true to their agreement with Government; if not, a serious attack was expected.

By the 20th of the month matters amongst the tribes had progressed considerably, and Major Coke reported to Brigadier Chamberlain that an attack would probably be made by the united clans of the Orakzais, some 10,000 or 12,000 men, after the "Eed," on some point between Balamian and Samilzai, a distance of 20 miles; that the rest of the hill tribes were in a most excited state, and that they were all trying to foment a Holy War, or Jihad; and Major Coke asked that at least two more regiments might be sent into the district.

Report by Brigadier Chamberlain. at Kohat, and the following arrangements were set on foot:—

Reinforcements of 6 Mountain Train Guns ... { 3 guns.
3 howitzers.

800 Infantry,
6 Elephants,

with 2 Artillery Officers and 1 Medical Officer were called for from Peshawar. The detachments garrisoning the out-posts of Nari and Lattamar, and Bahadar Khel, were recalled, and their duties taken up by similar detachments from Banu, from which station a troop of the 3rd Panjab Cavalry was moved up to Kohat.

The Engineer Officer was ordered to put the border villages threatened, in a state of defence, and to open out the roads most likely to be used for the protection of the frontier.

The different chiefs, amongst whom were Kahwaja Mahomed Khan the Chief of the Khataks, and Bahardur Shir Khan Bangash, were directed to collect armed retainers, horse and foot.

Every endeavour was at the same time made to collect commissariat and carriage.

On the 25th the force (*vide* appendix) had assembled at Hangu.

The cantonment of Kohat was occupied by one troop, 3rd Panjab Cavalry from Banu, and the 1st Regiment Native Infantry from Peshawar.

On the 29th of the month the Deputy Commissioner wrote to the Brigadier recommending the destruction of the villages of Malik Nasin and Sangi, in the Samana Range, both belonging to the Rabia Khel Orakzais. He represented that the conduct of that tribe had been so atrocious and insulting, and the injuries they had inflicted on the Government so great, that the necessity for inflicting on them some punishment was apparent.

He feared that the inactivity of the troops would only increase their presumption, and have a bad effect on the other tribes, who then appeared to

be wavering in their intentions. He thought that a blow struck at the Rabia Khel tribe would be productive of the best effects in deterring the others from attacking British villages. He then proceeded to detail the various offences committed by the tribe since April 1855. Besides an attack on Balliamin, they had killed 10 men, wounded 3, and carried off 3 women, and no less than 792 head of cattle—all the men and women being British subjects, and the cattle the property of the same.

Major Coke also proposed that the village of Katta on the banks of the Bara River should be destroyed with its rice cultivation.

In reporting his determination to carry out these punitive measures, Brigadier Chamberlain in writing to the Chief Commissioner after stating that he was not unmindful of the great responsibility he was taking on himself in adopting such a course, went on to say "as the officer in command of the troops on the frontier, and more especially of the field force in this camp, I conceive that occasion may arise when it becomes my bounden duty to exercise a very great discretionary power; and I trust in the present instance it will not be deemed that I have exceeded or abused the authority I suppose to be vested in my office, and for the judicious exercise of which I hold myself to be just as much accountable to Government as for the discipline and efficiency of the troops." He added, that he quite concurred with the Deputy Commissioner in the necessity of adopting aggressive measures, that he looked upon an attack on the Rabia Khel tribe as unavoidable, and that the urgency of the case rendered immediate steps compulsory.

On the 31st August therefore arrangements were made to attack early on the following morning the villages of Katta, Sangar, Nasin Mela, and Sangar China or Mela.

The plan of operations was to make as many simultaneous attacks as possible on the enemy,—the main object in view was the destruction of the villages and defences of Sangar and Mela; for the chiefs of those villages were notorious freebooters, and the inhabitants had been those who had been most active in making raids into British territory, as they believed from the natural defences of their strongholds they were impregnable.

The village of Sangar Mela was situated on the very crest of the Samana Range of mountains. It was well built, the dead walls of the houses being faced outwards for strength, and the whole was perfectly commanded by a high loop-holed tower of two stories.

Water is not procurable on the top of the hill, the inhabitants of the place supplying themselves either from the spring just below Nasin Mela, or from the Bara River which flows at the northern base of the Samana Range.

Nasin Mela, or, as it was more commonly called, Nasin Ghari (Fort), was situated in the centre of a sloping plateau about $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile below Sangar, and from this amphitheatre two spurs run down from the Samana Range parallel to and close to each other, terminating in the Miranzai Valley below.

The mural cliffs which the inward faces of these spurs present to one another, form the gorge up which one of the only two paths leads to Nasin Mela,—the other path being along the ridge of the eastern spur, and which, though difficult and precipitous at the bottom from the circumstance of the spur descending abruptly into the plain, is nevertheless practicable for mules. The two villages were connected with each other by a winding path, the ascent, however, being everywhere practicable for infantry.

The Ghari (Fort) was a square building, the walls were about 9 feet high, and commanded by a loop-holed tower of two stories. Its position was such as to completely command and close the paths leading up the gorge. Just below it, and within range of its fire, was the spring which supplied its defenders and the inhabitants of the village with water.

The houses of the village were scattered in rows of fives and sixes, the ground being terraced for the sake of cultivation.

The difficulties the troops had to contend with were thus great, and the loss of life, if the ascent had been undertaken by daylight and the tribe prepared to meet our forces, would probably have been large. Success depended almost entirely upon both villages being surprised, and, if possible, at the same time; and as any forward movement of the camp would have tended to create suspicion, it was absolutely necessary to make Hangu the starting point.

This involved a march of 14 miles before the commencement of the ascent; or, if the Samana Range were ascended opposite camp, (it was just practicable for infantry at certain points,) there was still about the same distance to be accomplished along its ridge before Samana could be reached. It was determined, therefore, that these villages should be attacked both from above and below, and the following dispositions were ordered:—

1st column of attack.

The attack on the village of Sanga was entrusted to Major Coke; it consisted of the—

1st Panjab Infantry, Major Coke commanding.

Three Companies, 2nd Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Sykes commanding.

The column was provided with small shells, to be used as hand grenades, bags of powder, crow-bars, etc., and was accompanied by Lieutenant Boyce of the Artillery as Engineer Officer. It was to leave camp at 10 p.m., (the night was moonlight), and to ascend the Samana Range near camp, and move along the ridge until the village was reached, which, it was hoped would be before daybreak. The village was then to be immediately attacked and destroyed. If on arrival at Sangar Major Coke found that the 2nd column had not established itself at Nasin Mela, or was hard-pressed, he was to detach a party to its assistance; this party acting from above had every thing in its favor, and as soon as the village of Sangar had been taken and destroyed, the remainder of the 1st column was to move down to aid in the attack on Nasin Mela.

2nd column of attack. The 2nd column, which was under the command of Captain Henderson, 3rd Panjab Infantry, consisted of 3 companies of that regiment, and was to move at 9 p.m. on the

village of Nasin Mela. On reaching a hill on the right of the gorge, Captain Henderson was to take up such a position above and near the village as would give him the command of it, as well as of the path by which the Mountain Train Guns were to ascend; his subsequent action was to be guided generally by the movement of the 1st column and main body.

3rd column of attack. The village of Khatak, situated across the Samana Range in a glen below on the Bara River, was reported almost undefended, and its destruction with that of any other

villages which could be reached with their rice crops and mills was allotted to the levies under the Chief Khawaja Mahomed Khatak.

All prisoners taken were to be spared and brought into camp, but the levies were on no account to attack any other tribe except in self-defence, or to go down the stream. This column was to follow Major Coke's, and was to leave a

body of footmen on the top of the range when the column descended to cover its return.

Main body.

The main body under the personal command of Brigadier Chamberlain consisting of—

- | | |
|---|------------------------------|
| 2 Guns, | } Peshawar Mountain Battery, |
| 2 Howitzers, | |
| 2 Mountain Guns attached to No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery, | |
| 3 Companies, 2nd Panjab Infantry, | |
| 4 „ 3rd Panjab Infantry, | |

was to leave camp shortly after the march of the 1st column, and, ascending the same spur as the 2nd column, was to move on Nasin Mela ready to support either of the other columns.

A reserve with the field guns was to follow this column, so as to reach the foot of the spur by dawn, ready to cover any retirement.

The Reserve column.

The guard for the camp under Major Jacob, 4th Panjab Cavalry, consisted of that regiment, and one company from each of the Infantry Regiments.

Camp guard.

The troops were only to be warned an hour before starting, and great care was to be taken that no sickly or weakly men accompanied the columns.

Plundering was to be strictly prohibited in any of the columns.

The first column gained the crest of the Samana Range by 3 o'clock on the following morning, when the troops, having rested an hour, continued their march, and as they reached

Report by Major Coke.

the foot of the last crest, having traversed some as difficult ground as ever seen, they described the 2nd column below them at Nasin Mela.

Major Coke then pushed on as fast as the nature of the ground would admit against Sangar, which he came in sight of at break of day. He described it as a village strongly situated on a knoll, the ground sloping away on either side, surrounded by a low wall and defended by a tower of great height, which from its lofty position in the centre commanded the ground on all sides.

A rush with a cheer was made on the village, and before ten shots had been fired, many of the sepoy, gallantly headed by Lieutenants Travers and Lumsden of the 1st Panjab Infantry, had got beyond it, thus enabling the troops not only to cut off retreat, but also to capture nearly the whole of the cattle which had by this time got half a mile away under the main range. About 200 head of cattle and buffaloes, with a large number of goats and sheep, were thus seized and sent into camp.

The villagers did not attempt to make a stand but fled, some by the track to Usghara, others by the valley of the Bara, leaving a number of women and children in the village; none of whom, however, were in any way injured.

Sangar was found to contain about 60 houses, which, with the tower and the jowar crops on the plateau below, were entirely destroyed.

The 1st column then joined the main force at Dar Mela.

2nd column of attack.

The 2nd column after marching 14 miles, and carefully avoiding the only village met with *en route*, commenced the ascent of the crest at 2-30 A.M., and getting as quickly and silently as possible over the ridge, gained its position over Nasin Mela at 4 A.M.

Report by Captain Henderson.

Shortly before it reached this point, the enemy began beating their war drums, but the column continued its movement in perfect silence and unseen.

As soon as the position was gained, the men were collected and ordered to lie down under cover, waiting for dawn. The drums continued sounding, and the enemy endeavoured to ascertain the exact position of the column by firing a few random shots from the ridge and tower, which did no harm, and which were not returned. As dawn broke, the 2nd column made a rush on the village, when the enemy took instantly to flight, and were driven along and over the highest crest (the one commanding the village of Sangar) without any loss to us. The leading men of the column led by Subadar Fyz Mahomed Khan, pushing on over the crest, captured some hundreds of cattle, sheep, goats, poneys, and donkeys, which the enemy were driving off.

Main body.
Brigadier Chamberlain's
Despatch.

The main column having left camp at 11 P.M., proceeded by the road to the small village of Pul Darbund, situated at the base of the spur previously referred to, and from which ran the paths leading up the mountain.

The column reached Pul Darbund at about 3 A.M., when some half hour's delay took place owing to the difficulty of ascertaining the practicable route for the Mountain Guns, for the malik of the village, (although one of our own subjects,) declared that no laden animal could possibly ascend; but when he found his arms pinioned, and became aware of the penalty of treachery, he promised to show the way, and the column commenced the ascent. The first part of the ascent was so steep, and the path so narrow, from the rocks on each side, that the guns were got up with considerable difficulty; but higher up, the path improved, and just at daybreak the main body came in sight of Captain Henderson's column.

It was at first difficult to determine whether they were friend or foe, but this was soon cleared up by the advance of that column on the village.

Before the guns could be got into position, the enemy finding themselves threatened from above by the 1st column, and from below by the other two columns, were in full flight for the Samana Range; the body of only one man, killed by a shell, being found in the village.

The troops were now actively employed, covered by picquets till 10 A.M. blowing up the towers, and destroying the villages and crops.

The signal for our retirement had been anxiously looked for by the mountaineers, and no sooner had it been given, than they commenced following up, beating their drums, &c.

As the skirmishers of the 2nd Panjab Infantry under Captain Green were abandoning one of the commanding points, they were attacked and driven back by a sudden rush of the enemy, sword in hand, when a native doctor and some 7 men were hacked to pieces, their rifles and accoutrements falling into the enemy's hands; but Captain Green, of whose conduct the Brigadier spoke very highly, rallied his men under cover of the fire of 2 Mountain Guns under Captain Sladen, and re-took the position.

The retirement then continued in good order. Before the troops had reached the foot of the hill, the enemy had ceased to follow up, and the troops reached camp by sun-set.

In the meantime the Khataks under Khawaja Mahomed Khan, aided by the men of Togue with 300 footmen and 60 horse, had moved down into the valley of the Bara, and destroyed the small villages of Kutsa, Saifulmela, Khadazai, and Chini Sang. As Khawaja had been ordered not to descend the range until firing was heard at Sangar, many of the villagers had moved off to assist Sangar before Khawaja Mahomed Khan had arrived, and

the cattle had almost all been driven off; what remained however were captured.

The men of Togue attacked the Rabia Khel, near Chini Sang, and made a very spirited fight; they had 4 men killed, and reported the enemy's loss to have been greater.

Major Coke's Report.

Brigadier Chamberlain stated that in consenting to the employment of our Miranzai subjects against the Rabia Khels, he was guided by the consideration that, for the subjugation of both parties, the feuds between the independent hill tribes and our Bangash subjects of Miranzai could not be made too wide; for in that part of the country a blood feud once well established was a difficulty almost beyond the bounds of amicable settlement.

The casualties on our side were small (*vide* appendix).

The loss of the Rabia Khel tribe was estimated by Major Coke at 24 killed and wounded, amongst the former being 4 Chiefs.

Brigadier Chamberlain spoke highly of the conduct of the troops, who were on foot 17 hours, marching 28 miles, and ascending and descending a rugged mountain of nearly 4,000 feet in height (the weather was very trying, for the thermometer stood at 99° in a large tent in the day time, and at 127° in the sun); and he alluded to the able manner in which the duties assigned to them were carried out by Major Coke and Captain Henderson, and his Staff Officer Captain Adams; also to the excellent zeal and energy of Captain Sladen of the Artillery.

A few days after this punishment the Mishti Khel section came to terms and gave hostages; this was shortly followed by the submission of the Rabia Khels, who brought back a large number of the plundered cattle, agreeing to pay for the remainder which they had eaten. The tribe were also willing to pay a grazing tax for the pasturage ground near our frontier, but Government declined to receive any revenue from them. The Shekhan and Mishti sections also came to terms, and the force returned to Kohat on the 7th October, when it was broken up.

The good discipline of the troops was specially commented on by the Brigadier*; and the services of Khawaja Mahomed Khan warmly acknowledged.

There had been a good deal of rain, and the health of the troops had been far better than could have been anticipated at that season of the year.

It was then intimated that the Governor General in Council had read with

Government letter. "the most lively satisfaction the report of these operations. Brigadier Chamberlain had stated that any

"man might be proud to command such troops, and in the opinion of the Governor General the Brigadier had ample ground for the remark, for the Government were both proud and happy in the knowledge that it possessed troops able and willing to perform so gallant a service, and officers capable of planning, leading, and executing such attacks.

"The most cordial acknowledgments and thanks of Government were to be conveyed to Captain Coke and Captain Henderson, who had led the several attacks, and for their admirable execution of the combined movements against the villages of Nasin Ghari and Sangar; and the above sentiments were to be made known to the whole of the Panjab Irregular Force."

* At this time the troops of the Line, when serving across the Indus, received extra batta, which was not allowed to the troops of the Panjab Irregular Force; and Brigadier Chamberlain alluded to the injury and heartburnings which must arise from employing the line troops with those of the Panjab Irregular Force under the circumstances.

APPENDICES.

Hangu Expedition, 1855.

Brigadier N. Chamberlain, commanding.

Staff.

Captain Adams, S. O., P. I. F., Staff Officer.

Lieutenant Garnett, Engineer Officer.

Artillery.

Detachment, Peshawar Mountain Train, Lieutenant Pulman commanding.

No. 3 Light Field Battery, Lieutenant LeGeyt Bruce commanding.

2 Mountain Guns, No. 3 Battery, Captain Sladen commanding.

Cavalry.

4th Panjab Cavalry, Major Jacob commanding.

Infantry.

1st Panjab Infantry, Major Coke commanding.

2nd Panjab Infantry, Captain Green commanding.

3rd Panjab Infantry, Captain Henderson commanding.

Political Officer.

Major Coke, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat.

DENOMINATION.	European officers.	European non-commissioned officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers—rank and file.	REMARKS.
Brigade Staff ...	3	Peshawar Mountain Train.
Peshawar Mountain Train ...	3	2	3	91	Two 3-Pounder Guns.
No. 3 Light Field Battery ...	3	2	2	87	Two 12-Pounder Howitzers.
4th Panjab Cavalry ...	3	...	13	387	No. 3 Battery.
1st Panjab Infantry ...	4	1	10	619	Two 3-Pounder Guns.
2nd Panjab Infantry ...	2	...	10	567	One 9-Pounder Gun.
3rd Panjab Infantry ...	2	1	9	633	One 12-Pounder Howitzer.
Total ...	20	6	47	2,384	One 24-Pounder Howitzer. 6 Elephants.

Casualty Return, Hangu Expedition, 1855.

Nature of Casualty.	Regiment.	Native officers.	Native doctors.	Non-com-missioned officers.	Sepoys.
Killed	{ 1st Panjab Infantry 2nd Panjab Infantry 3rd Panjab Infantry
Wounded	{ 1st Panjab Infantry 2nd Panjab Infantry 3rd Panjab Infantry	1	1
Missing	... 3rd Panjab Infantry	1
Total	...	1	1	1	12

* Afterwards ascertained to have been killed by the enemy.

SECTION III.

Affair with the Bazoti Section of the Daolatzai Division at the Ublan Pass, March 1868.

IN the cold weather the Bazotis live in the Bazoti Valley, a narrow and difficult part of the Tirah Toi Valley under Mulagarh. They have two main settlements, Dana Kula and Gara. In the hot weather they go to the head of the Mastura glen in Tirah, and remain from April to November.

Report on Tribes by Mr. Temple.

They sow their wheat crop at Tirah before they come down, and their rice crop in the Bazoti Valley before their return to Tirah, leaving only a few families in the valley to look after it in the hot season; but the whole tribe can be down from Tirah in case of an attack in from 24 to 30 hours. The Bazotis have little or no trade to lose by misbehaviour, and their chief strength lies in their insignificance; and, as their principal settlements are in the midst of Tirah, they had hitherto escaped punishment for their misdeeds.

The entrance to the Bazoti Valley is over the Ublan Pass, about 6 miles from Kohat.

At the commencement of British rule Trans-Indus, the Bazotis were always cattle-lifting on the British border, plundering and cutting up travellers and grass-cutters whenever they could lay to hands on them, and they were the tribe who organized and headed the attack on the Kohat Kotal, which led to Sir Charles Napier's expedition in 1850; but in 1853 Major Coke, in consequence of the misbehaviour of the Afridis, admitted them, amongst others, to a share of the allowances paid for the peace of the Kohat Pass. Besides the Bazotis who touch our border, the two tribes of Utman Khel and Feroz Khel are generally one with them in all their political moves, and the allowance given to the Bazotis on this occasion was shared by them also.

The Sipahs, though a small tribe, are notorious as plucky men and great thieves. A portion of the allowance for the Kohat Pass is now given to them, *viz.*, Rs. 500. They have not more than 300 men, but they are well armed, and they have the character of being the best marksmen with the rifle amongst the tribes. They are armed with long rifles of Kohat manufacture, fitted with old, English marked, flint-locks.

Report by Secretary, Panjab Government.

The Sipahs do not migrate in summer to Tirah as do the Bazotis.

In 1865 a Sipah and two Bazotis were convicted of robbery in British territory, and sentenced to imprisonment; the Bazotis, Utman Khels, and Sipahs, interceded for the release of the robbers, and on their petition not being granted by the Deputy Commissioner, took to making raids on British territory; killed two of our subjects and captured cattle. Colonel Becher, then Commissioner of Peshawar, settled the case by releasing the prisoners, and exacting a small fine as compensation for the loss of the cattle, and the lives of our subjects who had been killed.

At the beginning of 1867, one Fateh Khan, a British subject of the village of Alizai, in the Kohat District, bordering on the Sipah Hills, petitioned the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat that a civil suit which had been decided against him in 1854 by Colonel Coke, then Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, (whose decision had been confirmed on appeal in 1855 by Sir Herbert Edwardes,) should be reopened. The Deputy Commissioner declined to reopen a case which had been finally decided 12 years before; but as Fateh Khan appeared in difficulties, he was promised a situation as a mounted orderly when a vacancy should occur.

At the close of 1867, Fateh Khan went over to his independent neighbours, the Daolatzais and induced them to take up his cause. On learning this, the Deputy Commissioner notified to the adjoining tribes that any intercession for Fateh Khan could not be attended to, as the matter was one which exclusively concerned British subjects. Notwithstanding this warning on the 23rd December 1867, a deputation from the Daolatzais, including representatives from the Bazoti, Utman Khel, Feroz Khel, and Sipah clans, came into Kohat, (without, as usual, asking permission to enter British territory,) to make intercession for Fateh Khan.

They were received in Durbar by the Deputy Commissioner, and informed that their request could not be granted, and they were at the same time reminded that they had been duly warned of this.

After this interview, all the tribes, except a section of the Bazotis under the chiefship of one Syad Reza, intimated their intention of abandoning the cause of Fateh Khan.

On the 15th January news was received that Syad Reza was collecting his followers for a raid into British territory, and preparations were made accordingly,—the Bazotis being warned that if they did not prevent the raid they must take the consequences. On the morning of the 16th, a demonstration was made against the towers at the Ublan Pass, but the Bazotis dispersed on the neighbouring villages turning out.

The same night as an attack in force was threatened, the 3rd Panjab Cavalry, 2 Field Guns, and the 6th Panjab Infantry, moved out, when the Bazotis dispersed.

These demonstrations were followed by gatherings of some of the tribes, who fired on our villages, and by an attack on the village of Alizai, when 1 villager was killed and 2 wounded when in pursuit of the marauders.

Meanwhile the representatives of the Daolatzai tribes had been summoned, and after some delay the "Jirgahs" appeared on behalf of the Utman Khels, Bazotis, and Sipahs; a proclamation was then read out to them, pointing out the various acts of hostility which had been committed, and calling upon them to exact from the actual perpetrators compensation for injury done, and restoration of the plundered cattle, and (according to tribal usage) the destruction by fire of two houses in each of the implicated tribes in token of submission. The Jirgahs expressed their inability to coerce the ill-disposed members of their respective tribes, and the tribes were then debarred from trade with British territory, and the Bazotis further deprived of the office of guarding the Kohat Kotal, and of the allowance on that account.

On the 10th March a party of men, chiefly Sipahs, made a demonstration against the towers at the Ublan Pass, and did everything they could to bring on an engagement; but, acting on the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, the police remained on the defensive: failing in this attempt, it was reported that

the following morning the Bazotis, some 400 in number, would attack the towers or the village of Mahamadzai, and during the night Lieutenant Cavagnari's Report. Lieutenant N. Cavagnari, the Deputy Commissioner, went out with 180 levies and 60 police foot.

After the affair of the 16th January, Major Jones, Commandant, 3rd Panjab Cavalry, who was commanding at Kohat, had, Plan of operations. Major Jones's and Lieutenant Cavagnari's Report. in company with the Deputy Commissioner and the Officer commanding the artillery, examined the ground at the Ublan Pass.

The pass itself is open, its width in some places being half a mile, and its length to the commencement of the ascent of the pass a mile.

Major Jones considered that if the Bazotis occupied a small hill in advance of the towers, as they had previously done, they could be easily driven off by the troops, when considerable punishment would be inflicted on them in their retreat, without the necessity for our advancing on to the high range. This hill was not under fire from the crest of the high range, and which, although British territory, was ground so very difficult that it was determined no advance on it should be made. Accordingly, Lieutenant Cavagnari on arrival at the Ublan, occupied the hills on the proper right of the gorge, leaving its left open for the raiders if they came down.

About 9 A.M. the news received showed that a raid was intended, and on the call from the Deputy Commissioner, 100 men, 3rd Panjab Infantry, under Captain Rynd, were sent out from Kohat to reinforce the towers, but their orders were not to advance without support. About midday some 200 of the Bazotis were in position—a few on the hills on the proper right of the pass, the majority on the hills on the left of it, with an advanced party on the small hill already mentioned.

Major Jones then moved out from cantonments with the following troops:—

Wing, 280, 3rd Panjab Infantry, Captain Ruxton commanding.

Wing, 200, 6th Panjab Infantry, Major D. Hoste commanding.

Two Mountain Guns, No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery, Captain Abbott commanding.

3rd Panjab Cavalry, 80 Sabres.

Major Jones's Despatch. As soon as the column arrived in front of the pass, the following dispositions were made:—

Captain Rynd's detachment, supported by a small body of police under the Deputy Commissioner, were to advance from the towers, which they had reinforced, towards the Kotál, and halt out of fire to cut off the retreat of the enemy, should they take that line after being driven off the low hill.

The 6th Panjab Infantry were to advance from the Kotál side of the hill to a position about half way up, and from which a few of the enemy were firing, and halt until further orders, after taking the position.

The 3rd Panjab Infantry were to advance from the right of the hill, and after taking it to await further orders.

The artillery were to cover the advance of the 3rd and 6th Panjab Infantry.

Half the cavalry were to support the guns, the other half were to watch a gorge on the right of our attack.

At 1-30 P.M. the troops advanced, and the small hill was carried without any loss on our side; the enemy retiring, with a loss of 2 killed, to their breast-works which they had erected on the crest of a very steep and precipitous hill, a spur of the main range, in rear, and in fact in continuation of the hill

on which the 3rd and 6th had established themselves; and Major Jones now proceeded with the artillery to shell a few of the enemy who were engaged with Captain Rynd's detachment, and who were then driven off.

But in the meanwhile the 3rd Panjab Infantry under Captain Ruxton were advancing against the breastwork on the higher point. The orders had been not to operate beyond the low hill, and the reason for the advance can never be known. Captain Ruxton may have thought that

Letters from Major Jones, Lieutenant Cavagnari, and Lieutenant Bertie, 3rd Panjab Cavalry.

as the enemy were holding the higher peak above him, it was his duty to take it;—or in the excitement of action he was anxious to add to the success of the day;—or he imagined from seeing that Major Jones had gone to Captain Rynd's detachment, and was shelling the enemy who were retiring up the pass, that the original limited plan was abandoned, and that an advance on the higher position was intended; or Captain

Report by Brigadier General Wilde, C. B.

Letter from Supreme Government.

Ruxton may have believed the instructions referred to the crest of the hill as the point beyond which he was not to go, and that it was intended the enemy should be cut off in a valley beyond it, which the cavalry were watching.

But, from whatever cause arising, the skirmishers, (3rd Panjab Infantry,) were now advancing on an almost impregnable position. They had been commanded by Lieutenant Mackinnon, and being joined by Captain Ruxton, they had descended the low hill and crossed the gorge, with the loss of one man wounded.

Statement by Lieutenant Mackinnon, 3rd Panjab Infantry.

The ascent towards the breastwork was made under a dropping fire from the enemy, but the skirmishers only got to within about 50 yards of it. From this point the ground above was very rocky and precipitous, there was no cover, and the advanced party of the 3rd Panjab Infantry, consisting of 2 native officers and some 30 or 40 men, were under a flanking fire, which quickly caused a great number of casualties (amongst which were Captain Ruxton killed, and Lieutenant Mackinnon wounded);—the enemy now began sneaking down amongst the rocks and hurling stones, and the first line fell back on the support under Captain Ward.

The 3rd Panjab Infantry had advanced so far before being seen by Major Jones, that he was unable to stop their onward movement, and all he could do was to order the guns to be moved so as to open on the position. Under their fire, the 6th Panjab Infantry under Major Hoste, which had been ordered up in support of the 3rd Panjab Infantry, now vainly endeavoured to carry the position with a rush, when Major Hoste was wounded. As the enemy were momentarily getting an increase of numbers in their breast-work, the detachment under Captain Rynd was moved up to reinforce the 6th and 3rd Panjab Infantry, when a third attempt was made covered by the guns but without success.

Major Jones's Despatch.

Reinforcements had been sent for from Kohat, when the 1st Sikh Infantry and 2 guns, No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery, moved out under Major J. P. W. Campbell, but before their arrival it was getting too late for further operations; moreover the position had been reported as impregnable from a natural barrier wall, and the troops were therefore retired to the plains under cover of the guns.

Our loss had been very heavy, see appendix. The enemy, too, were believed to have suffered considerably, and to which Major Jones attributed the fact that the retirement was in no way pressed by them.

The loss of Captain Ruxton was sincerely deplored by the Governor General in Council,—“an excellent officer of many years’ experience in the Panjab Frontier Force. And the Government letter. “Governor General much regretted the death of Subadar Ram Sing of the 3rd Panjab Infantry, said to be one of the bravest native officers of the Frontier” Force, and of the other men who fell on the occasion. Whilst the thanks of the Governor General in Council were to be conveyed to Major Hoste and Captain Quin of the 6th Panjab Infantry, and to Captain Rynd and Lieutenant Mackinnon, 3rd Panjab Infantry, for their conduct.”

Bazoti affair, March 1868—Casualty Return.

Corps.	KILLED.				WOUNDED.				REMARKS.
	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Sepoys.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Sepoys.	
3rd Panjab Infantry ...	1*	1	2	5	1†	1	4	13	{ *Captain Ruxton. †Lieutenant Mackinnon.
6th Panjab Infantry	2	1†	1	...	23	‡Major Hoste wounded.
Total ...	1	1	2	7	2	2	4	36	

ROUGH SKETCH
of
THE UBLAN PASS
and
OPERATIONS

on the 11th March


1868.



EXPLANATIONS

- Bazotis.....■
3rd P. C.....□
3rd P. I.....▬
6th P. I.....▬
Artillery.....⚡

ELEVATION OF GROUND NEAR UBLAN



SECTION IV.

Expedition against the Bazotis and Utman Khels under Colonel Keyes, C.B., 1869.

AFTER the affair at the Ublan Pass already narrated, a stringent blockade of the offending tribes was instituted, their pass allowance was stopped, and the implicated Orakzai tribes were called upon to unite in coercing and chastising the offending section of the Daolatzais. Overtures were made by the friendly Orakzai tribes to do this, but meanwhile the Bazotis and Utman Khels retired out of reach to their summer haunts in Tirah.

As the time approached for the Bazotis and Utman Khels to return to their winter quarters in the Bazoti Valley, it became necessary to determine what further measures of coercion should be taken in retribution of the outrage of the 10th March; and it was determined that as the blockade in its then limited extent had proved ineffectual, and as the Orakzais had failed to coerce the offending sections, that after due warning the blockade should be extended so as to affect not only the offending sections of the Daolatzais, but the Orakzai tribes collectively. There was every hope of this measure soon causing the Orakzai tribes to bring such pressure on the Daolatzais as would induce them to tender submission, and full satisfaction for their misconduct; when, on the night of the 13th February, a fresh outrage was committed, a party of 5 or 6 members of the Utman Khel tribe having surprised our police post at the foot of the Kohat Kotal, and having killed 1 policeman who resisted, and carried off 3 others.

Although large portions of the Orakzais desired to remain at peace and cultivate friendly relations with us, and with whom it was a matter of concern that outrages of this kind should be perpetrated by lawless members of portions of their clans, it was now evident that owing to the feelings of Afghan pride, and the complicated relations subsisting among the different divisions and sub-divisions of the tribe, it was hopeless to expect the well-disposed sections to coerce the offending clans, unless aided in their endeavour by an exhibition of the power of the British Government and of its determination not to be trifled with, with impunity. There, too,

was every probability that delay in noticing this outrage would cause matters to assume a still more serious aspect; and on the strong recommendation of Lieutenant Cavagnari, the Deputy Commissioner, and Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes, C.B., commandant, 1st Panjab Infantry, who was commanding the Kohat District, sanction was accorded by the Lieutenant-Governor for a sudden raid to be made into the territory of the offending tribes, as it was hoped that chastisement inflicted upon them at their homes (hitherto vaunted as inaccessible) would show such a determination on our part not to be further trifled with, as well as our ability, if necessary, to penetrate their most inaccessible fastnesses, that the prestige of the offending sections would be destroyed, and the action of the friendly tribes in coercing their confrères to come to terms would be greatly stimulated.

Memorandum by Secretary to Government, Panjab.

Letter to Supreme Government from Mr. Thornton, Secretary, Panjab Government.

Memorandum by Secretary to Government, Panjab.

As soon as the outrage on the tower at the Kohat Kotal was reported, the Mountain Battery had been ordered to move from Abbottabad, but it arrived too late to take part in the proceedings about to be related.

The plan of operations was to cross the Ublan Pass, and, if not opposed at the village of Gara, to pass on to that of Dana Kula, the head-quarters of Syad Reza, which was to be destroyed, as well as the settlements of the Utman Khels on the banks of the Towi; but if any opposition was met with at Gara, no attempt to surprise Dana Kula and the Utman Khels was to be made, as the delay would afford ample time to the enemy to make preparations, in which case the troops were to return from Gara.

A demonstration was to be made on the Peshawar side with the view of checking the Aka Khel tribe, especially the Basi Khel section, and also to attract the attention of the Utman Khels.

The Deputy Commissioner had no fear about the pass Afridis joining, as they had no sympathy with the Daolatzais; but, as a precautionary measure, their representatives, who were at Kohat, were to be detained there whilst the force was out; and as the troops moved out of cantonments, Rustum Khan, son of Bahardur Shir Khan, (who has the management of the pass arrangements,) was to proceed to the village of Bosti Khel in the pass. Just before the march of the troops, instructions were to be sent for levies to be collected to coerce the Alizai and Marai Kotals at daybreak, and for other levies to be sent to Ghazi Morad to attack Usiah, if the men of that village attempted to move, which would hold the Ustu Khels and Sipah sections completely in check. The Bazoti (Shakur Khan section) and the Firoz Khel Jirgahs, as well as Aka Khel Jirgah, then at Kohat, were to be detained under surveillance whilst the troops were in the hills.

Information regarding the nature of the country beyond the Ublan showed that it was impracticable to carry out the proposed plan of operations except by seizing the Kotal by a sudden surprise. Everything therefore depended on secrecy regarding our movements, so much so, that it was determined if the Kotal could not be seized without any alarm to the enemy in the valley below, it would be useless to push on with any reasonable hope of success, in which case the troops were to withdraw, and the expedition was to be abandoned.

But still it was necessary to get the opinions of natives experienced in hill campaigning, who could be trusted, and with whom could be discussed the chances in our favor and the difficulties in the way; and Colonel Keyes took into his confidence Subadar Major Habib Khan and Subadar Pyab (Afridi), 1st Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Cavagnari consulting with Shazad Zambur, Extra Assistant Commissioner, and Badsha the Kotwal of Kohat.

On the 24th February the following instructions were issued confidentially to commanding officers, but no warning was to be given, nor preparation made before the appointed time.

At midnight Captain Lewis, commanding No. 1 Light Field Battery, was to proceed to the fort and get ready the Mountain Howitzers for service: half an hour after, the men of the Battery were to be warned and crews for the Mountain Howitzers with mules sent down to the fort, at the same time the 1st and 4th Panjab Infantry were to be turned out; at 1 A. M. the 2nd Panjab Infantry were to be turned out: all without bugle sound.

Ten mule loads of ammunition were to accompany regiments. Food might be cooked by the Langris of regiments and sent up afterwards to the reserve. Stations and regimental guards were to be left standing.

At midnight a complete cordon of sowars, 4th Panjab Cavalry, was formed round the town of Kohat to stop any one attempting to enter or leave it, and police picquets were placed at all the likely places by which a footman might attempt to enter the hills.

At 1 A.M. the following force moved from Kohat under Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes, C. B. :—

1st Panjab Infantry,
4th Panjab Infantry,
2 Mountain Howitzers,
followed by the reserve under Captain Tyndall—
2nd Panjab Infantry.
2 24-Pounder Howitzers, No. 1, Panjab Light Field Battery.

On reaching the foot of the Ublan Pass, Colonel Keyes and Lieutenant Cavagnari with a few picked men from the police, headed by 4 maliks of the friendly portion of the village of Gara, ascended the pass as quickly as possible, leaving the column to follow slowly after them. A small picquet of the enemy had generally been posted at the top of the pass, and arrangements were made to seize this by stratagem. When challenged, the 4 maliks were to reply, assuring their people that, provided they kept quiet and did not raise the alarm, no harm would come to them; the police were at the same time to rush forward and seize them. This was the point that was to decide whether the enterprise was to be carried out or not; for, had the enemy been found on the alert, the troops would have at once been ordered to retire, and the expedition abandoned. Fortunately, however, the enemy never dreaming that such an attempt would be made, and confident in the boasted strength of their position, had on this night neglected their usual precaution; no watch had been set, and quiet possession of the Kotal was taken, and the troops awaited on the crest.

The 4 maliks of the Bazotis and Feroz Khels, who were with Lieutenant Cavagnari, and who had since the commencement of hostilities with the Daolatzais professed friendship, were now sent on to assure the friendly portion of the village of Gara that we only intended destroying Syad Reza's quarter of the village, and that, if unopposed, the troops would pass on to Dana Kula and the Utman Khel country; but that if any resistance was offered, Gara would be destroyed. The Feroz Khel Maliks were to warn their tribe of the penalties which would be incurred by their hostages if they assisted the Utman Khels.

The 4th Panjab Infantry and one wing of the 1st Panjab Infantry (under Lieutenant Pitcher, V. C.) then moved quietly down the pass with Colonel Keyes.

The maliks, when permitted to start, lost no time on the road; and whether unable to restrain their men, or whether their professed neutrality was only with the view of obtaining a settlement distinct from Syad Reza's section, it is impossible to say; for they simply, on arrival at the village, passed the word that the troops were coming, and proceeded at once to remove their families and property to a place of safety,—their example being immediately followed by the rest of the village, the men and women setting

Colonel Keyes and Lieutenant Cavagnari's Despatches.

at once to work to drive their flocks and herds up to the higher ranges. So that when the troops arrived in front of Gara, not a quarter of an hour after the maliks, all, except a portion of the fighting men, had cleared out of the village, and a fire was opened on the column from the so-called friendly quarters! The design of saving Gara in the hope of surprising Dana Kula was thus frustrated.

The troops immediately opened out and took the village with a rush, the left assault being made by the 4th Panjab Infantry, and the right by the wing, 1st Panjab Infantry, led respectively, by Lieutenant-Colonel Hood and Lieutenant Pitcher, V. C., with great spirit and determination,—their gallant example not being lost on the men, who fought as if the quarrel was their own, and as if they had a personal injury to avenge. In carrying the village our loss had been—

Demi-official letters from
officers commanding—

1st Panjab Infantry.
4th Panjab Infantry.

4th Panjab Infantry.

11 wounded.

1st Panjab Infantry.

1 killed, 8 wounded.

Some cattle, &c., were seized, and the village was completely destroyed, with the exception of a mosque, which was left uninjured,—the enemy taking up a position on the various spurs which commanded the village.

Although the greatest care was taken by the troops not to fire on the women retreating up the hill with their cattle, one was killed by pure accident.

Syad Reza was in Gara when the troops came up, having come over from Dana Kula; and amongst the killed in the village was "Tor" (black) Syad Reza, the most influential of Syad Reza's supporters.

The surprise of Dana Kula was now no longer practicable, for the troops would have had to fight their way for 2 miles, and everything would have been cleared out of the village long before it could be reached. The troops would also have had to fight their way back against increasing numbers, and no advantage that could have been gained by the destruction of the empty village would have warranted the risk that would have attended the operations, and the heavy loss of life that must have occurred; moreover, the Deputy Commissioner was of opinion that the punishment which had overtaken the tribe by the destruction of Gara, &c., fully satisfied the political requirements of the case, it was known that Syad Reza was in Gara when it was attacked, and it had, too, been always agreed that if detained by a fight at Gara, it would be neither politic nor advisable to go on; so the troops were ordered to retire.

The retirement was covered by some admirable practice by the Mountain Guns from the crest of the Kotal on advancing bodies of the enemy, and which materially assisted the retirement "conducted with great care" and skill by Lieutenant-Colonel Hood and Lieutenant Pitcher, and the "officers under them, and to which might be attributed our comparatively "light loss"—

Demi-official letters from
officers commanding—

1st Panjab Infantry.
4th Panjab Infantry.

4th Panjab Infantry.

4 wounded.

1st Panjab Infantry.

4 wounded.

On reaching the top of the Kotal, the 4th Panjab Infantry and wing, 1st Panjab Infantry, were sent down, and the Mountain Guns moved to a position lower down the pass; whilst the crest of the Kotal was held by the left wing of the 1st Panjab Infantry under Captain Higginson, supported by picquets 4th Panjab Infantry, on the right and left spurs under Lieutenants

Gaselee and Bruce respectively. These picquets were necessary, as the crest of the pass was bare of cover, and without them the ground held by the wing, 1st Panjab Infantry, would have been altogether untenable; but when the crest had to be evacuated, their withdrawal was a matter of some difficulty. The descent from the spurs to the crest was steep and difficult, and the retirement of the picquets was necessarily slow—much slower than the enemy's movements; they had pressed the retirement from the village closely to gain these points, and these light-footed skirmishers were not long in seizing the vantage ground and opening a smart fire on the retiring picquets, which the wing, 1st Panjab Infantry, had to keep down in the best way it could from the crest.

The great difficulty in moving off the hill was the impossibility (from the nature of the ground) of affording flanking protection, or of extending the movement beyond the narrow limits of the gorge itself, while every turn of the road is open to the fire of an enemy in possession of the crest; however covered by the fire of the Mountain Guns, which had taken up a position lower down the pass, and by the fire of the Field Howitzers in reserve, which opened on the enemy as soon as they occupied the crest, the men were withdrawn by Captain Higginson and Lieutenants Gaselee and Bruce with "great coolness, steadiness, and rapidity."

The force reached Kohat about 1 p.m.

The enemy who numbered about 200, and who had fought with great bravery and determination, lost 10 killed and 7 wounded.

In addition to the officers already alluded to by Colonel Keyes, he mentioned the names of Captain Tyndall commanding 2nd Panjab Infantry, Captain Lewis commanding the Artillery, Lieutenant Blake 4th Panjab Cavalry, Orderly Officer, and Lieutenant Sim Royal Engineers.

"The gallant and unselfish conduct of Lieutenant A. P. Broome, 1st Panjab Infantry," was also brought to the notice of Colonel Keyes by Lieutenant-Colonel Hood 4th Panjab Infantry, (and by the former to that of Government,) for having, at considerable personal risk, carried out of fire a wounded soldier of the 4th Panjab Infantry.

Colonel Keyes stated that not a whisper had got abroad of the intended movements, and that the 4 native officials and officers already mentioned had afforded valuable aid and exercised great discretion. He specially commented

2 Guns, Royal Horse Artillery.

3 Troops, 19th Bengal Cavalry.

200 Her Majesty's 36th Foot.

1 Company Sappers and Miners.

19th Native Infantry.

5 Companies, 3rd Native Infantry.

on the appreciation he felt of Lieutenant Cavagnari's thorough knowledge of the hills and accuracy of information, and of the great sagacity he had shewn in his management of the various tribes, in diverting their attention, and in reducing all possible resistance to a minimum.

Whilst these operations were being carried on from the Kohat side, a column consisting of the troops as per margin had moved out from Peshawar under Brigadier General D. M. Stewart, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the Utman Khel and Basi Khel tribes.

Early in the morning of the day that Colonel Keyes crossed the Ublan, an official was sent to the village of Akhor, in the Kohat Pass, to say that the troops were close behind, and *must* be allowed to temporarily hold it, and the pass, in check.

Commissioner's Report.

At the same time detachments of cavalry and infantry were placed in front of Ghari Jani and Fort Bara, in view to keeping the Basi Khels at home, and a leading man was sent to warn them. They began making off on seeing the troops, but afterwards on being re-assured by our emissary, they waited on the officer commanding the detachments.

The main body of the troops under Brigadier-General Stewart, accompanied by the Commissioner, moved into the Kohat Pass about daybreak. The Akhor people were averse to our going into their country, but they were not in a position to oppose us, and professed to acquiesce in our demands without hesitation.

Brigadier-General Stewart's Despatch.

The troops moved on about 2 miles beyond Akhor, along the dry bed of a torrent, towards the Kotal leading into the Daolatzai country, when a reconnoitring party was sent on to the Kotal.

Commissioner's Report.

The pass leading to the Kotal was at least 6 miles in length; very strong, and edged with precipitous, isolated hills. It was found to be a most difficult country to operate in, because a force could not move in it in presence of an enemy without crowning the commanding heights on each side, and this would necessarily be a very slow and harassing process. The distance to be traversed was greater than was supposed, and the country was far more difficult than represented.

Brigadier-General Stewart's Despatch.

The Kotal was reported low and easy, beyond which the nearest Utman Khel settlement was distant 3 or 4 miles. The force halted at Akhor until 1 P.M., and then fell back upon Fort Mackeson, returning to Peshawar the following day.

Commissioner's Report.

Brigadier-General Stewart's Despatch.

These movements excited much attention, and they probably proved indirectly beneficial to the Kohat column.

With regard to these operations, the remarks of the Government of India were as follow:—

Government letter.

"The reports of the expedition had been perused by the Governor-General with great satisfaction, and His Excellency considered that the operation was admirably planned, and bravely and skilfully carried out. He desired that the special thanks of the Government of India should be conveyed to Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes for his able conduct of the expedition.

"The thanks of the Government were also to be communicated to the whole of the officers and troops employed, who, His Excellency thought, appeared to have displayed much spirit, and to have well sustained the credit of the Frontier Force.

"Special acknowledgments were to be conveyed to the following officers:—

Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Hood, commanding 4th Panjab Infantry,
 Captain F. E. Lewis, R. A., commanding No. 1 Light Field Battery,
 Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, v. c., 1st Panjab Infantry,
 Captain J. Higginson, 1st Panjab Infantry,
 Ensign Gaselee, 4th Panjab Infantry,
 Lieutenant A. Bruce, 4th Panjab Infantry,
 Lieutenant C. A. Sim, Royal Engineers,

and native officers, Subadar Major Halib Khan, Sirdar Bahadoor, and Subadar Pyab of the 1st Panjab Infantry."

His Excellency observed with "much pleasure the report of the marked gallantry of Lieutenant A. P. Broome, 1st Panjab Infantry, and stated that the recommendation that his name should be submitted to Her Majesty for the decoration of the 'Victoria Cross' would be referred for the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief. His Excellency further desired to acknowledge, in a very special manner, the valuable aid and service rendered to Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes by Lieutenant Cavagnari on this occasion; and also to

"acknowledge the promptitude and secrecy with which a force under
"Brigadier-General Stewart, C. B., moved out from Peshawar to make a
"demonstration in favor of the expedition, and of the satisfactory manner in
"which that demonstration was carried out."

The Secretary of State for India observed that "in the expedition against the
Letter from Secretary of "Bazotis, and the destruction of the village of Gara,
State for India. "the operations appeared to have been well planned
"and ably executed, and the conduct of all the officers and men to have been
"highly praiseworthy."

In reporting the result of the expedition, Lieutenant-Colonel Keyes
Results. remarked that not only had the late outrage on the
Colonel Keyes' Despatch. police post and the death of Captain Ruxton been
fully avenged, but the minds of our subjects, visibly
affected by the repeated acts of defiance of the hostile tribes, had been
re-assured by the action taken; and many proofs were given of the utter depres-
sion of the Bazotis, from the feeling that their security from aggression had
been snatched from them in spite of tradition and the obstacles of their boasted
Kotal. And on the 4th April following, the Jirgahs of the Bazoti, Utman
Khel, and Sipah tribes, came into Kohat and tendered their submission to the
Deputy Commissioner, laying their swords at his feet. As they sued for
pardon, and as they were ready to pay a fine imposed upon them of
Rs. 1,200, and as they were ready to make arrangements for 9 of their
principal headmen remaining as hostages for their future good behaviour,
after an appropriate warning their submission was accepted, and the blockade
was removed.

Bazoti Expedition, 1869.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Keyes, C. B., commanding.

Lieutenant C. Sim, Engineer Officer.

Lieutenant P. Blake, 4th Panjab Cavalry, Orderly Officer.

Artillery.

No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery, Captain F. Lewis commanding.

Infantry.

1st Panjab Infantry, Captain Higginson commanding.

2nd Ditto, Captain Tyndall, ditto.

4th Ditto, Lieut-Col. J. C. Hood, ditto.

Political Officer.

Captain Cavagnari, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat.

Field Force.


CORPS.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Native doctors.	Buglers.	Sepoys.	ORDNANCE.		REMARKS.
							Field guns.	Mountain guns.	
No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery	2	2	9	1	1	65	2	2	
Detachment, 4th Panjab Cavalry	2	1	5	31	
1st Panjab Infantry	6	11	46	413	
2nd Ditto	6	12	55	1	8	437	
4th Ditto	8	18	53	1	13	456	
Kohat Police and Levies	2	3	4	410	
Total	26	42	172	3	22	1,812	2	2	

Casualty Return.

CORPS.				KILLED.			WOUNDED.			REMARKS.
				Native officers.	Non-com-missioned officers.	Sepoys.	Native officers.	Non-com-missioned officers.	Sepoys.	
No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery	1	
1st Panjab Infantry	2	11	
4th Ditto	1	2	2	14	
Police	3	
Total				3	2	2	29	


PLAN OF ATTACK.

Scale for Plan



BIRDS EYE VIEW FROM UBLAN KOTAL

NB. This is not drawn to scale and Birds Eye View form. Kotal is produced downwards to show Stiff ascent



S K E T C H E S
 ILLUSTRATING
 THE OPERATIONS
 OF A FORCE UNDER
 COLONEL C. P. KEYES C. B.
 against
 THE BAZOTIS
 February 1869.

REFERENCE.

- F. F. F.**—Advancing Force engaged—1st Punjab Infy., 4th Punjab Infy. and 2 Guns.
C. C.—Reserve—2nd Punjab Infantry and 2 Guns.
K. K. K.—Enemy when driven from GARA.
L. L. L.—Enemy skirmishing on our retiring.
O.—Second Position of right of Reserve.
X.—Point where Captain Ruxton was killed on 11th March 1868.
H. H.—Ublan Towers
D.—Ublan Kotal.
M.—High Hill held by friendly levies to protect our left when retiring.
P. P. P.—Towers held by Police and Levies.
R. R. R.—Peshawur Kotal Towers.
N. N. N.—Cordon of 4th Punjab Cavalry to prevent communication between KOHAT and the Hills.

Advance left **A.** at 1-45 a. m. 26th February 1869; halted at **B.** at 2-55 a. m. to form order of attack; reached KOTAL at 5-30 a. m. and commenced northern descent at 6-5 a. m. GARA evacuated by 7 a. m.; returned to KOTAL at 8-45 a. m. joined Reserve at 10 a. m. and returned to KOHAT at 1 p. m. Time occupied about 12 hours.

CHAPTER X.

SECTION I.

The Vaziris.

THE Vaziris are a large tribe of Afghans, who inhabit the hill country to the west of our frontier, from Thall in Miranzai to the Gumal Pass. The Vaziris are descended from Vazir, son of one Suliman. Vazir had two sons, 1 Khezri, 2 Lali; Khezri had three sons, 1 Musa, 2 Mahmud, 3 Mubarak; Musa had two sons, 1 Utman, 2 Almad, from whom are descended the Utmanzais and Ahmadzais, sometimes unitedly called Darvesh Khel; Mahmud had a son called Mahsud, from whom are descended the Mahsuds, and from his two sons, 1 Alizai, 2 Balolzai, are the two grand divisions of that clan, *viz.*, 1 Alizai, 2 Balolzai; Mubarak had a son called Gurbaz, from whom are descended the Gurbaz Vaziris.

From Lali, son of Vazir, are descended the Lali or Leila Vaziris, inhabiting the slopes of the Safed Koh.

The great branches of the Vaziris are therefore as follow—

McGregor's Gazetteer.	I.—Utmanzai	estimated fighting strength	...	17,200
	II.—Ahmadzai,	ditto	ditto	9,280
	III.—Mahsud,	ditto	ditto	14,500
Great tribal divisions.	IV.—Gurbaj,	ditto	ditto	1,500
	V.—Lali or Leila,	ditto	ditto	1,500
				<hr/> 43,980 <hr/>

But of the two first branches not more than one-third, and of the Mahsuds not more than one-fourth, are armed with guns, the remainder carrying a sword and shield, to which many add a pistol and dagger.

General Chamberlain's Despatch.
Mahsud Expedition, 1860.

The birth-place of the tribe is Kani Goram, at the southern base of the Pir Ghal Mountain, and from which, as their numbers increased, they have gradually spread themselves until they occupy their present limits; but their stronghold is still in the valleys and upon the plateau around the high mountains of Pir Ghal, Shui Dar, and Bundi Ghal (they are a branch from the Suliman Range, which separates the western Trans-Indus border from the high table-lands of Afghanistan), where all assemble to pass the summer months. In times of danger they and their families and cattle retire to the forest-clad spurs of these mountains, where, from the ruggedness of the ground, they are almost unassailable.

Head-Quarters.

Physically, the Vaziris are tall, muscular, and courageous; they generally go on foot, and are most active in the mountains. A few of the great men of the tribe have horses, but are bad riders.

Character and habits.
Major James's Despatch.
Kabal Khel Expedition.

They neither own, nor by their own account have they ever owned, any allegiance to any of the kings of Kabul. If you ask

of religion goes, and are powerless in political matters. Kani Goram is the seat of their religion, being the dwelling-place of the Syads, who have been settled there for many centuries. These men own valuable possessions in Tank.

In his report on the Dera Ismail Khan District, Major Reynell Taylor relates that the following humorous stories are current regarding the Vaziris, as illustrating the charge of barbarism in religion, &c., freely made against them by the more polished Afghans, although he rejects the whole charge contained in the last story as a gross libel on the Vaziris.

Report by Major R. Taylor. One of these stories was that of a Vaziri, who, after an earthquake, said that he really now had some idea that there was a God, since he had seen him shake so much earth at once.

Another that of a Vaziri, who, when engaged in his devotions, hearing the alarm cry that a caravan was approaching, left his prayers, went and joined in the attack and plunder of the caravan; when on returning with his share of the booty, he re-entered the mosque, and completed the unfinished balance of his prayers. Some of the by-standers, who were much scandalized by this conduct, reproved him sharply for it, asking how he could dare to leave his prayers for so unhallowed a purpose, and then return and finish them; he replied that he had been instructed that it was not good to pray when you had any worldly care on your mind, and if by chance you found it impossible to prevent your thoughts dwelling on it, it was better to leave your prayers for the time, go and get the worldly matter settled, and then return with an undistracted mind to your devotions. Now, in his own case, he said, that do what he would, he could not have helped thinking of the caravan, and therefore he had deemed it advisable to go and clear scores with that before finishing his prayers.

The third was as follows:—

The veneration for ziaruts, or holy shrines, is common to all Afghans: the tomb of a holy man is a blessing to its neighbourhood; all property placed near it is safe from theft, travellers encamping near it are safe from injury, and even the avenger of blood must spare his victim if he takes refuge at the ziarut; in fact, the more thickly the bodies of saints are sown about in a wild and troubled neighbourhood, the more feasible does it become to travel or reside in it; but a fakir in the Dera District declared that Syads and holy men did not fancy travelling in the Vaziri country, as they (the Vaziris) were in the habit of killing them to make shrines of them.

The Vaziris all belong to the Samil faction of politics.

Unlike all other independent border tribes, the Vaziris have had the wisdom to avoid internal feuds. Their character for union is undoubted.

This marked characteristic of the tribe is fostered by peculiar customs and laws. It is well known that amongst Pathans the avenger of blood is not only privileged, but bound to slay any relative of the man who had committed the deed for which vengeance is sought. But Vaziri grey-beards of ancient times ruled otherwise; with them the actual murderer must be the only victim. The effect of this wise law was to cement the tribe by avoiding those ramified feuds, which in other places arose out of indiscriminate vengeance, where an account current of blood was handed down from father to son, and balanced at convenience, and where the friend of yesterday became the victim of to-day.

Again, the sums of money which under certain circumstances were exacted by relatives of the slain, locally denominated "make-up-money" was

fixed at much higher rates than against other tribes. Vaziri life, therefore, was habitually regarded as something valuable. The sums were so large indeed as to be seldom forthcoming, when articles of property were reckoned in at fancy prices; but still the nominal mulct was of restraining influence on those passions which would lead to strife and disruption. This rude law had sufficient weight to control them in their intercourse with each other, and they worked for a common end; thus as their numbers increased, they had gradually overcome their neighbours, and extended their limits until they had

General Chamberlain's
Despatch. become the most powerful and the most dreaded tribe along the whole western border. Other tribes had been somewhat restrained in their internal policy by the fear of retaliation; but the Vaziris had felt no such check, for united themselves they had been opposed to disunited communities, and the fear of drawing down the vengeance of thousands had been to them a shield for the safe practice of tyranny of every hue.

Yet, as will be seen in the three expeditions we have made into their country, we have found that they will not support each other; in each case the division which had come under our displeasure was left to fight it out by themselves. And McLean says there is no pretence of union between the Darvesh Khel and Mahsuds. The former call themselves Vaziris and the latter Mahsuds, regarding them as wild beasts. But there is so far union among these, that though the Darvesh Khel or Mahsud may not take up the quarrels of their brethren, they generally will not give information against them.

The Vaziris boast that they have no poor man amongst them; whenever a family is brought low by deaths, accidents, or raids from without, the clan subscribes to re-establish it,—one bringing a bullock, another a blanket, and so on; thus there is no incentive to the Vaziri to leave his home to seek a subsistence or to enter foreign service.

Major James's Despatch. The climate of Vaziristan is reported good; the country is hilly, well wooded, and well watered; the people lead an active, healthy life, and are not subject to the low fever so prevalent in the lower and more marshy districts on the frontier. Their hakims, or native doctors, seem to have a certain knowledge of their duties. Inoculation is practised for small-pox. Splints are used for broken limbs, cold water for gun-shot wounds; but for fever the patient is enveloped in the skin of a newly-killed animal, and dosed with turmeric. It is not then to be wondered that the Vaziris complain that their doctors do not understand fevers, or that they should have such faith in the quinine of the British.

The Vaziri Hills to the east of the Kuram are much more difficult than that on the west; they are more massed together; huge cliffs meet the eye in every direction, and the inaccessible peaks of the higher mountains assume the appearance of gigantic castles.

The outer spurs of the Vaziri Hills are quite bare of verdure, and almost of soil; but as they recede from the plains, they become covered with wild olive, oak, and lastly pine. In some parts, as at Maidani and Razmak, the hills lose their steep character and assume the appearance of downs covered with trees and wild flowers. None of the trees met with in Vaziristan are of any size, and in strictness can only be called sub-arboreous; and this to the highest point, 8,000 feet, reached by General Chamberlain's force. Above 9,600 feet pines begin.

This fact of the absence of large trees depends in part on the aridity of this tract of country, and in part on the great scarcity of soil on most of it.

The country in the vicinity of the numerous mountain streams is well cultivated, although the extent of ground is not sufficient to produce enough grain for the whole population. Wheat, barley, rice, and Indian corn, are the chief crops.

The iron of the Vaziri Hill from Kani Goram is exported into the Dera Isma'il Khan District and Banu. It is described as a very rough iron; some of it is re-smelted at Kalabagh.

The iron mines are in the hill, called Koh-i-Mahsud, near Makin and Bobra; there the metal is found as a blackish and slightly lustrous ore; it is dug out and crushed. The furnace is made like a lime-kiln, beneath the shelter of a round roofed shed called Mundao. The furnace is charged with two parts charcoal and one of crushed ore; this being ignited, is urged by bellows. When the ore is melted, they insert an iron tool into the furnace and rake away the dross and slag, which allows the melted metal to fall to the bottom. This iron is called "khan matri;" it sells at 20 seers per rupee. This iron again, refined by melting, is called locally "kara kin" and "gapoli," and sells at 10 seers per rupee. The proprietary right in the mines is defined only by mutual agreement; it is said that Rs. 25,000 worth of iron from the mine is sold per annum, but this is probably over-estimated: Rs. 10,000 would be nearer the mark. The inhabitants of Makin and Sheikh Eldi make vessels and plates of the iron, and trade with them. The Turmuli tribe carry these vessels into Kabul and Ghazni for sale.

The chief articles of trade with us are iron, wood for firewood and also for the manufacture of charpoys, rope and matting. In return for these, agricultural implements and cloth are taken back by the caravans of the Alizai Mahsuds, in whose hands the whole of the British trade now lies. The Vaziris also trade, in like manner, with Barmul and Dawar.

Such is a general outline of the tribe who, upon annexation, became our neighbours, from the north-western border of the Kohat District, to the Ghwalaria (or Gumal Pass) in front of Dera Isma'il Khan, the measured distance along the boundary line being 140 miles. On their becoming so, every effort was made to conciliate them; but, as will be shewn, from the very commencement some clans of the Ahmadzais and Umarzais, and the whole Mahsud branch, exhibited the most hostile spirit and committed constant aggressions. No travellers or caravans were safe within miles of the border, except under strong escort. The salt mines in the neighbourhood of Bahadur Khel had to be protected by a fort and strong garrison. The Sardak Pass, through which runs the main road between Kohat and Banu, could not be traversed with safety until the heights were crowned. A line of posts had to be erected along the Banu and Dera Isma'il Khan borders to check inroads,* and every road within reach of the hills had to be guarded and patrolled.

Whilst Government was thus incurring expenditure for the protection of its subjects, its officers were required "to act purely on the defensive, to strive to conciliate those who dwell altogether beyond the boundary, and to reason into submission and rule with forbearance those dwelling within our territory." But it was not within the capacity of the Vaziris to believe that conciliation could co-exist with the ability to exact redress, and so far from crediting our power to inflict punishment upon them within their mountains,

* In the absence of knowledge of the country and of the ways of the marauders, the posts were originally built too far from the hills, and they had therefore not afforded the security they ought to have done. This was remedied, and every new post is now placed well to the front, at the foot of the hills.

they hoped and believed that by constantly harassing the border, and giving asylum to every malcontent or proclaimed criminal, Government would in the end be glad to buy them off. They accordingly kept the frontier in constant turmoil; the military posts, and on one occasion Banu itself, were threatened in force; the border villages were threatened, and in some instances, when not timely supported, attacked and sacked, and such of the inhabitants as fell into their hands slain or wounded; the village cattle when insufficiently guarded were driven off and the herdsmen killed,* whilst small bands roamed the country at night in the hope of coming across any travellers or husbandmen to be carried into captivity to ransom. A British officer was murdered whilst travelling along the frontier, and an attempt was made to plunder the town of Tank. The punitive measures which the aggressions of these people forced upon the Government, will be subsequently detailed.

The Leila and Gurbaz Branches.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

The most northerly branch of the Vaziri tribe is the Leila, then the Gurbaz.

The Gurbaz number 1,500, and reside on the borders of Khost, to the Afghan Governor of which they pay a small tribute. A small number live in the Tochi Pass, and form escorts for kafilas (caravans) to Dawar and Khost.

The Leila (number 1,500) and reside on the slopes of the Safed Koh; but the British Government has never come into contact with either of these branches, and no further allusion to them will be required.

The Darvesh Khel, generally known as the Utmanzais and the Ahmadzais.

In October the greater portion of these tribes descend to the lower hills bordering on the Kohat and Banu districts. Some of the clans, who are located on the lower slopes, remain there throughout the year. The lands thus temporarily vacated by the Vaziris, being occupied during their absence by the Ghilzai immigrants from the west, render the return of the Vaziris *en masse* before the spring impracticable.

Major James' Despatch,
Kabal Khel.

They have very few regular villages, and these are on the banks of rivers, protected by walls of loose stones and towers. Within the hills they reside in "*kirris*," or encampments, constructed of stout woollen blankets spread over curved sticks, with sides of coarse matting. These blankets are worth Rs. 20 to Rs. 30; are exceedingly durable, impervious to rain, and not easily destroyed by fire. The cattle, sheep, and camels, are all kept in the encampment, which is guarded by dogs of a large breed and of singular ferocity.

The only permanent traces of these Vaziris are found in the grave-yards of the tribe, which are scattered over the hills at convenient spots. The tombs are of loose stones put together with much care and neatness. These resting-places of their dead appear to be the sole objects of their veneration, and in them are deposited their household stuffs when absent from their camps, the boldest thief not venturing to lay sacriligious hands upon them.

Any respect they might have in excess of this was bestowed on their "Pir," or spiritual adviser, Kazi Najibula of Billand Khel, whose prayers and

* Many of the villages are within a short distance of the hills, and at some seasons the only grazing ground is at the foot of, or on the hills.

nostrums were sought for by the sick. In former days he travelled much amongst them, receiving their free will offerings; but having materially assisted the Amir Dost Mahomed in bringing Khost under subjection, he received a jaghir of Rs. 1,000 in that valley, which he found more remunerative. On the occasion of the Kabal Khel expedition he did good service for us, though he was not unmindful of his wild disciples when opportunity offered of doing them a good turn.

On both banks of the Kuram and also on the banks of the Kaiti, which rises in Khost and falls into the Kuram near Zirwahn, there are broad tracts of rich soil. The produce of these lands is a great source of wealth to the Vaziris. Beyond these streams they have no cultivation, but the hills afford abundance of rich pasture for their flocks, and the ravines are mostly lined with excellent grazing for their numerous camels. The general character of the hills to the right bank of the Kuram is not so difficult as their jagged outline would indicate. These are the rough walls which support extensive tracts of table-land, or conceal the grassy slopes within. On the right bank of the Kuram there are few places impracticable for horsemen.

The great apparent want is water; springs are rarely met with, and these are not copious; at some of their encampments it has to be brought from a distance of several miles.

The Ahmadzai branch of the Vaziris

ARE chiefly situated on the left bank of the Kuram, to the north of Banu.

Two of their clans, however, migrate into the Kohat District for pasturage—the Taji Khels into the Khatak Hills, and the Khojul Khels into the Miranzai Valley.

This branch is thus divided—

This branch is thus divided—

				Sub-divi- sions.	Fighting men.			
McGregor's Gazetteer.	Ahmadzais.	{	Ahmadzai.	{	Hati Khel	2	1,500	
				{	Sirki Khel	2	500	
					Umarzai	2	600	
			Shin Khel		{	Tazi Khel		1,300
				{	Zali Khel		1,400	
					Gangi Khel		500	
			Banu Khel.		{	Ali Khel		100
				{	Khojal Khel		1,200	
					Nasri Khel.	{	Kama Khel	
			Shadi Khel.		{	Bodin Khel		80
{	Bizand Khel			600				
	Paenda Khel			200				
	Kalu Khel.	{	Mahamad Khel	...	600			
{		Spir Khel.	{	Sudaun Khel	...	400		
		{	Sadi Khel	...	200			
	Total					9,580		
Independent					4,150			
Within the border					4,430			

All the Hati Khels come down to British territory and hold lands on the Vaziri Thall, north of the Kuram. Some of the Hati Khels go in the summer to the Shaki plain; they also extend back to the Kafirkot Range, and have their "kirris" scattered about in the various intervening nullahs. The principal settlement is Chapari, which is shared by the Umarzais, who with them control the communication from Kuram to the Thall *via* Gumatti, or the Barganattu. A few other tribes have settlements also between the Hati Khels and the Umarzais; but the quiet of the Thall border depends on the good behaviour of these two clans. The Hati Khels are very much employed

in the salt trade, and are not by any means an ill disposed tribe generally; but they have so many idle hands that it is not wonderful that some mischievous characters should be found amongst them.

In 1848 the Hati Khels murdered 3 men who had been set to watch their granaries, and then decamped to the hills. Lieutenant R. Taylor, who was holding Bani for the Sikhs during the minority of Dhulip Singh, on this moved a force out and seized a large quantity of their grain. Next year, 1849, being driven from the hills from want of forage, they came in and made terms with Lieutenant Pearse, paying Rs. 600 as blood-money for the murdered men. One Manzar Khan, however, did not pay his share and remained in hostility to Government, and on the occasion of the Umarzai attack on Bazid Khan's village in December 1849, he joined with a party of his tribe; and as he would not come in, Lieutenant Taylor moved out on the 20th April 1850 with a force of 2 howitzer guns, 5 camel guns, 3 companies Kator Mukhi Regiment, 3 companies Sobhan Khan's Regiment, 200 Irregular Horse, and 100 Irregular Foot, and cut all his crops without any resistance whatever being shown.

The Sirki Khels are located within British territory, and in the hills south of the Khissor Pass. Those beyond the border number 300 men, some of them living in the Wanuch Valley. The Umarzais are all situated in British territory, that is to say, they all have lands in British territory. They also extend back between the border villages and the continuation of the Kafirkot Range, where it cuts the Kuram. They have a village up there, called Gumatti. They extend to the east and join the Hati Khels at Chapari at the head of the Barganattu. Their "kirris" and flocks are in every nullah. They also go as far as Giring. Their own ancestral lands lie in the Sakdu near its head. They are the best armed of the Ahmadzais.

The Tazi Khels reside on the Khatak Hills in the Kohat District in winter; in summer they go up to hills west of Gomal. We do not appear to have had much to do with this section until quite lately. Colonel Taylor said, they "do not give much bother, but some of them occasionally join with the Kabal Khels in a raid. The section is generally trustworthy and respectable." The Tazi Khels can be sufficiently punished by prohibiting their grazing in the winter in British territory, as they have nowhere else to go, being at feud with the Ghilzais and Turis, and the snow prevents their remaining in the hills.

The Zali Khels live near the Gumatti Pass on lands which have come down to them from their forefathers, and also in Gendar and Zungarra. The Gangi Khels are scattered about the Zungarra ravine and Wullai ridge of the Kafirkot Range north of the Kuram. Colonel Taylor says they are always deeply engaged in the salt trade, but are always ready to join in any mischief that is going forward with the Kabal Khels and Hasn Khels (Utmanzais). Some live in the Wanuch Valley.

The Alikhanis are all far beyond the British border.

The Khojal Khels are all beyond the British border. Colonel Taylor says they are also deeply engaged in the salt trade, but are apparently always ready to join with the Khojal Khels and Hasn Khels (Utmanzais). One of the chiefs of this section has some land in the Bani District. They reside on the banks of the Kuram, from Thall towards Hangu. Some of them live in the Wanuch Valley, and in the winter many of them come into the Kohat District among the Khataks.

The Kama Khels are all beyond British territory, living at Tarap near the Kuram, 16 to 20 miles from the frontier. They also inhabit the lower part of the Shaki plain. Some also live in the Wanuch Valley on the Zungarra nullah.

The Bodin Khels are all in British territory, their land being on the Thall mixed up with those of the Spir Khels. Some of them go in summer to the lower part of the Shaki plain.

The Bizand Khel is a very well behaved, respectable tribe. They cultivate some land in a valley in the hills called Ping, which lies to the north of the Gumatti Pass between that and Barganattu. It has never been hostile to the British Government. Some also live in the Wanuch Valley. Their ancestral possessions are in Budi. The Moghal Khels never come down into British territory like the rest of the Bizand Khels.

The Paenda Khels have lands in British territory on the Dhamai Thall, mixed up with those of the Spir Khels. Some of the Paenda Khels live in the Wanuch Valley. The Bizand Khels, Paenda Khels, and Bodin Khels, are always ready to stand together. All of the Spir Khel sections, *viz.*, Mahamad Khels, Sudaun Khels, and Sadi Khels, except a few of the last who are great robbers, are in British territory.

All the Vaziris mentioned above as residing in British territory have settled down into good cultivators, and pay their revenue with praiseworthy regularity. Within the last few years they have become very eager to possess themselves of as much land as possible, and are not unfrequently to be seen in the British courts litigating for their rights with as much enthusiasm and not less noise than a Banuchi; for this Thall, though sandy, is very favourable for the rabi crops, and in some places produces also good kharif. During the early days of British rule, Major Taylor, the Deputy Commissioner, induced these tribes to settle by giving them grants of land. They are described as behaving themselves very well, and have furnished a police post in the midst of their camps for the better establishment of order amongst them.

The following statement shows in detail the extent and value of the land occupied by these Vaziris in British territory, and the amount of revenue paid by them :—

		Acres.	PRODUCE. Rs.	REVENUE. Rs.
Sudaun Khels including Paenda and Bodin Khels	...	6,525	8,968	1,685
Mahamad Khels...	...	1,205	9,213	700
Hati Khels	...	3,768	14,855	1,635
Sirki Khels	...	566	787	213
Umarzais	...	1,861	1,376	735
Khojal Khels	...	417	1,716	101
Total Ahmadzais	...	15,572	55,335	5,864
Jani Khels and Malikshahis...	...	1,937	6,637	500
Takhti Khels	...	2,076	5,278	465
Narmi Khels	...	750	2,104	325
Sardi Khels	...	1,085	2,774	506
Total Utmanzais	...	5,848	16,793	1,806
Grand Total Vaziris	...	21,420	72,128	7,670

Major Edwardes, writing in 1849, thus describes the emigration of the Ahmadzais to the plains of Banu: "A multiplying people, increasing flocks, and insufficient grazing grounds, first brought these nomads into Banu about 30 years ago. The Thall, too dreary and barren for the softer Banuchis, was to them a tempting space; they drove down their herds into it, and pitched their black blanket tents; the flocks fattened, and the winter which raged in their native hills passed luxuriously away in these new plains. The spring sun re-kindled the love of home, and made the goat-skin cloak hang heavy on the shoulders of the mountaineer, and the sheep to bleat under its fleece.

"The tribe turned their faces towards Spin Ghar, and the Banuchi thieves, hanging on the rear of their march to the very borders of the valley, were afraid to venture within the range of the jazails of the Ahmadzais, and the strangers went away unchallenged. Again and again the winter brought them back, and in occasional collisions between the savage of the plain and savage of the mountain the Vaziri proved ever the savagest, and became a name of fear and hatred in Banu. At length the Vaziri cast his eye on the Banuchi fields and harvests, and became possessed with the best of land; so he proceeded in his rough way to occupy what he wanted, which, for the convenience of being within reach of his own people, he chose nearest to the Thall; and when the Banuchi owner came to look after his crops he was 'warned off' with a bullet, as a trespasser. A sad era was this in Banuchi annals. Hushed were all private feuds now, for the lion had come among the wolves. Malik after malik was being robbed.

"At length the two great gundis (factions) laid aside their differences, and met in high council on the national dilemma. Then had been the time to fight, and fight desperately, ere the intruders had taken root; and some voices did cry out for war, but the chiefs of the two gundis knew their strength, and that the whole valley could not muster 20,000 men. On one side their neighbours of Dawar were afraid to assist them, for their little valley was nearer than Banu to the Vaziri Hills. The brave men of Marwat on the other side were scarcely less hostile than the Vaziris. The Vaziris themselves could summon 40,000 warriors. The 'council of war,' as usual, resolved on peace, 'tempered,' as Talleyrand said of the Russian despotism 'by assassination.' They would not fight the Vaziri tribe, but they would harass individuals with matchlock, knife, and ambuscade; and make occupation or cultivation impracticable. They little knew the Vaziri temper. The first act of treacherous hostility drew down a fearful and bloody retaliation. Where at first only a field was gone, now a home was desolate; and so both sides continued—the Vaziri encroaching, the Banuchi resisting; the Vaziri revenging, the beaten Banuchi retiring in despair. At length even this found its limit. Both sides grew weary. Only a few Vaziris cared for the new toy of cultivation, and many came to a compromise with the owners for small sums of money, inadequate, but better than nothing. The Vaziri intruders built forts like those of the Banuchis on the plundered lands, and, with the usual facility of revolutions in the east, soon passed into undisputed proprietors of some of the best tracts on the left bank of the Kuram. But they never mixed with the Banuchis either in marriage, religious ceremonies, or the more ordinary affairs of life. Had the Banuchis been less wronged, the Vaziri would have been still too proud to mingle blood, pure as the snow on the Safed Koh, with the mongrel lowland tribes of Banu. Proud, patriotic and united among themselves, austere and simple in their own manners, but hospitable to the stranger, and true to their guest against force or corruption, the Ahmadzais stood aloof from the people they oppressed, and looked on in contempt at their cowardly submission, their disunited efforts against the Sikh invaders, their lying dealings with each other, their treacherous assassinations at the board, and the covetous squabbles by which they converted into a hell the heavenly valley given them by nature."

After the annexation of the Panjab, the Vaziris were encouraged not only to retain the lands they had conquered, but to settle on them and leave their mountain homes altogether. The Board of Administration stated, "The Vaziri Hills were overstocked by a people who had never known external conquerors, and were too unanimous to quarrel among themselves; neither could those wild and elevated tracts afford for more than six months of the year any

“pasturage for the vast flocks and herds which are the wealth and subsistence of the clan, so that necessity alone would seem to have first driven the Vaziris down to the plains; a necessity to which habit had added force. For, the tribes of the Ahmadzai Division of the nation had now for 30 years migrated bodily with their families and herds to Banu every winter, and returned to the mountains when the snow had disappeared. In the course of this period they had possessed themselves (chiefly by violence) of not less than a seventh of the Tuppchs of Banu, besides the extensive Thall and open plain which lie between Banu and the Khatak Hills on the east, and the Dawar Hills upon the west; tracts which if surveyed would probably be found far to exceed the area of the 20 sub-divisions of Banu proper.

“The impolicy, if not the impossibility, of disturbing such old and extensive possession was so strongly felt by Sir Henry Lawrence, that he had confirmed to all Vaziris the lands they had held for five years previous to Lieutenant Edwardes’ second deputation to Banu; since which the Board believed experience had proved that the different tribes of Banu Vaziris were amenable to the civil power, or the contrary, in proportion to the extent and richness of their lands.

“Every tribe of Vaziris that was driven out of the valley of Banu must become a band of robbers on its border, both from necessity and revenge. In 1848, when the tribe of Mahomed Khels deserted the land at the head of the Kuram River, rather than submit to have their lands measured, they betook themselves to the neighbouring hills whence they made night attacks upon the Government outposts. In like manner, the Jani Khels carried off the cattle of the Miri Banuchis before Lieutenant Taylor had encouraged them to come down from the mountains.

“The policy, therefore, which promised most peace in Banu was that of inducing (by every encouragement consistent with fairness to the Banuchis) the Vaziri tribes to settle in the plains, to cease to be graziers and become cultivators; and so much importance did the Board attach to the carrying out of this system, that they were disposed to regard its good or ill-success—the maintenance of friendly or unfriendly relations with the Vaziris—as the great touch-stone of a district officer’s influence in Banu.”

The Utmanzai branch of the Vaziris

ARE mainly located on the right bank of the Kuram River, occupying the hills between that river and the valleys of Khost and Dawar, which are dependencies of Kabul. The tribe is thus divided—

tribe is thus divided—					Fighting men.
MAHMUD OR MAHMIT KHEL.	{	Hasn Khel Divisions,	3	...	1,100
		Wazi Khel	8	...	800
		Bara Khel	2	...	2,000
IBRAHIM KHEL	{	Manzar Khel	2	...	800
		Mada Khel	3	...	2,000
		Tori Khel	6	...	3,500
McGregor's Gazetteer.	{	Kabal Khel	3	...	3,500
		Malikshahi	0	...	p
		Baki Khel	3	...	p
		Jani Khel	2	...	p
WALI KHEL	...				
Total					17,200
Of whom there are beyond the border					14,700
Inside					2,500

The Mahmud Khels live in Razmak and Shum, on the Sakdu Khasur.

Of these, the Hasn Khels live on the Kaiti River, as do the Drudanis, an unimportant section.

The Wazi Khels live up to the south-west of Dawar.

The Bara Khels (the whereabouts of this section is not known).

The Manzar Khels chiefly reside in the Margha, at the head of the Tochi Pass, west of Dawar, and in a portion of Shehrna.

The Mada Khels inhabit the country near the Ghabbar Mountain, south of Dawar, a portion of Shehrna and of the Sheratala plain.

The Tori Khels are found in Razmak, in the Khissor Valley, parts of Shakhdu, and on the Sheratala plain. The Tori Khels have never given any trouble. Colonel Taylor mentions that they have a feud with the Mahsuds. They have "kirris" in the mouth of the Shakhdu.

The Kabal Khels are divided into—(1) Miami, (2) Saifali, (3) Pihali.

They inhabit a part of Shawal (Miami section), the upper part of Shaki (Saifali and Pihali sections), in the summer, and a part of the Sheratala plain. In the winter they come down to the north portion of the Vaziri Hills on both banks of the Kuram. They overlook the west portion of Miranzai and adjoin the Bahadur Khel sub-division of Kohat. They are a wild, lawless set.

About 300 of the Maliksbahis cultivate in British territory, being mixed up with the Jani Khels. The rest are situated in Shehr Khani and the upper parts of Shawal and Shaki.

The Baki Khels are all in British territory during winter. They are divided into—

1. Sardi Khels,
2. Takhti Khels,
3. Narmi Khels,

which are again sub-divided into numerous sections. They number about 1,200 fighting men.

The Baki Khels go in summer to the lower part of Shawal, their ancestral lands. The Baki Khels (says Taylor) have always been an excessively well-behaved tribe, have paid their revenue regularly, and have not only refrained from plunder themselves, but have always refused a road to the evil disposed through their "kirris." Urmston does not say anything contrary to this. The lands of the Baki Khels lie on the edge of the Miri sub-division, on the north bank of the Tochi River, and round the Tochi outpost, and below it, opposite the Madan sub-division (Banu) on the south bank.

Thus the Baki Khels cultivate extensively on both banks of the Tochi, and their grazing grounds extend from the great Kararra water-course, opposite the Mindu Konai Range, into Dawar to the lands of the Jani Khels near Nalli. They are responsible for the Tochi Pass (in consideration of which they are allowed to have 4 sowars in the frontier Militia), and for all the passes between the Bararra and Khissor; and they are also responsible, jointly with the Jani Khels, for the "Khaissra" and "Khissor" Passes; the former situated between the ranges of hills called Ishmail and Ucha, which open in front of Miran; the latter bounded on either side by mountains called Rucha and Mangri.

SECTION II.

The Expedition against the Umarzai Section of the Ahmadzais,
December 1852.

ON the annexation of the Panjab in 1849, the Umarzais, like other Vaziris, cultivated land in the Banu Valley, which had been wrested from the Banuchis of the neighbourhood. The head of these Banuchis was a local chief, named Bazid Khan.

The Umarzais used to pay their revenue through this man, who was responsible for the collection. Some of the Umarzais used to reap the harvest, go off to the hills, deserting their land, and leaving Bazid Khan to pay instead of them. Bazid Khan would then pay the revenue and occupy the lands of the defaulters. These defaults being repeated, some of the Umarzais were seized as a last resource. Shortly afterwards, two of the hostages were sent to ask the Umarzais to come into Banu and settle accounts. The day they came in, there happened to be no European officer at Banu, the district officer and the assistant being in the interior of the district; so that the Umarzais met Bazid Khan, some conversation ensued about the accounts with him, at which the Umarzais were dissatisfied. Forgetting that there were British officers near, who were anxious to settle everything, the Umarzais resolved to wreak their hatred upon the Banuchis; so that very night they attacked Bazid Khan's villages, in force 3,000 strong, killed several people, among whom was Bazid Khan's son, and sacked 14 villages, when 6 men were killed and 6 wounded, and damage done to the extent of Rs. 12,000.

This happened on the 3rd December 1849. Soon afterwards a body of 1,500, consisting of Umarzai, Mahamad Khel and Hati Khel sections, with some Kabal Khels and Mahsuds, came down through the Gumatti Pass, but were gallantly repulsed by a party of 350 horse and foot under Mr. McMahon, Extra Assistant Commissioner, the detachment losing 2 killed and several wounded, Mr. McMahon being himself hit.

Major Taylor, Deputy Commissioner, thus described the state of Banu:—"At this time, and for a long period afterwards, we were in a manner at open war with the Umarzais and sections of other tribes, which joined and assisted them in night attacks, cattle forays, &c., on the Government lands,—a state of things which required unremitting watchfulness, harassing labor in patrolling, and prompt action when the marauders were known to be afoot."

In November of 1850 the Umarzais having induced the Mahsud Vaziris to join them, made a formidable demonstration with several thousand men. They intended to attack the capital of Banu itself, had they not found a strong force ready for them. They assailed some border villages, but were repulsed. In December of the same year they carried off a caravan of supplies proceeding to a British camp.

In 1851 they induced the Kabal Khels to join them and appeared with 2,000 men, but retreated before our outposts; and in March they made a night attack on an outpost, but were driven back with loss by the garrison, consisting of a detachment of

Report on relations with
Frontier Tribes by Mr. Temple.

Report by Major Taylor.

Report by Deputy Com-
missioner.

the 2nd Panjab Cavalry and 2nd Panjab Infantry, the 2nd Panjab Cavalry having 1 man wounded. Within the same year they once attacked a police post, and once a baggage party.

From 1851 to 1852 the outposts of Banu were constantly engaged in skirmishes with the Vaziris, who came down almost daily and occupied the low hills in front of the Gumatti post, firing long shots at the men holding it, but the enemy never could be drawn into close quarters in the plain, and following them even into the low range of hills was strictly forbidden.

On one occasion, 13th March 1851, a body of some 500 or 600 Vaziris entered the plains near the Gumatti Pass and were driven back to the hills by the outposts, when Captain Walsh with the troops marginally noted moved out from Banu, and after a skirmish drove the enemy with some loss from the breastworks they had erected across the pass. The casualties on our side were—

Report by Captain Walsh.
2nd Panjab Cavalry.
2nd Panjab Infantry.
No. 2 P. L. F. Battery.

Artillery.

2 men, 1 horse wounded.

2nd Panjab Infantry.

1 man wounded.

Efforts had been twice made to settle some terms with the Umarzais, but they continued not only to threaten overt attacks, but also to rob and murder by stealth. Thus, ever since the Umarzais had left their lands, they had been in open rebellion against us, and at the end of 1852 permission was accorded

Demi-official letter from
Major Nicholson.

to Major John Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner, to arrange for their chastisement. At the time this permission was received, it was believed that a portion of the tribe would make submission, and operations were deferred while the result of their councils was at all doubtful.

But very shortly afterwards, the Southern Umarzais, who were thinly scattered in the low hills between the debouchment of the Tochi River and Ghabar Mountain, incited by a holy man, suddenly marched down towards the Kuram in the hopes of surprising one of our villages. In this they were frustrated by the arrangements made by Major Nicholson; and the time had now arrived for showing them that it was not fear which had induced us to offer to listen to any offers of submission, and that we were not to be annoyed any longer with impunity.

As the greatest secrecy was absolutely necessary, the 4th Panjab Infantry was ordered to march from Bahadur Khel as if in course of relief, and 2 companies of the 1st Panjab Infantry were ordered from Kohat with the same reason assigned, whilst the 6th Panjab Police Battalion was ordered up from Dera Ismail Khan.

The plan of operation was as follows:—One column was to march from Banu at 10 p.m. through the Gumatti Pass on Derabina and Giring, (distant the former about 14 and the latter about 17 or 18 miles,) so that, if possible, a simultaneous attack might be made on both places at daybreak. The latter village was at the foot of a narrow precipitous chasm in the Kafirkote Range, through which ran the road to Chapari, which is not far from the summit of the ridge. If the surprise proved complete, and this pass was undefended, the force was to advance by it to Chapari, otherwise it was to await until Chapari had been taken by the second column in reverse.

The second column was to move from Lattamar at 9 p.m. on Chapari by the Barganattu Pass, distant about 20 miles. This column consisted of the troops coming from Bahadur Khel and Kohat, and which were to reach Lattamar that day.

Both these columns were to bivouack the next night in the neighbourhood of Giring or Derabina.

A third column was to move from Banu at 11 p.m. on the Umarzai encampments, thinly scattered among the low hills near the mouth of the Khissor and Sein Passes; it was to be accompanied by the Malikhs of the Jani and Bakhi Khel tribes, who would be useful as guides, as well as to prevent any of the members of their tribes from making common cause with the Umarzais.

The "Kiris" (encampments) were so few and thinly scattered that it was not expected this column would be able to effect much, but it was considered its operations would show the Umarzais that they were no longer secure in that part of the country, and that they would have to seek other and inferior pasturage.

Major Nicholson added that the Umarzais were so weak he should not have thought of taking so large a force against them, were it not that the presence of a small force might, and probably would, induce the neighbouring tribes to coalesce against us.

Mounted Vedettes from the levies were to be posted early in the night at the mouth of the passes from the Kuram to the Lattamar posts, to prevent any scouts from Banu or the Thall preceding the columns with intelligence.

The heights on each side of the Gumatti Pass were to be occupied by parties of foot levies as soon as the force had entered.

The next day the Thall was to be patrolled from an early hour by cavalry to prevent the Thall Vaziris entering the hill.

Demi-official from Major
Chamberlain, Military Secretary.

The troops that would be left at Banu were Head-Quarters, 2nd Panjab Cavalry, 1st Panjab Light Field Battery, and 1st Police Battalion.

On the night of the 20th December 1852, the three columns moved off according to the plans already detailed:—

1st COLUMN—2nd Panjab Infantry under Captain Johnston, with Lieutenant Pollock Political Officer.

2ND COLUMN—Captain Walsh, 4th Panjab Infantry, commanding; 2 companies, 1st Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant C. P. Keyes commanding; 4th Panjab Infantry, Captain Walsh; Major John Nicholson Political Officer.

3RD COLUMN—Lieutenant Younghusband commanding; Detachment 40 Sabres 2nd Panjab Cavalry, Lieutenant C. Nicholson commanding. (400 bayonets), 6th Panjab Police Battalion, Lieutenant Younghusband Captain of Police, 50 Sabres, Mounted Police.

The first column entered the Gumatti Pass at midnight, and after a very *difficult and fatiguing march of six hours* reached the friendly village of Gumatti. After crossing the valley in which Gumatti is situated, and a low range of hills, the village of Derabina was come upon by the column, when all the flocks were captured and the village was destroyed.

Operations of the 1st
Column.

Report by Captain J.
Johnston, 2nd Panjab In-
fantry.

Captain Johnston then advanced, and with 2 companies crowned the hills above the Giring ravine, the remainder of his regiment holding the hills which commanded the entrance to it; and so correctly had the combination

been arranged and executed, that as this column arrived on the top of the hills, the head of the 2nd Column (4th Panjab Infantry and 1st Panjab Infantry), under Captain Walsh, which had marched from Lattamar, was seen emerging from the village of Giring.

The 2nd column (140 men, 1st Panjab Infantry, 350, 4th Panjab Infantry) entered the Burganattu Pass at midnight (9 miles from Lattamar), and following the course of the nullah for about 12 miles, the crest of the Kafirkot Range was reached after a gradual ascent a little before daybreak. After a short halt the troops descended into a nullah leading towards the Kuram River; and after about a mile some Vaziri encampments were seen.

The first village (Chapari) was taken completely by surprise and destroyed, a considerable flock of sheep and 5 camels fell into our hands; the enemy, it was said, had 8 men killed. Three other encampments in the very formidable Giring Pass were destroyed, but they had been abandoned before the troops could get up. This column was joined by the first column at about 9 A.M., at the mouth of the Giring Pass, when the troops proceeded to the village of Gumatti, where they bivouacked for the night; the 1st Punjab Infantry and 4th Panjab Infantry having marched over some 28 miles of very difficult ground in many places.

The combined movements of the 1st and 2nd columns had been so well executed, and the surprise was so complete, that the enemy had been able to offer little resistance; the Umarzais had been defeated, (with only two casualties on our side during the operations,) in their own retreats on the strongest ground in hills, which Major Nicholson considered more difficult than any he had seen in Afghanistan.

But, however successful these operations had been, they had been dearly purchased by a sad occurrence. On the 4th Panjab Infantry reaching their bivouack 23 men of the regiment were reported missing. Before moving off from Lattamar, to preserve the secrecy of the movement, it had not been thought advisable to weed out weakly or sickly men, and the regiment moved off as if marching in relief towards Dera Ghazi Khan; *but before* the regiment entered the hills, it was halted for the purpose, and the men deemed unfit sent back. It was ascertained afterwards that these 23 men (who had entered the hills with the regiment) had either fallen out, overcome by sleep and fatigue, or straggling behind had missed the road, when they were killed by the Vaziris in detail after the corps had descended from the heights.

The troops were not molested at their bivouack, nor on their return to Banu by the Kuram Pass the following morning. Before the column marched on Banu, a wing of the 2nd Panjab Infantry and some sowars under Major Nicholson destroyed some encampments without any resistance on the part of the enemy.

The 3rd column after passing through low hills reached at daybreak open ground, when the cavalry were pushed on against the nearest village, the cattle of which were captured and the village burnt. Two other villages were then burnt by the infantry; but as the highest range had now been reached, and as the troops were within 3 miles of Dawar, according to instructions, no further advance was made.

As the column retired with the captured flocks and herds, the Vaziris endeavoured to annoy the skirmishers holding the heights on the sides of the passes,

but with little effect, as the 6th Panjab Battalion had only 1 non-commissioned officer killed, 2 privates wounded; whereas the loss of the enemy was believed to have been pretty severe, and 2 of their number were taken prisoners.

The men of the 6th Panjab Police Battalion had marched 100 miles in four days to take part in the operations, and twelve hours after their arrival at Banu they had entered the hills, marching not less than 30 miles before they returned to their camp in British territory.

The approbation of Government was afterwards conveyed to Major Nicholson and the other officers for the way in which the operations had been conducted.

Government Letter.

In the month of September, Major Nicholson reported that the tribe were thoroughly humbled and had several times sent in suing for peace, but he recommended that terms should not be accorded them for a time. Their requests were subsequently granted, and they were re-admitted to their lands in Banu, and they are now as good cultivators as any section of the Vaziri tribe.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

In the Mahamad Khel complications of 1870, the Umarzais not only passively, but actively, assisted them. Some were present at the skirmish at the Kuram Pass on 24th April 1871, others were engaged in the attack on the village of Satha in February, and others were guilty of separate acts of hostility. On the conclusion of the Mahamad Khel difficulties, the Umarzais were also called to account, and ordered to produce all the men concerned in the outrages. These, with three exceptions, were given up, when fines proportionate to their offences were levied.

SECTION III.

Expedition against the Kabal Khel Section of the Utmanzai Vaziris, by a force under Brigadier Chamberlain, C.B., December 1859.

IN 1856, in his report on the frontier tribes, Mr. R. Temple, the Secretary to the Panjab Government, thus wrote of the Kabal Khels. They are a wild, lawless sect; always ready to join with the Turis, Zaimukht Afghans, and Orakzais, in any mischief or devilry, if the term may be used, such as raids on the Bangash and Khatak villages of the Kohat District.

Mr. Temple's Report on Frontier Tribes.

In the autumn of 1851, they signalized themselves by an audacious attack on Bahadur Khel and its salt mines. For this purpose they assembled in considerable force, and induced many Khatak villages round Bahadur Khel to league with them.

Detachment, 1st Panjab Cavalry; 5 companies, Sobhan Khan's Regiment.

Colonel Sobhan Khan's Report.

Troops were, however, promptly brought up from Nari to the scene of action, and the Vaziris dispersed without effecting much mischief. The cavalry pushed on ahead of the infantry, and on their approach the enemy fled, pursued by the cavalry, by whom 11 of the enemy were killed, amongst them a malik and his son. The villagers had 6 wounded.

This attempt does not appear to have been prompted by any particular motive. There was no grievance with regard to salt. Any doubts which the Vaziris might have felt as to the intentions of the British Government had been long since removed, when the salt mines were opened at the beginning of 1850, and a very low rate demanded. Being, like the Afridis, largely engaged in the salt carrying trade, they doubtless had perceived the political importance of the mines, and the great influence which accrued to the British Government from the possession of them. For the same reasons, the Khataks envied their masters the command of these valuable resources, and would have been glad if in co-operation with the Vaziris they could have secured the possession. It is probable, however, that no fixed idea existed in the minds of these savages on this occasion, and there certainly had been no provocation whatever given.

It was now determined to hold Bahadur Khel in force, and to construct a fort. During the construction of this fort, on which duties the 4th Panjab Infantry and Sobhan Khan's Police Battalion were employed, the Vaziris gave all opposition in their power, and constantly harassed the working parties.

On one occasion, a party of some 50 or 60 were attacked by 11 sabres of the 1st Panjab Cavalry, when 2 were killed and some 7 wounded, the cavalry having 2 men wounded.

Regimental History, 1st Panjab Cavalry.

Up to the year 1854, the Kabal Khels had been in the constant habit of committing raids in the Kohat District, and more especially in the Khatak Hills. No less than twenty of these affairs happened in the years 1852 and 1853. As the practice was on the increase, Captain Coke, the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, took decisive steps. The Kabal Khels were interdicted from trading at the salt mines. Two parties of these people, together with their cattle,

were seized; and by the medium of one of their men a message was sent to the head-quarters of the tribe, to the effect that unless satisfaction was given, the cattle would be sold, the proceeds applied to the reimbursements of the sufferers by the raids, and the men detained as hostages. The tribe then lost no time in making terms; the value of the stolen property was realized; the chief of another section of the tribe came forward as security for the future conduct of the Kabal Khels, when their prisoners were released; and for a time the Kabal Khels became more careful in their behaviour.

But, as detailed in the operations of the Miranzai Field Force in 1855, Chapter VIII, these Vaziris having resisted an invitation of the Commissioner of Peshawar to come in for the settlement of sundry questions and differences, a force crossed the Kuram to destroy their standing crops, when the mere exhibition of our strength was sufficient to bring this tribe to terms, without any resort to punitive measures; and as the Miranzai Field Force was returning from the Kuram Valley in 1856, five of the cavalry grass-cutters were murdered at Thall by a party of the Miami section of the Kabal Khels; when as there was not sufficient evidence to prove the murder against any individuals, a fine of Rs. 1,200 was taken from the tribe.

On the night of the 5th November 1859, Captain R. Mecham, of the Bengal Artillery (Commandant of No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery), was proceeding from Banu towards Kohat, when about 2 miles from the outpost and village of Lattamar he was set upon and murdered by a gang of marauders.

Captain Mecham was at the time very ill, and was travelling in a dooly; his escort consisted of 2 sowars of the Banu Mounted Police, he having sent on 2 men of his Battery to Lattamar to increase his escort from there.

It does not appear that the murderers had any previous knowledge of an officer being likely to pass that way; they were simply prowling about on a marauding expedition, and seeing the approaching light of the torches, they had hid themselves in some bushes to waylay the travellers. The moment the attack was made, the mounted police basely deserted Captain Mecham, and the dooly-bearers took to flight. Captain Mecham attempted to keep off his assailants with his revolver, but he was stoned and cut down; and thus fell

Brigadier-General Chamberlain's Report.

one, by "whose death the Bengal Army had lost an accomplished soldier and gentleman, and the Panjab Irregular Force a comrade beloved by all ranks."

The party consisted chiefly of Hati Khels of the Ahmadzai branch of the Vaziris, attached to a marauding band under the leadership of one Zangi, a Kabal Khel, some of whom afterwards found asylum in the encampment of another robber band, known as Manzur's sons belonging to the Hati Khel section.

Captain Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, at once proceeded to our frontier village of Thall in Miranzai, and summoned the chiefs of the different Vaziri sections; but although it was known the act was greatly disapproved by other portions of the tribe, the Kabal Khels refused to render any satisfaction for the murder, or to give up the men implicated, from the strong prejudice amongst the border tribes against the surrender of any person seeking an asylum with them. Our sole object was then explained to the other Vaziri sections, and they were warned of the penalties they would incur by siding with the Kabal Khels, from whom it now became necessary to exact retribution by force of arms.

The different locations, &c., of the Ahmadzais and Utmanzais have been already given. Our chief concern was with the Kabal Khels, for having first given asylum to the murderers; and although others were implicated, the main object to be kept in view was to prevent any combination, when by directing our efforts against the Kabal Khels only, the treatment of the other clans would become in a great measure dependent on the line of conduct they might adopt.

Major James's Despatch. Although the Kabal Khels numbered only 3,000 men*, yet the clans in their immediate neighbourhood could muster from 8,000 to 10,000; and it remained to be seen whether the rapid advance of the troops would give sufficient weight to our warnings and threats to deter others from openly siding with the Kabal Khels. The proverbial unity of the Vaziris was against such a supposition (the peculiar customs and laws by which this unity is fostered have been already described), nevertheless Major James, Commissioner, did not anticipate opposition on the part of the other branches, as we had a great hold on many of them from the fact of their bringing their cattle to graze within our territories, and much could be done in the way of reducing opposition, and in preventing other tribes joining the Kabal Khels by timely warning and advice. It was calculated that 6,000 men might be brought against us, but not more than half that number (the Commissioner thought) would be probably collected.

For a century the Vaziris had lorded it over their neighbours, none of whom were safe from their raids and encroachments, and their name was held in terror wherever it reached. It was not to be wondered then that under such circumstances they had assumed an air of proud superiority. Their boast that they had seen "kings coming and kings going, but had never seen the king who had taken revenue from them," was not unfounded; for no army had ever penetrated their country, or reduced any of their tribes to obedience. If in this proud spirit they now miscalculated the power and resources of their adversaries, they were not the first men who had similarly erred.

Their conduct towards the British Government hitherto had not been particularly hostile, and since the expedition of 1855† they had refrained from those acts of plunder in Miranzai, which had previously been so frequent. Such robberies as were committed by them in British territories were mostly the acts of the two gangs under the leadership of "Zangi," and the sons of the late Manzur Khan. Their own predatory habits in other quarters compelled them to connive at those acts, and thus to become responsible for them.

It has been already stated that in the winter months the Utmanzais are mainly located on the right bank of the Kuram River, and at this time the several sub-divisions of the Kabal Khels were thus located, below the Afghan frontier village of Billand Khel, cultivating for their spring crops.

Regarding the season for operations the Commissioner wrote:—

There are two seasons when the tribe is peculiarly open to punishment, *viz.*, the beginning of winter and the spring; more *real* injury can be inflicted in the winter; more *visible* in the spring. A force proceeding against them at the former season would carry off their winter stores and compel them to retreat to their higher hills almost to starvation. In the spring the crops would be destroyed upon which the tribe is dependent in the summer. He therefore advocated immediate action not only for the above reasons, but

* Estimated at 3,500 in McGrégor's Gazetteer.

because a blow delivered at the time strikes greater terror into the mountain tribes than at a subsequent period.

Moreover, the winter rains might be expected to set in early in January, after which military operations beyond the Kuram would be almost impracticable.

The line of operations led through a portion of the territories of the Amir of Kabul, and communications had to be addressed to His Highness on the subject.

With regard to the punishment of the Hati Khels, the Commissioner of Peshawar wrote:—

“The measures to be adopted towards the second gang, *viz.*, that of Manzur's sons, must be concerted at Banu. They will require no advance of troops, but must consist of strong pressure on the Hati Khel Vaziris within our border, and the imprisonment of such of their leaders as will not vigorously act in the matter.”

As the refusal of the Kabal Khels to make restitution had all along been anticipated, orders had been early given for a force to be assembled at Kohat. It was impossible, as already stated, to say what numbers might be opposed to us, or how far it might be necessary to follow the Vaziris into the heart of their mountains, when every additional mile would increase the difficulty of keeping open the communication with the rear, or lastly, what was the nature of the difficulties to be overcome, the country being then totally unknown.

The Peshawar Mountain Train and 4th Sikh Infantry were ordered from Hazara.

No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery and the 6th Panjab Infantry from Dera Ismail Khan.

To Peshawar requisition was sent for—

- 1 Company, Sappers and Miners,
- 100 Guide Cavalry,
- 300 Guide Infantry,
- 6 Elephants for a Field Battery,
- 1 Company, Mazbi Pioneers,
- 1 Engineer Officer,
- 1 Officer for Quarter-Master General's Department,
- 4 Infantry Officers to be attached to Panjab Infantry Regiments,
- 2 Artillery Officers, and
- A Mountain Train, with 2 guns, 2 howitzers.

Any sickly or weakly men were to be left behind.

The troops were to move equipped for service, bringing full proportion of ammunition, and were to be well provided with shoes, postins, and bedding; but no summer clothing was to be taken, and the men were to wear any shoes they liked. The full proportion of baggage for the transport of the men's baggage was to be allowed. The orders issued to the troops in former expeditions regarding re-gauging artillery ammunition, hobbles for vicious horses, unbelted bullets, spare shoes for the artillery and cavalry horses, &c., were repeated, as well as for every regiment carrying four days' supply of food for man and beast, in addition to which salt, gur, sugar, spices, tobacco, &c., &c., were to be arranged for regimentally for the whole probable time of the operations, as these articles would not be carried for issue by the Civil

Department, and arrangements were made for a seller of grog and drugs to accompany the camp. Every infantry regiment was to carry—

2 Hatchets, hand, per company.

2 Picks and two phowrahs.

4 Spare pelves.

Officers' camp equipage was to be reduced as much as the season would admit. A single-poled tent was allowed for each mess, but officers were to confine themselves to pals.

The dooly-bearers and regimental establishments were to be included, and spare pals taken for them. No superfluous followers were to be allowed in camp, and shelter for all followers was to be provided.

No dogs were to be taken as they disturbed a camp at night.

On the 19th December the expeditionary force encamped at Thail, the frontier village of Miranzai.

The following day it crossed the Kuram River, encamping at the village of Billand Khel, in the territory of the Amir of Kabul; instructions had been sent by His Highness to render every assistance to the expedition, but the troops were only in Kabul territory whilst encamped there, as all the country to the south of that village forms the possessions of the Independent Vaziris.

Previous to arrival at Billand Khel, it had been reported to the Deputy Commissioner that the notorious "Zangi," the bandit leader of the gang to which the murderers had belonged, was still at his encampment on the left bank of the Kuram with about 100 followers.

General Chamberlain awaited only the return of spies to verify this intelligence to send a detachment across the low hills, and by the Chapari table-land to surprise the party, whilst cavalry proceeded down the right bank by the river to cut off their retreat in that direction.

But by some accident the spies experienced difficulty in gaining the Deputy Commissioner's tent, and when they did arrive it was too late to undertake the enterprise.

The main body of the Kabal Khels had determined to make their stand on a high range of hills called Maidani (highest point 5,000 feet, and about 3,500 above Billand Khel), and to this place they had, previous to crossing the Kuram, removed all their encampments including their families, flocks, and herds, and they had prepared for its defence by storing grain and raising breastworks.

Maidani is about 8 miles west of Billand Khel, and its general features

may be described as two parallel ranges contiguous to each other, terminating at either end in a gorge, and enclosing a long narrow valley, the inward slopes of both mountains are tolerably easy and covered with grass and bushes, but the outward sides or faces are rugged and precipitous.

The two gorges, which are the water channels, are the means of entrance to the valley,—the one facing the east being termed Gundiob, and the other to the south, Zakha.

The watch-fires of the enemy on the surrounding peaks were nightly visible from our camp. The enemy were variously stated at from 2,000 to 3,000 men, and it was known that no other clan had yet joined them; some offers of arms and ammunition had been made, but proudly rejected in their self-confidence, as it was reported on all sides they considered their position too strong to be attacked. On the 21st, however, there were rumours that the Vaziris were

planning to remove as soon as the force should break ground, and it was agreed that night between the Brigadier-General and the Commissioner that an attack should be made as soon as possible.

Although it had been reported that the easiest and nearest approach was from the Gundiob side, for many reasons it was desirable the Zakha entrance should be seen before the plan of attack was decided on, and on the 21st a reconnoissance had been made by the Brigadier-General with a strong body of cavalry. The distance to the Zakha entrance was found to be about 16 miles from camp, and the gorge a difficult one. The Gundiob ravine was also examined, and the advantage of that route for an attack over the Zakha gorge verified.

At 6 o'clock the following morning the troops noted in the margin, (the

Guide Infantry, Lieutenant Kennedy commanding.

4th Sikh Infantry, Major Rothney commanding.

1st Panjab Infantry, Major Lambert commanding.

3rd Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Ruxton commanding.

4th Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Jenkins commanding.

4 Pieces Peshawar Mountain Train, Captain L. G. Bruce.

3 Pieces Hazara Mountain Train, Captain DeBude.

cavalry and field guns being ordered to follow at daybreak), marched upon Gundiob, to which place the camp was to be moved.

Each corps of the main column was to carry 50 rounds of ammunition per man, and to be accompanied by two mule loads of ammunition. The horses of native officers of infantry were to be left at the camp. All men were to carry cooked food with them.

As far as Gundiob (5 miles) the road was good; from Gundiob it became more confined, with abrupt hills on either side impracticable for field artillery, which with the cavalry remained at the new camp.

As Maidani was approached, parties of the enemy were observed on the hill tops, and the Guide infantry, supported by the Peshawar Mountain Train and the 4th Sikh Infantry, at once ascended the range of hills to the left, whilst the 1st Panjab Infantry, supported by the Hazara Mountain Train and 3rd Panjab Infantry, crowned the range to the right.

The left column was under the immediate orders of the Brigadier-General, who was accompanied by the Commissioner, while the command of the right column devolved upon Major Lambert, with whom was the Deputy Commissioner. The orders for both columns were to advance along the ridge, keeping parallel to each other.

The 4th Panjab Infantry in reserve moved up the bed of the ravine (which runs between and separates the two ranges), so as to close that passage and be ready to assist either column.

Major Lambert's column was the first in action, it having the easiest hill, to ascend, the constant training of the Hazara Mounted Train over the mountains of Hazara telling much in its favour; whereas the Peshawar Train had not had the advantages of such practice on the hill side.

It afterwards appeared that the enemy expected an attack by the Zakha gorge, from the reconnoissance having been made in that direction, and from the pioneers having been employed in making a gun road below Billand Khel, and the main body of the Kabal Khels had therefore posted themselves at that entrance. Breastworks on the right side of the gorge had not been thrown up, and little or no resistance was offered to the column. This enabled Major Lambert to outflank from his side with the mountain guns the breastwork held on the opposite range, and to this circumstance was attributed the little loss sustained by the left column.

On the left range breastworks had been raised at several points, and at first they were bravely defended by the enemy, who numbered about 1,500 men. Indeed, the charge by a small body of Vaziri footmen with some 10 or 12 horsemen upon the skirmishers of the Guide Infantry, under the command of Captain Gordon, 10th Panjab Infantry, (temporarily attached to the Guides,) whilst ascending to the attack of the first breastwork, was as gallant a deed as was ever seen, and elicited the admiration of our officers and men. It was wonderful how the horsemen, mounted on small but wiry mares, managed to charge down over the rocks and declivities.

But it soon became apparent that the enemy were deficient in fire-arms, and, opposed to our arms and discipline, sword and shield, and pistol, had no chance, and the Vaziris were speedily repulsed, and the breastwork carried. Another party of a dozen footmen, behind a low breastwork on the summit of a hill, endeavoured to keep their ground against a company of rifles. Having exhausted their ammunition they took to stones, which in Vaziri hands are formidable missiles, and coming out in front kept up an incessant discharge, wounding several sepoys. At last, finding that their foes were closing in upon them, several came down sword in hand to die.

The enemy now threatened in flank and pressed in front were driven from ridge to ridge at a trifling loss to the troops, and after two hours' rough climbing they were in possession of the heights above the Vaziri encampments.

As it was now past noon, and as there was no knowledge of the hills in advance or of the enemy's line of retreat, and as the troops had then been six hours on foot, and as they had still to return some miles to camp, possibly followed the whole way, the halt was sounded, and the reserve ordered to destroy the three large encampments, in which they were aided by bodies of the foot levies, who had followed in rear, when the course of two hours everything was either destroyed or carried away.

Very little grain had been taken away by the Vaziris, consequently all their winter stores fell into our hands, together with a large number of sheep and goats.

Rain began to fall in the afternoon, and the troops reached the camp at Gundiob at dark.

The casualties were small. (See Appendix B.)

The enemy left some 20 bodies on the ground, 3 of their principal leaders were amongst this number; and the Vaziris must have had some 50 casualties in all.

Between the Vaziris and the Turis there has been a feud for many generations, and no opportunity was lost by either

Major James's Report.

party of injuring the other. In 1856, when the force was sent* to recover damages from the Turis

for continued acts of plunder in British territories, a sum of about Rs. 1,500 was claimed from them by the Vaziris, and as the cattle had been stolen from Cis-Kuram, the claim was admitted and the money recovered. It was now the turn of the Turis, and more willing hands could not have been found for the purpose. Well acquainted with all the Vaziri paths and ravines, they acted as guides to the force, as spies, and as plunderers on their own account: following the troops with donkeys and bullocks, they left not an article behind which could be turned to any use, and carried off immense stores of grain and flocks of sheep from the hills around.

On one occasion a party wandered off to an encampment which they believed to be too near our camp to contain Vaziris, but they were disappointed; some of them were killed, and the rest only escaped by the abject submission of placing grass in their mouths, signifying that they were the beasts of burden of the Vaziris.

The rain having cleared during the night, it was determined to follow up the advantage of the previous day; so after the soldiers had cooked an early meal, and the tents had dried sufficiently, all the infantry, (except the Guides,) and the 2 Mountain Batteries, returned to Maidani; whilst the camp, escorted by the Guide Infantry, Field Guns, and Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden, changed ground to Shiva on the Kuram, 10 miles below Billand Khel. The same orders were issued to the troops as on the previous day, except that the men were to carry 40 rounds instead of 50, and that there were to be four mule loads of ammunition instead of two.

Major Lumsden was instructed to detach all his cavalry and 2 companies of infantry towards the Zakha gorge, as soon as he considered that they could be spared from the protection of the baggage. If they reached that point before Brigadier Chamberlain's column got there, they were to harass the enemy without committing themselves to serious loss, and the 2 companies were to be posted on the hills commanding the gorge, leading into the Zakha water-course, to keep a retreat open for the cavalry should they be pressed.

As the force after passing the smouldering remains of the enemy's encampment, neared the Zakha exit from the valley, the Deputy Commissioner obtained information which made it appear probable that by crossing over the range to the right and descending into a small valley named Durmani (which was occupied by the Hasn Khel Vaziris, who had declined to assist the Kabal Khels), the troops might be able to come up with some of the flocks and herds belonging to the latter tribe, who had fled by that route; but as the Hasn Khels had hitherto held aloof, warning was sent to them that they would not be punished, but that they must give up any of the property of the fugitives which might be with them.

Captain Henderson, the Deputy Commissioner, then pushed on with some of his levies; followed by Brigadier Chamberlain with a body of infantry, and the Hazara Mountain Battery in support; the remainder of the infantry and the other battery moving straight to camp through the Zakha Gorge, destroying *en route* one of the Kabal Khel encampments, which had escaped destruction the previous day, but which the Kabal Khels had not had time to remove.

Captain Henderson's foray proved most successful, although none of the Kabal Khels could be come up with, the levies supported by the troops managed to capture 5,000 sheep, 300 bullocks, and 60 camels, the Turis and others carrying off a lot of property besides, and but for night coming on many more flocks and herds would have fallen into our hands. Throughout the day no opposition was attempted, the few of the enemy seen confining themselves to flourishing their swords from the summits of the hills.

The levies rejoined the troops about dusk at Durmani, and as the camp at Shiva was some 18 miles off, the column bivouacked in the dry bed of the nullah for the night.

The Hasn Khels were required to post pickets on the hills around, and not a shot was fired during the night;—it was a strange duty for the Vaziris to find themselves called on to perform, and their readiness to comply with all our requisitions indicated how powerless they felt themselves.

At daylight the next morning the column commenced its march towards the camp, more flocks and herds falling into our hands. Some high ranges which intervene between Durmani and Shiva rendered it necessary to make a long detour *via* the Kaitu or Kaiti River, and it was 3 in the afternoon before the troops reached their tents. Rain fell throughout the day, accompanied by a cutting wind; and though many of the men had at last to walk barefooted, from their shoes having become worn out by their two days' march over the hills, nothing could have been more cheerful than their manner.

Representatives from the Kabal Khels, Turi Khels, and Hasn Khels, having come in, the force halted four days at Shiva, when strong escorts were placed at the disposal of the Survey and Engineer Officers to enable them to map the country in the neighbourhood of camp.

With the Kabal Khels it was determined to hold no immediate communication, but the other two tribes were informed if the Utmanzais would unite and deliver up "Zangi," or two of the murderers, we would be satisfied. To this they agreed, giving hostages, and, in token of their earnestness, sending in the next day one Gulam, a notorious robber suspected of murder. But as in case of laxity in carrying out their agreement coercive measures might become necessary, it was determined to move a force into their country, and as their lands lay to the south of the Kaitu River, a place on that stream called Spin Wam was selected for the camp.

Before making this move however, it was deemed advisable to surprise a small section of the Kabal Khels, who had separated themselves from the rest of their tribe, and secreted themselves in some very steep hills, a few miles to the south-west of the camp.

Accordingly, some hours before daybreak on the 28th, a column consisting of—

3rd Panjab Infantry,
4th Sikh Infantry,
Hazara Mountain Train,
Pioneer Company, 24th Panjab Infantry,
Detachment, 2nd Panjab Cavalry,

moved out under the command of Major Rothney, with the Deputy Commissioner, to beat up this party.

Following the downward course of the stream for about 7 miles, at dawn, a range of hills stretching down to the river was ascended, below the crest of which, in a small valley, the Vaziri encampment was situated. The 3rd Panjab Infantry was then detached under Lieutenant Ruxton to take up a position beyond the village, but on the main column reaching the "Kirri" it was found abandoned, when what was left of it was destroyed.

The refugees could not have selected a more favorable hiding place than that against which Colonel Rothney had moved, as the precipitous nature of the crags and ravines rendered it a very difficult task to approach it; these difficulties of the route had caused more delay than had been anticipated, and the Vaziris becoming aware of the movement had at once driven off their cattle.

The direction taken by the enemy was unknown, and the column was halted whilst scouts were searching the country, and the surveyors were taking observations. The enemy having been sighted, the column pursued them for some 6 miles, but without success, for they had too long a start with their cattle: however, a small encampment was destroyed and a few cattle captured.

Lieutenant Ruxton, who had been instructed to pursue independently, if opportunity offered, hearing there was another encampment in his front,

pushed on for some 4 miles in a direction at right angles to the main column and crossed the Kaitu, but found the encampment deserted, which he destroyed; following the tracks of the enemy some 200 sheep were captured, and a few shots were exchanged with the enemy; and on his return Captain Ruxton destroyed another small encampment which he had passed on the way, but which he had not then fired for fear of giving the alarm. About the middle of the pursuit, hearing there was a village about $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile to the right, Lieutenant Ruxton detached 2 companies under Lieutenant Pitcher to destroy it; this was done, and after a pursuit of another 2 miles, 56 sheep and 86 head of cattle were taken; when there was a slight skirmish with between 200 and 300 of the enemy, who had 6 men killed, only 1 non-commissioned officer being wounded on our side.

The 3rd Panjab Infantry rejoined the main column about 2-30 p.m., the whole reaching camp at dark.

Early on the morning of the 29th, the main column consisting of—

4 Pieces, Peshawar Mountain Train,
50 Sabres, 2nd Panjab Cavalry,
1st Panjab Infantry,
3rd " "
4th " "
6th " "

moved on to Spin Wam, distant 10 miles, under the command of the Brigadier-General; the remainder of the force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden, moved up the river towards Billand Khel, partly for the purpose of securing our communications with the rear and for the sake of supplies, &c., and also because there was little grass for horses, or forage for camels, on the Kaitu.

The next day the Darvishta Hill, 4,500 feet high, was visited. It was considered by the Vaziris as one of their most unassailable strongholds, and several of their encampments snugly situated amongst the spurs of the mountain were passed. From the top of Darvishta a most extensive view was obtained, including parts of the Kohat and Banu Districts, and the valleys of Dawar and Khost.

It was known that the murderers of Captain Meham had on their way back been hospitably entertained by Umber Shah, of the Zangi Khel, at whose house they had been seen displaying that officer's property. The camp at Spin Wam was in the neighbourhood of the Zangi Khels, and the headmen were therefore summoned; they arrived on 31st in a great state of alarm, when they were called on to give up Umber Shah, or to take the consequences.

They were then allowed to leave the camp, on the promise that they would give him up, hostages being taken from them for the fulfilment of this promise; the following day they kept their word, for Umber Shah was brought in a prisoner to stand his trial; this was a great triumph over Vaziri prejudice, and gave promise of success in regard to the murderers. Having complied with our demand, the Zangi Khels were only further required to give a formal agreement that they would henceforth give no passage through their settlements to robbers and outlaws, when they were dismissed.

The force remained at Spin Wam on the 1st January, as the Commissioner was anxious to ascertain the real views of the Utmanzais before moving, and the day was occupied by the Survey Officers in another long excursion over the Sheratala plain (the head-quarters of the Turi Khels) close up to the confines of Dawar.

In the afternoon a group of 28 captives, male and female, were brought into camp by a party of the Utmanzais, with a piteous story of Zangi's escape.

There being nothing more to detain the troops at Spin Wam, the next day the camp moved back to the Kuram, to a spot called Karara, a little below Shiva, where it was joined by Major Taylor the Commissioner, from Banu, who had come up the bed of the Kuram with a mounted escort.

Major-General Reynell Taylor is the only officer who has seen the country between Yuwan and Karara, and he gives the following account of it in a memorandum to the Compiler. He says: "I forget the exact distances, but the march up the shingly bed of the Kuram from the entrance near Banu to Yuwan had taken more than I hoped, and day was closing when Yuwan was reached; the cattle were so knocked up, I had to leave the main part of the escort there, and push on with 8 horsemen up the gorge of the Kuram to Karara. The gorge for 5 or 6 miles above Ballaona is very narrow, and the blue brimming river swings from side to side leaving intervals of shingle in its serpentine course. My recollection is that we crossed the river eleven times, and as the gorge got narrower the water became deeper with boulder bed, horses floundered, arms were lost, and night had fallen." The party were in the country which had been harried by our troops only two days before, and it was naturally a relief to Major Taylor and his escort when they emerged on the Karara plain.

The murderers had now left the Utmanzais, and had taken refuge with the Zakha Khels, a tribe of the Ahmadzais, who do not emigrate from the lower slopes of the Suliman Range, for whose coercion it was necessary the force should move to Chapari, in the heart of their country; and the 3rd of January was passed in making the road into the Zangarra ravine, practicable for laden camels.

Early on the 4th, the following troops under Brigadier-General Chamberlain marched for Chapari:—

Hazara Mountain Train,
Pioneer Company, Sappers,
3rd Panjab Infantry,
6th Panjab Infantry,

leaving the Peshawar Mountain Train and 1st and 4th Panjab Infantry encamped at Karara under Major Lambert, so as to keep open the defile in rear. After a march of full 20 miles through defiles and up the bed of the Zangarra ravine, the high valley of Chapari was reached, and the tents pitched near the only spring of water.

After entering that ravine which is the high road for the salt traffic, the troops marched up its bed for 16 miles. Anything more dreary could scarcely be conceived; the hills rising abruptly on either side to a great height shut out all beyond, and as the troops approached the head of the ravine, the hills closed in so much, and the bends were so numerous, as to convey the impression of subterranean galleries, and it was a great relief to emerge on the thorn-clad plain of Chapari. At one or two places it was found practicable to ascend the sides of the ravine, when occasional plateaux were seen on both sides, on which Vaziri encampments were located.

Major Taylor, the Commissioner of Leia, had informed the tribes of our intention of visiting their country, and had called upon the chiefs to meet him at Chapari, promising that life and property would be respected, if no opposition was offered. With the example of the Kabal Khels before them, resistance was considered by them as hopeless, and fully trusting to our word their

encampments remained as usual, and the women and children drove their cattle and flocks past the camp to graze.

On the 5th and 6th, whilst the chiefs of the tribes were assembling, the Kafirkot Range and other places, from which the surveyors could complete their map, were visited.

The entire country east of the Kuram is much more difficult than that on the west; the hills are more massed together, huge cliffs meet the eye in every direction, and the inaccessible peaks of the higher mountains assume the appearance of gigantic castles.

This similitude strikingly applies to the Kafirkot and Juni Mountains, which rise above the neighbouring hills grimly pre-eminent. Kafirkot is a name given to a series of peaks here, so called from their striking resemblance to the ruins of a gigantic castle.

McGregor's Gazetteer. The sides are so precipitous that it proved very difficult to ascend to the top of one of the gigantic pinnacles; five of the officers, however, succeeded in doing so, *viz.*, Major (now Major-General) Taylor, Lieutenant Campbell, and Captains Ruxton and Sladen. The view from the top over Banu on one side, and away into Miranzai, Dawar and Khost on the other, was magnificent. We had been looking for ten years at the "Infidel's castle" from Banu, and it was an event getting to the top of it.

Memorandum by General R. Taylor to Compiler. On the afternoon of the 6th, the Ahmadzai Chiefs were assembled, and they were asked if they would undertake to seize the murderers, but they strongly refused; they were told that they must at all events assist in the matter, as some of the murderers were of their branch; they were reminded of the immunity and comfort the tribe enjoyed in Government territory, and they were further warned if they did not help, they must take the consequences. Several claims against the tribe were then satisfactorily disposed of.

The object for which the expedition had been undertaken was now accomplished, and the troops were therefore free to return to cantonments.

When the main body struck camp on the 7th January, the 3rd and 6th Panjab Infantry, which were under orders for Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan, accompanied by Major Taylor, the Commissioner of Leia, and Captain Johnstone of the Survey Department, marched by the Barganattu ravine towards Banu, whilst the remainder of the force under Brigadier-General Chamberlain retraced its steps towards Kohat, by the same route as that by which it had advanced; at Thall it was joined by the detachments under Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden and Major Lambert, which had been halted respectively near Billand Khel and at Karara.

On the return march a halt of one day was made at Gundiawar, in Upper Miranzai, to enable the Deputy Commissioner to settle some outstanding cases with the Zaimukht Afghan (independent) tribe, and Kohat was reached just a month from the day of starting, when the force was immediately broken up.

The spirit and conduct of the troops had been most excellent, and the force all returned without the loss of a single follower, or animal carried away. That there had been so little opposition, the Brigadier-General attributed to three causes,—firstly, the strength and efficiency of the force; secondly, the conviction that it had entered the hill to exact reparation, and not to bring the tribes under subjection; and thirdly, to the fact that the appeals made to the neighbouring tribes by the Kabal Khels for assistance, had not been responded to, owing in a great measure to the arrangements adopted by the Deputy Commissioner to keep them aloof.

The weather had proved very favorable. From an unusually good fall of rain during the previous summer, there was more grass and forage than could be always expected in the winter season.

The furnishing of the necessary carriage for the force and the supply of provisions in the field, had rested entirely with the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat; and, although all supplies had to be drawn from a distance of from 50 to 80 miles, the Brigadier-General said everything had been most efficient. He also acknowledged the assistance he had received in regard to intelligence from the Deputy Commissioner, and he alluded to the zeal and good spirit of the native chiefs who accompanied the force.

The general character of the hills through which the force had marched was of sandstone formation; the higher ranges covered with a long coarse grass, but the lower hills almost destitute of vegetation. Conglomerate, consisting of small boulders or water-worn pebbles, cemented by a stiff clay, is met with on the left bank of the Kuram, more particularly in the Lakki Jun Range, Kafirkot, and Giring; nowhere on the right bank was this formation observed. Whenever sandstone formation obtained, the heights were invariably accessible, and even mules and horses found little difficulty in ascending paths which at first sight appeared to be too steep to be practicable; this was due to the hold which the animals had on the soft stone, and which prevented them slipping.

The conglomerate, on the contrary, was generally precipitous, which, joined to the treacherous nature of its footing, made it nearly, if not quite, impracticable for troops: hence forcing a pass where this formation abounds will generally be a more difficult operation than one through sandstone, where the heights are easily crowned.

Throughout the whole of the country traversed, water was generally procurable in small quantities, by digging wells in the beds of the nullahs, and letting them fill by "filtration." This was more particularly the case where the bed of the nullah was composed of small boulders, or of boulders and silt and sand, but it was doubtful if this supply would be forthcoming in the summer months.

The Governor General directed that his best thanks might be conveyed to Brigadier-General Chamberlain, for the promptitude and success with which these important operations had been conducted, observing that in the short period of one month Brigadier-General Chamberlain had exacted reparation from the Kabal Khel Vaziris, for the support and shelter given by them to the murderers of the late Captain Mecham; and while effecting that object, that he had exhibited to the tribes of the districts through which he marched, not only the power of the Government to reach and punish those amongst them who are guilty of offences, but its careful forbearance towards all others.

The thanks of the Governor General, it was also directed, should be particularly conveyed to all the officers mentioned by Brigadier-General Chamberlain, and generally to the force which was under his command.

It was no easy task to get the Ahmadzais to act; after the return of the force, the winter rains and snow on the hills had set in, nevertheless Major Taylor, assisted by Nawab Foujdar Khan, made them assemble a regular little army and enter the hills, when they knocked down and dragged Mohabat from a place far in the interior, beyond Dawar, bringing him gagged and bound on a charpoy to the Deputy Commissioner of Banu; he had been the leader of the party that had committed the murder, and he had, by his own

Captain Pollard's Report.

Government letter.

Memorandum by Major-General Taylor to Compiler.

confession, not only encouraged the others to attack the travellers, but he it was who had first struck Captain Meham when getting out of his dooly, and had cut him down from behind when he was, though wounded, bravely trying to defend himself with a pistol. On the very spot where the murder had been committed a gallows was erected, and Mohabat was executed.

Major Taylor believed that the statement made by the Ahmadzais, that the other murderers had dispersed to different places away in the snows, was true; the Ahmadzais thought they had done a great deal in capturing Mohabat, and in doing violence to their strongest prejudices against giving up offenders, and nothing but the re-assembly of the force would have made them do more.

There are no records of what ultimately became of the others of the gang; the pressure on the Ahmadzais was apparently subsequently relaxed; time, probably the general results of the expedition, and the execution of the principal murderer, may all have operated as causes for this relaxation.

Letter from Commissioner of Derah Ismail Khan, to the Compiler.

In June 1861, when an agreement was entered into with the Mahsud Vaziris, one of the stipulations was, that those of the party which assassinated Captain Meham, and who were still at large in independent territory, should receive no shelter from the contracting Mahsuds. But from what we know of Pathan character generally, and that of the ruder hill tribes in particular, it would be too much to expect that such a stipulation would be strictly acted up to by the Mahsuds, except under the certainty of immediate pressure in the event of infringement, and there can be little doubt that the four remaining men of Mohabat's party did receive shelter from various tribes occupying the hills between Kani Goram, Khost, and Kuram.

APPENDIX A.

Kuram Field Force, 1859-60.

Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C. B., commanding.

Staff.

Captain Williamson, Acting S. O., P. I. F., Staff Officer.

Captain Cooper, 7th Fusiliers, Assistant Quarter-Master General.

Lieutenant-Colonel Olpherts, C. B., V. C., Royal Artillery, Orderly Officer.

Lieutenant J. W. Campbell, Multani Horse, Orderly Officer.

Captain Johnstone (Revenue Survey), Surveying Officer.

Artillery.

No. 1 P. L. F. Battery, Lieutenant Sladen commanding.

No. 2 P. L. F. Battery, Captain Maister commanding.

Peshawar Mounted Train, Captain DeBude commanding.

Hazara Mounted Train, Captain Butt commanding.

Engineers.

Detachment of Sappers and Miners, Lieutenant Pollard, R. E., commanding.

Lieutenant Holmes, R. E.

Cavalry.

Detachment of Guide Cavalry.

2nd Panjab Cavalry, Lieutenant F. Craigie commanding.

Infantry.

- 4th Sikh Infantry, Major Rothney commanding.
 1st Panjab Infantry, Major Lambert commanding.
 3rd Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Ruxton commanding.
 4th Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Jenkins commanding.
 6th Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Fisher commanding.
 Detachment, 24th (Pioneers) Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Chalmers commanding.
 Detachment, Guide Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden commanding.

Political Officers.

- Major James, Commissioner of Peshawar.
 Captain Henderson, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat.
 Major Reynell Taylor, Commissioner of Leia.

APPENDIX A—2.

Kuram Field Force.

	European officers.	Commandants.	2nd in Command.	Adjutants.	Doing-duty officers.	Medical officers.	Staff sergeants.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Buglers.	Privates.	Total of fighting men.	Horses.	Mules.	FIELD GUNS.		MOUNTAIN TRAIN GUNS.		REMARKS.
															Guns.	Howitzers.	Guns.	Howitzers.	
Staff	5	5	
Detachment, Sappers and Miners ...	1	1	12	2	16	
Detachment, No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery ...	1	1	1	5	1	37	46	50	25	1	1	
Detachment, No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery ...	1	1	...	1	...	2	11	1	64	81	87	36	3	1	6 Elephants attached.
Detachment, Peshawar Mountain Train ...	1	1	2	9	2	70	85	...	85	1	3	
Hazara Mountain Train ...	1	1	1	8	1	47	69	...	48	1	2	
Detachment, Guide Cavalry	1	4	12	1	85	103	101	
Detachment, Guide Infantry ...	1	1	...	1	9	70	8	233	323	<i>Levies and Police.</i>
2nd Panjab Cavalry ...	1	...	1	1	1	11	37	3	273	328	243	Horse. Foot.
4th Sikh Infantry ...	1	1	1	1	1	14	88	13	519	639	Khataks ... 131 549
1st Panjab Infantry ...	1	1	1	1	1	16	88	14	394	517	Bangashes... 10 572
3rd ditto ditto ...	1	...	1	2	1	12	74	17	394	502	Police ... 75 0
4th ditto ditto ...	1	...	1	1	14	91	17	403	528	Total... 216 1,121
6th ditto ditto ...	1	1	...	1	1	13	86	13	471	587	
Detachment, 24th (Pioneers) Panjab Infantry ...	1	2	15	2	77	97	
Total ...	513	4	5	14	5	1	101	606	93	3,069	3,916	581	194	4	2	2	5		

RECORD OF EXPEDITIONS

APPENDIX B.

Casualty Return, Kuram Field Force.

		KILLED.				SEVERELY WOUNDED.				SLIGHTLY WOUNDED.					REMARKS.
		European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Sepoys.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Sepoys.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Sepoys.		
Corps of Guides	1	2	1	...	1	7	...	
4th Sikh Infantry...	6	
Bovies	2	2	
Total	1	7	1	...	1	9	2	

SECTION IV.

Demonstration against the Kabal Khel Vaziris, April 1869.

In March 1866, the Tazi Khel section of the Kabal Khel were preparing to return to their summer quarters, when they were drawn into an ambuscade of their enemies, the Turis, near the village of Thall. The Vaziris were overpowered, and lost 12 killed and 6 wounded; after stripping the bodies of their arms and clothes the Turis retreated to their own country before the Vaziris could assemble. The Vaziris believed that the inhabitants of Thall, who are Gar in politics, and friends of the Turis, brought down the latter on them, and three years afterwards a body of Vaziris, principally of the Kabal Khel and Tazi Khel sections, attacked the village of Thall, and succeeded in carrying off 700 or 800 head of cattle.

Lieutenant Cavagnari, the Deputy Commissioner, then called upon Colonel Keyes, C.B., who was commanding the Kohat District, to move such a body of troops into Miranzai as would enable him to destroy the crops of the Kabal Khels in the vicinity if the demand on them for reparation was not complied with and the following force, marched on the 17th April, under Colonel Keyes, from Kohat towards Thall, where it arrived on the 22nd April:—

4th Panjab Cavalry.

Head-Quarters 2 Guns, No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery.

Head-Quarters 2 Guns, Peshawar Mountain Battery.

Head-Quarters Wing, 1st Panjab Infantry, 300 R. & F.

Head-Quarters Wing, 2nd Panjab Infantry, 300 R. & F.

Head-Quarters Wing, 4th Panjab Infantry, 300 R. & F.

On the day the force arrived at Thall the chief men of the Kabal Khel tribe, with two exceptions, tendered their submission.

Colonel Keyes' Despatch. The two absent maliks came in two days afterwards; their absence had been caused by the Thall men having led them to believe that a surprise was intended, and that their crops would be destroyed without a further parley, and they had consequently retired with their followers to a considerable distance.

The maliks acknowledged they could not justify themselves for committing such an outrage in British territory, but pleaded it was only a just reprisal for the wanton outrage which they said the men of Thall had committed on them three years before, and to avenge which, (as they had received no redress,) their manhood and their code of honor required them to take the law into their own hands; but at the same time they declared themselves ready to comply with the Deputy Commissioner's demands. These were to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000 to Government, to restore the plundered cattle that remained in their hands, and to pay up on the part of the whole tribe a further sum of Rs. 8,000, Kabuli Rupees, which was sworn by the men of Thall to be the value of the remaining plunder; and further, to give hostages for their future good behaviour. The troops then commenced their return to Kohat.

The Governor General in Council, it was stated, had pleasure in recognizing the value of the service performed, which was mainly attributable to the alacrity and promptitude displayed by all concerned; and this expression of the views of Government was to be conveyed to Colonel Keyes and those employed under his orders.

Government letter.

SECTION V.

Outrage by the Mahomed Khel Section of the Ahmadzais.

THE Mahomed Khel section of the Vaziris number only from 200 to 300 fighting men. This clan had for many years been settled in the Banu District, where they held the lands on either bank of the Kuram River where it issues from the hills.

Resolution, Panjab Government.

In the beginning of 1870, or in the end of 1869, a baniah was carried off by the Kuram Fass, for which pass the Mahomed Khels were responsible, and they were therefore heavily, but according to their ideas unjustly, fined. Shortly afterwards the water in the Kuram fell very low, when they were ordered by the tehsildar to repair a bund, which diverted the little water that remained on to the Banuchi laud. They did this grumblingly, because their own lands were dry, but they shortly afterwards cut the bund, and seized the water for themselves, for which they were again heavily fined; and they now made up their minds to commit some

McGregor's Gazetteer.

outrage on the Government. They sold their property, abandoned their lands in our territory, and retired into the hills without attracting in any special manner the attention of the local authorities, who considered the matter to be unimportant, and failed to impress on the military authorities the necessity for any exceptional precautions.

Resolution, Panjab Government.

At daylight on the morning of the 13th June 1870, as a detachment of 10 men of the 4th Sikh Infantry, marching from Banu for the relief of the Kuram outpost, was passing through the old (abandoned) Kuram post, it were fired on by the Mahomed Khels, who lay concealed behind the walls, and in the neighbouring nullah, when 6 of the detachment were killed and 1 wounded, a syce and pony of the 1st Panjab Cavalry, which were with the detachment, being also killed.

Report by Captain McLean,
1st Panjab Cavalry.

About half a mile behind the infantry were 11 sabres of the 1st Panjab Cavalry, also proceeding as a relief to the Kuram post; this detachment on hearing the shots immediately galloped up, and were joined by a similar detachment from the post. The Mahomed Khels numbered about 140 men; but the ground they were in was so broken, and they clung so obstinately to the ravines and the banks of the Kuram, that the cavalry could not charge; they however made use of their carbines with some effect, and the Vaziris retreated up the Khost nullah, leaving 2 dead. The casualties in the 1st Panjab Cavalry were 2 non-commissioned officers and 1 sowar wounded, 2 horses killed.

The Mahomed Khels were at once proclaimed outlaws; all members of the tribe found in British territory were arrested, and their lands were sequestered till such time as the whole tribe should submit unconditionally, and should give up to justice the men who had joined in the attack on the British detachment.

Resolution, Panjab Government.

To those terms the Mahomed Khels refused to submit. From June 1870 to September 1871, they wandered among the hills bordering British territory, supported by the charity of other tribes, who sympathized with them

and aided them as much as they dared. They made numerous raids into British territory, carrying off cattle, and committing thefts and robberies.

None of these raids were of any political importance, but the marauders generally escaped with impunity, their attacks being made on isolated houses or hamlets close to the hills, to which they quickly retreated, and where, from the nature of the country, they were secure from pursuit. The troops in the outposts were always on the alert with their horses saddled day and night, but it was only on one or two occasions that they were able to inflict any loss on the enemy.

Amongst these affairs the following were the most important: On the 4th July 1870, as the Mahomed Khels were threatening British territory, Colonel Gardiner, who was commanding at Edwardesabad, moved out with the 2nd Sikh Infantry and the Artillery and Cavalry of the Edwardesabad garrison, but the Mahomed Khels retreated as the troops came up.

The 2nd Sikh Infantry had 13 men struck down by heat apoplexy, 3 of whom died.

An enclosure to the Bund tower in front of the Kuram outpost was being erected at this time, and hardly a day passed during its erection without the covering party of infantry being fired at by the Mahomed Khels from the adjoining hills. On the 31st March a party of 50 or 60 of them coming down into the nullah near the tower were driven back by a party of the 2nd Panjab Infantry, headed by Lieutenant Hervey, 1st Panjab Cavalry, when 3 of them were wounded, Lieutenant Hervey's conduct receiving the expression of the Lieutenant-Governor's satisfaction; and on the 24th April another skirmish occurred between the men of the Kuram post, detachments, 1st Panjab Cavalry and 2nd Panjab Infantry, near the Bund tower, when 1 subadar, 1 sepoy, 2nd Panjab Infantry, and 1 sowar, 1st Panjab Cavalry, were wounded,—the Subadar Lena Sing and his detachment earning the thanks of the Lieutenant-Governor.

The Mahomed Khels, weary of being hunted from place to place, dependent for the means of subsistence on the charity of others, were soon anxious to come to terms, and would gladly have accepted any punishment short of surrendering the original offenders. This was the one condition to which their Afghan pride would not submit, and which long delayed the settlement of the case. But the Lieutenant-Governor was convinced that nothing less than unconditional surrender should be accepted, and pressure was put on the neighbouring tribes to expel the offenders, whilst at a meeting of the principal chiefs of the Vaziris at Banu in the month of March following, the determination of the Government was reiterated in the most impressive manner.

The Mahomed Khels were at length driven to extremities, and on the 20th September they unconditionally surrendered to the Commissioner of the Derajat; the whole tribe, with their women, children, and cattle, coming into the cantonment of Edwardesabad, where, with their heads bare and turbans bound round their necks, they threw their arms, matchlocks, swords, pistols, and shields, into a heap at the feet of the Commissioner, and implored pardon for their offences.

Complete pardon for offences of such enormity it was impossible to accord, but, on the other hand, the Government desired the punishment inflicted should bear in the eyes of border tribes no appearance of revenge. The humiliation of the Mahomed Khels had been too unprecedented, and the assertion of the

Raid Reports.

Report by Officer commanding outposts Banu.

Regimental history, 2nd Panjab Infantry.

Resolution Panjab Government.

authority of the British Government so complete, that there was no fear of mercy being mistaken for weakness.

The six headmen of the clan were accordingly sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment in the Lahore Jail, and heavy fines were imposed on the tribe, on payment of which they were permitted to return to their lands in British territory.

Those who aided and abetted the Mahomed Khels were also punished.

First were the Umarzais, a tribe who had joined the Mahomed Khels in several of their plundering expeditions. For each offence an appropriate fine was imposed and paid by the tribe.

The Bizzan Khels, another clan, were next called to account, and paid without demur the fine imposed for assisting the Mahomed Khels.

Lastly, the village of Gumatti, inhabited by Sadun Khel Vaziris, who had harboured the Mahomed Khels, aided their raids, and covered their retreats from the plains with stolen property, was utterly destroyed. It was decided that the burning of this village would be the punishment, having the most lasting effect, while at the same time it could not seriously impoverish the tribe. The order for the burning of the village was carried into effect by the inhabitants themselves, in presence of Mani Khan, Chief of the Ahmadzai Vaziris and Mahomed Haiat Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Banu.

SECTION VI.

The Mahsuds Branch of the Vaziris.

ALL the Mahsuds are beyond the border. An attempt was made to get them to settle like the Darvesh Khel, but it has not yet been successful. They are the most southern of the Vaziri tribe, and their country is bounded on the north by the Tori Khel Vaziris, on the west by the Ahmadzai Vaziris, on the east by the Battanis, and on the south by the Gumal River and the Shirani country.

The Mahsuds are divided thus—

				Fighting men.
Alizai	6,400	Poti Khel	3,500	Shahabi Khel ... 1,200
		Shaman Khel	2,900	Manzai ... 2,300
				Jaliar Khel ... 600
				Khatti ... 500
				Badinzai ... 800
Haimal Khel	4,200	Gulshalu ... 1,000		
		Abdulli ... 2,500		
Balolzai	8,100	Band Khel	300	Malikshahi ... 800
				Nagar Khel ... 900
		Nana Khel	2,400	Aikam Khel.
				Tutia Khel.
				Haibat Khel.
				Umar Khel.
				Alikhani.
				Mirkhani.
		Shingi	1,200	Manda.
				Burta or Baru.
				Mihr Khani.
				Mahamadi.
Total			14,500.	Jalal.
				Mallai.
				Babali.

The above numbers are taken from Mahamad Haiat Khan. The Nawab of Tank makes the Alizais to number 7,600, and the Balolzais 6,000.

Amongst the Mahsuds some of the Shahabi Khel Alizais and Shingi Jalal Khel Balolzais have caused the greatest annoyance by their plundering habits. The Alizais are generally well disposed to the British, but the ties of kin and country are too strong to permit them to take a decided position against those evilly disposed. It is worthy of note that the Nawab of Tank is connected by marriage with the Manzai Alizais; also that the Mahsuds bear no good-will to the other two great tribes—the Ahmadzais and Utmanzais,—as they attribute much of the success of General Chamberlain's expedition of 1860 to the information given by the Ahmadzais to our officers. Several skirmishes have taken place between them annually, in which lives have been lost on both sides.

In 1865 a council was held in which an arrangement was come to, else, it is said, the Ahmadzais and Utmanzais would have united their forces, 20,000 in number, and attacked the Mahsuds in their own country.

The Ahmadzai and Utmanzai Vaziris are, as already stated, migratory, passing their lives in tents, and alternating between their winter quarters in the lowlands (towards the Kuram River and the British border), and their summer homes in the higher ranges; whereas the Mahsud Vaziris remain always in their mountains.

The Mahsud country is intersected in all directions by ravines, generally flanked throughout their course by high hills, which occasionally recede sufficiently to give the spaces enclosed the appearance of small valleys. The width of these ravines is very variable, in some places being as much as 1,000 yards, whilst at others they narrow to 100 yards or less; but, as may be supposed, they are broadest at their mouths, and gradually narrow as they ascend. The narrowest parts are where the water has had to pierce its way through a range crossing its course at right angles. Such gorges, called by the natives "tangis," are the points usually occupied to oppose an enemy. On both sides, at intervals throughout their course, patches of land have been deposited, and are preserved by artificial means for the purpose of cultivation, and the largest of these afford some space for the encampment of troops. The beds of the ravines are paved throughout with boulders and stones. In fine weather a stream of water usually trickles down them, requiring to be crossed every few hundred yards; but after rain these beds suddenly fill, and often become dangerous torrents; such channels and their tributaries form the ordinary means of communication within the country.

From the rugged nature of the country, cultivation is confined to the plateaux at the base of the high mountains, the small valleys, and the plots of land bordering the main ravines. These latter are termed by the natives "kachis,*" and they are a feature in all the principal defiles of the Suliman Range. In the valleys and "kachis" the land is generally terraced and irrigated for cultivating, but without the means of irrigation all this labor is thrown away; hence no less ingenuity is displayed in watering than in forming the "kachi."

A weir of brushwood turns the water from the nullah into the irrigation channels, which are often carried along an almost perpendicular cliff, with incredible labor, considerable engineering skill, and a wonderful degree of uniformity in the slope of their bed; and in many instances the water is led on to the fields by artificial tunnels of some 2½ feet diameter through the solid rock for upwards of 100 feet. The borders of the fields are commonly planted with mulberry and willow, which give to these spots a pleasing appearance, compared to the rugged hills which encircle them.

The Mahsuds live in houses, these are ordinarily perched upon the hill side

* The general character of the ravine is an alternation of banks of silt of alluvial deposit, and precipitous cliffs or "bluffs," according as the strength of the current strikes the nullah bank on that, or on the opposite side. These beds of deposit are carefully terraced and cultivated, and, being the only spots in the country capable of raising grain, are highly valued, and much time and labor is spent in extending them in the following simple manner:—A series of spurs made of stakes and brushwood, weighted down by heavy stones, and often solid trunks of trees, are first constructed; these break the current and cause a deposit of the silt and earthy particles carried down by the "freshees," and which, in a stream having a slope of bed of not less it is estimated than 100 feet in the mile, must be very considerable: every rise of the stream adds somewhat to this bank, and when it has reached the desired height, a row of poplar or willow cuttings, or some other quick growing tree, is planted along the edge. These consolidate the earth by their roots and prevent cutting away, whilst the new made bank is being again extended by a similar process. When the exterior row of trees has firmly rooted, the interior row is cut down, their roots trenched out, and the land is ready.

above their cultivation, not together in any order, but apparently only placed with reference to the convenience of families.

There are only two towns in the Mahsud country, Kani Goram and Makin. No Vaziris reside in the first, but all the tribal meetings are held there; and whilst the council is assembled, the inhabitants have to provide the members with board and lodging free of expense, each clan having its established billet. With the exception of a few artizans residing at Kani Goram, no others are to be found in the Mahsud country.

McGregor's Gazetteer. Their workmanship is strong but coarse, and the most valued arms are imported from Afghanistan or India.

The principal site where iron is found is in the hill, called Koh-i-Mahsud, near Makin and Babar. Every village and hamlet has its smelting furnace, constructed with a conical roof of long poles planted nearly vertically in the ground.

Such trade as there is in the country is carried on by the Urmar tribe, who owned the country till dispossessed by the Mahsuds.

Report by General Chamberlain. It was the boast of these Vaziris that, while kingdoms and dynasties have passed away, they alone, of all the Afghan tribes, have remained free; that the armies of kings have never penetrated their strongholds; that in their intercourse with the rest of mankind they know no law or will but their own; and lastly, that from generation to generation the "daman" (or the level country), within a night's run of the hills, has been their hunting ground from which to enrich themselves.

Under the Sikh rule this state of things was even worse; for through misgovernment the Chief of Tank became a refugee in the Vaziri Mountains, and his country was farmed out to Multani or Towana mercenaries, according as either class was for the time being in favor at the Lahore court. The Chief being expelled from his territory, his course was naturally to ally himself with the Mahsuds (which he did by marriage), and to keep the country in so distracted a state that it became almost uninhabited; the town of Tank at last contained nothing but its garrison, and a few banniahs (grain-sellers). On one occasion it was attacked and plundered by the Mahsuds, when they retained possession of it for three days.

After the first Sikh war the rightful owner was restored, and things returned to pretty much their usual state, the Mahsuds not causing uneasiness as a tribe, but raids being of constant occurrence.

SECTION VII.

Expedition against the Mahsud Vaziris by a force under Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B., April 1860.

PRIOR to our annexation of the Panjab, some clans of the Utmanzai and Ahmadzai had wrested certain lands, and possessed themselves of certain privileges within the Kohat and Bannu Districts, whereby, on annexation, they were necessarily brought into direct contact with the British Government and its laws. The Mahsuds had not acquired any such privilege, and consequently came not in any way under direct control.

General Chamberlain's Despatch.

The Mahsuds were of all three branches pre-eminent for living by plunder and violence, and trusting implicitly to the inaccessibility of their mountains; their conduct from first to last had been outrageous. *

They afforded open refuge to any criminal from our border; Zangi, the

1855	...	41	Tori Khel malefactor, the leader of the band by whom
1856	...	39	Captain Meham was murdered, had found asylum
1857	...	40	with them. To go no further back than the five years
1858	...	48	previous to 1860, the police reports of the District Officer,
1859	...	23	(to say nothing of the harassing duties imposed on the
		—	military), record against them the commission of 184
Total	...	184 or 36½ per annum.	crimes of a most heinous nature. In addition to this

list, in the month of March 1845, a native officer and 12 troopers of the mounted police, pursuing too far into the hills, were surrounded and (with the exception of one man) destroyed, and their horses carried off. In November of the same year, some 3,000 of the tribe assembled in the pass in front of Tank with the intention of plundering that town, but were foiled in their object by troops arriving by a forced march of 50 miles from Dera Ismail Khan.

The Mahsuds had long been in the habit of attacking the Povindah caravans, as their country commands the Ghawlairah,

Report on Frontier Tribes. or Goliri Pass (one of the main avenues of the Afghan trade); but the merchants, themselves of the Pathan race, are invariably armed, and able to offer a stout resistance. However, as soon as they are encamped in British territory, they often neglect the precautions which they adopt across the border, and the frontier is kept much disturbed and the outposts much harassed by the plundering attacks made on their "kirris" and herds by the Vaziris.

In 1859, General Chamberlain had thus written of the raids of the Mahsuds: "In the course of my annual tour, I see much of all classes of the people, and nowhere now do I hear the cry for justice until I come within reach of the Vaziris. Then commences a train of injuries received and unredressed; and I know of no more pitiable sight than the tears and entreaties of a family who have lost their only means of enabling them to accompany the tribe (Povindahs) on its return back to summer quarters. Supposing that our backwardness arises from fear, several times have the men, and even women, counselled courage, saying we will assist you; they cannot stand before guns and percussion fire-arms."

So far back as the spring of 1855, the Chief Commissioner (Sir John Lawrence), becoming impressed with the injuries committed by the Mahsuds, had recommended that a force should be sent against them that autumn, but the proposal was not carried out. In February 1857, Sir John Lawrence again found occasion to recommend "that retributive measures be no longer delayed," and Government sanctioned their being undertaken; but again circumstances arose to prevent their being carried into execution.

In the winter of 1860-61, Brigadier-General N. Chamberlain intended to resign the command of the Panjab Irregular Force preparatory to proceeding to England, and as he did not wish to leave the Vaziri question in the state it then was, and as he felt that sooner or later an expedition would have to be sent against the tribe, he proposed that punitive measures should then be adopted, enumerating the constant misdeeds of the tribe, and pointing out the utter hopelessness of expecting them to mend their ways till punished. The matter was submitted to Government, and discussed with Major Taylor and others at Sealkote, where Major Taylor had gone to meet the Viceroy accompanied by the Tank Chief and others of the Derajat. But Lord Canning eventually decided against an expedition on the ground that it was a cumulative case, and not actually pressing at the time as the border was then quiet, as evinced by the fact that the Commissioner, Major Taylor, had been able to take away all the Chiefs to Sealkote.

But before Major Taylor had got half-way back to Dera Ismail Khan, news of great importance had reached him.

Emboldened by years of immunity, and believing that they could successfully oppose any attempt to penetrate their mountains, and probably thinking too the absence of the Chief Shah Nawaz Khan was a favorable opportunity, the Vaziris had, on the 13th March 1861, without provocation or pretext of any kind, come out into the plains to the number of some 4,000, headed by their principal men, with the intention of sacking the town of Tank.

Tank stands near the Gumal stream on the plain some 5 miles from the foot of the hills; it is the chief place of a small district under the management of the Chief (now Nawab) Shah Nawaz Khan.

It was then held by a troop of the 5th Panjab Cavalry under Ressaldar Sadut Khan, who, on hearing of the gathering, sent to collect all the neighbouring outposts, as well as for assistance to Dera Ismail Khan. On the night of the 12th the reinforcement from the posts had augmented the sabres, 5th Panjab Cavalry, at Tank to 158, and as the Vaziris entered the plains by the Tank Zam Pass the following morning, this detachment under the senior officer Ressaldar Akwak Sing, and accompanied by 37 of the mounted police and levies, advanced to meet them.

On coming up with the enemy, the ground was very unfavorable, and the detachment, by the advice of Ressaldar Sadut Khan slowly retired, followed by the hillmen with shouts of derision and an ill-directed matchlock fire until a deep nullah was reached, which it was necessary to prevent the enemy occupying, when the cavalry, in spite of the enormous disparity of numbers, charged in the most dashing manner.

The Vaziris, personally brave, and invariably of vigorous muscular forms, wanted the power of combination to resist effectually the charge of our cavalry. Cut down and ridden over, they fled in confusion, the men in front forcing back the men behind, till all became a helpless rabble struggling striving

Memorandum by General Taylor to Compiler.

5th Panjab Cavalry history.

Panjab Administration Report.

The enemy, it was satisfactorily ascertained, lost close upon 300 killed, and many more wounded; among the former were 6 chiefs, including Janghi Khan with his son and nephew.

The loss on our side had been—

<i>5th Panjab Cavalry.</i>			
Wounded	2 non-commissioned officers, 11 sowars, and 30 horses.
Killed	9 horses.
<i>Mounted Police and Levies.</i>			
Killed	1 jemadar.
Wounded	3 men.

The casualties in the detachment, 5th Panjab Cavalry, had thus been 52 out of 158 men and horses, and the dashing and gallant conduct of this detachment met with the highest commendation from the Government of India. In addition to other rewards bestowed on Ressaldars Akwak Sing, Sadut Khan, and others, a Sword of Honor was conferred on Sadut Khan. Considering the relative numbers engaged, and the absence of artillery, this defeat of the Vaziris had been as signal a victory for cavalry acting alone against the mountain tribes in the plains, as that at Panj Pao in April 1852 had been for horse artillery with cavalry.

This outrage was considered as filling up the measure of their offences; and orders were issued by the Supreme Government for a force to enter the Vaziri country, and there exact satisfaction for the past and security for the future.

The unity of the Vaziris is proverbial; yet, when the force entered the hills it was found, as had been the case in the operations against the Kabal Khels, that no support was afforded by the divisions or sections who were not concerned.

The troops which were to take part in the expedition, and the different arrangements in connection with it, were as follow:—

From Hazara.

Head-Quarter Wing, Hazara Gurkha Battalion (400 Rank and File).
Head-Quarter Wing, 4th Sikh Infantry (400 Rank and File).
Hazara Mountain Train, 2 Howitzers, 1 Gun.

From Peshawar, Attock, Murdan.

Head-Quarter Wing, 24th Panjab Infantry (400 Rank and File).
Head-Quarter Wing, 14th Panjab Infantry (200 Rank and File).
Sappers and Miners (100 Rank and File).
Peshawar Mountain Train, 2 Howitzers, 2 Guns.
6 Female Elephants for carriage of Field Artillery.
Corps of Guides, Head-Quarters, 100 Sabres and 400 Rank and File.
Infantry.
6 Officers for duty with Infantry.

From Kohat.

Head-Quarter Wing, 4th Panjab Infantry (370 Rank and File).
Head-Quarter Wing, 1st Panjab Infantry (370 Rank and File).
2 Guns, No. 1 Panjab Light Battery, for duty at Banu.

From Dera Ismail Khan.

Head-Quarter Wing, 6th Panjab Infantry.
Head-Quarter Wing, 6th Police Battalion.
No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery, 2 Pieces.
Cureton's Multani Cavalry, 100 Sabres.

From Banu.

2nd Panjab Infantry (600 Rank and File).
No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery, 2 Pieces.

From Dera Ghazi Khan.

Head-Quarter Wing, 3rd Panjab Infantry.

Arrangements had been made for a large body of levies taking part in the expedition (drawn from the frontier classes) under the Khans and Tumandars. It was considered that

Commissioner's Despatch. they might be employed perhaps in the attack of minor places on the flanks of the main column, (thus distracting the enemy and affording a hope of seizing cattle,) in holding points to keep open communication, and on other duties; and it was thought by Major Taylor that advantage would be derived from the force being thus accompanied by the frontier classes and chiefs, all hereditary enemies of the Vaziris, as the operations would thereby be more clearly shewn to be in the cause of order, and in a great measure on behalf of our subjects.

Orders by General Chamberlain. Old and weakly men, whether native officers or soldiers, were to be left behind, and the best men selected.

The proportion of Hindus and Mahomedans was to be balanced as nearly as possible, and men who could not take water from a *mussuck* were to be left behind. Nothing superfluous was to be taken; the men were to take their half mounting suit and uniform cloth coat, their great-coats or chogas, and blankets, but not their nimchas; they were to be prepared for ordinary spring weather in the hills: but anything in excess of $7\frac{1}{2}$ seers of baggage per man was not positively forbidden. No women or children, or superfluous followers, were to be allowed to accompany the corps marching to join the expedition. Every soldier and camp follower was to be well found in shoes, and the former was to have a serviceable havresack and canteen. In addition to a full supply of tents for the men, two spare pals for hospital and two spare pals for guards and picquets were to be brought. The previous orders were reiterated,—about strong head and heel ropes, and hobbles for vicious horses, &c.; spare shoes and nails, full complement of farriers, no dogs, &c.; carriage for four days' supplies for man and beast with bazar establishment. The full proportion of dandies, doolies, kajawahs, medicines, lint, bandages, &c., were to be taken. The regiments were to move with 100 rounds of ammunition per man, the full complement being completed from the Dera Ismail Khan magazine. All mule ammunition boxes were to be brought. All the regimental mules were to be brought, and only mules or yabus were, if possible, to be used for the carriage of medicines, men's cooking-utensils, bedding, &c.

The country the troops were about to enter, was described by Brigadier-General Chamberlain as an entangled mass of mountains and hills of every size, shape, and bearing, made up of the five ranges noted in the margin, and their spurs. The two first are in the outer range and near to the border; the other three in the heart of the Vaziri tract are much higher; but owing to the continuous rise in the general level of the country towards the west, their real altitude becomes less and less apparent as they are approached.

Besides the smaller passages by which the range can be penetrated from our border, of which there are many practicable to footmen and unladen

Yunis	...	5,580 feet.
Gabbar	...	6,378 "
Kundighur	...	8,140 "
Pir Ghal	...	11,583 "
Shuidar	...	10,988 "

animals and freely used by marauders, there are three main entrances* known as the Khissora in front of Banu, the Tank Zam in front of Tank, the Ghawlairah in front of Gumal.

These three defiles, in common with almost every pass by which the Suliman Range can be penetrated, are nothing more than channels by which the drainage from the mountains finds its way to the plains ere falling into the Indus, and it may further be said that such channels and their tributaries form the ordinary means of communication within these ranges.

The Tank Zam was preferred because it afforded the shortest line of communication, and the best means of obtaining supplies from the rear. By it the nearest and most offending tribes could be reached and punished with the least difficulty; and if the tribe would not come to terms, and further ingress did not prove to be impracticable, the Brigadier-General hoped to penetrate to Kani Goram and Makin, their two most notable places, and then return *via* Banu and the Khissora defile, thus unmasking the whole route.

The Tank Zam is a huge ravine, having its sources at the base of the Shuidar, Pir Ghal, and Kundi Ghur Mountains. The branches from the two former unite about 6 miles below Kani Goram; that from Kundi Ghur about 20 miles before it reaches the plain. Its general features as regards defiles (Tangis), valleys (Kachis), &c., are as have been already described.

Its bed is paved throughout with boulders and stones. In fine weather a clear stream from 2 to 3 feet deep winds down it, requiring to be crossed at every few hundred yards; after rain the whole bed suddenly fills, and is impassable even by an elephant.

Colonel Taylor, the Commissioner, anticipated the Vaziris adopting one of the three following courses:—

The first and most probable was that they would make their grand stand at Shingi-ka-kot, their traditional strong point, like the Khanbund of the Bozdars. This was a fairly strong place protecting the head of the country, and was decidedly the most likely place for them to defend with all their available strength and means.

2ndly.—That they would come further forward to the Yunis Tangi. This is a much stiffer place than the Shingi position, and their holding it would make the first action, in all probability, a more serious matter than if they waited at Shingi, as they might inflict a good deal of loss before being driven off the heights. On the other hand, the Yunis Tangi was rather an advanced position for the Vaziris to take up, as they would be further from support than at Shingi, and there they would not be sure of a safe retreat.

The third plan Colonel Taylor thought they might adopt, was to avoid resisting the force in large bodies, and only to harass it by day and night, attacking the baggage, &c.; this was in all probability their safest plan, but he thought however that they would most likely adopt one of the two first courses.

It was probable that if once well defeated, they would break away and not offer much further resistance (but no precedent could be counted on, as this was the first time these Vaziris had been assailed in their homes); after defeating the enemy the force could advance *via* Kani Goram and Makin either into the Banu or Dawar Valley, concluding matters which were still pending with the Kabal Khels and Tori Khels; or, if the country was found stiffer than was expected, after taking full satisfaction from the Mahsuds at Kot Shingi, which is well in the Vaziri country, the force could return from there.

* There is a route by the Dawar Valley, but this eventually joins the Khissora, and cannot therefore be defined a separate road.

The Povindah merchants were ordered to assemble in front of the Gumal Valley, to act, if required, against their declared and bitter enemies; but there were the following difficulties in the way of their employment. The Povindahs had some doubts how their joining in the expedition would be regarded by the authorities and tribes above the passes; and there was the likelihood, that if, taking advantage of the advance of a Government force, the Povindahs took severe revenge for former injuries, it might be re-visited on them and their caravans by the Vaziris as a body when our quarrel had been settled. On the other hand, their especial enemies among the Vaziris were the Ahmadzais; but these were the Vaziris connected with Banu, of whom we intended to make much use, and whom it was necessary we should protect, but the Povindahs would probably seek their camps to make reprisal for injuries inflicted on them by the Ahmadzais on their journeys to and fro, although the Ahmadzais had never molested them within British territory.

On the 13th April 1860, exactly one month after the marauders had emerged from their mountains to sack Tank, the force pitched its camp upon the scene of the Vaziri disgrace, preparatory to penetrating their strongholds in search of redress.

But prior to moving, a proclamation was sent to the Mahsud Chiefs to announce the object for which the Government forces were about to enter their hills; to tell them that within a fixed period, they were free to attend the camp for the purpose of hearing the demands of the British Government, and that on their failing to appear, or not complying with the demands, they and their tribe would be treated as enemies and punished, when their blood would be upon their own heads.

From the 14th to 16th April the troops remained halted at Tank, when sufficient time having been afforded for the proclamation to become known throughout the tribe, and it being reported that a body of Vaziris had occupied the strong gorge called the Yunis Tangi within a few miles of the plains, and had barricaded the pass, further delay was to be avoided.

Accordingly, before daybreak on the 17th, the camp was struck, and at sun-rise the force entered the Tank Zam defile. After a march of $11\frac{1}{2}$ miles, the camp was pitched on a stony plateau, the present site of the Kot Khirgi outpost. The pass as far as the Tangi was reconnoitred by Major Taylor, the Commissioner, and it being found unoccupied, the pioneers were sent to remove the breastwork which had been thrown across it.

The next day's march was to a "Kachi," called Pallosin, some 9 miles; but as it was thought the village of Shingi-ka-kot might be occupied, it was determined to try and surprise it, and at midnight the whole of the cavalry under the Brigadier-General moved off, followed by a column under Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden, C.B., consisting of—

Guide Infantry,
1st Panjab Infantry,
2nd Panjab Infantry,
Hazara Mountain Train,
Peshawar Mountain Train,
3rd Panjab Infantry,
6th Panjab Infantry,

both columns being led by Battani* guides,—the remainder of the force and baggage moving later, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B.,

Shingi-ka-kot was a walled village, some 5 miles beyond Pallosin, perched on a high plateau at the junction of the Tank Zam with one of its main tributaries. On reaching the bifurcation of the defile daylight was awaited, when, leaving a troop to watch the rear, the remainder of the cavalry pushed on to Shingi-ka-kot. But there had been no intention of holding the place, and as the troops approached the few men in it quitted the village. Some few head of cattle and 200 sheep were captured upon the hill side a little in advance of the place.

One Vaziri was killed and 2 taken prisoners. On our side 1 horseman and 1 horse were killed.

After setting fire to every house in the place the troops returned to the camp, which was being pitched at Pallosin.

Throughout the day a few Vaziris occupied the neighbouring heights, but our picquets forced them to remain passive spectators of the destruction of their crops. Occasionally the Vaziri look-outs would taunt the Pathan soldiers with serving infidels, and fighting against Mahomedans, and when told they did so as servants of Government, the Vaziris would abuse them as infidels, and challenge them to put aside their rifles and fight like men with swords, when they would soon see how they would be served.

The village of Jandola, situated at the western mouth of the Yunis Tangi, belonged to the Battanis, and as the position commanded the passage to and from the plains, the greater portion of the levies were placed there for the convoy of supplies from Tank.

That every facility for making overtures might be given to the Mahsuds, in case they were disposed to negotiate, the force was halted during the 19th. But as it was asserted that so far from being inclined to submit the Vaziris were assembling for hostilities, the destruction of their houses and property was ordered, and as the owners were notoriously the worst of the border robbers, living almost entirely from the proceeds of plunder from the plains, there was the greater reason for not sparing them.

Before advancing on Kani Goram, it was deemed advisable to penetrate to Shahor and Bundi Ghur to examine a portion of the country which would otherwise remain unmapped, to show that the stiff defile which separated the force from Shahor was no real barrier to the march of the troops, and to visit the home of Jangi Khan and do as much injury as possible to the crops and property of the Shingi, Nana Khel, and Mallik Shai sections, who had been foremost always in plundering attacks on the Tank border.

On the 20th therefore the head-quarters, with the following troops, moved with 8 days' supply of food towards Haidina Kachi, $8\frac{3}{4}$ miles:—

- 1st Panjab Infantry.
- 1st Company Sappers.
- Pioneers (24th Panjab Infantry).
- 2nd Panjab Infantry.
- Peshawar Mountain Train.
- Hazara Mountain Train.
- 3rd Panjab Infantry.
- 4th Panjab Infantry.
- 6th Panjab Infantry.

* The Battanis are a small tribe, who inhabit the outer range of hills in front of Tank, the Mahsuds not having thought it worth their while to dispossess them of this remnant of their former possessions, as they make use of them as spies and guides in their forays upon the border.

No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery. Elephants. Guide Infantry. Detachment, Multani Cavalry. Detachment, Guide Cavalry. Detachment, 3rd Panjab Cavalry. 6th Police Battalion.	}	These were to return to Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden's camp, after seeing the force through the Shahor Pass.
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It was necessary to keep possession of Jandola that supplies might be collected there for an immediate advance on Kani Goram on the return of the troops from the Shahor Valley; and as the strength of the force admitted of a division, Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden, c. e., was left at Pallosin with discretionary orders to fall back on Jandola if any gathering of the Vaziris rendered it advisable. Captain Coxe, the Deputy Commissioner, remained with Colonel Lumsden's camp.

The move upon the Shahor gorge was not expected by the enemy, and it was found unoccupied, save by a small party, who retired as the infantry ascended the heights after firing a few shots*, by which a horse of the levies was killed.

The pass is a difficult passage of about 3 miles in length, the hills on either side closing in, in a manner to preclude artillery being turned to much account; and to command the sides, either a great circuit has to be made to reach the main range, or each spur has to be ascended in succession,—a most fatiguing operation involving much exposure. The western end of the gorge opens into a small valley called Haidina Kachi, where the troops encamped; but owing to the narrowness of the defile, and the difficult nature of the road, which is nothing more than the bed of a mountain torrent, it was late before the rear-guard came up.

After emerging from the gorge, Major Taylor, whilst reconnoitring the road in advance, came suddenly upon 3 Vaziris in broken ground, who turned upon his party and wounded 3 men and 5 horses (his own amongst the number) before they were destroyed, one of the Vaziris being cut down and another shot by

Despatch from Panjab
Government.

Major Taylor. The leader of the attacking party was a well-known Akundzada, Khindad by name, and one of the other men who was mounted was a malik or a malik's son. They had been of the party which had been firing on the troops in the pass, and being suddenly come upon by Major Taylor, Khindad proposed to his companions that they should die for the faith, and show the kind of men there were in the country we were going to invade.

Memorandum by Major
General Taylor to Compiler.

The ground where this fight had taken place was very bad, a narrow hill road—rocks above and a deep dip below, and for a time all Colonel Taylor and his party could do was to hold their own. Indeed, in the first onslaught which was suddenly made from behind a rock, Major Taylor and his men were forced back a few yards, with this advantage however that the ground was then more favorable. The Vaziris could at any moment have saved their lives by just stepping up among the rocks above the road, where nothing could have been done with them, but they never showed the slightest intention to escape, fighting to the last.

Knowing the importance these tribes attach to carrying off their dead*, and desiring to mitigate as far as possible the bitterness of hostilities, the

* Such importance do they attach to doing so, that when the whole body cannot be removed they cut off the head or right hand to be carried away and buried at their homes.

Brigadier-General invited the enemy to remove the bodies which had been brought into camp; but they did not do so, probably not knowing and not trusting us, although they proffered thanks for the offer.

Major Taylor's Despatch.

The following morning (21st) the force marched to Turi Chini, only 4 miles, as the stream it had been following suddenly ceased to flow above ground, and as the distance to the next water was uncertain.

On the march Kot Shahor, a walled enclosure containing thatched houses, was passed and fired, and during the day other detached habitations which were come across by the detachment on duty with the Officers of the Survey, were destroyed. Little or nothing was ever found in the houses, such articles of household furniture as could not be carried off had been generally dragged to the nearest shrine or burial ground.

A march next day (22nd), $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles, took the column to Barwind, at the foot of the Kundi Ghur mountains. On this and the previous march the country was found to be more open than any that was either previously or subsequently passed through, but beyond the camp the hills again closed in, and the bed of the ravine was the only practicable road.

On the 23rd the march was continued up the bed of the ravine for 4 miles, when Jangi Khan-ki-kot (Fort) was reached, and the camp pitched. Jangi Khan, who had been the principal chief of the whole Mahsud tribe, had been killed with his son and nephew the previous month in the attack upon Tank*.

The fort was blown up, and the village as well as the cultivation of the Nana Khels destroyed. Close by was the residence of another chief, who was known to have not participated in the intended attack on Tank, and purposely to mark the distinction between the conduct of the two men; no injury was done to his place or property. During the afternoon the escort on duty with the Officers of the Survey was attacked, but retired without loss, bringing with them a Mahsud spy captured near the camp.

By the defile by which the troops were moving Kani Goram (then distant only 14 miles as the crow flies) could be reached, and the Vaziris supposing this to be the real object of the movement, determined to defend the passage at a gorge called Khissora, 3 miles beyond the camp.

But as to reach Kani Goram by this route was no part of the general plan, to have forced the gorge would have been an objectless expenditure of life; and having now seen and surveyed the best part of the north-west portion of the district, and consumed half the supplies, it was time for the force to return.

The absence of men on the distant hills, or even the usual look out on the heights in the neighbourhood of camp, had been marked for the last two days, and this was now explained by their having collected all their numbers to close the passage to Kani Goram; and also, as will be shown, to attack Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden's camp; the news of which attack reached General Chamberlain by a Battani spy as the troops were falling in at daylight on the 24th, preparatory to moving back to Pallosin.

* In the Vaziri war songs, the cavalry affair at Tank is much dwelt on, and the little of position offered generally to the expeditionary force is attributed in a great measure to the death of their former great leader Jangi Khan.

Attack on the camp at Pallosin.

Report by Colonel Lumsden. The force left under Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden's command at Pallosin consisted of—

2 Guns, No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery,
2 „ No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery,
80 Sabres, 3rd Panjab Cavalry,
20 Sabres, Guide Cavalry,
400 Guide Infantry,
400 4th Sikh Infantry,
164 14th Panjab Infantry,
200 24th Panjab Infantry,

with a body of levies; as well as the sick of the corps which had gone with General Chamberlain, spare carriage and establishments, supplies, and war material. It occupied a position (see map) on the “kachi” land, on the left bank of the Tank Zam, its right resting on an old Vaziri tower (distant some 800 yards) overlooking the stream; and the left protected by a picquet on the abrupt peak to the south-east, having the scarped bank of the stream in its front and the edge of the high table-land immediately in the rear.

On the night of the 22nd the outlying picquets were at their posts on the ridge behind camp; a complete company occupied the tower, three other parties, each of 1 havildar and 8 sepoys, were posted along the rear, and one of 30 men were on the high peak just mentioned,—each regiment furnishing a picquet also held a party of equal strength in readiness to support it when necessary.

The little information which could be obtained by the Political Officer from Commissioner's Report. scouts tended to the assurance that no bodies of the enemy had yet assembled, and that they would not do so till the force proceeded further into their country; but owing to the unanimity among the Mahsud section of the Vaziris, it was almost impossible to obtain anything like reliable information of the movements of the clan.

Spies were stopped and turned back, or allowed to go and see as much as the Vaziri Chiefs chose, and Captain Coxe had no means at his disposal that could be depended on; the Battanis when sent only went probably for a short distance and returned with a made up story, more dangerous than the simple truth that they were unable to go among the Mahsuds, and thus there was the danger of their reports having the effect of lulling suspicion.

During the night a few stray shots were fired by the sentries at intervals, but all appeared tranquil, till, just as Revéille sounded, Colonel Lumsden's Report. the camp was alarmed by a volley fired by the rear picquet and the call to “fall in.”

A body of 3,000 Vaziris making a sudden rush had overpowered and nearly destroyed the picquets, immediately in their line of attack, holding the high bank above the camp; here the greater mass stopped, while 500 the bravest of them dashed into the camp sword in hand, the remainder beating their drums, cheering on their fellows, and keeping a heavy fire from the ridge. As it happened, they were chiefly successful where the store godown and mounted levies were placed, but they

Commissioner's Report. also penetrated into a part of the Guide camp. Owing to the suddenness of the attack considerable confusion first prevailed, and the Vaziris did great mischief among the surprised

mounted levies, killing men, especially camp followers, and a large number of horses at their picquets, and cutting and slashing among the godown camels.

The alarm became general, and an in-lying picquet, consisting of a company of the Corps of Guides, was quickly placed by Colonel Lumsden's Report. Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden in person on the ridge to enfilade the slopes on the enemy's flank, and to check their advance; this had the effect of making them move off more to their right, but they still bore down on the levies and stores, where they did much mischief as already stated. The confusion for a time was general, but Lieutenant Bond of the Guides, and Lieutenant Lewis, 7th Fusiliers, attached to that corps, rallying a considerable body of men, drove back at the point of the sword bayonet the Vaziris in front of them. No sooner had the alarm been given than the artillery (supported by the 24th Panjab Infantry) under Captains Maister and Hughes were in action, rendering the most valuable assistance in clearing the camps of the enemy.

In the meantime, Major Rothney had formed the Hazara Gurkha Battalion on the ridge, supported by the 4th Sikhs under Lieutenant Jenkins, the picquet of which regiment had not been driven in; when after driving out the enemy who were now pouring into that part of the camp, Major Rothney advanced on the enemy's flank, bearing down on the mass of Vaziris on the table-land above with undeniable steadiness. After these two regiments had got clear of the right of the camp they were joined by the Guides, when the three corps under Major Rothney pursued the enemy for fully 3 miles over the hills, inflicting severe punishment on them till they broke and dispersed,—a part of the enemy going in the direction of Shingi-ka-kot, and the rest over the ridges more to the eastward. The Gurkhas were in front all the way, and although quite a new regiment, their skirmishing over difficult ground won the admiration of all.

The 3rd Panjab Cavalry and the 14th Panjab Infantry, which were on the extreme left of the camp, and furthest from the scene of action, were brought up as a support to the guns on the advance of the infantry under Major Rothney.

The casualties were heavy, for the attack in the true Afghan style, dashing but ill-judged and ultimately failing for want of support and assistance, had not only been very sudden, but for a time conducted with determined gallantry by the enemy; indeed it was a hand-to-hand conflict for the time the enemy were inside the camp, and the unarmed camp followers suffered much. The picquets, too, had greatly suffered; in the Corps of Guides alone there were the following casualties:—

Appendix C.

In one picquet, 1 native officer, 2 non-commissioned officers, and 10 sepoy killed, and 6 non-commissioned officers and 38 sepoy wounded.

In a second, 1 non-commissioned officer killed, and 1 non-commissioned officer and 3 sepoy wounded.

In a third, 3 sepoy wounded.

But the losses of the enemy were also very heavy; 92 of their bodies were found in and around camp, and some 40 more in a nullah on their line retreat. Of their wounded nothing was known, but they must have been great from the number actually killed.

In regard to this affair, Brigadier-General Chamberlain remarked that Major Rothney had displayed that promptness of decision and correctness

judgment which of all qualifications evinced fitness for command, and which, in addition to his other qualifications, marked Major Rothney as an officer of high promise.

And now to return to the movements of General Chamberlain's column, which was marching to rejoin Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden.

On the 24th the force marched back to Luan China, and the following day to the western entrance of the Shahor Gorge.

When the force had advanced, only such crops had been destroyed as were known to belong to the worst offenders; but after the attack on Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden's camp, and the evident intention of the Mahsuds to resist to the utmost, it would have been weakness to have exercised such forbearance any longer, and all the crops the troops passed were now destroyed.

As soon as the Vaziris found that Kani Goram was not our object, their first intention was to oppose the force as it returned through the Shahor Gorge, and a Chief sent a message to the Commissioner's Despatch. Commissioner to this effect, saying, he might take the intimation as friendly or not as he liked; but the hearts of the Vaziris failed at the last moment, and as the column approached the pass they were seen retiring from it.

Early on the 26th a move through the gorge was commenced; some attempt was made to harass the rear-guard under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, but all the heights had been crowned, and the picquets were withdrawn without any casualty on our side, although the Vaziris lost some men.*

The camp was pitched at Mandan Kachi, 1½ mile above Pallosin, where the main body was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden's force.

From the 27th to 31st of May the force remained halted, to admit of the sick and wounded being sent back to Tank, and

Appendix D.

for the litters to rejoin preparatory to an advance

upon Kani Goram. During this period the arrangements for carrying fifteen days' rations for man and beast were completed by Captain Coxe the Deputy Commissioner; and a supply of 4,000 shoes for the soldiers as well as horse shoes and nails were brought up from the rear, the constant marching over boulders and through water having caused an inordinate expenditure of these necessities.

On the 1st May, as it was reported that the Mahsuds had occupied the Annai Tangi, 9 miles beyond camp, it had been

General Chamberlain's and Major Taylor's Despatches.

intended to move the next day to within easy range of the gorge, so as to attack it in the early morning,

but late in the afternoon eleven Mahsud Chiefs arrived in camp, deputed, they said, by the whole tribe to make terms. They were received by the Commissioner, Brigadier-General Chamberlain and Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden being also present.

The reasons for the force entering the hills was fully explained to the chiefs; the Government proclamation was read to them in Pushtu, and they were told there was yet time for them to make terms. These were either the immediate payment of the value of the cattle stolen during the past eight years, calculated at a low estimate at Rs. 43,000, or the giving security for its payment within a reasonable time and hostages for their future good conduct; and they were further told there was not the slightest wish to meddle

* In a memorandum furnished to the Compiler by Major-General R. Taylor, he says that General Chamberlain detached a column direct on Pallosin over the heights on the northern side of the pass, although not mentioned in the despatches.

with their country, far less to annex any portion of it, all that was desired being that they should keep their clans-people in order and prevent their plundering in British territory.

But the Vaziris had evidently no fancy for paying a fine, and the alternative proposal, namely, that they should give a free passage to the force to Kani Goram, the capital of the hills, was equally unpalatable. The malik who acted as spokesman, a well-known character, named Nabi, of the Shingi branch of the tribe, made great protestations of their anxiety for peace; but it was evident that they hoped for it without paying for the past, and probably without giving security such as we should wish for the future, and further that they were decidedly opposed to the march through their country. The question of security for the future never came actually under discussion, as the deliberation never got beyond the first point.

The tone of the maliks throughout this meeting was quiet and the reverse of disrespectful; but through the veil cast by professions of humility and desire for peace, might still be discerned the unquelled pride of the men in the strength of their tribe and country. Thus, when the march to Kani Goram was under discussion, they asked—"Why it was wished to go there; the people were rough mountaineers difficult to restrain; blood was fresh, and the bodies of their relations were still bleaching unburied in the sun; the country was mountainous and confined, and not fitted for our army at all"—all which representations of course contained a good deal more of pride and warning than of humility and submission.

One passage in the conversation appeared to show a good feeling, and one that the Commissioner would gladly have worked on for good. General Chamberlain called attention to the bodies of Vaziris lying near the camp or hastily buried by our troops, and explained to the maliks his willingness to allow the relations to come and remove their dead on this and on future occasions, as it was wholly contrary to our customs and feelings to extend our hostility to an enemy when dead, and he said it gave him pain to see them lying about unburied and uncared for. In reply to this the maliks said, if it was pain to us, what must it be to them whose brothers and fathers and cousins were thus lying ghastly in the sun, making food for the fowls of the air.

Major Taylor tried to improve this opening, but without result. They no doubt feared that the burial parties would be subjected to an ambuscade, as they possibly would have been by native commanders, and only at night and by stealth did they attempt to recover the bodies of their friends.

Towards the end of this meeting there arose a point of difference as to whether the force should halt or move onward the next day.

It was an object in every way to move on to Shingi; the ground occupied had become unhealthy, and supplies were getting scarcer every day.

On the other hand, the maliks wished for a day's delay to consider the propositions; but after fully weighing the whole case, General Chamberlain decided in favor of moving on, feeling convinced that if the maliks were sincerely bent on peace, this would not interrupt or mar their plan, while it saved a day's supplies and gave the troops a healthy encampment.

One view of the case which the maliks put forth was very fairly turned against them, namely, that in our generosity, as representatives of a strong Government, we should allow them some "pardah" (or screen for their honor), meaning that we should spare them the disgrace of submission, or of having an army march through their country; but in answer to this it was fairly objected that we also required some "pardah;" an army had marched into

the country to demand reparation for years of unprovoked injury, and trustworthy security for the time to come, and it was out of the question that it should of its own free will march back again without attaining satisfaction on one point or the other, either by realizing the fine demanded, in which case all further march would be at once relinquished, or by marching through the country.

When it was decided that the force should move on, General Chamberlain promised that it should only move on to the better ground at Shingi, and not advance at all towards their position at Annai until the final decision of the council was received. On the other hand, the maliks undertook to go and consult their tribesmen and to bring back an answer at Shingi on the evening of the following day.

As the force marched on the morning of the 2nd May to Shingi-ka-kot, the chiefs proceeded to rejoin their clansmen at the Annai Tangi; and as the advance guard neared Shingi-ka-kot, it was seen that the hills in its neighbourhood were occupied; but as their chiefs approached, the Vaziris descended and moved off with them.

Not even a message was received during the afternoon of the 2nd, the march was therefore continued the following morning; the Annai Gorge was found abandoned, the Vaziris having fallen back to their next position, distant 5 miles, known as the Barara Tangi, and which was said to be the more defensible of the two gorges.

As there was no suitable ground for a camp between the Annai and Barara Gorges, the force encamped for the day at Ziriram, at the southern entrance to the Annai Gorge, when the destruction of houses and crops was again carried on. During the afternoon 400 of the foot levies were brought up from Jandola to assist in guarding the convoy of grain, the remainder of that garrison was then ordered to return to Tank.

But before any further advance was made, it was thought right to make one last effort for a peaceful settlement with the Vaziris, and the Ahmadzai Vaziri Chief, who had been the bearer of the proclamation, was despatched to the Mahsud leaders to ask for the promised answer. So determined however were the Mahsuds generally for war, and so confidently did they count upon their numbers and position, that our messenger, though a Vaziri, was insulted and threatened, and one ruffian, a petty chief and notorious leader of freebooters, went the length of drawing his sword and hacking his horse to pieces. Thus disgraced our messenger returned to camp, mounted on a horse given him by a Mahsud Chief. Nothing was left therefore but to reply to their appeal to the sword.

The reason why the Vaziris had not stood at the Annai Tangi was obvious enough, for it was found the easiest the troops had passed through; whilst the Barara Gorge was unquestionably the most difficult of any that were seen. Moreover, from the Annai upwards, the passage is considerably narrower than it is below the gorge, and the hills on either side are steeper and higher. In short, above the Annai the whole road (with the exception of two Kachis, viz., the one at the entrance to the Barara Tangi, and the other the Bagiwala beyond it) is a defile until close to Kani Goram, when the hills became lower and rounder in form.

Soon after daylight on the 4th the force moved forward, and after advancing 4 miles up the defile, entered a narrow cultivated dell, at the further end of which, and distant about a mile, was the Barara Gorge, which, it had been reported, the enemy were holding.

met the column, as well as by the report of the flanking parties; and as the force approached the position the Mahsud picquets were seen retiring from their more advanced points.

The Barara Tangi is a narrow cleft cut by the Tank Zam through a chain of mountains crossing its course at right angles.

General's Report.

Both sides of the passage are perpendicular cliffs of 40 or 50 feet in height, from which the mountains slope upwards at a considerable incline.

The enemy, who numbered from 4,000 to 7,000, were in position as follows:—

A thick grove of trees concealed the actual mouth of the pass from the column, but it was conjectured from seeing low lines of breastworks immediately over it that something difficult had been prepared there.

Enemy's centre position.

Commissioner's Report.

It proved eventually to be a strong abattis, composed of large stones and felled poplar trees, forming a massive barrier, completely closing the pass. Guns would have had but little effect on this abattis; it took the Sappers, after the heights had been taken, half an hour to make a gap in it sufficient for the force to pass through.

The right of the enemy's position was very formidable. On the true

right of the mouth of the pass, and overhanging it, was a craggy steep hill surmounted by a tower; then

Enemy's right position.

came a short level interval, and then the commencement of a lofty ridge, which, from its precipitous nature, was wholly unassailable by an attacking force; while from the great distance of its chief peaks from the scene of action, it was only necessary for the defending force to occupy the spurs above their position to enable them to lend good assistance to their fire.

From the tower to the spur of the main hill stretched a double row of breastworks, and for some distance up the spurs of the ridge breastworks were terraced one above another, affording a flanking fire on a force attacking the main position. Above these again were the sharpshooters, crouched in the rocky spurs of the ridge, whose fire would also tell on the ranks of a body advancing along the ledge between the main ridge and the ravine,—the only line of approach by which an attack could be made on the breastworks of the chief position. The precipitous ridge, already described, afforded also what most hillmen like—a safe line of retreat,—enabling them to inflict injury on an attacking force up to the last moment, and then to retire without the fear of being cut off.

The ascent to the left of the enemy's position was steep, but some of its

Enemies' left position.

General Chamberlain's Despatch.

Commissioner's Despatch.

spurs were practicable to infantry and mules. The most difficult feature to deal with was the ravine, which joins the Zam just at the mouth of the pass. For, it appeared that even if the heights on the left bank of this ravine were taken, little advantage would be gained, as probably this position was cut off from the heights beyond, which were very stiff, and were strongly occupied. The advanced position on the enemy's left was also strongly occupied, and when the Vaziri leaders saw that it was intended to seize it as the first step, they lost no time in greatly strengthening it.

Plan of Attack.

The plan of attack was as follows :—

<i>Left Column.</i>		<i>Right Column.</i>	
Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden, c.B., commanding.		Lieutenant-Colonel Green, c.B., commanding.	
<i>Advance.</i>		<i>Advance.</i>	
Wing, 6th Panjab Infantry, 300 men—Lieutenant Fisher.		Wing, 3rd Panjab Infantry, 300 men—Lieutenant Ruxton.	
<i>Support.</i>		<i>Support.</i>	
Wing, Guide Infantry, 250 men—Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden.		2nd Panjab Infantry, 500 men—Lieutenant-Colonel Green, c. B.	
Peshawar Mountain Train, 4 pieces—Captain DeBude.		Hazara Mountain Train, 4 pieces—Captain Butt.	
<i>Reserve.</i>		<i>Reserve.</i>	
Wing, 6th Police Battalion, 300 men—Lieutenant Orchard.		Wing, 1st Panjab Infantry, 300 men—Captain Keyes.	
<i>Centre Column.</i>			
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde, c.B., commanding.			
Nos. 2 and 3 Panjab Light Field Battery Captain Maister and Hughes.			
Wing, 4th Panjab Infantry—Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, c.B.			
24th Panjab Infantry—Lieutenant Chalmers.			
<i>Reserve Column.</i>			
Major Rothney commanding,			
Cavalry, Hazara Gurkha Battalion—Major Rothney.			
<i>Baggage.</i>			
Foot Levies—Baggage—14th Panjab Infantry Captain Ward.			
<i>Rear Guard.</i>			
4th Sikh Infantry—Lieutenant Jenkins.			

The right column was to crown the heights on the right. The left column was to threaten that flank by the passage leading to the tower, but was not to advance against the enemy's position before the right attack had succeeded, when the left defences would become partially open to enfilade from our right attack.

The troops in the centre were drawn up in the bed of the defile, about 900 yards from the gorge.

The reserve was drawn up a little in rear of the centre.

The baggage was massed in rear of the reserve; its flanks protected by the 14th Panjab Infantry and Foot Levies, whilst its rear was guarded by a wing of the 4th Sikh Infantry.

The Right Attack.

A plateau, about 300 yards, below the crest of the hill, (on which the enemy had erected a strong line of breastworks,) was reached without any loss. From this plateau three small spurs, with ravines between them, led to the crest of the hill, and the 3rd Panjab Infantry were ordered to advance covered by the fire of the Mountain Guns, and the Field Guns with the Centre column in the nullah.

Two companies were thrown into skirmishing order, the remainder in support; but the fire from breastworks being very heavy, the rear companies of the 3rd Panjab Infantry were pushed on to strengthen those in advance;

General Chamberlain's Despatch.

Lieutenant-Colonel Green's Report.

Regimental History, 3rd Panjab Infantry.

Enquiry by Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde.

Enquiry for order of merit, &c.

at the same time the 2nd Panjab Infantry was ordered to move up in column of sections to the cover of a spur of a hill (about two-thirds of the way up), to keep down the flanking fire on the left of the 3rd Panjab Infantry and as a support to it. The 1st Panjab Infantry was halted as a reserve, and as a support to the Mountain-Battery.

After a difficult advance, during which there were some 20 casualties, the leading men of the 3rd Panjab Infantry, headed by Lieutenant Ruxton, rushed to within a short distance of the breastworks, situated on the crest of a rugged, steep ascent, the last 12 or 15 feet of which were almost inaccessible.

The ground was much cut up by ravines, and the attacking party was consequently much dispersed, and broken up into knots of men, so that there was not a sufficient body collected in any one spot to make the final rush. The men, to avoid the enemy's fire and the stones hurled down upon them from above, now sought shelter behind the rocks, whence they could only keep up a desultory fire on the breastworks.

The Vaziris emboldened by the check, and at the moment receiving an accession of numbers from the rear, leaped their breastworks and with a shout rushed down upon the 3rd Panjab Infantry sword in hand, causing a panic which became general. The 3rd Panjab Infantry were driven back upon the support, which also gave way, and the enemy bravely continued their advance upon the Mountain Guns and the Reserve.

The nature of the ground admitted of the attack being witnessed alike by friend and foe; and as the Vaziris charged down the hill, their bright swords glistening in the sun, the mountains resounded with the plaudits of their clansmen as they cheered them on to victory.

Although many of the 1st Panjab Infantry who were in reserve got mixed up with the two lines which had been driven back, those on the right, who were clear of the retreating bodies, escaped the panic, when Captain Keyes, (who cut down the leader of a party which was advancing on the flank of the guns,) putting himself at the head of this portion of the reserve, turned the tide which affairs had taken in favor of the Mahsuds. But the men of the Mountain Battery under Captain Butt had never swerved, they had gallantly stood to and fought their guns, and the enemy were now, not only under the fire of the Mountain Guns, but also under that of the Field Guns below, and their triumph, brilliant as it had been for the moment, was over. Brave and dashing as are the hillmen in attack, when checked they are lost, and the Mahsuds retreated up the hill hotly pursued by the 1st Panjab Infantry who took the main breastwork; the other troops now rallying, breastwork after breastwork was carried, and the right of the position won.

Our loss had been 30 killed, including Lieutenant Ayton (Her Majesty's 94th Regiment, attached to the 2nd Panjab Infantry,) shot through the head at the commencement of the ascent, and 84 wounded.

Appendix E.

Amongst the killed, was a dooly-bearer of the 2nd Panjab Infantry, shot whilst assisting under a sharp fire to tie up Lieutenant Ayton's wound.

The enemy left 35 dead bodies on the ground, including some chiefs. The ruffian who had killed our messenger's horse, and the leader of the party which had killed the detachment of police in 1855, being of the number.

The Left Attack.

The enemy on the right of the gorge, disheartened by the loss of their left position and exposed to the fire of our guns from the right column, were now giving way, so orders were sent to Lieutenant Colonel Lumden to advance.

After moving on the tower, he ascended the eastern slope of the hill, when he cleared ridge after ridge with his Mountain Guns with a loss of only 2 men.

The Centre Attack.

As soon as the barricade at the mouth of the gorge had been removed, the wings of the 4th Panjab Infantry and the Hazara Gurkha Battalion were sent up to clear the eastern ridges, as the hill ascended by Lieutenant-Colonel Green's column was separated from these hills by the tributary to the Zam, before alluded to.

No further opposition was then offered, and the camp was pitched on the

Commissioner's Despatch. *Bagiwalla Kachi, 3 miles beyond the defile.*
 patch. Exposed as the enemy had been to the fire of both Field and Mountain Guns and Rifles, their losses in killed and wounded must have been very severe, although it was impossible to ascertain them exactly for the following reasons:

When the Vaziris go out to a distance to fight, they know the numbers they take out and the number missing at the end of the day, and in such case the loss is easily ascertained by spies; but here our troops were in the midst of their homes, and men in leaving the field dispersed in families, some even retreating to the hills in rear of the troops; and thus an individual Vaziri questioned by a spy was quite unable to say what number of men had been killed, or had gone off, or had been carried away wounded.

The crops in the neighbourhood of camp were given over to the cattle, and the houses set fire to.

In the evening deputation was received from the Mahsud Chiefs expressing renewed wishes for peace. The Chief of Makin also sent to intercede for the same, and another leader sent a special messenger to beg that his property might be spared. To all conciliatory answers were given, and they were assured that, if they would come in and make peace, there was no wish to injure them further.

The last act of the day was to commit the remains of the late Lieutenant Ayton to the grave. A spot was carefully selected, which would be almost certain to escape observation, and by the light of a bright moon he was laid

Commissioner's Despatch. *in his last resting-place; and few soldiers sleep in a wilder spot.* While his funeral was being conducted, the ground on the opposite side of the stream was one blaze of fire, in which the mortal remains of the Sikhs and Hindus who had fallen were being gradually reduced to ashes, and it was impossible not to reflect on the position which the few English officers occupied, leading a mixed force, composed entirely of strangers, to effect the subjection of tribes whose country no native power had ever ventured to invade.

In his despatch General Chamberlain stated that the officers he desired to bring specially to notice for the attack on the Barara position, were, Captain Keyes, commanding 1st Regiment Panjab Infantry, Captain Butt, commanding Hazara Mountain Train, and Lieutenant Ruxton, commanding 3rd Panjab Infantry.

At sun-rise the next morning (5th) the force advanced, and at 4 in the afternoon, after a march of 15 miles, halted near Kani Goram.

As the force ascended, the defile became narrower and the ascent steeper. Hitherto only the wild olive had been seen, but oaks were now found. The appearance of the houses improved as the troops advanced, and there was an air of comfort and solidity about them; many of the vistas where the stream rushed

along its course, hemmed in on either side by slips of cultivation bordered by rows of willows and poplars, were exceedingly picturesque.

Relying on the friendly professions of the chiefs, injury to crops and property was stayed, with one exception, that of the Shinghi village of Ginjal, the residence of people notorious for their depredations upon the border; and as the head of the clan, through whose tract the troops were passing, sent a messenger to say that he was coming in immediately, and to intercede for his property, safeguards were left at every collection of buildings, at the same time for our own security the heights had to be crowned, notwithstanding which precaution the column was fired upon and 2 horses shot.

At Maidani, about 4 miles from Kani Goram, the force was met by the Syads and Urmars elders of the latter place, who were assured of protection, and who were told to return and recall the inhabitants.

On reaching Maidani the country assumed quite a different aspect. The hills were generally low and of easy slope, and in some places had the appearance of downs. The plateau is there reached, from which the lower ranges radiate, ending in the Mountains of Pir Ghal and Shui Dar.

The town of Kani Goram is built on the southern slope of a low hill, the houses rising in tiers. It contains, it is said, 800 houses; these are built of stone, and are flat roofed: some of them have a sort of balcony in front. The principal street is roofed over to keep off the snow in winter, and the rain in spring and summer.

A small stream runs in front of and below the town, on either side of which are the gardens of the townspeople, containing walnut and other fruit trees, and vines. Above the gardens are terraced fields, which then bore luxuriant crops of green corn. The gardens are fast going to decay, the people saying they derive no benefit from them, as the Mahsuds plunder the fruit.

Hardly any Vaziris reside in the town, but all the tribal meetings are held there. The inhabitants are Syads, and a Pathan clan called Urmars, who occupied the country until dispossessed by the Vaziris. They carry on the trade of the country. The Urmars are not a fighting class of their own free will; but as they had under compulsion taken part in the defence of the Barara Pass, and as they had furnished no supplies to the camp, it was thought

proper that they should pay a nazaranah of Rs. 2,000, in consideration of which the town was to be spared. This was immediately arranged for, and good security was given by the Syads, who are the head of the society, and who have considerable mercantile and other connections with Tank.

The force halted on the 6th. During the night a fire broke out in the town; it was in the house of a Syad, and had been caused by a Vaziri in revenge for some supposed injury. The bodies of two camel drivers, who had, in opposition of orders, gone beyond the line of sentries, were found at daylight hacked to pieces.

Some of the townspeople now returned to their homes, but they were in too great awe of the Mahsuds to assist us with supplies,—a little tobacco and some grass sandals being the extent of the aid afforded.


The height of the camp was found to be 6,700 feet above the sea, and the range to the south (easily ascended) 8,300. Numbers of wild plants and flowers, such as, Thyme, Forget-me-not, Clover, and several other kinds common to England, were found.

The Pir Ghal Mountain was too distant from the camp, and too difficult of ascent to be visited, much as the survey officers desired to do ascend it to lay down the range to the west.

SKETCH
of
BRITISH POSITION
above
PANJ DURRA OR UMBEYLAH PASS

Scale 1 Inch to the Mile.

Furlongs 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Mile



REFERENCE.

Village Site
Route
British Position Red

No further communication having been received from the Mahsud Chiefs, a halt was made on the 7th, and messengers were sent to ascertain the intention of the enemy, when a most unsatisfactory reply was received,—the only thing definite in it being that if the force would remain two or three days at Kani Goram, they would come in to arrange terms. They were well aware of the unreasonableness of their request, knowing full well that the supplies were limited; and these once expended, there was nothing but starvation for the camp until the plains were reached. The cavalry and private

Field Force orders.

horses had been put on half rations of grain. However, Brigadier-General Chamberlain determined to halt the 8th, to give them no excuse for not coming in; when in return for this forbearance, it was found the enemy were discussing where further opposition could best be made. To avoid injuring the crops, the camels had been starved for two days, (for they would not browse on the oak trees,) but the duplicity of the chiefs having thus relieved us from any necessity for self-sacrifice, the beasts were allowed to satisfy their hunger in the fields.

Although the force had come provided with blankets and great-coats, the great change in climate, and more especially the really cold nights, added to the rain which fell every afternoon, began to tell upon the troops, British officers as well as men; and fever and diarrhoea were sending numbers into hospital. To enable them to be transported, bedsteads were procured from the town, which were transformed into camel litters through the exertions of Captain Pollard, Field Engineer, and Lieutenant Chalmers, commanding the Pioneers, aided by regimental armourers.

During the halt of the force at Kani Goram, the soldiers were permitted to visit the town morning and evening in parties under officers; and on one occasion, one of the head Syads, who was watching their orderly march through the place, loudly called out to the by-standers, "Well done! British Justice." General Chamberlain observed that such a remark from such a sect was more honorable to our arms and country than any military success.

As no communication was received from the chiefs, the force moved back on the 9th to Doa Toza, 5½ miles, setting fire to everything that had been spared and protected on its upward march. To this only one exception was made in favour of a small property opposite the camp, known to belong to the son of the Ahmadzai Chief, Swahn Khan, famous as having as far back as 1824 shewn civility to the enterprising traveller Moorcroft, and as having subsequently rendered assistance to the late Sir Herbert Edwardes when that officer entered upon the settlements of the Banu Valley in 1847.

On the march some attempt was made to annoy the rear-guard, but only 2 men were wounded, whilst the enemy suffered from the practice of the long range rifles of officers.

Doa Toza is the point where the Tank Zam divides into two branches, one going south-west to Kani Goram, the other a little north of west to Makin, and the camp was pitched at the junction; the hills close in here and are high and rugged, and it is a difficult position to quit in presence of an enemy.

The next morning (10th) a move was made towards Makin, 5¼ miles; it was not known if the Mahsuds would oppose the force entering that valley, or if an attack would be made on the rear. The first part of the defile was difficult, but after about 3 miles the hills became lower; and opposite Makin the plateau is again attained.

No attempt was made to oppose the column; the picquets were skilfully withdrawn and the rear-guard under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde reached

camp with only 2 men and 1 horse wounded. All Mahsud property passed on the march was destroyed.

The force was now approaching the boundary line that separates the Mahsuds from the Ahmadzais; and an Ahmadzai settlement, located within the Mahsud border, was passed on the march. Relying on protection being afforded them, the inhabitants had remained at their homes, and safeguards had been placed over their property as the column passed: unfortunately, however, one of the rear-guard flanking parties not being aware of the circumstances, and coming suddenly upon some Ahmadzais, took them for Mahsuds; when, before any explanation could be entered into, the party fired and badly wounded 2 of the Ahmadzais. These men were brought into camp and their wounds attended to; but being unwilling to accompany the force, they were sent back to their homes each with a handsome present.

The valley of Makin, which is the true Vaziri head-quarter, is situated at the point where the mountains of Shui Dar and Pir Ghal close in upon each other,—a spur from each mountain forming its northern and southern face.

Commissioner's Despatch. The houses are built upon the slopes of these spurs, the spaces between them being covered with groves of wild olives and apricot trees. Makin contains numerous smelting houses, and is the principal seat of the Mahsud iron trade. Next to Kani Goram it is *the most important and best built place in the country; many of the houses measure 50 x 20 feet, with solid stone walls, and roofs of excellent timber. The whole of the valley is cultivated, and considerable skill and labour have been exhibited in turning to account every bit of ground available for cultivation. A small stream, having its rise within the gorge formed by the meeting of the Shui Dar and Pir Ghal Mountains, flows through the centre of the valley which is filled with villages of considerable size.*

Earnestly desiring to come to a settlement, and to avoid having to commit further destruction, a last effort was made to induce the tribe to listen to reason; and to this end a Mahsud, who was in camp, was despatched by the Commissioner to inform the tribe of our wish to spare the place. But, though they had suffered so much and were perfectly aware of their inability to withstand our arms, their stubborn pride would not still allow of their yielding, and on this, as on previous occasions, nothing came of the proposal.

The force accordingly halted the next day (11th), when the work of destruction went on. The ridges of the northern and southern sides were crowned by Infantry and Mountain Guns, whilst a column moved up the centre of the valley.

In this manner, the few men inclined to offer opposition were driven back to the main ranges, where they were kept until the force retired. By evening the whole of the town and villages were in flames, and the towers burnt or blown up, amidst shouts and yells of rage from the Vaziris on the mountains. At dusk the troops returned to camp with only two casualties.

The state of the supplies now rendered it absolutely necessary to bring the operations to a close; and, as was previously intended, Banu became the point on which the troops began to move. As they marched away from Makin on the 12th, two high towers which guard the entrance to the valley, and which had been occupied by our picquets, were blown up, and Makin was left in ruins.

A march of 8½ miles up the bed of the ravine was made to Razmuk, from which descends the defile leading to the Banu Valley. Shortly after leaving Makin, the Mahsud boundaries were passed, and the Ahmadzai lands were entered; but before crossing the boundary, the Mahsud village of Tula Chini was given to the flames, and its crops destroyed.

After passing the Mahsuds limits, small parties of the Mahsuds still endeavoured to annoy the line of march from the hill sides. Considering the relative position of the two branches—Mahsuds and Ahmadzais—it was not to be expected that the Ahmadzais could or would interfere to prevent the Mahsuds following the column, and the rear-guard lost 2 men and 1 horse wounded.

The country about Razmak has much the appearance of English downs, and is covered with turf and wild flowers, the violet amongst the number. Both at Makin and Razmak the cuckoo was heard and the regular English magpie seen in numbers. Razmak is 7,300 feet above the level of the sea, and is the greatest altitude to which the camp attained. The crest of the Razmak Pass is the water-shed between Banu and Tank, the water on one side flowing into the Banu Valley, and on the other side into the Tank Zam.

As the camels would not browse upon the oak trees, fields of green corn were purchased for them to graze in, and from this day everything required was paid for most scrupulously.

During the 13th there was a halt, to admit of the road down the pass being made practicable for guns and laden animals; this for about a mile and a half is very steep, when the bed of the Khissora Pass is reached, the fall of which is gradual from this point.

By 2 P.M. on the 14th the road was ready, when the tents were struck and the descent was commenced. During the 12th, 13th, and 14th, heavy rain had fallen at intervals, and the wind was cold and cutting; the supplies were running short and the camels were suffering from want of food; and as there was no certainty when the rain might cease, the General considered it undesirable to delay the onward march, even though a late move would prevent the rear-guard reaching the new ground till very late.

By night-fall the heights on either side of the pass were crowned, and every one passed into camp in safety, though it was midnight before the rear-guard came in. Some shots were exchanged without loss to us.

The stone from which the Vaziris extract their iron seemed to be more abundant at the head of the Khissora, than at any other place the troops passed through, and each collection of houses had its smelting furnaces.

From Rab Gani the force marched on the 15th to Larshah (10 miles). The rear-guard was fired upon as it quitted the ground, but after this the Mahsuds were left behind and no further molestation was attempted.

A march of 12 miles on the 16th brought the column to Doa Wurkha, it was necessary to halt the following day on account of rain, the bed of the defile becoming a torrent impassable even by an elephant. From the ridge behind the camp a portion of the Dawar Valley was visible, and beyond it the outline of the tract General Chamberlain had passed over a few months previous, when operating against the Kabal Khels.

On the bleak heights of Razmak the stunted wheat was struggling into ear, but as the troops descended, every few miles brought its change in climate, until at Doa Wurkha the Ahmadzais were found treading out their corn preparatory to moving up to summer quarters. As the troops marched along, men, women, and children, left their encampments to watch them pass, thus proving their confidence in our sense of justice. Almost every plateau of cultivation had its high narrow tower of two or more stories, built partly to afford refuge to the men who remain behind to attend to the rain crops, and partly for the defence of the defile.

The Povindahs had been ordered to march round at the back of the

Commissioner's Despatch. Kundigur Mountain *via* Spin Wam, and to enter the Khissora Valley, to destroy crops, houses, &c.; and

when the force was at Kani Goram, the Commissioner heard that they were close to Khissora, and that the Mahsuds had been consequently obliged to remove from their villages to the hill tops; but after the return of the force it was known that some quarrel had arisen between the Povindahs and their especial enemies—the Ahmadzais, and that fighting had ensued;—word was therefore sent to the Povindahs to pass on to their homes. They had marched in with the full intention of working against the Mahsuds, and their doing so successfully at this point would have completed the disturbance of every portion of the Mahsud country but one, and that a thinly inhabited portion; and though the move of the Povindahs was rather a failure, owing to their previous hostility with the Ahmadzais, the effect on the Mahsuds will not be thrown away.

On the 18th, after 10 miles, Spin Wam was reached, just clear of the defile and within British territory; and on the 19th May the Expeditionary Force marched into Banu, where it was broken up after one month of the exertions inseparable from hill warfare.

General Chamberlain thus describes the services which the troops had rendered.—The shortest marches took hours to perform, the safety of the followers, supplies, and baggage, requiring the heights on both sides to be crowned and held until the arrival of the rear-guard. Though starting by sun-rise, it was generally noon and often later before the new ground was reached; arrived there, day picquets had to be posted, and escorts for the surveyors, and cattle, and foragers, to be supplied.

In the afternoon fatigue parties had to be turned out to construct breast-works for the night picquets. These had to be substantially built with stones collected from the hill sides, and to be palisaded to prevent a sudden rush by overpowering numbers*. Near sun-set from 700 to 1,000 men occupied these works, their comparatively isolated position rendering support difficult; at dusk the tents were struck, and, in addition to in-lying picquets, half the men slept accoutred, and the whole in uniform.

But no one grudged the exertion, for all felt that success and honor, and safety depended on unceasing vigilance. The result was, that in a march of 160 miles through an unknown and difficult country, carrying 16 days' supplies for 8,000 men, with an enemy ever on the watch to take advantage of remissness, the expeditionary force lost but 3 camp followers, and as many camels,—the former through their own negligence and disobedience of orders, the latter by a bold thief, who feigned to be a camel driver, and who was not noticed till beyond reach. Every camel that fell from exhaustion had been immediately shot† that it might not be of any use to the enemy.

* The style of defence was to build an interior "sangar," or breastwork of stones, and to surround it at a distance of some 25 or 30 paces with an abattis. Report by Captain Pollard, Field Engineer. When trees were not procurable, small thorny brushwood pegged down, or weighted down by massive stones when pegs would not hold, made a good substitute.

† The number of camels that died, or had to be destroyed, can never be known. Letter from Colonel Becher, Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan. Compensation for 151 attached to the levies and the supply department was paid; but by some mistake bills for compensation for those died or killed, attached to regiments, were not sent in.

Letter from Colonel R. Taylor. Colonel R. Taylor, the Commissioner, stated that although it should never be allowed as a precedent in regard to camels employed in the *plains*, it would be only just, considering the fatiguing nature of the marches, the scantiness of forage, and the short time for feeding, and politic considering how much depends on carriage, that the owners of camels, &c., employed in *hill* expeditions should be compensated for casualties. When carriage is pressed on such occasions, the owners feel the Government are taking their property to certain ruin.*

General Chamberlain added, the conduct of the troops had been most excellent, and every officer afforded the most cheerful and hearty support. In addition to officers already named as having distinguished themselves, the General specially acknowledged the services rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden, C.B., commanding Corps of Guides; Lieutenant-Colonel G. Green, C.B., commanding 2nd Panjab Infantry; Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B., commanding 4th Panjab Infantry; Captain Pollard, Field Engineer; Surgeon H. B. Buckle, senior Surgeon, and upon whom devolved the superintendence of medical arrangements: and the General testified to the unwearied zeal with which Major Walker and his assistants, Lieutenants Basevi and Bramfield, of the Great Trigonometrical Survey, accomplished their task of constructing a map of the country. He also observed that the report on the flora of the country by Assistant Surgeon T. S. Stewart, would fill up a blank in the botanical chart of the Trans-Indus frontier. The Panjab Government, when sending on the report of the operations, alluded to the services of Captain H. C. Johnstone, Topographical Survey, who had been attached to the expedition.

General Chamberlain after stating that the Commissioner, Major Taylor, and the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Coxe, had as military officers from the first taken part in everything, and cheerfully rendered every assistance in their power, added he had to acknowledge how greatly the military operations were assisted by the hearty co-operation of those officers in their capacities of Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of obtaining information, Major Taylor's sketches and description of the country proved to be singularly accurate, and no exertion was spared by him to afford every assistance. Indeed General Chamberlain said he would be ungrateful were he not to say that, had Major Reynell Taylor been an officer of the staff instead of the chief political officer in camp, he could not have afforded more assistance, or more freely placed his services at the General's disposal. Of Captain H. W. H. Coxe, he was bound to say that, without his excellent arrangements for keeping the troops in supplies, the force could not have separated itself, as it did, from all communication with the rear, and the advance upon Kani Goram would not have been practicable.

It was stated by Major Taylor that the Nawabs Foujdar Khan Bahadur and Shah Newaz Khan of Tank, and the eldest son of the Nawab of Dera Ismail Khan, besides some other chiefs of border influence, accompanied the force, and that all were desirous of exhibiting their loyalty; and that the Irregular Levies did the duty assigned to them cheerfully and well, and exhibited an excellent spirit.

The Commissioner in his despatch also alluded to the energy with which supplies were sent up from Tank by the Assistant Commissioners, Captain Ferris and Lieutenant Ommanney, before the force advanced from Pallosin.

In a despatch from the Secretary of State for India, it was recorded that His Royal Highness the Field Marshal, Commanding-in-chief, had agreed with the Secretary of State in highly appreciating the skill, energy, and judgment displayed by the Commander, and the disciplined courage and devotion exhibited by the troops, in carrying to a successful issue operations of such peculiar difficulty. That the service rendered to the State was of considerable political importance, and proved that under proper guidance a well organized force can penetrate the rugged mountains which form the northern frontier

Commissioner's Despatch.

Despatch from Secretary of State for India.

of India, and operate at will against the warlike tribes which inhabit them, without loss, and independently of local supplies.

It was further intimated that the name of Brigadier-General N. Chamberlain, C. B., would be submitted to Her Majesty, in view to his nomination as a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath. That Captain C. P. Keyes's distinguished conduct at the Barara Pass would be rewarded by a Brevet Majority; and that the conduct of Captain Butt, R. A., on the same occasion merited the favorable notice of Her Majesty's Government.

The cordial aid afforded by the political officers was considered by the Governor General in Council to be deserving of the highest commendation; and the special thanks of His Excellency in Council were to be conveyed to Lieutenant-Colonel R. Taylor, C. B., the Commissioner, whose valuable services had been prominently brought to notice by the Brigadier-General.

Letter from Supreme Government.

General Observations.

No trace of the amount expended in the Military Department is to be found. The expense in the Civil Department was Rs. 64,471, and the principal items of expenditure were—

McGregor's Gazetteer.

Camel hire	14,745
Bullock hire	4,124
Donkey hire	376
Shoes and sandals*	3,337
Commissariat establishment, &c.	4,108
Subsistence allowance to Chiefs	1,346
Khillats to Chiefs	1,725
Pensions to heirs of levies killed	2,950
Compensation for damage to crops, loss of camels, &c.	14,229
Pay of temporary levies	19,285
Carriages for levies	1,535

The returns of the sick are very incomplete, but those which are forthcoming, as well as the amount of carriage which was attached to regiments for sick and wounded, are given in Appendices H and I.

Remarks by the Compiler.

With regard to the medical arrangements, Deputy Surgeon-General Buckle, Presidency Circle, has been good enough to furnish the following memorandum:—

"There is no record of the information required regarding medical arrangements, &c., in frontier expeditions. The returns of the regiments employed on the various expeditions were submitted, as usual, in the monthly return of sick, to the Medical Department. When the expedition assumed larger proportions, as that against the Mahsud Vaziris of 1860 and the Ambeyla campaign, daily states of sick were submitted every day to the General commanding.

"The organization of the Panjab Frontier Force is on the principle of making every regiment efficient in all details. The regiments in the plains keep up 75 camels, in the hills 100 mules. The hospital 1 dooly and 6 bearers per company; in past days, when the companies were 10 and 8, the doolies and bearers were in proportion: and the same with the cavalry per troop. With each infantry regiment, besides the complement of doolies, 10 stretchers

* Sandals were issued without charge to the troops as a special case during the operations by order of General Chamberlain, subject to the confirmation of Government, in consideration of the great wear and tear there had been.

"with poles, and 2 fracture doolies. On proceeding on service, 4 camels with kajawahs are allowed, and 1 camel to carry the poles of the stretchers and the stretcher. The idea being, that on proceeding into the hills the doolies or a portion of them should be left behind, a dooly requiring 6 men, and 4 being ample for a stretcher. The provision of carriage for the sick was usually found adequate.

"There were no medical provisions required, or ever made, except to a very small extent, which will be explained, beyond what was maintained with every regiment.

"The ordinary custom on the force proceeding on service was to direct complete wings of the regiment detailed to concentrate at the place selected. By this means all weakly and sick men were left behind as guards at the different stations. The force was thus actually a selected force, and the carriage allotted for the whole regiment thus became available for a wing only. In the same way, medical stores and hospital necessaries were selected.

The force was Native, except the officers. "At the forts along the frontier provisions were stocked, and the Commissariat was managed by the civil officers of the districts. Camels to carry 'attah' for

"a certain time accompanied the force at times with a proportion of mules. Along with the ordinary hospital necessaries, as the force contained a larger number of Sikhs—rum, opium, bhang, spices (mussalahs for native food), cloth for bandages, arrowroot, sago, gundabaroza, and things to supplement dressings, were provided.

"The Mahsud expedition assumed rather large proportions. There were some 5,000 troops, and perhaps 1,200 Irregulars; the latter had no medical arrangements, and the civil dispensaries in the Derajat were laid under contribution in the shape of bandages and sticking-plaster.

"The system was a rough and ready one, but there is no doubt it was most efficient and capable of meeting everything required, when more cumbrous arrangements would simply have been an impediment.

"In the Mahsud expedition it was put to a severe test. The opposition was very serious, and the force was shortly after entering the hills isolated, with no communication with the plains, and entirely dependent on its own resources.

"There was a large number of wounded at the night attack on the camp at Pallosin. These were all sent back to Tank, and arrangements made for their going on to Dera Ismail Khan. After the return of the carriage and convoy of these men, the force proceeded on and communication with the rear ceased.

"There were somewhere about 100 men wounded at the forcing of the Barara, and as the force marched on to Kani Goram the morning after the action these all had to be carried.

"This force was nearly a month in the hills, and all the marches except the last five or six were made under fire. As the flour on the camels was consumed, the camels became available for the carriage of the sick. Portable "kajawahs" were made out of the charpoys taken at any village; if string was wanted, it was made out of the fibres of the dwarf palm tree (Mazurri), which grows like a low shrub; and in this way every one was carried along. For medical stores, the dependence was on the stock of each regiment."

SECTION VIII.

Subsequent conduct of the Tribe.

THAT the force should have had to return without coming to a settlement with the tribe, was to be regretted; but the enemy had been most severely punished. Their losses were estimated as very heavy, and the amount of property destroyed (but destroyed only after every opportunity had been afforded them of acceding to the reasonable demands imposed), and when, notwithstanding their hostility and dissimulation, they were to the last almost solicited to spare the troops from having to cause such devastation had been great. And both the Commissioner and the General were very sanguine that the expedition would ultimately bring about a state of peace hitherto unknown on that blood-stained border. As no arrangement, however, had been come to, the tribe was put under blockade, and as they trade largely with the plains and live in a great measure on the profits of their iron trade, their annual loss from exclusion was estimated at Rs. 20,000 yearly.

More than a year passed away, but the Mahsuds would not submit. Being able to draw supplies from the Afghan valleys of Khost and Dawar the Mahsuds were not pinched by famine, though they suffered by the exclusion of their own and other commodities from British markets. During the whole of 1861 the Mahsuds lost no opportunity of making plundering raids into British territory. In February 1862 they opened negotiations, but they came to nothing. Subsequently they agreed to the terms offered to them, and were again admitted to trade in our territories. The basis of the new

engagement was, that each main section of Alizais, Balolzais, and Shaman Khels, should be responsible for any outrages committed by members of their sections. It was, moreover, ruled that 3 approved hostages should be lodged at Banu and 3 at Tank, receiving subsistence from Government.

But the Mahsuds had hardly concluded this treaty before they broke it: several thefts were committed, and five grass-cutters of the 3rd Panjab Cavalry were murdered by men of the Alizai and Balolzai sections. In consequence of this, all men of these sections found in our territory were seized and their property confiscated, and they were fined Rs. 4,500; but the Shaman Khels were allowed ingress as before. Afterwards a deputation of the principal men of each sub-division waited on the Commissioner at Dera Ismail Khan to ratify the treaty previously made. Colonel Taylor then advocated some of the Malikshahi sections and others being settled in the plains, and employment in the Militia being given to the tribe; but although tried this project failed.

Meanwhile they did not discontinue their raids one iota. In 1862 on the Dera Ismail Khan border there occurred 31 cases of cattle-lifting, 4 petty thefts, and 4 highway robberies, by which 133 camels, 90 head of cattle, and 332 sheep and goats, besides some cash and clothing, were stolen.

In 1863 the Mahsuds in force attacked the Jata outpost, which was then not quite finished, and did some damage, and, besides this, 905 head of cattle were carried off; but 714 of these were re-captured, and 5 of the raiders were killed, 3 wounded, and 13 captured.

In 1864 the Mahsuds continued their depredations, especially in the Tank border. They seldom gave an opportunity for reprisals, so that at

length it was found necessary to exclude them from trading in the Banu or Dera Ismail Khan Districts.

Colonel Becher's (the Commissioner) instructions on this subject were issued in August 1863, from which date the Nana Khels and Shingis, comprising the Jalal Khels, Gujar Khels, Kokarais, Haibat Khels, Abdul Rahman Khels, and other minor sub-divisions, were prohibited from entering British territory.

These tribes, especially the Jalal Khels, Kokarais, and Goga Khels, continued to plunder whenever they found an opportunity, till at last, in April 1864, they sought for peace by sending deputations to the foot of the hills to ask permission for a "jirga" to come in and make terms.

The Nana Khel division having carried on their principal trade with Tank, their chief men sought and obtained an interview through the Nawab, who forwarded them on to Dera Ismail Khan, where they made terms and promised to behave well in future.

The Shingi tribe would not, however, come to terms either at Dera Ismail Khan or Banu: a large "jirga" indeed, who came in to see the Deputy Commissioner of Banu, requested that their clan might be forgiven and allowed once more to trade. They were hospitably entertained for some days, but were told that they must make good all they had plundered, amounting to Rs. 2,272, and must besides pay a fine of Rs. 500; and give hostages for their good behaviour. They promised to do this, and went off in order to gain the consent of the rest of the tribe, who however refused.

Attempts were then made at reprisals in order to obtain some compensation for our villages which had thus been robbed, and Rs. 1,359 were collected in this manner.

At last, in August 1865, Major Graham, then Deputy Commissioner of the Dera Ismail Khan District, despairing of doing anything with the tribe, recommended that service in the frontier Militia should be given to 25 Mahsud horsemen, and that land should be granted to them within the border.

The preliminaries to this arrangement progressed but slowly. The Mahsuds were not modest in their ideas, "demanding nothing less than 100 sowars for each section and lands from Dabra to Tator;" and they wished to make the release of some prisoners caught marauding the first condition of their assent to the proposal. Gradually, however, they gave in, and all sections agreed in February 1866, except part of the Shingis who held out for more horsemen. This persistent refusal of theirs to come to terms was regarded by Major Graham as a very good proof that "they would hereafter have to depend on this means of subsistence provided by Government as a substitute for plunder;" and that officer therefore determined to take the opportunity of vacancies occurring in the frontier Militia gradually to provide for a few more of them.

As soon as the terms were agreed to, the horsemen were enlisted, and in the cold weather of 1866-67 about 20 families of Mahsuds settled on the land, brought about 60 acres of land under cultivation, and reaped the produce,—a sum of Rs. 2,000 out of the Government grant of Rs. 5,000 having been expended. The prisoners were retained pending the result of these measures.

During the year, from 18th February 1866 to 18th February 1867, the tribe was on the whole much better behaved, but towards the close of the year some heavy cases of plunder of camels, with one or two of kidnapping Hindus occurred, which swelled the amount of compensation due by the tribe to about Rs. 8,000. As usual, the Shingi and Nana Khel clans of the Balol-zai section were the principal offenders, and as usual they were unable to pay up: the release of the prisoners therefore (all Shingis and Mani Khels), which

was contingent on good behaviour, was held in abeyance pending compensation.

But, in order to show his scrupulous observance of the terms of the treaty, Major Graham caused the prisoners to be removed from the jail on the 18th February 1867 and to be placed in a serai under a guard, with permission to see their friends freely, to resume their own dress, and to receive presents of food : their fetters were also removed.

In the meantime a "jirgah" of the tribe was summoned into Tank for the settlement of accounts previous to the release of the prisoners, and when matters looked sufficiently promising to warrant such a step, the prisoners were conveyed, still under a guard, to Tank.

It soon, however, became apparent that no settlement of such heavy accounts could be hoped for (a quit settlement, indeed, of Rs. 2,000 was offered and rejected), and when their inability to pay became clear, Major Graham determined to withdraw the prisoners from Tank to the jail as before, which was carried out without any accident or outbreak of any kind.

In so acting Major Graham felt that it was necessary, if he hoped for success, to deal strictly as well as justly with the tribe; at the same time he well knew that the retention of the prisoners was in reality his only tangible security for the future.

He now summoned a special "jirgah" of the tribe from Tank, and, receiving the representatives of the three main sections separately, explained to the Alizai and Shaman Khel sections that, according to our old standing treaty with them, each section would be dealt with separately; that they had only a small amount of compensation to make good, and had no prisoners to be released; and that they should act up to their agreement with Government, square their own accounts, remain on good terms with Government, and leave the Balolzais to settle their own affairs. To this the delegates unhesitatingly agreed, and they were then dismissed.

Major Graham then received the other clans of the Balolzai section (through their representatives) and suggested the same course to them, when they also agreed.

Lastly, the Shingi and Nana Khel delegates presented themselves, and to them it was announced that their prisoners would be retained pending compensation for plunder during the year. The release of the prisoners was promised after another year on the same terms as before, *i. e.*, on the tribe refraining from plunder during the year, or paying compensation for such plunder, &c., as might be committed, in which case their liabilities for the past year would be remitted as before.

At the same time they were given fully to understand that if they were determined to give trouble, their quota of horsemen (eight) would be discharged, that they would be ejected from their lands, and excluded from British territory and from any further favors which might be extended to the rest of the tribes.

This occurred during April, and the delegates agreed to refer the matter to a conference of the whole tribe at their capital of Kani Goram, the result of which was that the Alizai and Shaman Khel sections elected to remain on good terms with the Government, while the whole of the Balolzais elected for mischief.

Amongst the murders committed by the Mahsuds in 1866, that of the agent of the Nawab of Tank was conspicuous. This act was committed by 22 Vaziris, who came into the Gumal Valley by the pass opposite the post of Murtaza.

In 1867 there were 2 murders, 2 cases of wounding, and 40 of cattle-lifting.

In 1868 there were 5 cases of murder, 5 of wounding, and 64 of cattle-lifting, the most prominent of the raids being that on the 25th February, when a party of Haibat Khels, variously estimated at from 20 to 60, made a dash into the plains near the Girni Pass, and falling on a party of Battanis carried off 10 bullocks. They were pursued by a guard of the 1st Panjab Cavalry, who rescued the bullocks and wounded one of the marauders.

Again in April a body of Shingis attacked the village of Dabra, some miles within our boundary. Taking advantage of a dark and stormy night they succeeded in reaching the gateway of the village without being observed, when they killed 1 man and wounded 3 others.

The state of this frontier was deemed so unsatisfactory that General Wilde in this year selected sites for new posts, near the Girni and Zam Passes, the better to stop these raids.

In 1869 there were 5 cases of murder, 15 of wounding, and 48 of cattle-lifting.

In one of these, on the 10th March 1869, the Nawab's agent at the Gumal Thannah was cut up at midnight in the court-yard of his thannah by a party of Nana Khels, Shaman Khels, and Shingis, who had succeeded in breaking through the wall and concealing themselves within the enclosure, notwithstanding the presence of two sentries. After this occurrence the thannah officials and villagers were so paralyzed by fear that they gave no alarm to the Jata post till the morning, and the Vaziris escaped.

The second outrage occurred on the 11th April 1869, between 9 and 10 p.m. A body of hillmen, 50 in number, surrounded the village of Fateh Namiji. Four men, who were in the "chouk," apparently on watch, though unarmed, on hearing the hill men arrive ran to their houses to obtain arms: an alarm was given, and intimation was immediately conveyed to the neighbouring outpost of Kot Nasaran, and also to several Povindah and Battani encampments that were near with a view to pursuit. Meanwhile the assailants having despatched a woman of the village and wounded 5 men (one of whom lost an arm or hand), and carried off property estimated at Rs. 400, retired to their hills with impunity before any of the pursuing parties could overtake them.

The Girni post was begun in 1869 at a site 3 miles from the pass, but was abandoned on account of the failure to reach water, and the site was changed to the mouth of the pass, and in 1870 this post was completed and that of Kot Kirghi begun.

On this the Mahsuds signalized their displeasure by making a treacherous, and unfortunately a successful, attack on the 13th April 1870 on a guard of five bayonets of the 1st Sikh Infantry proceeding to Tank from Kot Kirghi. These men were joined in the Zam Pass by a body of from 20 to 40 Shingi Mahsuds, who represented themselves as servants of the Nawab of Tank, and being allowed to mix with the guard suddenly disarmed and attacked them, killing 2 and wounding the remainder. It was afterwards ascertained that these men had come down for the express purpose of waylaying stragglers between Tank and Kot Kirghi.

The raids on the Mahsud border for 1870 show 4 cases of murder, 5 of wounding, and 58 of cattle-lifting.

On the 29th October 1870, Lieutenant Norman, 1st Sikh Infantry, Small detachment, 2nd Panjab Cavalry, 1st Sikh Infantry, and Battani footmen. who had for some days been completing a survey of the Gumal Valley on the Tank frontier, was attacked by a marauding party of some 60 Vaziris in front

fired on them at long range with a Henry-Martini rifle. The fourth shot knocked over the leader, when the remainder of the party at once retired up the hill with his body.

Of Lieutenant Norman's conduct, Sir Henry Durand, the Lieutenant-Governor, recorded that while there might have been a little unnecessary assumption of risk on Lieutenant Norman's part, still the way in which he extricated himself from the attempt of the Vaziris was creditable to him and to those who were with him, and the indiscretion that was committed by unnecessarily exposing himself and his party under circumstances that might have been avoided without any disgrace, was redeemed by the steadiness displayed by himself and his party when attacked.

On the night of the 21st January 1871, a party of Vaziris, principally Shingis and Malikshahis, attacked the village of Shahzaman near Tator, but were beaten off with a loss of one killed and some wounded. The villagers had 9 wounded. The marauders not being followed till morning, escaped.

On the 31st October 1871, 34 camels belonging to Nasars were carried off from between the Jata and Murtaza outposts by 8 Shingis.

On the 1st January 1872, a party of Vaziris carried off a baniah, but he was rescued by the Mulazai post.

On the 2nd January 1872, a party of 7 Shingis were found hid in a mill by 6 residents of Gumal and 3 Povindahs; 6 escaped, but 1 was cut down near Gumal.

On the 4th January 1872, a party plundered 8 camels from about Kolachi.

On the 10th January 1872, a party of 7 men of the Kurmuch Khel and Nasrani Khel plundered 10 camels, and wounded one of the herdsmen near Chundah.

On the 19th January 1872, a party plundered 3 camels from Ama Khel.

On the 7th February 1872, a party of Vaziris plundered 46 goats from the Battanis. Pursuit was made by the Militia without success, but on returning they met a man driving 4 camels, who on their approach made up the hill, but on their threatening to fire, threw down his sword and gave himself up. These camels, it appears, had been stolen two days before.

On the 8th February 1872, a party carried off 5 bullocks from near Murtaza.

On the 9th February 1872, information was sent by the Nawab of Tank that parties of the Malikshahis, Nana Khels, and Shingis, were preparing for thefts in British territory.

On the 18th February 1872, a party plundered 30 camels on the 13th from near Paniala.

On the 5th March 1872, a party stole 4 cows from Maryi (Dera Ismail Khan), but they were afterwards recovered and the thieves captured.

On the 9th March 1872, 2 Mahsuds stole 3 bullocks from Jani Khel, Arsala-ki-kiri.

On the 9th March 1872, a party of Hasn Khels stole 2 camels from Tajori (Ban); the grazier was beaten, but escaped.

On the 9th March 1872, shots were heard at the Jata outpost from the village of Mahomed. A duffadar and 6 sowars of the 5th Panjab Cavalry were detached, and found that 2 cows had been stolen; they were followed up and recovered, the thieves getting away in the darkness.

On the 15th March 1872, a party plundered 110 head of cattle from Manjhi near the Zorwani. The cavalry of the post went in pursuit. Captain Carr of the 5th Panjab Cavalry went up the Sharani Pass to cut off the line of the thieves, accompanied by Ressaldar Iman Khan, 5th Panjab Cavalry

who had gone to meet him, and by Ressaldar Sar Biland Khan with some Militia men, and were joined by 100 men of the Gwarazais of the village. The retreat of the robbers being thus cut off, cattle were recovered in the Natasalkha Pass.

On the 15th March 1872, a party attacked 6 men near Zarkani, who went into the hills to cut grass; on hearing this the Zarkani post proceeded up the Shaikh Haider Pass and found 4 bullocks killed, and brought back the other two.

On the 17th March 1872, a party plundered 10 camels, which were afterwards recovered.

On the 25th March 1872, a party of 12 or 15 Waziris made a demonstration in front of the Girni outpost on the left of the pass, waving their swords and firing their matchlocks. On the cavalry of the outpost turning out, they retired.

On the 26th March 1872, a party of robbers attacked 5 men and 16 camels near Draban; the men were cut down (3 dead). The alarm was given to the different outposts, but no traces of the thieves were discovered; 2 camels, however, were afterwards recovered.

On the 4th March 1872, the Nawab of Tank reported that certain men of the Vaziris at Pallosin were plotting to make a demonstration against the Zam post, as they had already done at Kirghi and Girni.

On the 1st April 1872, a party of 13 men carried off 40 head of cattle up the Suneri Pass.

On the 2nd April 1872, a Battani brought news to the Mulazai post that he had come across a party of 9 Vaziris of the Haibat Khel section in the Pragul Yid Pass on their way to make a raid, and that he had persuaded the leader to come down with him under the pretence of showing him cattle, and that he was hiding in some corn-fields; the post accordingly turned out and captured the leader.

On the 2nd April 1872, a party stole 12 head of cattle while grazing in front of the Daman Pass; on finding themselves pursued they killed 10 of the 12 cows carried off, rather than that they should be recovered.

On the 7th April 1872, a party of 3 thieves lurking near Jatta were fired at, when one was killed, a Shingi Khel.

On the 10th April 1872, a Mahsud called Mukarab stole a camel from the Deputy Commissioner. Two Mahsuds and one Sardi Khel stole a bullock from Tajori (Banu), which was afterwards ransomed for Rs. 30.

On the 20th April 1872, the Mulazai post turned out and patrolled, as there was news that a body of Jalal Khel Vaziris were down, but nothing could be seen of them. It appears, however, that they were pursued from Chundah and one of their party killed.

On the 14th June 1872, a party of hillmen kidnapped a girl; the Gumal outpost turned out, but no traces could be found.

On the 18th June 1872, a highway robbery was committed near Tank, and patrols from the Tank and Zam posts were sent out without success.

On the 1st August 1872, an attack was made on the villagers of Karoki in the Gumal Valley.

On the 1st August 1872, a party of 3 men (2 Shingis and 1 Battani) plundered a herd of cattle near Girni. Information was given by a Battani lad to the Girni post; the thieves were pursued by a detachment of the 5th Panjab Cavalry under Jamadar Abdula Khan; cattle recovered (33 in number), and a man and a boy who had been herding them.

On the 7th August 1872, 2 Vaziris attacked a man near the Tank Zam, whose cries attracted the attention of the patrol, who went to his assistance, but the thieves escaped in the darkness.

On the 9th August 1872, 2 thieves attacked 2 men and 30 camels near Maidad Khel whilst grazing; one of the men went for assistance, and the other beat the thieves off before assistance could arrive; one was slightly wounded by a sword cut.

On the 8th August 1872, a party attempted to carry off 2 Hindus near Kolachi, but they got away.

On the 29th September 1872, news was brought to the Girni post that 74 head of catttle had been carried off from the village of Gara Fateh; on pursuit being made, the cattle were recovered.

On the 3rd October 1872, a party of Vaziris carried off a bullock from the village of Ragza near the Manjhi post; the robbers were pursued, but escaped; the bullock was recovered.

On the 17th October 1872, 2 thieves drove off 8 head of cattle from near the Zam post; on being pursued, the thieves left the cattle and escaped; cattle recovered.

On the 26th October 1872, a party of Vaziris stripped 2 villagers of their clothes near Khut and attempted to carry off their 2 bullocks, but on being pursued, they left the cattle and escaped; the cattle were recovered.

On the 26th October 1872, the Nawab of Tank warned the officers commanding the outposts and posts that news had been brought in by a spy that all small parties of Vaziris were assembling for border raids.

On the 28th October 1872, a bullock was taken away from the vicinity of a village near the Khirgi post by 2 thieves; the bullock was afterwards recovered on pursuit; the thieves escaped.

On the 31st October 1872, a party of Vaziris attacked a village named Pirwahna, one mile from Shabaz, killed and wound 10 men. Pursuit was made, but without success.

On the 18th November 1872, a party of 18 Vaziris lifted 15 camels and 4 Povindahs from Bain Pass.

On the 20th November 1872, a party of 18 Vaziris robbed the Government mail near Rori. This brings the raids of this tribe down to a sufficiently late date.

The following is a tabulated statement of the border offences committed in the Tank Valley from 1861 to 1872 :—

McGregor's Gazetteer.

Years.	Murder (section 302) in the Tank Valley.	Dacoity (sections 395 to 397) in the Tank Valley.	Robbery (section 392) in the Tank Valley.	House-breaking (section 457) in the Tank Valley.	Other petty offences in the Tank Valley.	Total.
1861	15	2	6	83	106
1862	16	2	7	49	74
1863	1	17	13	12	54	96
1864	1	40	7	15	64	127
1865	2	22	14	22	88	148
1866	1	5	13	18	68	105
1867	4	9	10	26	77	126
1868	1	17	7	35	81	141
1869	4	15	16	21	81	136
1870	2	28	15	15	78	138
1871	4	30	14	10	50	108
1872	22	19	9	29	78
Total	20	236	130	196	800	1,382

The following remarks have been kindly furnished to the compiler by Major-General R. Taylor, as shewing the effects of the expedition on the Mahsud tribe:—

“ Defeated men take to burglaries and petty thefts, and it may be taken as
 “ a sign of their spirit for more daring attempts being broken. Now, it appears
 “ from the above list that 20 murders and 236 dacoities occurred in the 12 years
 “ subsequent to the expedition, giving an average of something over 21 heinous
 “ offences in each year, whereas the average in the previous five years had been
 “ something over 36 per annum. The improvement effected in the matter
 “ of murders has certainly been great, *viz.*,—in 1861 none, in 1862 none, in
 “ 1863 one, and in 1864 one, that is two murders in the four years subsequent to
 “ the expedition—a vast improvement on former times. Moreover the above
 “ statistics show that in the whole 12 years after their punishment, the murders
 “ committed by the Mahsuds in one year never exceeded four, which is really not
 “ much in such a locality and dealing with men habituated to this kind of
 “ petty warfare, for such it is, from their childhood.

“ The Mahsuds are at open war with the Povindahs in the hills, and they
 “ see no reason why, if they get an opportunity, they should not carry on
 “ the feud in our territory. The Povindahs trusting in a great measure to
 “ our border arrangements, and with their numbers weakened by the body
 “ of men who pass on with the merchandize to Calcutta and Bombay,
 “ relax their vigilance over their herds of milch camels, which are always
 “ left to graze on the Derajat plains, whilst the kafilas with the working
 “ camels descend into Hindustan; and thus the Mahsuds get continual chances
 “ of sweeping off herds in the course of the season, when in fight or resistance,
 “ or in order to save time and their booty, some of the custodians fall victims.
 “ It is all savage enough, and they are truly men of blood; but there is a
 “ difference between these acts and an attack on a defenceless village, or the
 “ murder of a miserable cow-herd. The Povindahs when they get their chance
 “ pay them in their own coin.”

The reckless way in which the villagers have been in the habit of grazing
 their flocks and herds, generally insufficiently, often
 quite unguarded, has tended much to the cattle-lifting
 by the hillmen. Moreover the Tank Valley is very exceptionally situated;
 there is no organized police there, the arrangements for the prevention
 and detection of crime in the valley being in the hands of the Nawab of Tank,
 although to meet raids in *force* there are the military and militia posts on the
 border line.

APPENDIX A-1.

Tank Field Force, 1870.

Brigadier-General N. Chamberlain, C.B., commanding.

Staff.

Captain W. Graydon, Staff Officer.

Captain H. Plummer, Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master General.

Major Walker

Lieutenant Basevi

Lieutenant Branfield

} Trigonometrical Survey.

Captain Johnstone, Topographical Survey.

Captain Pollard, Field Engineer.

Assistant Surgeon, J. L. Stewart, on special duty.

Artillery.

No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery, Captain Maister commanding.

No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery, Captain Hughes commanding.

Peshawar Mountain Train, Captain DeBudé commanding.

Hazara Mountain Train, Captain Butt commanding.

Engineers.

Sappers, Lieutenant Browne commanding.

Cavalry.

Guides, Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden, C.B., commanding.

3rd Panjab Cavalry, Major L. B. Jones commanding.

Multan Cavalry, Lieutenant Campbell commanding.

Infantry.

Guides, Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden commanding.

4th Sikhs, Lieutenant Jenkins commanding.

1st Panjab Infantry, Captain Keyes commanding.

2nd Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Green, C. B., commanding.

3rd Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Ruxton commanding.

4th Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C. B., commanding.

6th Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Fisher commanding.

14th Panjab Infantry, Captain Ward commanding.

24th Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Chalmers commanding.

Hazara Gurkha Battalion, Major Rothney commanding.

6th Police Battalion, Lieutenant Orchard commanding.

Political Officers.

Major Reynell Taylor, Commissioner, Derajat.

Captain H. Coxe, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan.

APPENDIX A-2.

Tank Field Force on the 16th April 1860.

DETAIL OF TROOPS.	European officers.	Staff sergeants.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Buglers.	Privates.	Total number of fighting men.	ORDNANCE.					REMARKS.
								Field.			Mountain train.		
								9-pound guns.	24-pound how-itzers.	4½-inch mortars.	3-pound guns.	12-pound how-itzers.	
Staff	8	8	The mortars were carried on platform carts dragged by horses. No waggons accompanied the field pieces. All the ammunition was transported on mules and yabus*; 6 elephants were attached. Two mortars, 4½-inches (12-pounders), were attached to each Mountain Train Battery, and transported on camels.
Sappers	1	8	1	50	60	
No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery	1	...	1	6	1	44	53	1	1	1	
No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery*	2	1	1	6	1	41	52	1	1	1	
Peshawar Mountain Train	4	1	2	9	2	50	68	1	3	
Hazara Mountain Train	2	...	1	9	2	50	64	1	2	
Guide Cavalry	5	...	4	12	1	86	109	
3rd Panjab Cavalry	2	...	6	16	2	105	131	
Multan Cavalry	1	...	3	12	1	83	100	
Guide Infantry	12	71	8	316	407	
4th Sikh Infantry	5	...	14	73	13	322	427	1,700 levies were attached to the expedition, 400 of whom marched with the force to Kani Goram, &c.
1st Panjab Infantry	4	...	10	63	10	310	397	
2nd Panjab Infantry	5	...	16	85	17	561	684	
3rd Panjab Infantry	4	...	10	58	8	293	373	
4th Panjab Infantry	4	...	10	59	14	294	381	
6th Panjab Infantry	5	...	10	63	14	308	400	
14th Panjab Infantry	3	...	6	36	3	159	207	
24th Panjab Infantry	3	...	12	66	6	330	418	
Hazara Gurkha Battalion	3	...	11	54	14	382	464	
6th Police Battalion	1	...	14	60	19	300	394	
Total	63	3	148	766	137	4,084	5,196	2	2	2	2	5	

APPENDIX B.

*Proclamation to Umar Khan Khanzum, Achmiddin Durani, and other Maliks
of the Mahsud Tribe.*

Ever since the Daman has become the British boundary, the Mahsud Vaziris have never ceased to harass the border and to commit injuries upon the persons and property of British subjects, and likewise upon merchants and travellers.

Further, the evil intentions of the whole tribe have lately been manifest by their assembling to the number of 5,000 or 6,000 men in the Tank Zam, and coming out of the hills for the purpose of plundering the town of Tank.

How this army of Vaziris was met and defeated by a small band of Government horsemen, and driven back in rapid flight to their hills, leaving their chief malik and 250 bodies on the plain, need not here be entered into; and had this been the only aggression committed by the Mahsuds, the punishment which they suffered might have been considered by Government to have been sufficiently severe to obviate the necessity of further retaliation.

But the Mahsuds have, as before mentioned, for years past committed deeds of violence, and this last unprovoked attack, in which all sections of the tribe joined, convinces the Government that its previous policy of leniency and forbearance is misunderstood, and that consequently there is no hope of its territory being respected, or of future immunity from injury, until it shall have evinced to the tribe that it has resources and ability to redress the wrongs done to its subjects.

Wherefore the Viceroy and Governor General has desired that a force shall enter the Mahsud country, and there obtain redress for the past and security for the future.

This proclamation then is to inform you that a force will enter your mountains in a few days, and to explain to you the reason of its doing so and the objects with which it comes.

If the tribe will comply with the just demands of Government, force will not be employed against them; but if the Mahsuds refuse to make restoration for the past and to give security for the future, and appeal to arms, then they will be met by the Government troops in the full hope that if our cause be just, God will help us, and the bloodshed on both sides will be on the heads of the Mahsuds themselves.

Lastly, and with the object of avoiding bloodshed, if possible, the maliks of the tribe will be permitted to attend the camp to have any points in this proclamation, which may not appear clear to them, explained in *viva voce* communication, after which they will be permitted to return unmolested.

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
Brigadier-General.

REYNELL G. TAYLOR,
Commissioner and Superintendent.

APPENDIX C.

Return of Casualties in the attack on the Camp at Pallosin on the 25th April 1860.

CORPS.	KILLED.									WOUNDED.								CAMP-FOLLOWERS.		ANIMALS.								REMARKS.		
	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Buglers.	Sepoys.	Sowars.	Camel Sowars.	Total.	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Buglers.	Sepoys.	Sowars.	Camel Sowars.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.				Wounded.					
																					Horses.	Yabus and Mules.	Camels.	Total.	Horses.	Yabus and Mules.	Camels.		Total.	
No. 2 Light Field Battery	1	3	4	...	2	1	1	2	1	...	3	In addition to these casualties 26 of the Kushada Levies with the Deputy Commissioners were killed and 34 wounded.
No. 3 Light Field Battery	1	1	...	5	10	10	...	1	...	1	
Corps of Guides	1	2	1	...	11	15	5	4	...	58	3	1	71	16	12	...	11	10	21	1	1	
4th Sikh Infantry	1	1	2	2	
24th Pioneers	2	2	2	1	...	6	9	...	4	20	20	
25th Hazara Gurkhas	1	11	12	* The return of camp-followers and animals does not include those attached to the Civil Departments or Levies.
6th Police Battalion	3	3	10	10	
Total	1	2	2	...	16	21	1	...	7	5	1	91	3	1	109	16	23	1	11	40	52	3	2	...	5

ABSTRACT.

			Killed.	Wounded.
Fighting men	21	109
Camp-followers	16	23
Animals	52	5

APPENDIX D.

Roll of Soldiers and Followers, sick or wounded, or weakly or unable to march from having sore-feet, sent back to Tank after the affair at Pallosin.

RANK OR OCCUPATION.					Can walk or if cavalry can ride.	NATURE OF CARRIAGE REQUIRED.			Attendants required.	REMARKS.
Fighting men.	Camp-followers.	Syces.	Grass-cutters.	Mahouts.		Doolies.	Dandees.	Kajawahs.		
89	25	2	2	1	15	48	11	45	40	

APPENDIX E.

Casualty Return of the Tank Field Force in the action fought at Barara Pass on the 4th May 1860.

CORPS.		KILLED.								WOUNDED.								REMARKS.
		European officers.	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Buglers.	Sepoys.	Camp-followers.	European officers.	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Buglers.	Sepoys.	Camp-followers.	
RIGHT ATTACK	Hazara Mountain Train	1	...	The subadar and one sepoy subsequently died. One havildar subsequently died. One sepoy subsequently died.
	1st Panjab Infantry	1	2	1	4	...	
	2nd Panjab Infantry	...	1	1	...	3	1	1	9	1	...	1	...	2	3	1	27	
	3rd Panjab Infantry	1	2	...	9	...	1	2	...	9	6	...	24	
LEFT ATTACK	6th Panjab Infantry	2	...	One sepoy subsequently died.
Total		...	1	1	...	4	3	1	19	1	1	3	2	12	9	1	58	

Officer killed—Lieutenant J. M. Ayrton, 94th Regiment, attached to 2nd Panjab Infantry.

Officer wounded—Lieutenant Ruxton, 3rd Panjab Infantry.

Subsequently wounded.

	Sepoys.	Camp-followers.	Date.
2nd Panjab Infantry	9th May.
4th Panjab Infantry	10th "
24th Panjab Infantry	...	1	11th "
Peshawar Sappers	12th "

APPENDIX F.

General Casualty Return of the Tank Field Force, 1860.

CORPS.	KILLED.								WOUNDED.								REMARKS.																																			
	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	Camp-followers.	Horses.	Yabocs or mules.	Camels.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	Camp-followers.	Horses.	Yabocs or mules.	Camels.																																				
No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery	1	1	...	3	2	2	1	...	<div>Abstract.</div> <table><tr><td></td><td>Killed.</td><td>Wounded.</td></tr><tr><td>European officers</td><td>...</td><td>1</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Native officers</td><td>...</td><td>3</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>Non-commissioned officers</td><td>...</td><td>12</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>Rank and file</td><td>...</td><td>67</td><td>200</td></tr><tr><td>Followers</td><td>...</td><td>17</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Horses</td><td>...</td><td>2</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Yabus and mules</td><td>...</td><td>11</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Camels</td><td>...</td><td>40</td><td>0</td></tr></table> <div>* Lieutenant Ayrton, 2nd Panjab Infantry.</div> <div>† Lieutenant Buxton.</div> <div>‡ Major Taylor's charger.</div>		Killed.	Wounded.	European officers	...	1	1	Native officers	...	3	5	Non-commissioned officers	...	12	32	Rank and file	...	67	200	Followers	...	17	24	Horses	...	2	8	Yabus and mules	...	11	2	Camels	...	40	0
	Killed.	Wounded.																																																		
European officers	...	1	1																																																	
Native officers	...	3	5																																																	
Non-commissioned officers	...	12	32																																																	
Rank and file	...	67	200																																																	
Followers	...	17	24																																																	
Horses	...	2	8																																																	
Yabus and mules	...	11	2																																																	
Camels	...	40	0																																																	
No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery	10	1	5	1	1	...																																				
Hazara Mountain Train	1																																				
3rd Panjab Cavalry	1	2																																				
Cureton's Mooltan Horse	2																																				
Sappers and Miners	1																																				
Corps of Guides	...	1	3	11	16	...	11	10	9	62	12	1																																				
4th Sikh Infantry	1	8																																				
1st Panjab Infantry	1	2	1	4																																				
2nd " "	...	1*	2	4	11	5	29																																				
3rd " "	4	9	1†	2	14	24																																				
4th " "	2																																				
6th " "	1	1	1																																				
24th " "	2	20	3	8																																				
5th Hazara Gurkhas	12																																				
6th Police Battalion	3	11																																				
Levies and Police Staff	28	37	...	4																																				
Political officers	1‡																																				
Total	1	3	12	67	17	1	11	40	1	5	32	200	24	8	2	...																																				

Dates of Casualties.

DATE.	KILLED.				WOUNDED.						
	All ranks.	Levies.	Followers. *	Animals. *	All ranks.	Levies.	Followers. *	Animals. *			
20th April	1	...	3	...	*4	Killed. Wounded.		
23rd „ ...	2	All ranks	... 56	201
25th „ ...	21	26	16	52	109	34	23	5	Levies	... 26	37
4th May ...	33	...	1	...	82	Followers	... 17	24
6th „	1	Animals	... 53	10
9th „	2			
10th „	3			
11th „	1	...	1	...			
12th „	3	1			

* These do not include followers or camels, &c., belonging to the levies, or the Civil Department, for the conveyance of stores, but only to those belonging to Corps.

APPENDIX G.

Estimates of Losses inflicted on the Mahsuds.

	Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.
1. Zam from Shingi to Kani Goram ...	63,600	0	0			
2. " Shuhoor to Jangi Khan Kot ...	5,900	0	0			
3. " Dootoyah, including Maidan and Mukim ...	68,600	0	0			
4. " Kani Goram ...	2,800	0	0			
				1,40,900	0	0
<i>Detail of No. 1.</i>						
(a). Balolzai ...	32,500	0	0			
(b). Alizai ...	20,100	0	0			
(c). Shamun Khel ...	11,000	0	0			
				63,600	0	0
<i>Detail of No. 2.</i>						
(d). Alizai ...	2,200	0	0			
(e). Shamun Khel ...	3,700	0	0			
				5,900	0	0
<i>Detail of No. 3.</i>						
(f). Alizai ...	4,000	0	0			
(g). Balolzai ...	62,600	0	0			
(h). Shannuk Khel ...	2,000	0	0			
				68,600	0	0
<i>Detail of No. 4.</i>						
Fine ...	2,000	0	0			
Khusseel ...	600	0	0			
Shahzadah ...	200	0	0			
				2,800	0	0
Total ...				1,40,900	0	0
<i>Detail of (a).</i>						
Shingi, 60 houses burnt ...	5,000	0	0			
Shingi crops eaten ...	6,000	0	0			
Detail of lands of Shingi { Junumkee Kuch ...						
on which these crops { Mundawa " ...						
grew ... { Nai " ...						
... { Kurungah " ...						
... { Chismwam " ...						
... { Goolummah " ...						
... { Mezhaiwam " ...						
... { Kuzhawam " ...						
Detail of the Remul Khel { Moarghal Bund ...						
... { Poosh Kucha ...	1,500	0	0			
Detail of Nana Khel ... { Gahnawam near the ...						
... { Unai Jungah ...	500	0	0			
Shingi houses at Jungah, 40 in number. These were said to have been excellent houses ...	8,000	0	0			
30 Uzrosteen Shingi houses ...	6,000	0	0			
25 Kuron " " ...	5,000	0	0			
Kuron crops eaten ...	500	0	0			
				32,500	0	0
<i>Detail of (b).</i>						
30 houses of the Shahabi Khel at Zeriwam ...	3,500	0	0			
Crops eaten at Zeriwam ...	1,000	0	0			
50 Shahabi Khel houses and crops eaten at Doa Qogah ...	7,500	0	0			
Crops destroyed ...	400	0	0			
30 Alizai houses destroyed near Kani Goram ...	6,000	0	0			
Crops destroyed at Kani Goam ...	500	0	0			
10 Vaziri houses ...	800	0	0			
Crops destroyed ...	400	0	0			
				20,100	0	0
Carried over ...				52,600	0	0

Estimates of Losses inflicted on the Mahsuds—(contd.)

	Rs.	As.	P.	Rs.	As.	P.
Brought forward	52,600	0	0
<i>Detail of (c).</i>						
30 houses of the Shamun Khel Joorzee, &c., at Bangeewallah ...	2,000	0	0			
Cultivation destroyed ...	1,000	0	0			
50 houses and one tower of Khudadad Shamun Khel near the Maidan encamping ground ...	7,500	0	0	11,000	0	0
No. 2.						
<i>Detail of (d).</i>						
12 houses of Fercedeh Alizais in Buwana ...	300	0	0			
Crops destroyed ...	400	0	0			
Kot Jungel Khan, Suleenah Khel Alizai five houses, tower, and water-mill ...	1,000	0	0			
Crops, Jungeh Khan ...	500	0	0	2,200	0	0
<i>Detail of (e).</i>						
30 houses in Shahoor and Durgahao and one mill ...	1,500	0	0			
Shamun Khel crops destroyed at Rojal Khel 300 } Hyderi Khel ... 400 } Juram China ... 500 } Burmund ... 1,000 }	2,200	0	0	3,700	0	0
No. 3.						
<i>Detail of (f).</i>						
40 houses of the Shahabi Khel from Dutoyeh to Mukeen ...	4,000	0	0	4,000	0	0
Balolzai houses destroyed, viz.— 400 Abdullee houses with five towers ...	62,600	0	0			
<i>Detail of (h).</i>						
15 houses of the Shufman Khel burnt at Maidan			2,000	0	0
No. 4.						
Fine on Kani Goram ...	2,000	0	0			
Crops eaten ...	800	0	0	2,800	0	0
				1,40,900	0	0

APPENDIX H.

Return of Sick in Hospital attached to the Tank Field Force, 1860.

DATE.	DISEASES.																			TOTAL.
	Abscess.	Catarrh.	Contusion.	Colic.	Debility.	Diarrhoea.	Dysentery.	Fever.	Gonorrhoea or swelled testicle.	Lumbago.	Ophthalmia.	Pneumonia.	Urticaria.	Ulcer.	Tumour.	Wounds.	Syphilis.	Rheumatism.	Dyspepsia.	
2nd May	1	1	10	1	3	5	5	39	2	1	2	1	1	25	1	3	101
6th "	3	1	30	1	...	1	8	46	1	...	4	1	...	18	...	67	1	4	1	187
7th "	4	1	39	1	...	5	7	77	1	...	4	6	...	71	2	4	...	222
9th "	5	...	42	...	1	6	11	80	1	...	4	9	...	73	2	4	...	238
10th "	6	...	46	...	1	4	18	71	1	...	4	9	...	73	3	3	...	239
12th "	6	...	46	...	2	8	16	80	1	...	2	1	...	9	...	74	4	6	...	255
16th "	9	3	54	2	2	6	19	68	2	...	3	1	...	9	...	74	5	8	...	265
19th "	11	5	45	1	1	8	29	63	2	...	2	2	...	18	...	73	4	5	...	269

Note.—These are the only records forthcoming: the returns for other days are wanting.


APPENDIX I.

Amount of carriage attached to the Regiments and Detachments of the Tank Field Force for the transport of sick and wounded men.

BEARERS.		Dulis.	Dandis.	CAMEL KAJAWAHS.		REMARKS.
Mates.	Bearers.			Kajawahs.	Camels.	
...	8	...	2	Sappers.
...	6	1	2	1 pair.	1	No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery.
...	6	1	2	1 "	1	No. 3 ditto ditto.
...	7	1	Peshawar Mountain Train.
...	5	...	2	Hazara Mountain Train.
...	23	4	Guide Corps.
1	18	3	1	1 pair.	1	3rd Panjab Cavalry.
...	6	1	...	1 "	1	Cureton's Multanee Cavalry.
1	20	5	9	4 pairs.	4	4th Sikh Infantry.
1	42	7	10	4 "	4	1st Panjab Infantry.
2	35	8	8	5 "	5	2nd ditto.
1	36	4	5	5 "	5	3rd ditto.
1	35	6	5	5 "	5	4th ditto.
1	34	5	5	3 "	3	6th ditto.
1	14	1	5	2 "	2	14th ditto.
...	29	5	7	24th ditto.
...	29	4	7	4 pairs.	4	Hazara Gurkha Battalion.
1	23	4	6	2 "	2	6th Police Battalion.
10	388	60	77	38 pairs.	38	Total in camp.
...	288	48	11	23	23	Total number required.
...	...	12	61	15	15	Excess.
...	Deficiency.

MAP
OF
THE OPERATIONS
OF THE FIELD FORCE UNDER
BRIGADIER GENERAL N. B. CHAMBERLAIN C. B.
AGAINST
THE MAHSUD VAZIRIS
in April & May 1860

Scale of Miles
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100



APPENDIX J.

Abstract of Arms, Accoutrements, &c., lost in the Tank Field Force, 1860.

RIFLES.																MUSKETS.						
Rifles.	Swords.	Sword belts.	Pouches.	Pouch belts.	Scabbards.	Waist belts, plate and frog.	Ramrods.	Mallets.	Mallet cords.	Leather bag for ball.	Slings.	Scouring bits.	Warns.	Turnkeys.	Pouch waist belt.	Muskets.	Pouch, 40 rounds.	Pouch, 20 rounds.	Bayonets.	Scabbards.	Slings.	Ramrods.
41	46	16	31	32	13	4	15	17	17	16	13	14	24	10	4	10	3	4	14	4	5	13

CHAPTER XI.

SECTION I.

Dawar.

Is a valley of Afghanistan, lying to the west of the Banu District, watered by the Tochi River, which, under the name of the Gumbelah, joins the Kuram in British territory.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

This country is bounded north by the Manzals and Khost, east and south by the Vaziris and Karotis, and west by the Jadrans. It has a length of about 50 miles, and a breadth of about 15 miles. It is surrounded by mountains, and being irrigated by the Tochi River, is very fertile and productive, being covered with flourishing villages, extensive cultivation, and numerous groves of plane, shishum, and mulberry. There are about 150 fortified villages in Dawar, the three largest of which are said to be Khati, Haidar Khel, and Ismail Khel. Edwardes, however, gives the names of the divisions or villages,—Khadi Khel, So Khel, Haidar Khel, Ardak, Mubarakzai, Tapari, Miran Shah, Darpa Khel, Amzani, Malik.

The Dawaris are said by Edwardes to be great blackguards, perhaps the most vicious and degraded tribe of the Afghan nation, and to resemble in character the Banuchis, whose state 25 years ago is still existent among them; and the account of their revels given by Agha Abbas proves them to be addicted to the most unnatural of crimes.

They are, however, said to be peaceful and industrious, not nomadic in their habits, but cultivating largely. Most of the Banu trade is carried on by them. The Dawaris have—some of them—a peculiar custom of shaving one eyebrow, one moustache, and half the beard, and applying antimony with the finger above and below the eye, so as perfectly to disfigure their faces. The reason of this custom is not known.

Dawar formerly belonged to the Durani Empire, and it was, together with other outlying tracts, formerly ceded to Ranjit Sing by the tripartite treaty of 1838; but afterwards, in 1847, the British relinquished all claim to it on behalf of the Sikhs.

When Sir Herbert Edwardes first went to Banu, the Dawaris were in great alarm, lest theirs should be the next valley absorbed; and, consequently, they were prominent in all the numerous efforts made by the hill tribes to effect a sufficient gathering to come down and assist the Banuchis to drive the Sikhs out of their country. Gradually, however, their fear subsided, when they found that there was no intention of advancing; and also that the advent in Banu of British officers had been anything but a misfortune to the Banuchis.

Dawar, though nominally subject to the Kabul authorities, is practically independent; for it is so remote and hedged in by so many independent tribes as to render it almost inaccessible to Durani collectors, who consequently never attempt to visit it. The people of Dawar have more than once expressed a wish to come under British jurisdiction, but their offer has never

been entertained. During the treaty negotiations of 1855, the Amir's Envoy urged that the valley once formed an integral part of the Durani Empire, and that it was now wished to take it, provided the British Government did not claim any title; the Government replied that the British did not desire to assert any claim, nor to interfere with the Amir if he chose to re-annex it to his kingdom.

The Deputy Governor of Kuram, who accompanied General Chamberlain's force in the Kabal Khel Vaziri campaign, was extremely anxious that the General should follow the Vaziris into Dawar, in order that he might take advantage of the opportunity to collect arrears of revenue he held to be due.

The population of Dawar is not known; but James, who puts that of Khost at 12,000 inhabitants, thinks it is more populous. Reynell Taylor says, they number 8,000 men—presumably fighting men; and Agha Abbas says, that the largest forts can turn out 6,000 fighting men. The Dawaris appear to be as much under the influence of their priests as were the Banuchis: Agha Abbas mentioning that two Parnuli Syads from Kani Goram were held in great reverence.

The Dawaris are unfortunate in being surrounded by the Vaziris. These, on their return from the plains at the commencement of the hot weather, generally plunder the Dawar villages and crops which lie near their line of march. The result will probably be, that the Vaziris will occupy their country; and, indeed, they have openly stated their intention of doing so, and have invited the aid of the Durani Chiefs.

Major Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division, gives the following account of Dawar:—

The ancient history of Dawar is somewhat obscure. The people are believed to have migrated from the westward some 500 years ago, at the same time that Banu and other parts of this country became the permanent residence of detached parties from the great wandering hordes of Khorassan. Dawar was included in the Mogul Empire of Hindustan during the reign of Aurungzebe, whose son, Bahadur Shah, is said to have visited the valley and imposed a revenue of Rs. 12,000 per annum upon it. In the course of the waning fortunes of the house of Timur, Banu and Dawar fell away early, and were for some time subject to the Durani yoke, being subjected to periodical visits, mainly with a view to extort revenue, by the Lieutenants of the Sadozai kings of Kabul.

The character of the people of Dawar does not stand high among Afghans, either for prowess or any of the other better qualities which distinguish the Pathan race. They are unwarlike—opium and bhang eaters—fond of pleasure—of very indolent and filthy habits—thoroughly priest-ridden and fanatical. It is to be hoped that some have redeeming qualities, but the general estimate of the Dawaris even by their own countrymen and neighbours is decidedly low. They are chiefly occupied in cultivating the soil; they possess few cattle, and their reluctance to leave their own country is proverbial. Their peregrinations are confined to Banu and Khost, which are the limits of an outer world to them. Their mosques are infested by Mahomedan students of fanatical tendencies, "Talib-ilms," who flock thither from all the neighbouring hills,—food being easily obtainable, and prices cheap. It is notorious that to the dictation of these men and of the priests are the Dawaris indebted for any exhibition of martial spirit which they may have ever shown, the offspring of a dark unquestioning fanaticism, rather than of patriotic feeling.

Agha Abbas of Shiraz, who had been deputed in 1837 from Multan by Lieutenant (afterwards Sir Alexander) Burnes to explore some of the neighbouring countries, and to collect information of a commercial nature, visited Dawar, and notes in his journal of that tour that the valley is "embosomed in hills, and the cultivation is carried on by running streams," of the forts, of which he says there were 100 to 150 small and great in the valley, Thatti (Tappi), Ismail Khel and Haidar Khel were the largest. He estimates the fighting men of all three at 6,000, and says those of Haidar Khel amount to 2,000. This account tallies exactly in regard to the last-named village, with our present information as to the strength of the Lower Dawaris. In every field in the valley there was a tower built for its defence. The Dawaris were then very much divided amongst themselves, friends with the men of Khost and Banu, and at enmity with the Vaziris. This latter enmity appears to have been chronic until the Mahomed Khels sought shelter and aid from them. Dawar was then, as now, perfectly independent. Their deference to Syads and "holy" men was excessive. (*Vide* Journal, Asiatic Society, No. 139 of 1843.)

SECTION II.

Expedition into the Dawar Valley, February 1872.

WHEN the Mahomed Khel Vaziris fled from Banu before committing the outrage of the 13th June 1870 (see Section V, Chapter X), the whole tribe were received in Dawar. Report by Major Munro. They assembled on the Lower Dawar plain at a place a little north of the Haipi village, and there resolved in council to carry on hostilities with the Government. The plan of attack at the Kuram outpost was here concocted and matured. People from the Dawar villages of Musa Khel and Haidar Khel accompanied and aided the Mahomed Khels on this occasion.

And the Mahomed Khels afterwards returned to Dawar and obtained shelter, being distributed over the different villages, and treated rather as relatives in distress than as members of a separate and hitherto inimical tribe in rebellion against their Government. Lands were given them to till, and it was entirely owing to this material aid and succour granted by the Dawaris that the Mahomed Khels were so long able to hold out against the Government. The Kazi Khel section of the Mahomed Khels, under its head Malik Golabdin, distinguished itself most during the period of revolt in marauding excursions, and resided in the Dawar village of Haidar Khel; from whence they used to emerge to carry fire and sword along the British border, and on one occasion they carried off a herd of 34 camels from the Banu Thall, which were taken to and kept at Haidar Khel until otherwise disposed of by the robbers. Mir Khan, the principal Malik of Haidar Khel, was most conspicuous in affording the Mahomed Khels aid and countenance in every way, and Dawaris frequently accompanied the Mahomed Khels in their raids.

After the surrender of the Mahomed Khels in September 1871 at Banu, it became necessary to deal with such of the neighbouring tribes as had specially signalized themselves in aiding and abetting the Mahomed Khels during their fifteen months' revolt. First, the Umarzais were called to account, and paid the fine imposed. After them, the Bizzen Khel Vaziris satisfied the demands of Government, and paid a fine. Thirdly, the Sadun Khel (Sperkai) Vaziris, who, from a nearer tribal connection and common origin with the Mahomed Khels, had more systematically and continuously aided their brethren in rebellion, were dealt with; and even they, from whom greater resistance might have been expected, succumbed to the requirements of authority, and became amenable to all our demands, setting fire themselves to the village of Gumutti, which they possessed in independent territory, in proof of their contrition, and as a palpable mark to all the neighbouring tribes of the punishment to which they had been subjected.

Dawar alone remained to be dealt with, and their jirgahs were invited to Banu for the purpose of arranging the terms of reparation demanded for the aid they had so continuously and openly afforded to our rebellious subjects within a few miles of the scene of the first great outrage. But a deputation sent to the Dawaris met with a most insulting reception. They were abused and expelled the village, and were pelted with stones and clods of earth.

After this, the jirgahs were with considerable difficulty induced to come to Banu to negotiate. In the interval a written communication of a most

assistant by the leading men of Dawar. The men of Upper Dawar, or Pangiwal, however, paid a fine of Rs. 1,500, and were dismissed to their homes as they had made reparation for the past; and as their conduct of late had been satisfactory, they were told that they were to have free access, as before to British territory for all lawful purposes.

The secret of the men of Upper Dawar having been more tractable than those of the lower portion of the valley, lies in the fact, that they are afraid of the Vaziris who reside in their neighbourhood, and know that at a very slight instigation from us, they would suffer considerable losses, if they were not completely driven from their lands by the Vaziris, which the Vaziris so much covet; and the influence of the Vaziri Maliks had been brought to bear upon them from the beginning.

The Haidar Khel and So Khel jirgahs, after promising on 22nd January to pay the fine fixed, declined to do so the next day, and as they persisted in their refusal, they were allowed to depart. Some of them, after their return to their homes, professed a readiness to pay their share of the fine, but the majority declared their intention to hold out.

The clemency shewn by the Government to the Mahomed Khels, or perhaps the very completeness of the results attained without the movement of troops, or the display of any force, were misinterpreted by the people of the Dawar Valley; but it would have been unjust to have punished any of the abettors of the Mahomed Khels if the constant hostility of the Dawar people had been allowed to escape punishment. The Lieutenant-Governor therefore considered it would probably be necessary for a force to enter the Dawar Valley and demand compliance with the orders of Government, though no military movement was to be made until all other means of obtaining a peaceful solution of the question had failed; and if it became necessary for a force to be employed, the operations were on no account to extend over twenty-four hours.

Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, c.B., had proceeded to Edwardesabad, the 1st Sikh Infantry and 2nd Panjab Cavalry had arrived there in course of relief, and a final attempt to bring the Dawaris to terms was now made.

To encourage those who professed themselves willing to pay the fine, and to test the temper of the recusant party, those of the Haidar Khels and the So Khels who were in opposition were addressed by purwanah by the Commissioner, and invited to come in and communicate personally with him. They were told their reply was quickly required; but, although two days gave ample time for a reply, four days were accorded.

On this invitation only a few of the Haidar Khels came in, the principal portion of that section and the So Khels remaining behind, who sent a verbal message in reply, to the effect that they were not disposed to come in, unless certain conditions as to the release of prisoners, &c., were first complied with, and that they required time.

Further delay was now not only undignified, but both in the opinion of the Commissioner and Brigadier-General Keyes, such delay might prove fatal to the accomplishment without cost of the object in view, within the time allowed for the operations, and with the force then at Edwardesabad. Circumstances might so change, that within a few days it might become imprudent, in a military point of view, to enter the hills with that force alone.

It was known that the Dawaris had sent messages into Khost and the neighbouring hills for aid, and that certain priests and syads had been instigating them to resist. There were, too, rumours that the Ahmādzai Vaziris began to think that if they had shewn a bolder front and had offered more resistance, they might have escaped more easily in the settlement that had been made with those implicated with the Mahomed Khels. Delay therefore would have been tantamount to an abandonment of the original scheme, which was still deemed feasible and best; and on the evening of the 5th February the Commissioner (immediately after the reply of the Dawaris had been received) called on the Brigadier-General to move a portion of the troops at Edwardesabad, to the mouth of the Tochi Pass, to carry out the instructions of Government.

The Executive Engineer was to arrange for 2 mule loads of blasting powder, and 50 coolies to repair the road if necessary. Cooked food was to be taken by the troops, and—
 Brigade orders. arrangements were to be made that the great-coats of the men should be sent out to them if the force did not return to the camp that night.

On the morning of the 6th the troops (see Appendix A) moved into camp Tochi from Edwardesabad, distant about 6 miles.

The day previous to the march of the troops it was arranged that Haiat Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, should proceed with a thousand Vaziris and seize the pass; but the numbers collected for this purpose were not as many as had been anticipated. The plan had been consented to, as Haiat Khan was not only confident of his ability to carry it out, but because of the declared desire of the Vaziris to show their readiness to do good service; and above all to spare no effort to effect the proposed object peacefully and without coming into actual collision with the inhabitants of Dawar.

General's and Commis-
sioner's Reports.

On the night of the 5th February, Haiat Khan proceeded with a few armed Umarzai and Ahmadzai Vaziris, and a small intermixture of Banuchi Levies, to a place called Tangi, the narrowest part of the pass, which he occupied without opposition at daybreak on the 6th, as well as a small ridge beyond, called the Shinki Kotal, which the road crosses.

On reaching the camp at Tochi, the Brigadier, accompanied by the Commissioner, Colonel Kennedy, Captain Sim, and Captain Mackenzie, proceeded to reconnoitre the pass.

The road for the first few miles led along the left bank of the Tochi westward, and taking then a more northerly course, followed the channel of the stream to the Tangi and thence to the Kotal, over which the road passed at a height of 190 feet from the bed of the stream.

Major Munro's Despatch.

After the party had proceeded about 4 miles, reports were received from Haiat Khan that the enemy had approached to within 300 yards; that he had only 400 men, out of the 1,000 which had been calculated on; that of these only 100 had matchlocks, and that he required the assistance of a regiment. As it would have been quite dark long before a regiment could reach him, such support was utterly out of the question, and the General determined to push on and see matters for himself. It was about 4 p.m. when the party reached the Kotal, and its occupants were found in a great state of excitement. There was a little firing chiefly from the Vaziri side, but it was manifest the men who held the Kotal had no intention of holding the place against opposition; they had, indeed, already begun to retire.

The attacking force did not exceed 150 men, led by a So Khel Malik named Husein, who was acting independently of the jirgahs of the valley, and it had approached within 200 yards in open ground of the Vaziris. Captain Sim very spiritedly volunteered to remain the night with the Vaziris to give them confidence, but the Brigadier could not consent to an officer being left in such a position, as there was no necessity for leading a forlorn hope.

The Vaziris were assured that supports would be sent up as soon as possible; the Brigadier warned Haiat Khan that he could not allow these supports to join him in the dark, and that therefore he need not expect them until the morning, as they could not be moved in the night. But it was obvious that the defence was a sham, and that the Vaziris had no intention of making a stand. It was now necessary for the party to hasten back to camp; but before the General and Commissioner had retired many yards, the Vaziris abandoned their position and fled down the pass. Two of the runaways were slightly wounded, and the body of a Banuchi, with his throat cut, was found some way down the pass the next morning, but he was believed to have been murdered by Mahsud robbers.

This conduct of the Vaziris made a peaceful settlement more difficult, and it became a question whether it would not now be advisable to make a forced march by the longer and more open route through the Khissor Pass, in order to avoid loss of life, should the pass which had been abandoned by the Vaziris be occupied by the Dawaris. After due consideration this plan was given up on account of the length of the route, and of the difficulty of finding any one sufficiently acquainted with the road to lead the column in certainty on a dark night. There was also the probability that the Vaziri kirris, of which there were several in the pass, would take alarm at the approach of the troops; on the other hand, the road and its difficulties by the shorter route were fully known; and as the effect of forcing our way into the valley by this route, would be so much greater and more lasting after what had occurred, it was resolved to carry out the bolder course.

At 4 A.M. on the 7th the camp was left standing under the charge of Captain Bertie, 1st Panjab Cavalry, with 150 sabres of that Regiment, and the outlying picquets of the infantry corps, consisting of 40 rifles each, while the rest of the troops marched on the Dawar Valley.

The troops reached the Kotal at 9 A.M. without opposition, and were detained three hours in making the road and passing the guns over it.

It was said that the men of Dawar knowing that the camp was at Tochi, and that no movement had been made to support the Vaziris, imagined that we would not attempt any further demonstration without endeavouring to negotiate, and consequently, instead of securing the pass, they had returned to their homes to assemble their people and hold counsel.

The howitzers and ammunition waggons having been got over the Kotal about noon, the Brigadier-General advanced with the cavalry towards the valley, still following the channel of the Tochi. As the troops ascended the plateau at the entrance to the valley (covered by skirmishers, with a troop of cavalry on each flank, the remainder of the cavalry being in support of the guns), they were met by two

So Khel Maliks, who expressed a willingness on the part of the people of Dawar to agree to any terms which might be proposed. They were then informed by the Commissioner that the fines formerly mentioned would be levied with an additional Rs. 1,000 upon the So Khels, and Rs. 500 additional upon the

Commissioner's Report.

Colonel Kennedy's Despatch.

Haidar Khels, as a mark of our further displeasure at their conduct. Blood-money at the usual rate would be demanded for the Banuchi found dead in their pass that day; and two watch-towers in each of the four villages would be burnt for the previous day's misconduct of the So Khel Malik, as well as for the recusancy of the leading men of Lower Dawar, which had necessitated the march of a British force into the valley.

The Maliks acquiesced in these demands, but they begged for time. However, the afternoon was advancing, and if the force was to return to camp that night, no time was to be lost. A second time did the Maliks come up full of promises, but with nothing tangible, and begging for more delay; so the guns and infantry were advanced towards the principal Haidar Khel village, with the double intent of expediting compliance with the terms and of witnessing the destruction of the towers.

Armed men from all parts of the valley were drawn up in front of the village, and behind a net-work of deep water cuts, apparently unconcerned at the approach of the troops. The artillery had been brought into action at about 600 yards from the village, and when the infantry skirmishers had got within 200 yards of the Dawaris, a shot was fired by a Dawari apparently as a signal, which was followed by a volley from the rest of the enemy, who at once took shelter behind the walls and in the ditches.

At this time so little suspicion of faithlessness had been entertained, that the skirmishers had got within matchlock range of the opposing line; the 1st Sikh Infantry and wing of the 4th Sikh Infantry were then immediately ordered to advance, and as soon as the front of the guns had been cleared by our own skirmishers, artillery fire was opened on the village: the village was then taken by the 1st Sikhs, whilst the cavalry were moved to the right of the village to cut off any attempt at escape.

The ground, however, was so intersected by deep and wide water-courses, and so swampy, that it was impossible for the cavalry to carry out this object with much effect; but about 30 of the enemy having been driven from house to house by the 1st Sikhs, finally made a rush out of the north corner of the village, when they were turned by the cavalry, by whom some 10 were sabred; when the rest made towards the guns and head-quarters, and throwing down their arms, surrendered as prisoners. As soon as the enemy had been driven out, the village was set on fire.

The 1st Panjab Infantry and the Cavalry were then advanced on the next large village, "Haipi," which was surrounded.

The village was nearly deserted, many of the men having gone to the defence of the first village; those left declared their inability to at once collect the fine, but they promised to pay it up at Edwardesabad.

The chief Haidar Khel village, a very strong and large one, having been destroyed (a much severer punishment than was ever intended), it was considered that clemency in the case of "Haipi" would have a better effect than its destruction, even though deserved; and as such a course was more worthy of our name, and more in accordance with the wishes of the Government, the village was spared accordingly.

Symptoms of submission were everywhere visible, and both the General and Commissioner believing the object of the incursion into Dawar to have now been fully attained, determined to pursue success no further.

The troops left the Dawar Valley in sufficient time to admit of the artillery crossing the Kotal by daylight on their return to camp. No sooner had they retired from the valley, than the people sent deputations with assurances of

their entire amenability to all our demands. Two of the So Khel Maliks presented themselves to the Commissioner on the Shinki Kotal, and said they had brought a portion of the fine and would pay the rest at Banu. They stated that they would never forget the punishment inflicted, but at the same time they admitted that they had brought it upon themselves. The Commissioner informed them that but for the treacherous and unprovoked conduct of the men who fired at the troops, inviting retaliation, not a man in the valley would have been touched.

The camp at Tochi was reached at 10 p.m., the troops having been 18 hours under arms.

Our loss had been trifling. (See Appendix B.) The loss of the enemy, as stated by their own Maliks, was about 48 killed, 30 taken prisoners; the number of wounded was not known.

Brigadier-General Keyes stated that the conduct of the troops had been admirable throughout a long and laborious day; during the operations the troops had marched over about 25 miles of ground, almost entirely covered with boulders, and had made a road practicable for guns over the Kotal,—a duty in which the infantry most cheerfully assisted, and which occupied them three hours.

The artillery had much hard work, and the manner in which the guns had been dragged over nearly 25 miles of boulders (the horses were 18 hours in harness) spoke much for the hardiness and endurance of the animals, and for the discipline of the battery.

The names of the officers he wished to bring to notice were—

Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. W. Campbell, especially for the spirited and pushing manner in which he had with his regiment, the 1st Sikh Infantry, assaulted and took the village.

Captain FitzHugh, commanding 4th Sikhs.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy, commanding 2nd Panjab Cavalry.

Captain Keen, commanding 1st Panjab Infantry.

Surgeon Farrell, 2nd Panjab Cavalry.

Captain Charles, commanding No. 3 Light Field Battery.

Captain Sim, Executive Engineer, Kohat Division.

Captain Mackenzie, Staff Officer.

Mr. Hilton, Assistant Engineer.

And General Keyes begged to bring to notice the spirited way in which Captain Sim had volunteered to remain with Haiat Khan and the Vaziris, when it was believed that they would not stand without the presence of some one to give them confidence.

Brigadier-General Keyes said his acknowledgments were also due to Major Munro, Commissioner, Derajat Division, and to Captain Johnstone, Deputy Commissioner, who accompanied the force, for their cordial co-operation.

The Commissioner mentioned the unremitting exertions of the Extra Assistant Commissioner Haiat Khan, and the names of the following native gentlemen who, unsolicited, immediately joined the force on hearing what was about to take place :—

Mahomed Surfaraz Khan Bahadur, Mahomed Aiaz Khan, Shir Khan (late Ressaldar), Mahomed Nowrang Khan Bahadur, late Ressaldar.

Shortly after these operations, the fines were paid and the prisoners were released, when a treaty, similar to that entered into by the Kabal Khel Vaziris, was signed by the representatives of Upper Dawar and both factions of Lower Dawar.

Result.
Report by Deputy Commissioner of Banu.

The satisfaction of the Governor General in Council was expressed at the success of the expedition, which, it was remarked, had been well conceived and carried out, and the hearty thanks of Government were to be conveyed to the officers engaged.

APPENDIX A.

Dawar Valley Expedition, 1872.

Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C. B., commanding.

Staff.

Captain Mackenzie, Staff Officer, Panjab Frontier Force.

Captain Sim, Royal Engineers.

Mr. Hilton, Assistant Engineer.

Artillery.

No. 3 Light Field Battery, Captain Charles commanding.

Cavalry.

1st Panjab Cavalry, Captain Bertie commanding.

2nd Panjab Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy commanding.

Infantry.

1st Sikh Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell commanding.

4th Sikh Infantry, Captain FitzHugh commanding.

1st Panjab Infantry, Captain Keen commanding.

Political Officers.

Major A. A. Munro, Commissioner, Derajat.

Captain Johnstone, Deputy Commissioner, Banu.

Troops.

CORPS.	Ordnance.	British officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Trumpeters and buglers.	Privates.	REMARKS.
No. 3 Light Field Battery	Two 24-Pr. Howitzers	2	1	6	1	50	
1st Panjab Cavalry	1	5	16	2	125	
2nd Panjab Cavalry	4*	7	27	2	166	
1st Sikh Infantry	6†	13	49	12	454	
4th Sikh Infantry	4	12	50	8	350	
1st Panjab Infantry	4‡	13	53	10	368	
Total, two 24-Pr. Howitzers	...	21	51	201	35	1,513	

* Includes one medical officer.

† Ditto ditto.

‡ Ditto ditto.

APPENDIX B.

Casualty Return.

CORPS.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	REMARKS.
1st Sikh Infantry	6 ...	{ 3 severely. 3 slightly.
2nd Panjab Cavalry ...	2 horses*	...	5 horses	* riders dismounted

CHAPTER XII.

The Shirani Tribe.

THE Shiranis are a tribe of Afghans, who inhabit the hill country to the west of the British frontier, from the Gumal on the north, to Kot Thaga on the south. They thus adjoin the sub-divisions of Tank, Kolachi, Drabund, and Chaodwan.

McGregor's Gazetteer.

The Shiranis have been estimated as being able to turn out 10,000 fighting men; but this is believed to be exaggerated. Raverty estimates them at 5,000; and Temple says, they can muster 1,000 men on a day's notice, and in the course of three or four days 3,000 more.

A great part of the Shirani country is occupied by the lofty mountain of the Takt-i-Suliman, and the hills which surround its base. Many parts of it are nearly inaccessible; one of the roads is in some places cut out of the steep face of the hill, and in others two supported by beams inserted in the rock, and with all this labour is still impracticable for loaded bullocks.

The population are in villages of from twenty to forty houses, scattered through the valleys and the lower parts of the mountains. They cut out the sites of their houses in the slopes of the hills, so that on three sides the earth forms the lower part of the wall. Each cottage contains but one room, and has only one entrance, which is closed at night with a branch of a thorny tree. Even in winter they have nothing to shut out the cold, but sleep on black carpets round the fire, wrapt up in their sheep-skin cloaks. Their forests furnish them with plenty of firewood, and their houses are lighted with branches of a particular sort of fir which burns like a torch.

The Shiranis are generally of middling stature, thin but hardy and active. They have bold features, grey eyes, high cheek bones, and their general appearance is wild and manly. The dress of a common Shirani consists of a coarse black blanket tied round his middle, and another thrown over his shoulders. They wear sandals, the soles of which are made of bullocks' hides, rudely prepared by steeping in the ashes of the tamarisk tree; and their dress is completed by a few yards of white cotton cloth loosely twisted round their heads. The dress of the richest is not much finer than this. The Chief is thought magnificent because he dresses in Multan silk.

Their usual food is bread made of Indian corn, butter, and croot. This last, however, is a luxury seldom enjoyed, but by those who keep sheep. Wheaten bread is only produced on festivals. The flesh principally eaten is mutton. They never kill beef; but when a bullock happens to die, they cut its throat with the usual Mahomedan ceremonies and eat it without scruple, though the flesh of animals that die of disease is strictly forbidden by the *Koran*.

They eat wild olives fresh from the tree, and dried olives, which they are obliged to boil. They also eat wild pomegranates (though they are very sour and harsh), the seed of the jalghuzih pine, and several sorts of berries which grow wild in their mountains.

The Shiranis marry late. They differ from the other Afghans in this respect, that the father of the bride gives a dowry, instead of receiving a price for his daughter. The women only work at domestic employments, and at reaping the harvest.

Money is very scarce among them, trade being principally carried on by barter.

They have no domestic servants, or slaves, and no artificers. About a dozen Hindus keep shops, and sell grain, cloth, treacle, tobacco, clarified butter, and a few of the coarsest manufactures of the plains; and a small number of settlers from the Daman practice the trades of smiths and weavers.

The principal employment of the Shiranis is agriculture, which is carried on in the valleys. Some places under the hills produce grain without watering, but all the rest of their lands is irrigated by means of dams thrown across the hill streams. There is no man in the tribe, but the chief, (and the Mulas,) who does not labor.

They have two harvests, one of which consists of red rice, Indian corn, moong, and tobacco. It is sown in summer and reaped in autumn. When it is off the ground, they sow wheat and barley, which is cut in the beginning of summer.

Their common stock consists of bullocks, but there are some shepherds who live scattered in small hamlets over the summits of the mountains, and some even in tents.

Their bullocks are very small, always black, and without humps. They have a few goats and some asses; but no mules, buffaloes, or camels. There are not 20 horses in the whole country.

Elphinstone gives the following description of the Shirani Government:—

The Chief of the Shiranis is called the Nika (which in Pushtu means the grandfather). He has very great authority in his tribe, which is partly derived from his being the chosen head of the oldest family, and partly from the belief of the Shiranis that he is under the immediate guidance and protection of Providence. He has a large estate, and consequently employs many people in husbandry; but he has no domestic servants. He receives a lamb annually from every man in the tribe who has sheep, and a calf from those who have many cattle. No force is employed to realize this tax, but it is readily paid from the conviction of the people that some great misfortune (the death of a child for instance) will fall on every person who refuses to pay.

Though men often redress their injuries by mere force, yet the “Nika” is the only regular dispenser of justice; he hears the parties, and after saying a prayer, decides the cause by the inspiration of the divinity. His order is always obeyed, from the dread of supernatural punishment.

The Shiranis have also Chilwashirs, but they seem intended rather to supply the place of the Nika in distant parts than to strengthen his power. They are appointed by the Nika, and act under his orders. The Shiranis have little internal dissension.

There is a Mula in every village, who receives a tithe of the produce of its lands and flocks. The simplicity of the Shiranis is shewn in a strong light by one of the functions of this priest, which is to sew the shrouds for the dead. A great many of the Shiranis learn to read the *Koran*, though none but Mulas learn to read Pushtu, and none Persian. They are very punctual in their prayers, but apparently feel little real devotion. The Shiranis are at war with all the tribes that pass through their country in the annual migrations. They may, indeed, be said to be at war with all the world, since they plunder every traveller that comes within their reach, and besides make incursions into parts of Daman, with the inhabitants of which they have no quarrel.

All, however, agree that their faith is unblemished, and that a traveller who hires an escort of Shiranis may pass through their country in perfect security.

The passes in the Shirani country are the Shaik-Haidar, Draband, Chaodwan, and Gagistan.

SECTION II.

The Shirani Expedition, March 1853.

PREVIOUS to our annexation of the Panjab, the Shiranis had made themselves the terror of the border. They used to carry off not only cattle, but men and women, whom they never released except for a rich ransom. They once sacked the town of Draband, though defended by a small Sikh garrison, with a Kardar at its head. In 1848 Major Edwardes testifies that for miles the border was laid waste by their depredations, or deserted through fear of their attacks.

The plain men would make reprisals and retaliation, and thus the feud would be inflamed. However, the Shiranis were so much feared that the arable lands skirting the base of the hills were left untilled, and the neighbouring plain villages regularly paid them one-fourth of their produce to buy off their depredations.

After annexation, efforts were made by Major Reynell Taylor, the Deputy Commissioner, to conciliate them to peace; but from the first they made war on our subjects. In 1849 they attacked a place on the Kulachi border, when one of their leaders was slain.

Most of the posts along the border line, during the years 1849 and 1850, were held by the Police Battalions and Major Edwardes' Levies.

In the spring of 1851, the Thnadar of Chaodwan, receiving information that some camels of Shazad Khan Nasar were grazing within the Government border lines, proceeded to the spot with his police detachment, and, assisted by the Babar zemindars of Chaodwan, seized the camels; when a skirmish with the Nasars ensued, in which several men on both sides were wounded.

Shazad Khan was rather a troublesome character, made notorious by the coercive measures Major Edwardes on one occasion was obliged to adopt towards him, when Shazad suffered considerable loss, and after which he had been very careful not to approach too near to the Government limits.

On his camels being seized, Shazad joined himself to Katal Khan Shirani, and for some time there were considerable hostile gatherings in the hills, when some petty raids were committed; and as there seemed a probability of a serious attempt at reprisal and revenge, a force consisting of a squadron 5th Panjab Cavalry, and 2 companies Scinde Camel Corps, marched from Dera Ismail Khan on the 1st March 1851 on Draband.

The presence of the troops had the desired effect for the tribes dispersed, and after a few days the force returned to Dera Ismail Khan, leaving a troop of the 5th Panjab Cavalry and a company of the Scinde Camel Corps at Draband, which was thus the first of the military posts established on this border line.

Shazad Khan subsequently sued for the restoration of his camels, sending in his son and brother to make terms.

In July of the same year, Katal Khan, the Shirani Chief, (who was molesting British territory in the hope of being bought off with a fief,) entering the plains at night to plunder, was cut off by a detachment of the 5th Panjab Cavalry and Mounted Police near the Dirwaza Pass in front of Draband, when the Chief and two of his sons and nephew were slain. The Chief was killed by the police jemadar, Ghulam Ali Khan, who himself lost his life; one of the sons, by a duffadar, Emam Khan, 5th Panjab Cavalry.

The third remaining son soon afterwards applied for service in the military police; it was deemed politic to comply with this request, but with the fickleness of a savage he soon retracted his offer, and in the following December a large body of Shiranis entered the plains near Draband, when they were driven back by a detachment consisting of—

5th Panjab Cavalry, 84 sabres,
Scinde Camel Corps, 73 of all ranks,
Mounted Police, a few sabres,

under Captain R. FitzGerald, 5th Panjab Cavalry, who was in camp at Draband, covering the building of the out-posts, and the construction of the frontier road. The ground was impracticable for cavalry to act over. The enemy had 7 killed and several wounded. Our loss was—

5th Panjab Cavalry, 1 non-commissioned officer killed.
Mounted Police, 1 sowar killed.

At the beginning of 1853, attempts to plunder in British territory were successfully met by the Draband and other posts; on the 10th March, the Shiranis, aided it was believed by the Nasars, (700 foot and 70 horse in all,) having entered the plains, were driven back after a long skirmish by the Draband post, consisting of 35 sabres, 5th Panjab Cavalry, and 47 of the Scinde Camel Corps, under a native officer of the 5th Panjab Cavalry, leaving one dead body in our hands, and having many wounded. The 5th Panjab Cavalry had 2 horses wounded; Scinde Camel Corps, 1 non-commissioned officer, 1 private, wounded.

The attitude and conduct of the Shiranis was now so hostile, that a small force was encamped at Draband, and on the 14th March 1853 the Shiranis advanced in force into the plains to attack a reconnoitring party, when the following troops moved from the camp under Captain F. F. Bruce, of the Scinde Camel Corps:—

5th Panjab Cavalry, 64 sabres.
Scinde Camel Corps, 2 British officers, 2 Native officers, and 123 Rank and File, with their camel establishments.
Mounted Police, 5 sabres.

Retiring before this force, the enemy took up their position on the crest of a hill, in a strong breastwork they had erected some little distance up the pass. This position was gallantly stormed and taken by a detachment of the Scinde Camel Corps led by Ensign and Adjutant C. H. Palliser, who was wounded; when the enemy fled in confusion, leaving their dead and many of their arms on the ground. Our loss was considerable—

5th Panjab Cavalry—killed 1 sowar, 1 horse; wounded 7 sowars, 11 horses.

Scinde Camel Corps—killed 4 sepoy; wounded 2 British officers, (Captain F. F. Bruce and Ensign Palliser,) 1 Native officer, 2 non-commissioned officers, 10 sepoy.

Total killed—5 privates, 1 horse; wounded—2 British officers, 1 Native officer, 2 non-commissioned officers, 17 privates, 7 horses.

The enemy left 5 dead in the entrenchment, and were said to have had 17 killed in all, and 39 wounded; amongst the former being 4 chiefs, with several men of more or less note.

The gallantry and good conduct of the troops engaged received the expression of the approbation both of the Governor General in Council and of the Commander-in-Chief.

Government letter.

Adjutant-General's letter.

But these were not the only offences of the Shiranis. In the beginning of the year 1853, they had plundered and burnt a British village; and again in February, they had plundered and burnt one under the hills near Draband, owing to some dispute about the payment of the black mail they had always exacted. In addition to these more important cases, the minor raids they had perpetrated were numerous, and Major J. Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner, summed up their conduct by saying "the Shiranis have regularly plundered and taken black mail from the border since it came into our possession," and he urged their punishment; which was then sanctioned by Government.

The troops which were to take part in the expedition were the—

5th Panjab Cavalry,	}	From Dera Ismail Khan.
Detachment, 4th or Garrison Company,		
Artillery, with two Mountain Guns,		
Scinde Camel Corps,		
6th Panjab Police Battalion,	}	From Banu.
No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery, one		
24-Pounder Howitzer, two 9-Pounder		
Guns,		
2nd Panjab Police Battalion,	}	From Kohat; these came down the Indus by boat from Kala Bagh.
Wing, 1st Panjab Infantry,		
Head-Quarters and Wing, 3rd Panjab		
Infantry,		

The troops were assembled at Dera Ismail Khan, from whence they marched to Draband, where they encamped on the 30th March 1853. *Vide* Appendix A.

The 5th Panjab Cavalry had been sent out to the frontier previously, with orders to patrol day and night in front of the Shirani country, to prevent the enemy having any knowledge of our movements.

Brigadier Hodgson's Report.

The enemy, it was estimated, could muster from 1,000 to 1,500 men in one day, and 4,000 to 4,500 men in three days. There were only two passes into their country practicable for guns. Water was plentiful in the Shirani Hills.

Major J. Nicholson's letter.

Brigadier Hodgson's Despatch.

It was determined to operate by the Shaik Haidar Pass, 12 miles to the north of the Draband Pass. The orders for the troops were, that the cavalry and artillery should make their own arrangements for the carriage of grain for three days. The supply for the men of the infantry

Brigade orders.

regiments, &c., were to be carried under arrangements made by the civil officers, regimental bazar establishments being employed for issue. The men were to carry one day's provisions in their havresacks. No camp followers, except those absolutely requisite, were to be allowed to accompany the column. One camel and one servant was to be allowed to every 2 officers. The men were to march in summer clothing, and to wear pyjamahs, &c., if they wished. All sickly, or weakly, or foot-sore men, were to be left with the camp guards.

The force which was to enter the hills consisted of—

- 1 Squadron, 5th Panjab Cavalry.
- 3 Pieces, No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery.
- Wing, 1st Panjab Infantry.
- Wing, 3rd Panjab Infantry.
- 6th Panjab Police Battalion.

The camp was to be left standing under Ensign Paget, 5th Panjab Cavalry, with the remainder 5th Panjab Cavalry, 2nd Police Battalion, detachments of the different regiments, &c.

On the evening of the 30th, demonstrations were made both in front of the Draband and Chaodwan Passes.

At midnight on the 30th, Brigadier Hodgson moved on the Shaik Haidar Pass with the force detailed above.

And, shortly afterwards, 4 companies of the 6th Police Battalion, with a detachment, 5th Panjab Cavalry, moved out under Ensign Paget to the Draband Pass, which was held only by a few scouts, who retired as the detachment advanced; the pass was then held until the main body had passed round by the Shaik Haidar and beyond the Draband Pass.

Entering the Shaik Haidar Pass a little after daylight, Brigadier Hodgson reached Kotki about 5 p.m., without molestation, after a march of 25 miles. Shortly after leaving Draband heavy rain fell, continuing for five hours, and it was doubtful at one time if the troops could move up the pass on account of the torrent. Great difficulties of ground were encountered, and had the enemy offered any opposition, much loss must have occurred. Kotki was found to be a very strong village, surrounded by a breastwork and defended by eleven towers, and containing 300 houses substantially built, which gave shelter to 1,200 inhabitants.

The following day, the 1st April, the 3rd Panjab Infantry were moved to the Draband Zam Pass, to hold it, and to improve the road for the passage of artillery, as well as to open communications with Draband; whilst the rest of the troops were employed in destroying the Shirani villages within a circumference of 8 miles of Kotki, strict injunctions being given to respect women and children, and all mosques and shrines.

100 men, Scinde Camel Corps.
100 „ 1st Panjab Infantry.
200 „ 6th Police Battalion.
20 „ 5th Panjab Cavalry.

The 1st detachment under Captain F. F. Bruce, Scinde Camel Corps, destroyed Landi (1st), Nunga, Vazir-ki-kot, and Landi (2nd).

100 men, 6th Police Battalion.

The 2nd under Captain Younghusband, Captain of Police, destroyed Shara.

100 men, 1st Panjab Infantry.
100 „ 6th Police Battalion.
20 „ 5th Panjab Cavalry.
20 „ 4th Panjab Cavalry.

The 3rd under Brigadier Hodgson in person, destroyed the village of Dak.

The several detachments rejoined the main column at Kotki by night-fall.

On the 2nd April a column under the Brigadier moved out to attack and destroy the villages to the extreme southward of the Shirani country, when the village and stronghold of the Chief Rehmat Khan, as well as the villages of Spina Tangi, China, and Shaik Maila, were entirely destroyed, without opposition. Small parties of the enemy hovered about and fired long shots. As the troops retired the enemy attempted to harass the column, but were held in check by the rear-guard under Lieutenant Keyes, when they suffered some loss themselves without inflicting any on the troops.

Whilst these operations were going on, 150 of the Babur tribe, under their Chiefs Dado and Gul Mahomed, entered the hills from Chaodwan, and destroyed the village of Saidel, some 8 miles up the pass.

During the day the troops left at Kotki had mined and blown up the towers, and, with the exception of one solitary building (a mosque), had razed the village to the ground.

The following day the troops returned to Draband by the pass of that name, and, although a few of the enemy showed themselves, not a single shot was fired at the column.

In his despatch the Brigadier spoke very highly of the conduct of the troops, and mentioned the following officers:—

Captain Prout, Brigade Major.
 „ F. F. Bruce, Scinde Camel Corps.
 Lieutenant Hammond, Artillery.
 „ Stokes, Artillery.
 „ Keyes, 1st Panjab Infantry.
 „ Henderson, 3rd Panjab Infantry.
 „ Younghusband, Police.
 „ Bruce, 5th Panjab Cavalry.
 Ensign Paget, 5th Panjab Cavalry.

And he alluded to the able, zealous, and energetic co-operation he had received from Major Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner, and to the good arrangements for supplies made by Lieutenant Busk, Assistant Commissioner.

The Brigadier attributed the absence of opposition on the part of the enemy to their not expecting the force to enter the hills so far to the northward: however, Major J. Nicholson considered it arose from a jealousy between the southern and northern divisions of the tribe which prevented their combining against us, as he pointed out that the unexpected line of attack adopted might have prevented opposition in the first instance, but would not have affected the action of the tribe in the subsequent operations.

Although the collection of the force at Dera Ismail Khan had given the Shiranis time to drive their herds into the interior, and no captures had consequently been made, the punishment of the tribe had been very complete, their country had been overrun, and their principal villages destroyed, without the loss to us of a single man: and Major Nicholson considered the expedition would have not only a salutary effect on the Shiranis themselves, but also on all the neighbouring hill tribes.

The satisfaction of the Governor General in Council at the successful issue of the expedition was then
 Government letter.

Since this expedition the Shiranis occasion comparatively very little trouble ;
McGregor's Gazetteer. no raid in force has occurred, and Katal's son, Azim,
 is well disposed and anxious to be considered a well-
 wisher to the Government.

He undertakes to prevent any small expeditions being organized in his
 portion of the tribe, and not to allow any marauders to pass through his
 country. One year he joined in the pursuit of some plunderers of the Sultanzai
 Shiranis, (the only section of the tribe which cause any trouble,) who had
 carried off cattle from near Chaodwan, and assisted in recovering the booty.

Shirani Field Force.

Brigadier J. S. Hodgson, commanding.

Staff.

Captain Prout, Brigade-Major, Panjab Irregular Force, Staff Officer.

Artillery.

No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery, Lieutenant Hammond commanding.
 Garrison Company Artillery, Lieutenant Stokes commanding.

Cavalry.

5th Panjab Cavalry, Lieutepant H. Bruce commanding.

•Infantry.

Scinde Camel Corps, Captain F. F. Bruce commanding.
 Wing, 1st Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant C. P. Keyes commanding.
 Wing, 3rd Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant B. Henderson commanding.
 2nd and 6th Police Battalion, Lieutenant J. Younghusband commanding.

Political Officers.

Major J. Nicholson, Deputy Commissioner.
 Lieutenant Busk, Assistant Commissioner.

Troops.

DETAIL OF TROOPS.	European officers.	Staff Serjeants.	Native commissioned officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Buglers.	Privates.	Total number of fighting men.	ORDNANCE.					REMARKS.
								Field.			Mountain Train.		
								9-Pr. guns.	24-Pr. howitzers.	54-inch mortar.	3-Pr. guns.	12-Pr. howitzers.	
Staff ...	3	3	
No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery ...	1	...	2	5	...	48	56	2	1	
Detachment, Garrison Artillery	1	1	...	12	14	
Scinde Camel Corps ...	3	...	6	81	...	573	668	
5th Panjab Cavalry ...	1	...	8	14	...	98	121	
Wing, 1st Panjab Infantry ...	2	...	8	47	...	374	431	
Wing, 3rd Panjab Infantry ...	2	...	7	48	...	286	343	
3rd Police Battalion ...	1	...	11	40	...	308	360	
6th Police Battalion	18	70	...	603	691	
Brigadier's Escort, 4th Panjab Cavalry	1	2	...	10	13	
Total ...	13	...	62	308	...	2,312	2,695	2	1	

CHAPTER XIII.

SECTION I.

Kasranis.

THE Kasranis are a Biluch tribe, who inhabit the extreme north of the Dera Gazi Khan District, a portion of the south of the Dera Ismail District, and the hills to the immediate west of these tracts. They are bounded on the north by the Kaora, on the east and south there is no defined boundary, as their lands are scattered about in the district, and west by the Drug Hills.

McGregor's Gazetteer. According to the Census Report of 1868, there are 376 Kasrani souls in the Dera Ismail Khan District, and 2,938 in the Dera Gazi; total 3,314 in the plains. Of these, about one-third only, or 1,105, are adult males, the rest being women and children. There is, of course, very little data to go on in estimating the number of this tribe in the hills. (Van Cortland says that it is 500 fighting men, Pollock 750, Minchin 150, and Bruce about 373, or on an average 668. But the average of the estimates given by the above authorities of the fighting strength of those living in the plains is 1,668, or 563 more than the actual amount, which is only 1,105; so that, if we also reduce the average of the estimates of the hills (Kasranis) by one-third, we shall probably be nearer the truth. Thus, 444 will be the number of the hill Kasrani fighting men, and 1,105 of those of the plains; total 1,549.) In the hills their principal villages are Bati and Korianli, and they principally about the Vehowa, Litra, and Mithawan Passes. The Kasranis have large herds of camels grazing on the sandy plain between Kot Kasrani and Vehowa, which affords good pasturage; and a large portion of the tribe reside in small detached temporary villages along the foot of the hills near the mouths of the passes, into which they take their cattle for water, and are on good terms with their own fraternity in the hills. A portion of the tribe also cultivate land near the river, irrigated by wells.

In former times, when the Vehowa route through their country was frequented by traders from Kabul and Ghazni, the Chiefs of the Kasranis received a transit duty of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ rupee for each loaded camel.

The Kasranis are the most northern tribe of all the Belochis. They are said to be descended from one Kasra Khund Biluch. Very little seems to be known of their history before annexation. They are always described as a very predatory race; but of their feuds, &c., there is no information.

When the Multan outbreak took place, and Lieutenant Edwardes took the field against Diwan Mulraj, Mita Khan, the Kasrani Chief, took possession of the fort of Mangrota, and ejected the Diwan's governor. He then quietly waited to see how events would turn out, prepared to act his part accordingly, and when he saw the scale turning in favor of the British Government, he offered his services to Lieutenant Edwardes.

SECTION II.

Expedition against the Kasrani Tribe by a force under Brigadier Hodgson.
April 1853.

ON annexation, Mita Khan was confirmed in the grants which he had enjoyed under former Governments of the Panjab, which he seems to have done little to deserve; for he winked at raids and petty robberies by the hill portion of his tribes, and by his neighbours (the Bozdars,) till we became better acquainted with the border: when satisfied of his ability to check raids on his portion of the frontier, we obliged him to do so, in consideration of his light assessment and money allowances. He was hand and glove with the Bozdars when they lifted cattle from the Sangar plain.

At last the conduct of the Kasranis became so bad, that early in 1852 Major Nicholson; the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, suggested that the Kasranis in the plains should be held responsible for the good conduct of their brethren in the hills. The matter being referred for the opinion of Mr. Van Cortland, that officer, after consultation with Mita Khan, stated that it would not be just to compel Mita Khan to take charge of the passes between the Litra and Kaōra, as the country opposite them was not inhabited by his tribe, and he could not therefore exercise that control over them that he could over the passes from Sangar to Litra, where the villages of his tribe run parallel with the hills, and cultivation extends to the mouths of the passes. However, as there seemed no alternative, Mita Khan proposed that he should be allowed to entertain a jemadar and 25 sowars, and a jemadar and 30 footmen, to enable him to take upon himself the responsibility of the whole of the passes (with the exception of the Kaōra); and he agreed to bind himself to put down marauding, and to restore whatever might be taken through these passes. This plan Mr. Van Cortland considered reasonable, considering the position of the passes and the extent of country he would have to look after.

For the passes already under his care, Mita Khan was allowed a reduction in the rent of his lands to the extent of Rs. 400 per annum, which he again made over to the cultivators under him, besides taking little or nothing from those cultivating in the immediate vicinity of the passes. This system was in force under the Sikh Government, and was therefore continued by Mr. Van Cortland. It appears that this plan was eventually sanctioned in a modified form, and Mita Khan was held responsible for all the passes from Kot Kasrani to Vehowa, on an allowance of Rs. 500 per annum.

But the tribe, being divided and scattered in their separate jurisdictions, soon became disorganized, and raids and other crimes were perpetrated on the Kasrani border. Major Nicholson reported that the Kasranis were very thievish, and the hill portion were in the habit of proceeding through the lands of their brethren in the plains to plunder. The freebooters received support from some of their plain brethren, and collusion from all.

The country round Dera Fateh Khan was now continually harassed by the Kasranis, and many hundred head of stolen cattle were conveyed through their passes into the interior

Report by Major J. Nicholson.

Report on Tribes.

In 1852 they signalized themselves by an audacious act. One of the chiefs, named Yusaf Khan, held a village in the British territory. From this village a subordinate, (a fiscal employé,) disappeared under suspicious circumstances. Yusaf Khan was summoned to answer, but did not appear. His brother was, however, found and sent in to the civil officer, when in trying to escape from custody, he fell from a wall and received injuries, from which he died. Yusaf Khan then organized an expedition against Dera Fateh Khan, about 20 miles from the hills,—a measure which had been once before adopted in the Sikh time; and on the evening of the 16th March 1852, about 300

Major Minchin's Report.

Kasrani foot with 40 horse started from the Kaora Pass, and marching between the ports of Gurwali and Vehowa arrived at Dera Fateh Khan at early dawn on the 17th. The force at the Thanah consisted of 14 sowars and 19 burkundazes, but it was not strong

<i>Killed.</i>		
Police Sowar	...	4
Burkundazes	...	1
Villager	...	1
Horses	...	3
		—
		9
		=

<i>Wounded.</i>		
Police Sowar	...	1
Burkundazes	...	2
Horses	...	5
		—
		8
		=

enough to offer much opposition; and the Kasranis plundered such portion of the bazar as was not under fire from the Thanah, and then retired with the loss of 3 killed and 1 prisoner, but carrying off most of the cattle of the village.

Our loss was as given in the margin.

The Kasranis in their retreat took a more southerly direction than in their advance, making for the road between Vehowa and Thata; to both of which posts, the most northerly of the Dera Ghazi Khan District, news of the attack had been sent by the Thanadar, who was following up the Kasranis, and collecting as many of the people of the country as he could as he went along. About 7 miles south of Vehowa he was joined by the cavalry detachments, from those outposts when the force altogether mustered—

4th Panjab Cavalry.

Two native officers, 43 sabres.

Police.

9 horse, 30 foot.

Villagers.

30 horse, 30 foot.

The Kasranis had taken up a strong position behind an embankment, where they were out of fire. The Thanadar wanted to attack with the footmen first, but the cavalry native officer determined to charge at once, which was done in a most gallant manner, although the attack was repulsed with the loss of—

Report from Officer commanding 4th Panjab Cavalry.

4th Panjab Cavalry.

Killed—1 native officer, 3 sowars, 3 horses.

Wounded—6 sowars, 9 horses.

Missing—1 horse.

The enemy, it was believed, had many casualties, but they made good their retreat with their booty, except 4 baniahs they were carrying off for ransom to the hills, who managed to escape in the melee.

In the month of April following, the Kasranis assembled and threatened British territory, but a force from Dera Ismail Khan, consisting of the

5th Panjab Cavalry and Scinde Camel Corps, moving down in one night to Vehowa, where it was joined by a detachment of the 4th Panjab Cavalry and 200 Police Battalion from Dera Ghazi Khan, the Kasranis dispersed.

The tribe, however, continued their depredations, and it became necessary to blockade the hill portion; and in September 1852, Major Nicholson urged that punitive measures should be undertaken against them, as, since their attack on Dera Fateh Khan, assisted occasionally in secret by the Bozdars, Hindanis, and others of the southern Biluch tribes, the Kasranis had been continually making petty forays on the border.

Accordingly, on the breaking up of the Shirani Expeditionary Force at Draband in April 1853, a column (see appendix) was formed for the punishment of the Kasranis.

Moving two marches along the frontier, the direction of this column was changed to the rear, that an impression might be created that no further hostile movements were contemplated, and the force arrived at Pahur on the 11th April. Marching at 10 p.m. that night, Brigadier Hodgson reached the mouth of the Bati Pass exactly at daybreak the next morning, and found the enemy (who had evidently received intelligence of the approach of the troops) in position behind breastworks on the hills on both sides of the pass.

These hills were ascended and the breastworks taken by 2 companies 1st Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant Keyes, and 2 companies under Lieutenant Travers, whilst the remainder of the force advanced up the pass for about a mile, when the village of Bati, the head-quarters of the tribe, was reached; it was defended by a very high stockade erected on the crest of a precipitous ridge above the village, the fire from which swept the gorge. As the right flankers had difficulty in enfilading this position, it was carried by a rush of the Light Company of the Police Battalion and some 20 men of the 1st Panjab Infantry under Lieutenant Keyes, supported by the remainder of the Police Battalion, and the village was then taken. Bati consisted of some 80 or 90 well and substantially built houses, and it was with two other hamlets, completely destroyed, with the exception of the mosque, and the houses of a malik and his son, who had held aloof from the plunderers of the tribe.

The enemy had not had time to remove their property, a great quantity of which of all descriptions was found and destroyed; some of the Kasrani flocks were captured by the skirmishers; two Zamburaks (wall pieces) which the Kasranis had captured from Sawan Mull (the Nazim of Multan), with a number of matchlocks, were also taken.

The troops then retired in the same formation as they had advanced, and reached the mouth of the pass at 10 A.M., the enemy ineffectually trying to harass the retirement.

There was no water between Pahur and the hills, and the force had therefore to march back to its encampment at Pahur, where it arrived at 2 P.M.; the main body had marched 34 miles, whilst the skirmishers had marched some 40 miles in all.

Whilst the troops were employed in the pass, the police and levies had destroyed the encampments of those portions of the tribe in the plain who were known to have joined the enemy as the troops approached, but two encampments in the neighbourhood, the inhabitants of which remained peaceably in their homes, were not molested.

The 4th Panjab Cavalry under Captain O. Jacob had patrolled between the Bati Pass and Vehowa during the operations.

Our loss has been small (see appendix) ; that of the enemy was not known, though they acknowledged to have had 5 killed and 7 wounded.

Brigadier Hodgson reported that the conduct of the troops had left nothing to be desired, and he expressed his satisfaction with Lieutenants Keyes and Travers, 1st Panjab Infantry, Captain Younghusband, Police, Captain Prout, Brigade Major, and Mr. Apothecary Hayes; and he said he was greatly indebted for the valuable information afforded by Major Nicholson.

The satisfaction of the Governor General in Council with the conduct of all who were employed was afterwards communicated.

Kasrani Expedition, 1853.

Staff.

Brigadier H. Hodgson commanding.

Captain Prout, 56th Native Infantry, Staff Officer.

Infantry.

1st Panjab Infantry, Lieutenant Keyes commanding.

6th Police Battalion, Captain Younghusband commanding.

Political Officer.

Major J. Nicholson, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan.

Strength of Field Force.

CORPS.	European officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	REMARKS.
Staff	2	2	2	30	
Detachment, 4th Panjab Cavalry	3	7	46	400	
1st Panjab Infantry	1	13	48	400	
5th Police Battalion					
Total	6	22	96	830	

Casualty Return.

CORPS.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		REMARKS.
	Rank and file.	Native officer.	Non-commissioned officers.	Rank and file.	
1st Panjab Infantry	1	1	1	5	
6th Police Battalion				2	
Total	1	1	2	7	

SECTION III.

Subsequent conduct of the Tribe.

Report on Hill Tribes. AFTER the expedition raids for the most part ceased, and before the end of the year (1853), the chief of the plain Kasranis, Mitta Khan, who had formerly been lukewarm, and who, when called to account, had urged that he could not be responsible for the control of his hill neighbours unless the lost rights of retaliation were restored to him, now engaged to guard the passes of the Kasrani Hills, seven in number. He had formerly enjoyed perquisites and privileges under the Sikh rule, worth about Rs. 500 per annum. These had been continued since annexation. He was now to receive Rs. 500 more in cash from the British Government in return for the responsibility undertaken.

This arrangement was so far successful, that the authorities were enabled in 1854 to remove the prohibition against Hill Kasrani entering the British territory.

In the operations against the Bozdars, Chapter XIV, Mittu Khan with some of his tribe was employed with the levies.

McGregor's Gazetteer. In the autumn of 1868, Lieutenant Grey, Deputy Commissioner of Dehra Ismail Khan, was carried off into the hills by Kaora Khan, one of the Kasrani head men, as he had gone down to Tibi to enquire into a murder case, supposed to have been committed by this man's son. Kaora Khan was then pursued by Nur Mahomed (Khetran) and others; but Kaora Khan kept Lieutenant Grey in advance and himself covered the retreat, threatening, if brought to bay, to kill Lieutenant Grey first, and then sell his own life dearly; which threat of course kept the pursuers at a distance. Meanwhile, Mehr Shah, a priest of the Biluchis, had sent to the Bozdars to close the exit from the Kasrani country, and Karim Dad Khan and Nur Mahomed Khan (Kasranis), and Fazl Khan, Chief of the tribe, with the principal Kasranis of Mangrota and that neighbourhood, had joined actively in the pursuit.

Finally, Kaora Khan and his party were brought to bay some 13 miles beyond Bati, when, after considerable negotiations with Sultan Mahomed, he released Lieutenant Grey.

During the day that he was in restraint, Lieutenant Grey was hard-pressed for terms, but he succeeded in turning the matter off by expressing his conviction that the Commissioner would ratify no conditions that he made, and Kaora Khan had to content himself with a promise that all the grain then in his house would be sent him, and, as he pressed it, that Government should be informed of his contrition; and lastly, that in the event of Government summoning him, he should have a safe conduct, or that if Government refused, he should be informed. He said that he, on his part, would commit no further outrage.

turned out and marched towards Vehowa, making Miran, 33 miles, by the morning; but before they could get further, intelligence was received that Lieutenant Grey had been given up, and so, except one troop, which was ordered into Tibi, the regiment returned. The 1st Panjab Infantry under Captain Keen, and the 4th under Colonel Hood, were embarked in boats, and the latter had actually started before the news of Lieutenant Grey's release arrived.

Lieutenant Grey returned to Dera on the evening of the 13th, and on the 14th the Commissioner, Colonel Graham, accompanied by Lieutenant Grey, and escorted by a company of infantry, went down in boats to Tibi to take steps for the capture of Kaora Khan. Sultan Mahomed of Vehowa was deputed to induce the chiefs of the neighbouring tribes to refuse him an asylum: Kalu Khan and Naorang Khan, Gandapurs, had meanwhile been despatched by Lieutenant Grey into the hills, at the head of the Ushtaranas, to cut off Kaora Khan's retreat, and they followed him up to the Zmara boundaries, but he managed to escape them by a ruse.

Having failed to secure the rebels by these means, the Commissioner now deputed Ghulam Hasan Khan (Alizai) with Sultan Mahomed (Khaitran) to induce or compel Kaora Khan to come in. Kaora Khan received the deputation at the head of 100 men, but, after a long conference, they utterly failed in their object. Having thus failed a second time, the Commissioner summoned the tribes to his assistance. His call was responded to. From the north the Ushtaranas brought 600 men, and were placed under the Gandapur Chief, Kalu Khan; and there came also 120 Babar horse and foot under Mahomed Gul, and 120 Mian Khels; and from the south the Bozdars came 1,000 strong, followed by the Hadianis 700, Lunds 400. To these forces was entrusted the duty of blockading the hill Kasranis on the north, south, and west. The principal men of the plain Kasranis were also summoned, and ordered to bring in the criminal under the following penalties:—1st, forfeiture of allowances for guarding the hill passes; 2nd, confiscation of standing crops as a fine; 3rd, deportation of the plain chiefs to Dera Ghazi Khan; 4th, blockade of the hill portion of the tribe.

The chiefs at once took up their responsibilities, and collecting their clansmen in the plains entered the hills, and returned in a few days with 22 families, including about 40 women and children belonging to the rebels.

The Kasranis were again despatched to the hills to perform the essential duty of bringing in Kaora Khan, and with them were associated, as advisers and supporters on the part of the Government, a Chief of the Kosabs with 50 men, and one of the Gurchanis with the same number. The tribe returned again, after some days, with 5 of the principal rebels, but with the intelligence that Kaora Khan, his son, and others, escorted by about 80 of the hill Kasranis, had escaped beyond the Kala Roh, and sought shelter with the Musa Khels.

To guard against such escape, or to make such shelter more difficult, the Commissioner had proclaimed a reward of Rs. 10,000 on the heads of the 4 principal rebels; and to provide the means of payment of the reward, of feeding the tribes who had assembled, and of meeting the fines which would hereafter be inflicted on the criminals, the moveable property of Kaora Khan, and of a few of his chief abettors, had been seized and sold, producing upwards of Rs. 20,000.

The pressure being continued, Painsa Khan, the Chief of the Musa Khels, at last brought Kaora Khan into Mangrota, and delivered him up to Captain Sandeman on the 27th October. A durbar was then held by the

Commissioner, at which he thanked the assembled chiefs, and distributed the following rewards:—

			Rs.
To the Bozdars	who brought 1,000 fighting men,		2,500
„ Hadianis	„	700	2,000
„ Lunds	„	400	1,000
„ Ushtaranas	„	500	1,000
„ Kosabs	„	50	700
„ Babars	„	120	750
„ Mian Khels	„	120	750
„ Isots	„	100	300
„ Gurchanis	„	50	300
„ Nutkanis	„	50	500
„ Gandahpurs	„	40	200
		<u>3,140</u>	<u>10,000</u>

and at the same time the following “khillats” were bestowed on the chiefs of the tribes:—

The political expenses of the above force amounted, in round numbers, to Rs. 15,000; and this sum, as well as the Rs. 10,000 reward, was charged to the criminals and to the Kasrani tribe generally, the cost of the “khillats” to the Government.

A bitter blood-feud has existed for many years between the hill Kasranis and their neighbours, the Bozdars, which every now and then breaks out afresh and causes a good deal of trouble to the local authorities. The difficulty is in preventing the Kasranis in the plains from assisting their kinsmen in the hills; and it is only by enforcing the responsibility of the chief and his headmen that it can be done. It is, however, altogether a clan quarrel, and neither of the tribes bear any ill-will towards the Government.

In July 1869 a raid was made by a body of Kasranis and Ushtaranas (residents of British territory) on the Bozdars beyond the frontier, in revenge for the murder of 3 Kasranis by men of the Bozdar tribe, and for an outrage committed in British territory against the mother of the Kasrani Chief. The Chiefs of the Kasranis and Ushtaranas were fined, and further required to pay the Bozdars compensation for the raid; while the Bozdars made amends for the injuries inflicted on the Kasranis, and the dispute was thus satisfactorily adjusted. But no raids of any consequence have occurred since the expedition in 1853 on British territory.

CHAPTER XIV.

SECTION I.

The Bozdars.

MR. TEMPLE, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, thus describes the Bozdars in 1856.

From the Kasrani limits the hills of the Bozdar tribe extend along the British frontier for about 15 or 20 miles. The range is intersected by some nine passes leading into the plains, the chief of which is the Sangar Pass, through which there is a considerable traffic with Kandahár and the Panjab.

There are also two other large passes, *viz.*, the Vehowa and the Mahoi. The length of the first is about 14 *koss* to its junction with the Dhubnai, which is 10 *koss* long, and connects it with the Drugnai, where the Bozdar country commences; the Dhubnai has only a precarious supply of bitter water: there is, however, a longer way round by the Drug.

Report by Lieutenant
Medley, Bengal Engineers.

The Sangar Pass leads directly into the heart of the Bozdar country, the Drugnai branching off from it, 6 miles from its mouth, joins the Vehowa Pass after a course of 14 *koss*. There is much cultivation along the Drugnai up to Kalamara.

The Mahoi Pass leads also direct into the Bozdar country, and joins the Sangar Pass after a course of 19 *koss* at Bharti, the head-quarters of the tribe.

The distance to Bharti from the mouth of the Sangar is about 25 *koss*; from the mouth of the Mahoi Pass, 19 *koss*; to Kalamara from the mouth of the Sangar, 25 *koss*; from the mouth of the Vehowa 25 *koss*.

The route along these three passes is, generally speaking, of about equal difficulty, the beds being covered with sand and boulders, intermixed with brushwood; the passes vary in width from 200 to 600 yards: on both sides the hills are generally perpendicular and vary in height from 50 to 200 feet; they are bare, of soft pliable sandstone, and difficult to ascend from the pass.

In the Vehowa nullah water is procurable from the stream perpetually flowing down from the Kala Roh.

In the Sangar and Mahoi nullahs there is no perennial supply, but a small stream generally flows down the former, forming in places pools averaging about 4 feet deep. The water is sweet and good, but the supply in the hot season is not very abundant; and in the Mahoi nullah the quantity is certainly small.

Opposite these hills lies the Sangar lowland, forming the upper portion of the Dera Ghazi Khan District, which was cultivated by several peaceful tribes, and who were very much at the mercy of the Bozdars. There was only one Bozdar village in the plains, but there was much scattered cultivation belonging to the tribe. Almost the whole tribe and their chiefs lived in the hills. They could muster 3,000 or 4,000 fighting men, some portion of whom were horsemen. They were probably the most formidable robbers in this part of the frontier. Under the Sikh régime they repeatedly carried fire and sword

in vain endeavoured to repel them by force; so he built a fort at Mangrota and granted a handsome cash allowance* to the Bozdar Chief. In return for this, the Chief was to guard his passes and to reimburse sufferers for any plunder of property conveyed by those routes. But such conditions could not be rigidly enforced by Sikh rule.

The tribe possessed neither towns nor villages, but lived in detached huts and in caves on the hill sides: they had a good deal of rabi cultivation in their valleys and in some open spots.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Ross, Commissioner, Leia.

The Bozdar country is thus described in McGregor's Gazetteer. It is entirely mountainous, being formed of the outer spurs of the Great Suliman Range. The main spurs run down from the parent range with a direction generally easterly, and instead of sinking gradually into the plains, they split into successive ridges, running north and south, connected with each other by a distinct water-shed, but having the appearance from the plains of forming three separate ranges. These curious parallel and knife-edged spurs are divided from each other by the main drainage lines of the country which run east and west. These are called the Drug, Luni, Saora, two Soris, and the Vidor, of which only the Luni rises behind and to the west of the third range, which is known as the Kala Roh. The main ravines have generally more or less water in them, but the lesser ones seldom or never, except after rain. There is another peculiarity in the Bozdar Hills, which however is common to the whole border from Scinde to Banu, namely, the narrow defiles called "Tokhs," running north and south between what may be described as enormous walls. So precipitously do the hills rise on either side! By these "Tokhs" there is communication from the northernmost to the southernmost point of the Bozdar country; but though continuous, it is by no means direct, as the road follows the ravines, though preserving a general direction of north and south. It was by these "Tokhs" that the Khaitrans were enabled, after their attack on the Bozdars in 1861, to retreat to the Siri Pass without once entering British territory, and it would be quite possible for a marauding band of Northern Bozdars to go by them and raid in the southernmost part of the Kosah country without entering the plains at all in coming and going.

The greatest portion of the tribe is situated between the first and second ranges; the Gholamani section inhabit the Majvel Valley, north of and contiguous to the Khaitrans. The road between the Majvel and the main border valley is through a very narrow pass, called Saora.

The Bozdar tribe differs little from any other Biluchis. Their language, dress, and food, are the same. They are, however, more civilized than the tribes further removed from our border, and are noted for being stricter than any other class in their religious observances. A large number of priests and Syads reside in their lands, and consequently a few mosques, built of mud, or thatch, are to be seen here and there. They are, however, by no means fanatical, nor do they seem to have any hatred to the British rule. They are, as a general rule, disciples of Hazrat Suliman, the founder of the Taosa shrine, where large numbers of them resort for pilgrimage. On this account (Hazrat Suliman being of Jafar parentage) the small and weak tribe of Jafars inhabiting the country north of the Bozdars are ordinarily respected by them.

	Rs.
* Cash	4,332
Land value	2,000
Total	6,332

The greatest enemies of the Bozdars are the Ushtarana Pathans, and perhaps also the Khaitrans (with whom they are at present on good terms). The Gholamani Bozdars occasionally plunder as far as the Luni Pathan Valley and Sahra of the Musa Khels, but of late years they have ceased their depredations in this quarter; and in fact the Gholamani Bozdars assert that it would now be a benefit to them if the Luni Pathans were strong enough to settle down in their old hereditary property, *viz.*, Rankan Kot, Khan Mahomed Kot, and the parts bordering these places, which, from a feeling of insecurity, have long been abandoned. Were the Luni Pathans powerful enough to re-occupy these lands, it would be the means of opening up a direct road from Bora, the Musa Khels, and Lunis, to the Sangar District, which would be to the Bozdars a source of no small income,—the transit duties paid to them being the same as that levied by the Khaitrans, *viz.* :—

					Rs.	As.	P.
Per donkey load	0	4	0
„ bullock „	0	8	0
„ camel „	1	0	0

The Bozdars in their style of fighting differ so far from the other Biluchis that they do not await the attack of their enemy's sword in hand, but fight with matchlocks. The peculiar nature of their country, the routes through which are nothing but passes through hills, being particularly favorable for skirmishes and surprises.

They manufacture a very fair quality of powder.

The Bozdars have very few horses, and in the whole tribe they could not muster 100 horsemen. This prevents them from carrying their inroads to the countries of the more remote tribes.

SECTION II.

The Expedition against the Bozdars by a force under Brigadier Chamberlain,
March 1857.

Report on Tribes. AFTER the annexation of the Panjab, the allowances which had been made to the Bozdar Chief by the Sikhs were continued by the British Government; but, by way of evading the conditions, he arranged that his followers should plunder in places distant as well as near, and should carry their booty into the hills by passes other than their own. In 1850 they committed one raid on Umarkot, below Mithankot, far away to the south, the marauders being chiefly mounted; and another raid on the Kosah village of Yaru, to the north of Dera Ghazi Khan. Towards the close of the same year a party of 120 attacked Vidor, a place of some importance on the frontier opposite Dera Ghazi Khan, and were stoutly resisted by the villagers. In 1852 a party of 90 Bozdars, having lifted the camels of the Bulani village, were pursued by a detachment, 4th Panjab Cavalry, from the Mangrota Post, when the camels were recovered,—the detachment having 1 horse killed by a fire from the hills up which the marauders had retreated.

In 1853 there were three forays by the tribe; two of these incursions were successful as regards spoil, but no life was lost; in the third however, though well mounted, they were pursued for many miles by a detachment 4th Panjab Cavalry, and forced to disgorge their booty at the mouth of the Mangrota Pass. In 1853, it became necessary to prohibit any hill Bozdar from visiting the plains under pain of imprisonment if seized. At the beginning of 1854, the Bozdar Chief was confirmed in the grant of his old allowances amounting to Rs. 4,332 per annum, and the proceeds of some rent-free lands amounting to Rs. 2,000 more when he renewed his engagement to prevent plundering. For a time these pledges were kept. One of the Bozdar chiefs visited the camp of the Chief Commissioner in the winter of 1854. During 1854 no raids were reported; but unfortunately, during 1855, the Bozdars returned to their bad habits, several raids occurred, even villages were plundered, and a large number of minor thefts were committed, no less than 74 in six months. In order to partially reimburse the sufferers, some Rs. 2,500 were escheated from the allowances of the chief. There was also a long list of robbers and murderers, refugees from British territory, sheltered in the Bozdar Hills. The Bozdars crowned the list of their misdeeds of 1855 by a serious raid on the 1st December, carrying off spoil, chiefly cattle, valued at Rs. 1,200, and murdering one man. The marauders were 200 strong. All the chiefs were then summoned, under safe conduct, to answer for the grievous misconduct of their tribe, and to offer such explanation as they could.

Supreme Government letter. But nothing satisfactory appears to have come from this, and in March 1856 the Governor General sanctioned the discontinuance of the cash allowance to the tribe, who were to be warned that on the occurrence of any further raids or forays their rent-free lands would also be confiscated, and a rigorous embargo laid on them. In recommending that the cash allowance should cease, the Chief Commissioner, Sir John Lawrence, had stated he could not recommend it to be continued, even on the condition that the value of plundered property should be retrenched from it. The allowance was granted on

Panjab Government letter.

the condition that tranquility should be preserved; this failing it seemed unreasonable that the Government should continue to subsidize people who committed forays in its territories. Even if the value of property plundered was deducted, the arrangement would still be tantamount to this, that the Government were to pay for the losses suffered by its subjects at the hands of its enemies. Under such circumstances the credit of granting an allowance would be lost, and the Chief Commissioner believed that the continuation of it to the Bozdars on any conditions, after their recent misconduct, would be a pernicious example to other tribes on the border.

Up to the middle of 1856 no great outrage was committed by the Bozdars, although there were cases of cattle stealing, highway robbery, &c.; but in June of that year the outposts had to be reinforced, as it was reported the Bozdars were collecting for an attack on Mangrota, and from that time up to the close of the year they made eleven forays into British territory, generally in large numbers, from 20 to 200 men. Most of these cases were attended with bloodshed; numerous others were planned, but were baffled, by the action of the outposts. On two occasions (in the month of December) the detachments of the 2nd Cavalry and 4th Panjab Infantry had skirmishes with the Bozdars on the hills near the border; in the latter of these (the 27th December), they were driven from four different positions, which they successively occupied. Our loss was—

2nd Panjab Cavalry—1 sowar and 1 horse wounded.

Police—1 sowar and 1 horse wounded.

4th Panjab Infantry—1 sepoy killed.

At the beginning of January 1857, the whole of the 2nd Panjab Cavalry was moved to the frontier; and on the 17th January a reconnoitring party of 1 non-commissioned officer and 8 sowars of that regiment was surrounded by a party of 150 Bozdars, and lost 2 men in cutting their way through the enemy.

The Chief Commissioner, Sir John Lawrence, now strongly urged that an expedition should be sent against them, as the only effectual way of putting a stop to the harassing annoyances to which the villages and posts were exposed. The Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel Ross, had represented "that the Bozdars carried on these forays in the vain hope that they would lead to the restoration of the money payment which they had forfeited through their own misconduct, and that it was evident they would not cease to give trouble until a force was sent to chastise them, when the destruction of their crops would reduce them to great straits, and bring about a state of things which the mere interdiction of their intercourse with the plains had failed to effect." Sanction for the despatch of an expedition was therefore accorded by the Supreme Government, and the confiscation of all the rent-free lands of the Bozdars ordered.

The best time for punishing the tribe was the spring, when their harvest was ripening.

The troops which were to take part in the expedition were the—

No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery from Dera Ismail Khan.

No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery from Kohat.

No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery from Banu.

Detachment, 2nd Panjab Cavalry, from Dera Ghazi Khan.

Detachment, 3rd Panjab Cavalry, from Dera Ghazi Khan, moving in relief.

Detachment, 5th Panjab Cavalry, from Asni, moving in relief.

Sappers from Dera Ghazi Khan.

1st Sikh Infantry from Dera Ghazi Khan.

3rd Sikh Infantry from Dera Ismail Khan.

1st Panjab Infantry from Banu.

2nd Panjab Infantry from Dera Ghazi Khan.

4th Panjab Infantry from Banu.

Eight hundred levies were also collected at Brigadier Chamberlain's request from the district, to be used as guides, and to keep open communication with the plains, and as foraging parties to search for the grain and cattle which the enemy, it was reported, had hidden or driven off to the higher hills.

On the 5th March 1857, the force (see Appendix A) was assembled at Taosa.

Arrangements were made by the district officers for supplies for ten days for man and beast (atta, ghi, salt, dal, and barley or gram). Four days' supply was to be carried regimentally, and six days' supply for the whole force by the civil authorities.

The orders for the force were, that sick and weakly men were to be left behind at Mangrota as the force advanced; 3 doolies with all the dandies and kahars, and kajawahs, were to accompany. All superfluous baggage, camp followers, and animals, were to be left at Taosa. Officers were to be restricted to one pal each, and one mess tent per regiment. The whole of the bullock ammunition boxes attached to regiments were to be carried on the mules and yabus. The frontier posts were considerably strengthened, and provision made for the safety of Dera Ghazi Khan that confidence might be given to the people of the country during the absence of the troops in the hills.

There were, as already stated, three main passes by which the Bozdar country might be entered from the plains, and which are termed by the Belochis "*Nais*." They are simply empty channels, which have been cut through the hills, at right angles to the strata, by the rain which falls in the mountains, forcing a passage for itself to the plains, before flowing into the Indus.

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| 1. The Vihowa Pass. | { In front of the military post and village of Vehowa, and 30 miles to the north of the Sangar Pass. |
| 2. The Sangar Pass. | { Opposite to Taosa, and immediately in front of the fort of Mangrota. |
| 3. The Mahoi Pass. | { Twelve miles to the south of the Sangar Pass, and in front of the Mahoi outpost. |

The first mentioned was not only circuitous, but was reported to be impracticable for guns; and in addition to the disadvantage of its passing through the lands of other tribes (Kasranis and Jaffar Pathans), it enters the Bozdar country at one corner near the Drug Valley, from which access to other parts is very difficult.

The second is the principal entrance, and the only one in ordinary use. It was practicable for wheeled carriages, and it was stated that after that portion of the defile known as the Khan Bund is passed, the more open and cultivated lands are at once entered upon, whence there is access to every part of the Bozdar country.

The third and last-named pass was reported difficult in the extreme, if not impracticable when defended; and so far from there being any gun road, it was affirmed that at one place the path skirted a precipice commanded from above, along which a single horse had to be led with care. Lieutenant Watson, who returned by this route after the operations, confirmed the truth of its difficulties.

Under such circumstances the Sangar Pass was in every way the best, if not the only one suited for the troops to enter by. The strong places where the enemy were likely to make a stand, were reported to be—

Lieutenant Medley's Report. Firstly, at the mouth of the Drug Nai or nullah, where it was said a strong breastwork of stones had been erected.

Secondly, at the Khan Bund, about 12 miles from the mouth of the Sangar Pass, which position, it was anticipated, would be the enemy's main one. It was here that in an attempt to force the passage in front, Sawan Mull, in the time of the Sikhs, had met with considerable loss; and as no real advantage was to be gained by making a false attack by the Mahoi Pass, the Brigadier thought it best to let it become generally known beforehand that he intended entering by the Sangar defile; for, whilst it could make no difference as to the result of our attack if there were a few more or a few less of the enemy, there was no doubt the value of our success would be

Brigadier-General Chamberlain's Despatch. greatly enhanced by encountering the tribe on its own ground, and by thus not admitting of any excuse being afterwards made by the Bozdars to explain away defeat, when the example upon all the neighbouring tribes would be so much the more beneficial.

The force marched from Taosa on the evening of the 6th March, and after proceeding across the plain for 7 miles reached the mouth of Sangar Pass at daybreak. A few Bozdars were discernible on the heights, but no attempt at opposition was made; the few shots fired were evidently only intended as signals.

The march was continued up the stony bed of the Sangar stream (which is the only road) for about 4 miles, when a convenient place for encamping "Didachi-ke-Kachi was reached, and the force halted there for the day.

Towards noon a party of the enemy made some show of driving in one of the picquets, but on its being supported by Captain Green commanding the 2nd Panjab Infantry they retired; our loss was 1 sepoy, 2nd Panjab Infantry, wounded.

In the afternoon a reconnoissance of the Khan Bund, and the approaches to it, was made by Brigadier Chamberlain with a force consisting of 300 officers and men of the 3rd Sikh Infantry and 1st Panjab Infantry. About 8 miles from its mouth the Sangar Nullah is joined by the Drug Nai, which flows from a small valley of that name some 20 miles to the north-west, in the Bozdar country, and from this point of junction to its opening out at the Harrambor Kachi, a distance of about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles, the Sangar Pass presents a route the most formidable. From this junction to the point where the Sangar Nai turns at right angles to the west, it is bounded on either side by scarped hills of considerable height, which completely command the road, a matchlock fired from one hill ranging to the foot of the other; and beyond this again the hills have to be passed at right angles to their strata, when, instead of having one range on either side to deal with, a series of precipitous spurs rising one after another in close succession have to be crossed, which completely command the road below.

It is to this particular portion of the defile that the term "Khan Bund" is generally applied, though, strictly speaking, perhaps the name implies only that one spot across which a mound of stones and earth has at some former day been raised to add to the natural defences.

On arriving at the point where the defile turns to the west, a view of Khan Bund was obtained, and the enemy were seen clustered on every ridge

and pinnacle commanding the defile; the position was so strong a one, that it was very evident that to carry it in front would be a very doubtful operation, and one certainly not to be accomplished except at a large sacrifice of life; but it was possible to turn the position by its left, and Brigadier Chamberlain therefore determined upon attacking the Khan Bund from that side, after assuring himself both by conversation with the guides, and by observation of the practicability of the hills from the Drug Nai. The reconnoitring party then returned to camp, having had a duffadar of the Mounted Police (on orderly duty with the Deputy Commissioner), and 1 sepoy, 1st Panjab Infantry, killed, and 1 sepoy wounded.

Attack on the Khan Bund Defile.

The night passed over undisturbed, and at daybreak on the following morning (7th), the force continued its march up the defile. By 7 o'clock it was halted in front of the enemy's position, whilst the necessary arrangements for the protection of the baggage and camp followers were made.

Major Coke's column.

The plan of attack was as follows, commencing from our right:—The 1st Panjab Infantry and 4 Mountain Guns of No. 2 Battery, under Major Coke, were to advance up the Drug Nai, in the hopes of finding a practicable spur by which to ascend the heights south of the Drug Nai in support of the wing of the 4th Panjab Infantry; and to acquire firm possession of those heights, for this was indispensable to success.

The wing, 4th Panjab Infantry, under Captain Wilde, was to ascend (by its northern spur) the hill which commands the Sangar Nai from the west, covered by the fire of the 4 Field Pieces of No. 1 Battery, and the 4 Mountain Guns of No. 3 Battery, under Lieutenant Mecham.

Captain Wilde's column.

The 3rd Sikh Infantry and the 2nd Panjab Infantry were placed in support at the junction of the nullahs, whilst a portion of the wing of the 1st Sikh Infantry under Major Gordon was sent to crown the hill which closed in the Sangar Nullah to its east, with instructions to move along its summit so as to keep parallel with Captain Wilde's wing.

The supports.

The enemy had failed to occupy the spurs to the north side of the Drug Nai, and this was, of course, turned to immediate account by parties of Major Coke's men who occupied these spurs as they advanced.

Operations of Major Coke's column.

Becoming alive to the object we had in view, the Bozdars lost no time in strengthening their left flank, and numbers of them at once crossed the Drug Nai and took up a very strong position on its northern side: A hill on the southern side of the nullah was also strongly held by the enemy, whilst the nullah between these positions was closed by a breastwork across it; the fire the Bozdars were thus able to bring to bear from three sides was more than any wing of infantry could hope successfully to oppose, more especially as the hills were knife-edged with the faces next the Nai a perfect wall, and the Brigadier therefore immediately supported Major Coke with the wing of the 2nd Panjab Infantry under Captain Green, and withdrew Lieutenant Mecham's 4 Pieces Mountain Battery from Captain Wilde's attack, sending them to Major Coke's assistance.

On the arrival of this support, the two wings, well aided by the fire of the 8 Mountain Pieces, against which the enemy stood their ground most

determinedly, at once attacked the enemy's position on the left of the Drug Nai, Captain Green advancing against the right, and Major Coke against the left of the position, "when the utmost gallantry was displayed by the officers and soldiers of both the wings." It was here that almost all the casualties of the day occurred. Major Coke received a severe wound on his shoulder, although he continued to exercise his command throughout the day. His native adjutant, Mir Jaffir, was wounded at his side, and received another bullet through his shield and clothes. How the British officers as well as the men escaped as they did, was extraordinary, for the fire for the time was excessively sharp. It was here, too, that the Bozdars lost most of their men.

After the Bozdars had been driven from this position, they crossed to the southern side of the Drug Nai, followed by the wing of the 2nd Panjab Infantry, and a portion of the 1st Panjab Infantry, whilst the remainder of the 1st Panjab Infantry and Mountain Guns had to move up the bed of the stream, as the hills were too precipitous to admit of even of the Mountain Guns being taken up.

Whilst these events were passing on our right, Captain Wilde's wing had gradually ascended, and carried the enemy's position on the left bank of the Sangar nullah near its junction with the Drug. This had been done with little loss under cover of the artillery, and Captain Wilde then pressed along the ridge of the hill overlooking the Sangar Nai, his advance being greatly facilitated by the correct practice of Lieutenant Sladen's Field Battery.

Major Gordon, with the wing of the 1st Sikh Infantry, had been enabled in the meanwhile to crown the heights on the east of the Sangar Nai without loss, as the few Bozdars who had at the outset occupied this range fell back without offering any opposition.

The heights on both banks of the Sangar having been thus seized, the Field Battery and wing of the 3rd Sikh Infantry and the detachment of Cavalry were enabled to advance up the bed of the nullah without inconvenience; the artillery, taking up successive positions, kept covering Captain Wilde's advance along the left bank. As these troops reached the point where the defile turns to the west, it became evident from the movements of the enemy who were holding the Khan Bund, as well as from the sound of firing on their left rear, that the enemy were giving way and that the time had come to threaten the Khan Bund in front.

Whilst the Field Battery under Lieutenant Sladen plied them quickly with common and shrapnell shell, Captain Renny, with a company of the 3rd Sikh Infantry, carried the nearest ridge with a loss of only 3 men wounded; whilst Captain Campbell with 2 companies moved on their next breastwork. But by this time portions of the 1st and 2nd Panjab Infantry which had ascended from the Drug Nai, were crossing the hills in pursuit of the Bozdars they had defeated; the Khan Bund was thus threatened from the rear, and the flight became general. To add to the enemy's embarrassment, the detachment of cavalry under Captain S. Browne, 2nd Panjab Cavalry, was ordered to dash through the defile, and after reaching the more open ground to go on as far as the nature of the country permitted.

Success was now complete, and arrangements were made for pitching the camp in a pretty well cultivated little valley, Harranbor, just at the western entrance of the Khan Bund.

Taking into consideration the difficulty of the ground, the Brigadier considered the smallness of our casualties a matter of congratulation. (See

The Bozdars, whose numbers were estimated at 1,700 men, lost from about 20 to 30 killed, and from 50 to 70 wounded. Their chiefs afterwards admitted that they had entertained no doubt that they would be able to hold the pass against the troops; as the troops were advancing they had called to the Brigadier from the hills, asking in a jeering manner why we did not come on; and so far from expecting that their position would be turned from the Drug Nai, the Bozdars stated that it had been arranged that the body of the enemy which had been in position on the left of the Drug Nai was to have attacked the rear of the column, whilst the head of it was engaged at the Khan Bund..

Nor was this self-reliance to be wondered at, for they had seen General Ventura and Jemadar Khushal Singh with a large Sikh army retire from before this stronghold and enter into terms with them, and they claimed to have killed on another occasion 1,200 of Dewan Sawun Mull's soldiers, and to have plundered his baggage.

The conduct of the whole of the troops, Brigadier Chamberlain stated, had been excellent; they exhibited the highest spirit, and well maintained the reputation of our arms.

The services of Major Coke and Lieutenant Lumsden, and Assistant-Surgeon Jackson of the 1st Panjab Infantry, and Captain Green, and Lieutenants Franklin, Fisher, and Assistant Surgeon Clarke, of the 2nd Panjab Infantry, together with the native officers and of both these wings, called, Brigadier Chamberlain said, for special mention, and he begged to recommend them to the favorable notice of the Government. The whole of the Native Infantry was then about to be armed with the enfield rifle, and as a mark of the approbation of Government of the conduct of these two corps Brigadier Chamberlain solicited that they might be the first so armed.

The Brigadier added, the artillery which supported Major Coke's attack had likewise earned distinction, and he particularized Lieutenants Maister and FitzGerald of No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery, and Lieutenants Meeham and Hughes of No. 3 Battery, Mountain Train, as well as the native officers and men employed with the Mountain Guns belonging to those batteries.

On the march of the force from Taosa, the levies had been left at Mangrota in charge of the reserve supplies, for it was an object not to employ them in concert with the troops before our ability to chastise the Bozdars without any other assistance had been shewn to all, and they were now ordered forward; and to Mittah Khan and his Kasranis was assigned the task of occupying the Khan Bund, and keeping open the communication with the plains. The duty was one he was able to discharge if loyal, and he fortunately became sufficiently impressed with the penalty of failure to do this to the Brigadier's satisfaction, although his course was doubtful until convinced that he had more to fear from the displeasure of the British Government than that of his other neighbours, the Bozdars.

After the troops had emerged from the Khan Bund, it became evident from the ruggedness of the country that there was little chance of hemming in the tribe, or capturing their cattle, without the aid of greater numbers; and, in communication with the Deputy Commissioner, arrangements were made by Brigadier Chamberlain during the evening of the 7th, to send off to the Ushtarana Pathans to invite them to come down and plunder their enemies on the north, whilst the force closed in upon them from the south.

The invitation was accepted with alacrity, and a portion of the tribe entering by the Drug Valley had commenced to plunder and lay waste, when they were stopped and ordered to return home in consequence of the

During the 8th the troops remained halted, to admit of the wounded being sent to Mangrota under a strong escort of infantry, assisted by a portion of the foot levies.

• A detachment, consisting of the 2nd Panjab Cavalry and the wing 3rd Sikh Infantry, was employed during the day in reconnoitring the Sangar Nai as far as Bharti, and the course of this detachment was marked by the smoke of the huts and stacks of forage it set fire to as it marched along. The country was found abandoned, and only a few Bozdars were seen on the summit of the hills, who appeared to be occupied with simply watching the movements of the troops.

During the 9th, also, the force remained halted, awaiting the return of the empty doolies which arrived in the evening.

As on the previous day a reconnoitring party was employed in penetrating the country, and doing the enemy as much injury as possible.

On the 10th the force marched to "Bharti," distant about 6 miles. It was considered one of the principal places of the Bozdars, and presented a fine sheet of luxuriant vegetation, and with its pretty clumps of date trees somewhat resembled the scenery in the neighbourhood of Dera Ghazi Khan. The road, as heretofore, was up the stony bed of the Sangar Nai, but during the march five or six richly cultivated nooks were skirted.

The house of "Nowrang Khan," the chief of one section of the tribe, on the summit of one of the hills surrounding Bharti, was destroyed.

Reconnoitring and other parties were always accompanied by some of the levies, who exhibited great skill in discovering concealed property. When our sepoys failed to find anything, a Biluch ally would follow up the track of a man or woman's feet and speedily return with plunder of some kind or another, which had been hidden in the hurry of flight.

During the 11th and 12th the force had to halt to enable supplies to be brought from the rear, for it was not prudent to enter further into the hills without ten days' provisions in camp. On both days the country in advance both to the right and left was patrolled by reconnoitring parties, and everything come across destroyed. The column of smoke which rose into the air over a circumference of some miles must have been a distressing spectacle to the Bozdars, but it was no more than they deserved, and to have spared their crops and property would have been to neutralize the object of the expedition, and to withhold the punishment most likely to make a lasting impression.

Of all the frontier tribes none were less deserving of consideration, for to plunder and murder had been the avocation of the Bozdars for years past, and but for the military posts the country in their front must have been abandoned. Nor did they confine their raids simply to the plains, for they plundered all *their neighbours*, and it may truly be said that their hand was against every man and every man's hand against them.

The secret of their success in this course of plundering was attributable to the inaccessibility of their country, for nature had made it equally unapproachable on all four sides, and within, it is nothing but a net-work of hills and ravines, and quite unassailable except by disciplined bodies. The Bozdars had ample cultivation to support them, were rich in flocks, and well-to-do, and had therefore the less excuse for living on their neighbours.

On the 13th the force continued its march up the Sangar Nai for about 10 miles, and encamped in a well cultivated hollow at the entrance of the Saorah Pass.*

* This pass leads through the "Kala-Roh" (Black Mountain), or, as it is termed in English geography, the Suliman Range.

Just before descending into the cultivation a few horse and footmen were seen, but they disappeared in the defile as the force approached. On this day's march the enemy sustained much loss in the destruction of numbers of their hamlets and stock, and as they belonged to the section of the tribe most given to plundering the border, there was the greater reason for not sparing anything.

The Saorah Pass, or more properly speaking defile, is to the Bozdars on the west what the Khan Bund is to them on the east. One section, called the Ghuliman, possess lands to the west of the defile; and the tribe claim the country, and feed their cattle and flocks up the hills which separate them from the "Luni Pathans" on the west, and the Kaitrans to the south-west; but when at feud with these clans, and obliged to act on the defensive, the Bozdars retire and hold the Saorah Pass, thereby closing the only entrance from the west.

Brigadier Chamberlain had expected, from all that the guides had stated, to find this defile difficult, for the natives had always pronounced it impracticable for artillery, and had adverted to its strength and the necessity for holding it if the force went beyond it into the Ghulimani lands; and although he had looked therefore for a strong position, it far exceeded his anticipations; indeed, he said he had never yet seen in Afghanistan anything to be compared with it, for it might be pronounced impregnable from the west, and according to the reports of trustworthy persons, was not to be turned on the north nearer than by the Vehowah Pass, 30 miles off, or on the south nearer than by the Viddor Pass, distant 45 miles. From the east side it is difficult but practicable, and the Bozdars having failed at the Khan Bund appeared to have thought it was useless to defend it. Its inaccessibility from the west arises from the mountain being scarped on that side, presenting at its summit a precipice of from one to several hundred feet in height; which scarp is said to run north and south as far as the Vihowah and Viddor Passes.

In the days of the Moghals this road was one of those used for keeping open the communication between the southern part of the Panjab and Kandahar; and when "Shah Sujah" was defeated by "Dost Mahomed Khan" at the latter place a remnant of his followers returned by this route. From 13 to 15 days are given as the average time for a horseman to reach Kandahar from Mangrota.

Late in the evening two Bozdars came into camp, stating that they had been sent by the chiefs who wished to be allowed to come in and sue for terms, and begging that the work of destruction might meanwhile be stayed.

The chiefs were told in reply to present themselves in camp during the next day, when our demands upon the tribe would be made known, but that if they failed to attend within the prescribed time, *hostilities and the work of destruction* would re-commence, and that in the interim the force would halt and cease to cut their crops and burn their property.

On the following evening, the 14th March, Nowrang Khan and Ashid Mahomed Khan, the two heads of the tribe, made their appearance, but it was too late to transact business, and the meeting was deferred until the next morning.

At a durbar held on the following day, the reasons for our invasion of their country and the concessions required were publicly made known. The latter embraced—

1st.—Compensation at the rate of Rs. 125 for the life of every man killed or wounded in British territory during the past year.

Deputy Commissioner's
Report.

2nd.—Restitution of, or compensation for, all cattle killed, or stolen, or injured, or property carried off or destroyed during the past year, the restitution or compensation to be completed within two months.

3rd.—The immediate expulsion of all refugee criminals. Not to afford an asylum to refugees from British territory, or to harbour thieves or bad characters of any tribe; nor to allow any one to pass through their country to plunder or commit acts of violence; nor to permit stolen cattle or property of any kind to be taken through their passes.

4th.—To pay a nuzzurānāh of 200 sheep in consideration of the remainder of the crops being spared, with 100 additional sheep from the Ghulimani Bozdars, whose country beyond the Saorah Pass had escaped injury. The sheep were to be given to the troops.

5th.—To give approved hostages for a twelve month as security for good conduct, and to have a vakil always at the Mangrota Tehsil.

A ready assent was given to every demand, and the whole demeanour of the Bozdars was that of men thoroughly subdued. Doubtless much more might have been demanded and would have been acceded to at the time, but it seemed to the Brigadier and to the Deputy Commissioner that the future peace of the frontier would be more likely to be secured by dealing leniently with them, and it was hoped that having now felt our ability to punish, the Bozdars, like the Shiranis and Kasranis, would become peaceable neighbours.

Had they not given in, they would in all probability have suffered considerable loss in cattle, for the Ushtaranas had closed in upon them, and they could only have escaped by finding refuge among the Pathān tribes further to the west.

As soon as our terms had been agreed to, orders were sent off for the

2nd Panjab Cavalry, 17
sabres.

3rd Panjab Cavalry, 24
sabres.

5th Panjab Cavalry, 28
sabres.

4th Panjab Infantry,
66 men under Lieutenant
Humphrey.

Ustaranas to return to their homes.

Whilst the force was encamped at Bharti, a detachment under Lieutenant Younghusband, 5th Panjab Cavalry, had proceeded from Mangrota up the Mahoi Pass, destroying the cultivation there without opposition, and orders were now sent to him to stop any further operations in the work of destruction.

On the 16th the force commenced to retrace its steps, a portion returning by the road by which it had advanced, the remainder by the Lemi Nai. Both columns united again on the 17th at Harranbor Kachi. This course was adopted that more of the country might be seen, and to admit of the completion of a map by Lieutenant Medley, Engineers.

From the 18th to the 21st inclusive, the troops remained halted, the sheep not having been brought in. The Deputy Commissioner thought there was no necessity to remain in the Bozdar country after the chiefs had given in, but Brigadier Chamberlain felt it was both just and necessary to exact the fulfilment of this simple stipulation before relieving the tribe of our presence. The reason assigned by the chiefs for the delay was the distance the flocks had been driven to avoid capture, an excuse the Brigadier did not think reasonable, and which was overcome as soon as the Bozdars understood the alternative, and saw their crops decreasing; for though they were not wantonly destroyed, it was necessary to feed the cattle.

The required number of sheep having been completed on the afternoon of the 21st, the force returned through the Khan Bund on the 22nd, and having encamped during the night at Didachi-ka-Kachi, re-entered the plains the following morning after an absence in the hills of seventeen days.

Brigadier Chamberlain considered that nothing could have been better than the conduct of the troops, and he said it was quite gratifying to witness the mutual confidence which existed between the British officers and their men.

The Brigadier remarked that the only want now required to make the infantry thoroughly efficient was for every man to be armed with the new Enfield rifle, adding that nothing too bad could be said against the musket as a fire-arm for hill warfare; and that so impressed was he with its uselessness, that he felt considerable compunction in putting men armed with it against the very superior fire-arms (compared to the muskets) in use by the hill tribes.

The carriage of one of the two howitzers taken into the hills by Lieutenant Sladen had broken down whilst in use in the attack on the Khan Bund, and the whole of the carriages and wheels were, as might be expected, much shaken. To save the carriages as much as possible two of the four guns were carried on the elephants, but no precautions could overcome the constant jar caused by continually travelling over large boulders, and Brigadier Chamberlain urged that on the frontier old and "repaired" carriages should never be issued to the batteries.

He stated that the troops were indebted to Captain Pollock, the Deputy Commissioner, for having been well kept in supplies, and added how useful had been some notes and a map of the Bozdar country prepared by Captain Graham, Assistant Commissioner.

In sending on Brigadier Chamberlain's despatch and recommendations, the Chief Commissioner, Sir John Lawrence, observed
 Proceedings, Panjab Gov- "that the aim of every commander must be to save
 ernment. "his own troops and to punish the enemy as much as
 "possible; but these objects are not to be obtained by any other weapons
 "than rifles, and when our men can systematically beat the enemy out
 "of the most formidable positions with little loss, inflicting at the same
 "time a heavy loss on that enemy, it will be then, and then only, that
 "we may hope to see our frontier respected by the robber tribes of the
 "Suliman Range. At present the skill and devotion of our officers, and the
 "spirit and courage of the men, overcome all obstacles, but the price which they
 "have to pay for it is heavy, and may some day be distressing. If we are to
 "hold the western bank of the Indus, we must do it in strength and in a man-
 "ner to defy all enemies. We should allow no system of raids or premeditated
 "insults to pass unpunished. But to do this with justice to our officers and
 "soldiers, the troops must be armed with the best weapon procurable."

In January 1858 the thanks of the Governor General in Council were conveyed to Brigadier Chamberlain and to the officers and men who had been engaged in the expedition; but as the events of 1857 had prevented the issue of Enfield rifles to the native troops, the 2nd Panjab Infantry were to be armed with 2-grooved rifles.

Of the successful results of this expedition, it is sufficient to say that from the time the troops left the hills up to the present, 16 years, the only mention of the Bozdars in the return of raids which have taken place on the Dera Ghazi

Return of raids. Khan District is to the effect, that in March 1861 they carried off 12,000 sheep from the Nasar Povindahs,

when they were pursued by the Nasars and a fight taking place the Bozdars lost 24 men and the Nasars 22; and that in May 1863 a Bozdar thief, who had stolen 3 camels near the Mahoi Post, was pursued and taken with the camels, as well as 3 of the tribe who had attempted his rescue, and that since then no raids have taken place on that frontier.



Taken from Sheets Nos. 6 & 7 of the Atlas of India.

Lithographed at the Surveyor General's Office, Calcutta, August 1874.

M A P
ILLUSTRATING
THE OPERATIONS
OF THE FIELD FORCE UNDER
BRIGADIER CHAMBERLAIN, C. B.
against
THE BOZDARS
in March 1857.

REFERENCE

Routes Traversed by Columns

1864 the Supreme Government sanctioned the restoration to the Bozdar chief of the rent-free wells which had been confiscated in 1857, and he was also allowed a certain number of Barghirs in the Frontier Militia.

APPENDIX A—I.

Bozdar Field Force.

Staff.

Brigadier N. Chamberlain, C.B., commanding.
 Captain J. P. W. Campbell, Staff Officer.
 Lieutenant J. Medley, Field Engineer.

Artillery.

No. 1 Light Field Battery, Lieutenant J. R. Sladen commanding.
 No. 2 Light Field Battery, Lieutenant Maister commanding.
 No. 3 Light Field Battery, Lieutenant R. Meham commanding.

Cavalry.

Head-Quarters and Detachments, 2nd Panjab Cavalry, Captain Browne commanding.
 Detachments, 3rd Panjab Cavalry, Lieutenant J. Watson commanding.
 Detachments, 5th Panjab Cavalry, Lieutenant Younghusband commanding.

Infantry.

1st Sikhs, Major Gordon commanding.
 3rd Sikhs, Captain Renny commanding.
 1st Panjab Infantry, Major J. Coke commanding.
 2nd Panjab Infantry, Captain G. W. G. Green commanding.
 4th Panjab Infantry, Captain Wilde commanding.

Political Officer.

Lieutenant Pollock, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan.

APPENDIX A—II.

Strength of the Bozdar Field Force.

DETAIL OF TROOPS.	European officers.	European non-commissioned officers.	Native commissioned officers.	Native non-commissioned officers.	Privates and buglers.	FIELD PIECES.		MOUNTAIN TRAIN.		REMARKS.
						Howitzers.	Guns.	Howitzers.	Guns.	
Staff ...	3	This does not include the detail 5th Panjab Cavalry or troops left at Mangrota or in the outposts.
No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery ...	3	1	2	11	69	2	2	
No. 2 Panjab Light Field Battery ...	2	...	1	6	41	2	2	
No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery ...	2	1	1	6	40	2	2	
2nd and 3rd Panjab Cavalry ...	7	...	7	12	94	
Sappers	2	8	50	
1st Panjab Infantry ...	3	...	8	50	421	
2nd Panjab Infantry ...	4	...	11	48	428	
4th Panjab Infantry ...	4	...	10	52	432	
1st Sikh Infantry ...	3	...	12	65	378	
3rd Sikh Infantry ...	2	...	10	60	385	
Total ...	33	2	64	318	2,338	2	2	4	4	

APPENDIX B.

Casualty Return, Bozdar Field Force, March 1857.

CORPS.	KILLED.				WOUNDED.				REMARKS.
	European officers.	Native officers.	Native commissioned officers.	Sepoys.	European officers.	Native officers.	Native commissioned officers.	Sepoys.	
No. 1 Panjab Light Field Battery	1	* Major Coke severely wounded.
No. 3 Panjab Light Field Battery	1	
3rd Sikh Infantry	1	...	2	
1st Panjab Infantry	3	1*	1	7	12	
2nd Panjab Infantry	1	1	...	1	3	16	
4th Panjab Infantry	3	
Total	1	4	1	3	10	35	

Abstract.

Killed ... 5.

Wounded ... 49.

CHAPTER XV.

APPENDICES.

Extracts from the Orders issued to the Field Forces by Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain,

ARTILLERY.

Every shot and shell was to be re-gauged before being taken on service.

CAMPS AND BAGGAGE.

A dooly and a pair of kajawahs were to accompany the rear-guard. A guard was to be told off to prevent baggage crowding upon the road leading out of camp before the troops marched.

The doolies, dandies, and bhistees, of corps and detachments, were to follow in rear of their own corps.

Soldiers and camp-followers were to be warned not to injure trees.

No soldier or camp-follower on any account were to go beyond the picquets.

No person in camp was to stir, or the least noise was to be made, until the first bugle had sounded.

No baggage or followers of any kind were to move until the advance had sounded.

No dogs were to be allowed, as they disturbed the camp at night.

Grass-cutters were never to go beyond the cavalry picquets.

Commanding officers were to always take measures to prevent any injury to houses, fields, or other property, and were responsible for cultivation in the immediate vicinity of their camps.

Camp color men were to march in rear of the advanced guard.

When camps were pitched on ground subject to irrigation, care was to be taken that the dams were well secured.

Great care was to be taken that the water near camps was not polluted, and animals were to be watered down stream.

No firing was to be allowed in camp or its vicinity without permission, or any unnecessary noise permitted.

Camp-followers and baggage were always to keep the high road, and not to take short cuts through fields.

No soldier or camp-follower was to enter a village on the line of march, or after reaching camp, without permission.

The desecration of shrines or burial grounds was strictly prohibited.

All supplies were to be paid for on the spot; and plundering, however trifling, would be severely punished.

Every soldier or camp-follower, having occasion to go beyond the picquets, was to carry his arms; but none were to be permitted to roam about the country. When going to cut wood, they were to keep close to the picquets.

No person was to be allowed to go beyond the line of camp sentries after dark.

The greatest sanitary precautions in regard to the cleanliness of camps and their vicinity were enjoined.

The people of the country were not to be permitted to enter the camps armed. No women or children, or superfluous followers, were to be allowed to accompany troops. Shelter was to be provided for all followers.

ORDERLIES, GUARDS, AND PICQUETS.

The employment, by officers, of guards or orderlies with their baggage, whereby the services of a large number of soldiers are misapplied and lost, was strictly prohibited. The protection of the baggage was otherwise provided for, and officers were to leave their baggage to the care of their servants.

The infantry camp guards and sentries were to stand fast until all the baggage had left the ground, when they were to form up by regiments and follow the column in succession at intervals of a quarter of an hour, under the orders of the officer in command of the rear-guard.

While the troops were employed on field service, four sentries were to be allowed to each post instead of three.

Cavalry picquets were to be withdrawn at dusk.

The outlying picquets were to stand fast until the whole of the baggage had moved off, when they were to be called in and marched into camp under the orders of the officer commanding the rear-guard.

During rainy weather every sentry was to be posted under shelter as far as might be possible, for it is of the utmost importance to preserve the men in health, and standing in the rain for two hours and then having to lie down in wet clothes must be injurious to health.

The soldiers were also to be instructed to invariably sling or secure their arms when exposed to the rain, and not to carry them at the shoulder or support, by which means the rain trickles down the barrel on to the charge. This order applied to sentries as well as others.

Tents were to be provided for guards and picquets.

The officer in command of the advanced guard was always to report overnight that he had made himself acquainted with the road leading out of camp.

INFANTRY.

The ammunition of regiments of infantry was to be completed to 200 rounds per man.

Such corps and detachments as were not provided with sickles for cutting green crops were to provide themselves with some. Every corps and detachment were also to have one or more adzes for the purpose of making new or re-pointing old tent pegs.

The men were to be allowed to wear what shoes they liked, and were to be allowed to carry their native swords, but were not to take pistols with them on picquet.

Unbelted bullets for quick loading at night for the 2-grooved rifles were to be supplied.

Every man was to be provided with a havresack and canteen.

SICK AND HOSPITALS.

All sick and weakly men were to be left in cantonments.

All soldiers or camp-followers, who fell sick or were unable to travel previous to the force marching, were to be sent to the dépôt hospital.

Arrangements were to be made regimentally for the provision and carriage of hospital stores, medicines, doolies, &c.

Medical officers were to see that the dooly bearers were well provided with shoes.

The doolies, dandies, and bhisteas, of corps and detachments, were to follow in rear of their own corps.

CATTLE.

The officer in command of the grazing guard was to see that sufficient space was ~~allowed~~ for the camels to graze and that they were not brought back before sun-set. Unless the animals are properly fed, they cannot carry their loads. Camels were to be sent out of camp by sun-rise to graze.

HORSES.

Strong head and heel ropes were to be provided, as well as hobbles for vicious horses for hobbling them at night.

The artillery and cavalry horses were to be well found in horse shoes and farriers.

SUPPLIES.

Every regiment and battery were to arrange to have carriage for four days' supplies for all men and camp-followers, as well as for that amount of grain for the public cattle.

A contractor for drugs and liquor was arranged for, for the troops generally in the Kabal Khel Expedition.

BUGLE SOUNDING.

No regiment or detachment was to sound any bugle between the first bugle and the "Assembly." Corps and batteries were to learn to have their horses saddled and harnessed and put to by verbal order, as a multiplicity of bugle calls caused confusion.

The "Assembly" and "Advance" were to be repeated by every corps and detachment. In like manner, the "Advance" or "Halt" were to be repeated by all on the line of march.

The "Assembly" was to be sounded one hour after the first bugle, when corps were to take up their place according to their order of march, ready to move off on the "Advance" being sounded from the head of the column by order of the commander of the force.

ELEPHANTS.

The elephants were to be all females (a male elephant having been found very intractable), selected in regard to their docility and thorough soundness. They were to be equipped for the conveyance of a field battery, and were to be provided with leather pads for kneeling on, shields or aprons for their foreheads, and an ample supply of chains. In selecting them, their feet were to be carefully examined.

ORDERS.

Every British officer in camp was to make himself acquainted with the orders connected with camp duties, and regulations which had been issued on previous occasions to field forces, and which could be copied at the office of the Staff Officer, and all those orders were to be considered as in force until altered or annulled.

All commanders were to attend at the Staff Office to ascertain if they had received all memos. previously issued for the guidance of the troops proceeding on field service.

Every officer was to be provided with a note-book and pencil.

The Gar and Samal Factions.

These are the two political factions on the Peshawar and Kohat borders. These are said to be derived from two Hindu brothers, who 200 years ago had a quarrel, one brother being aided by one party of Pathans, the other by a separate party, whence arose a feud, and now not a year passes that some men are not killed on this old story. The Gar and Samal parties are confined to the Kohat and Peshawar border. The Khataks are Samal, and that part of the Bangash about Kohat are Gar. The following villages of Miranzai, viz., Billand Khel,

Mahomed Khoja, Torwari, Hangu, Lodi Khel, Kachai, both the Uchtarzais, Alizai, Kajarzai, Mahomedzai, and Nasrat Khel, are Samal; and Darsamand, Nariab, Kahi, Sturizai, Togh, Ibrahimzai, Raisan, Shahu Khel, Bazar, and Marai, are Gar.

Of the tribes on the border the following are Gar:—The Kambar Khel, Kuki Khel, and the Adam Khel, Afridis; the Bazoti, Utman Khel, Firoz Khel, Sipah, Akhel, Ali Khel, Masuzai, Mamu Khel, Abdul Aziz Khel, Ustura Khel Orakzais, and the Turis of Kuram.

And the following are Samal:—The Malikdin Khel, Zakha Khel, Aka Khel, Sipah Khel, and Kambar Khel, Afridis; the Barmahamad Khel, Shekhan, Mishti, Rabia Khel, Alisherzai, Mula Khel, Mamazai, Sada Khel, and Khadarzai Orakzais, the Zaimukhts, and the Vaziris on the Miranzai and Bahadur Khel border. Mozafor Khan of Hangu is the head of the Samal faction. The Gar clans have no recognized chief, but the Tira Syad Mahomed Hasn has considerable priestly influence in this faction, and is always ready to use it in British interests. But he has often great difficulties to contend with, owing to his being a Shia, and opposed to the Akhund of Swat.

The Gar and Samal faction feeling has, however, not sufficient hold on many of these tribes to make them side against their own tribe with outsiders.

